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ABSTRACT 
This study investigates the effect of four pivotal auditor attributes underpinning 
auditor quality (that is, auditor brand, provision of non-audit services, audit tenure, and 
audit fee) on the likelihood of Australian firm’s financial distress risks across a 
longitudinal timeframe. This investigation is important given continuing questions, 
uncertainty and lack of empirical evidence of the precise nature of the auditor 
quality/financial distress association, and the need to validate if recent corporate 
governance reforms designed to improve auditor quality has any impact on firms’ 
financial distress risks. The hypotheses are developed within an agency theory 
framework and tested using data collected from a sample of a total of 4,876 firm-year 
observations spanning the period January 1 2008 to December 31 2014. Findings of 
this study indicate that all four auditor attributes are significantly negatively associated 
with the respective firm-year financial distress risk. The main results of the study are 
largely supported by a range of robustness and sensitivity tests. Results from this study 
have clear implications for regulators, capital market participants, firms/management, 
the auditing profession/auditors, and scholars. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
Studies have been carried out since the 1960s with an aim to establish the 
business and economic factors that are likely to mitigate the effect of financial distress 
on firms. The recent economic turmoil (the global financial crisis as well as the 
European sovereign debt crisis) has significantly increased interest in the determinants 
of financial distress with the aim of decreasing corporate collapses. A study on 
financial distress is important, especially because of the costs it imposes on firms and 
on the economy. Such costs can be divided in two distinctive categories: direct and 
indirect costs (Wruck 1990). Direct costs include outlays for debt restructuring and 
indirect costs range from the depletion of the company’s share value as a result of a 
reduction in stakeholders’ trusts, to bankruptcy (Liou and Smith 2007).  A distressed 
financial position may result in insolvency and subsequently, in bankruptcy (Baxter 
2006), but this may however be avoided if the distressed risks are detected and 
managed effectively and efficiently (Opler and Titman 1994). Such firms which are 
successful at effectively managing and over-coming a financially distressed position 
may gain increased confidence from various stakeholders which may consequently 
lead to an improvement in market capitalisation (Wruck 1990). 
Similarly, as a result of the trend in corporate bankruptcies since the 1960s, 
interests in both financial distress and corporate governance related determinants have 
increased. Wruck (1990) states that as part of ethical corporate governance practices, 
managing financial distress plays an upmost role since financial distress may be a 
result of weak corporate governance structure. Porter (2009) finds an increase in 
societal demand for responsible corporate governance as a result of continued 
corporate failures. Porter (2009) further concludes that an effective corporate 
governance made up of a robust and autonomous component of the “tripartite audit 
function” (the external audit function, the internal audit function and the audit 
committee) is required to ensure corporate accountability. Extant literature commonly 
finds an effective corporate governance to be an element that firms may utilize to 
mitigate or avoid financial distress. Specifically such an association was pointed out 
between (1) board of directors and financial distress (Bredart 2014; Salloum, Azoury, 
2  
and Azzi 2013; Manzaneque, Priego, and Merino 2016; Iskandar, Noor and Omar 
2012); (2) internal audit function and financial distress (Wallace 2004; Bailey, 
Gramling, and Ramamoorti 2003; Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, and Wright 2004); and (3) 
audit committee and financial distress (Noor and Wan 2009; Salloum, Azzi, and 
Gebrayel 2014; Chien, Mayer, and Sennetti 2010; Rahmat, Mohd Iskandar, and Mohd 
Saleh 2009).  
Within the corporate governance mosaic, audit quality has also been a topic of 
growing emphasis since the beginning of the new millennium. There have been a 
considerable number of studies conducted on different dimensions of audit quality and 
its measurement proxies in order to understand factors affecting audit quality. A high-
quality audit provides substantial benefits to most key stakeholders. Specifically, 
companies with higher audit quality are deemed to be less risky and consequently, 
have more access to capital markets as well as lower cost of equity and capital. 
However, low audit quality could demonstrate an uncertain financial position and may 
lead potential shareholders and debt holders to deem the company to be riskier. The 
end-result would then be a reduced access to capital markets and an increase in the 
cost of financing. 
Similar to other studies on different corporate governance elements and 
financial distress, some scholars have researched the final key element of an effective 
corporate governance (in addition to board of directors, audit committee and internal 
audit function), that is, the external audit function, with financial distress. Lu and Ma 
(2016) proxy audit quality with the engagement of a Big 4 auditor and finds a negative 
correlation with financial distress, which is proxied for using the Altman’s (1983) Z-
Score. Jin, Kanagaretnam, and Lobo (2011) investigate the effect of audit quality on 
financial distress in the banking sector by proxying audit quality with Big 4 auditor 
and auditor specialization and financial distress with banking specific factors such as 
non-performing loans, loan loss provisions, and proportion of securitized loans. 
However, Francis (2004) funds audit quality to be hard to measure, and Blasam, 
Krishnan, and Yang 2003 (2003) conclude that due to audit quality being unobservable 
and multidimensional, different auditor characteristics (as opposed to only one auditor 
characteristic) is required to proxy for it (that is, audit quality). Whilst the study 
conducted by Jin, Kanagaretnam and Lobo (2011) use two different auditor attributes 
to proxy for audit quality (namely, Big 4 auditor and auditor specialization), they. 
however, proxy financial distress with banking specific variables which renders the 
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findings non-generalisable to other industries (other than the banking industry). Lu and 
Ma (2016) solve this issue by proxying financial distress with the Altman’s Z-Score. 
However, the Altman Z-Score (as opposed to the Altman Z2-Score) does not consider 
non-manufacturing industries. In addition, by only proxying audit quality with Big 4 
auditor, the multidimensional nature of audit quality as specified by Blasam, Krishnan, 
and Yang 2003 (2003) is ignored. 
The absence of empirical studies (to the best of the author’s knowledge) and 
evidence on the association between audit quality (considering its multidimensional 
nature) and financial distress warrants investigation. This gap in extent literature 
therefore drives the motivation behind this study to use a set of auditor attributes to 
measure audit quality and its impact on financial distress. In so doing, an equally 
important motivation is the possibility of improving the external audit function and 
consequently, corporate governance. 
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES 
The association between financial distress and auditor attributes warrants 
investigating as a comprehensive understanding of such a linkage can support 
regulators to formulate legislation and strategies in an attempt to improve credibility 
in the capital markets and the financial reporting process. In addition, corporate 
governance is continually under reform and by studying the relationship between a 
range of auditor attributes and financial distress, deviations to regulations governing 
certain auditor attributes such as audit partner tenure and auditor independence will be 
able to be enacted if deemed necessary, therefore improving overall corporate 
governance practices. Corporate governance has attracted intense interest in Australia 
as a result of prominent corporate collapses (such as One-Tel, HIH, and Harris Scarfe). 
Consequently, governance improvements in the form of CLERP 9 and ASX CGC 2003 
have been introduced in an effort to restore investors’ confidence in the Australian 
capital market. Both investors and regulators have recognized the significant role of 
the external audit function as a key corporate governance mechanism (Lai et al. 2013; 
CLERP 9). CLERP 9 reform was introduced with the intent of expressively improving 
the financial reporting and auditing processes in Australia.  
In addition to the two motivations mentioned in Section 1.1 above, this study, 
being conducted in the post-CLERP 9 period, has the potential to shed some new light 
and understanding on the debate surrounding the effectiveness and true impact of the 
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CLERP 9 legislation. Though legislations contained in CLERP 9 does not ban auditors 
from providing non-audit services to auditees, it imposes extensive disclosure 
requirements in regards to the provision of non-audit services by the incumbent 
auditor1. The effectiveness of the implementation of such regulations as part of CLERP 
9, especially in key capital market determinants such as earnings management, has 
been well researched in extant literature2. However, an examination of the impact of 
CLERP 9 (especially the disclosure requirements imposed on the provision of non-
audit services) on firms’ distressed risk is lacking. This study has the potential of 
shedding some light on such requirements of CLERP 9 and its effects on firms’ risk of 
financial distress and the capital markets. 
On a similar note, another requirement of CLERP 9 is the mandatory audit 
partner rotation, whereby audit partners of an Australian listed firm must rotate after 
five successive years and can only return after a two-year gap. Extant literature agrees 
this strategy is successful for Big 4 auditors to achieve a better-quality audit, however, 
finds this detrimental to non-Big 4 auditors suggesting that the learning experience 
obtained through longer audit partner tenure to be crucial for smaller sized auditors. 
This has led to scholars questioning the ‘one size fits all’ requirements for audit partner 
rotation (Hamilton et al 2005). However, a question that remains unanswered is the 
effect of this CLERP 9 requirements of firm’s financial position, especially, its 
financial distress risks. This study has the potential of shedding some light on such 
requirements of CLERP 9 and its effects on firms’ financial distress risks and the 
capital markets. 
Based on the above, the primary objective of this study is to provide a 
comprehensive investigation of the connotation between four pivotal auditor attributes 
(that is, big 4 auditor, provision of non-audit services, audit tenure and audit fees) and 
the likelihood of financial distress in Australian publicly listed companies. Though 
studies on audit quality/auditor attributes and financial distress are not unique (as 
stated in Section 1.1 above), prior empirical research has not taken the 
                                                     
1  For reporting periods commencing from the 1st July 2004, CLERP 9 requires the inclusion of details of fees paid to the 
incumbent auditor in the directors’ report. Such details need to include itemize amount paid to the auditor for each of the non-
audit services provided during the year. In addition, also required is a statement by the audit committee (or board in its absence) 
that the non-audit services provided during the year were aligned with the general standard of independence of auditors imposed 
by the Corporations Act 2001 and that the non-audit services provided have not compromised auditor independence (Behan 
Legal 2004). 
2   Extant literature include studies finding a statistically significant positive association between the provision of non-audit services 
and earnings management in the pre-CLERP 9 period (Hussain 2013; Coulton, Ruddock, and Taylor 2007; Chai and Jubb 2000) 
however the same association is found to be statistically insignificant in the post-CLERP 9 era (Hussain 2013). 
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multidimensional nature of audit quality into account and / or has not used a 
generalisable proxy for financial distress. The originality of this work is that this study 
considers the impact of key auditor attributes in unison, thereby capturing its 
multidimensional nature, and its linkage, if any, with financial distress.  
Consistent with the primary objective, this study’s main research question is 
identified as follows: 
RQ: Are auditor attributes associated with Australian publicly listed firms’ 
likelihood of financial distress? 
A number of other significant research objectives will also be investigated in 
addition to answering this study’s main research question. Since this study uses 
different profession driven and governance guideline driven auditor attributes (big 4 
auditor (that is, auditor brand name), provision of non-audit services and audit tenure), 
findings of this study can provide guidance on the type of auditor attributes of more 
significant importance in mitigating financial distress in firms. In addition, since this 
study uses alternative measures of auditor attributes (such as auditor specialization and 
different metrics for audit tenure and the provision of non-audit services), valued 
understandings into the use of different attributes to reflect key auditor characteristics 
can be provided. 
1.3 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
This Australian study provides an examination of the auditor attributes and 
financial distress association linkage by using a comprehensive range of fundamental 
auditor attributes along with two different proxies for financial distress. Results 
obtained as part of this study will provide various important contributions. First, this 
study is the first (to the best of the researcher’s knowledge) to examine such an 
association with the use of these pivotal auditor attributes. Given the exploratory nature 
of this study, the benefits derived are two-fold. In the first instance, this study will 
assist in the provision of a deeper understanding of business and economic factors that 
are likely to exacerbate or mitigate financial distress, of which costs and determinants 
are becoming increasingly important given the recent economic turmoil and the 
growing number of corporate collapses. On a similar note, this study will further help 
in the provision of a deeper comprehension of the external audit function as a 
monitoring mechanism (based on the Agency Theory concept) and the degree to which 
it benefits to the auditee (by helping firms mitigate its financial distressed risks) as 
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well as other stakeholders (by improving the credibility of financial reporting by listed 
firms). In so doing, this study will assist in providing a critical analysis of an effective 
corporate governance contribution by the external audit function by investigating 
whether key external auditor attributes impact on the likelihood of financial distress, 
thereby aiming to contribute to the limited Australian empirical evidence on this 
association (that is, the association between pivotal auditor attributes and financial 
distress). These results, therefore, have important significance for the effective and 
efficient process of capital markets, scholars, auditors and firm’s actions.  
Second, results of this study from the four pivotal auditor attributes adopted in 
this study (namely, Big4 auditor, provision for non-audit services, audit tenure and 
audit fee) will assist to determine which of these four auditor attributes (if any) are 
found to effectively reduce the likelihood of financial distress. Based on this 
information, regulators, auditors and scholars can utilize the results from this study to 
further investigate and possibly regulate key corporate governance instruments 
(especially the external audit function) in an attempt to increase the quality and 
efficiency of the external audit process so as to improve the integrity of firms’ financial 
reporting processes and subsequently attempt to provide capital market players with a 
tool to mitigate firms’ risks of financial distress. Henceforth, results of this study will 
have real economic consequences for auditees, auditors, regulators and scholars alike. 
Third, given that all CLERP 9 changes (as will be detailed in Section 4.2.3) are 
reflected in the observation window used in this study (from 1 January 2008 to 31 
December 2014), the results from this study may also be used to determine the extant 
to which CLERP 9 regulations have been successful in achieving the objectives of 
using the statutory external auditing process such as the audit partner rotation 
requirements, and the disclosure for the provision of non-audit services requirements. 
This further strengthens the contributions and benefits provided by the results of this 
study to regulators and the audit profession.  
Fourth, if results of this study show a promising association between auditor 
attributes and financial distress, scholars can extend similar studies to investigate other 
key corporate governance mechanisms that may also be effective in improving the 
integrity of the financial reporting process and subsequently mitigate the likelihood of 
financial distress. This further strengthen the contributions and benefits provided by 
the results of this study to auditees, auditors, regulators and scholars. 
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In summary, results of this study will benefit a number of key capital market 
players. Policy makers and regulators will be able to determine the effectiveness and 
true impact of legislation impacting on the auditor attributes (as well as on corporate 
governance) in an attempt to improve firms’ quality of financial reporting. This will 
also benefit capital market partakers by having a flow on effect of minimizing poor 
corporate reporting practices and, possibly, subsequent financially distressed firms and 
in turn corporate failure. In addition, external auditors will be able to use the findings 
of this study to assist them in determining which of the four attributes adopted in this 
study significantly influence auditees’ (or potential clients) performance and hence 
financial distress. The auditors will also be able to apply information on which client 
features are most significantly associated with financial distress to their advantage so 
as to enhance audit effectiveness. Finally, evidence from this study will also help 
scholars to identify which specific auditor attributes to investigate in future research. 
1.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
Whilst this study has a number of strengths, it is not without limitations. First, 
even though there are a significant number of studies in the extant literature using 
accounting-based models such as Zmijewski and Altman to determine financial 
distress (or to predict firms’ bankruptcy risks) (Wu, Graunt, and Gray 2010; 
Tanthanongsakkun, Pitt, and Treepongkaruna 2009) there also exists a significant 
literature reporting models such as the Merton BSM (Black-Scholes-Merton 2010) and 
the Shumway (2001) to outperform accounting-based models in the prediction of 
bankruptcy (Wu, Graunt, and Gray 2010; Tanthanongsakkun, Pitt, and 
Treepongkaruna 2009; Vassalou and Xing 2004). Whilst acknowledging these 
negative performance reporting, there has been a significant number of studies 
dedicated to finding the best model to predict corporate failure but in vain (Balcaen 
and Ooghe 2006). In fact, let alone the empirical identification of the best model to 
predict corporate failure, even the definition of corporate failure lacks undivided 
consensus. In addition, the use of accounting-based models in the prediction of 
financial distress (not bankruptcy) is still prominent in extant literature. 
Second, given the multi-dimensional nature of audit quality (Blasam, Krishnan, 
and Yang 2003), prior studies have used a varied number of auditor attributes to 
measure audit quality. This study uses four specific auditor attributes. Even though 
these four selected attributes are the most commonly cited in prior studies as being key 
auditor attributes (Francis 2011; Carcello and Nagy 2004; Blasam, Krishnan, and Yang 
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2003; Balsam, Krishnan, and Yang 2003; Kim et al. 2003; Ashbaugh et al. 2003; 
Carcello et al. 1992) there may be other auditor attributes that could be significantly 
associated with financial distress. 
Third, in order to test the hypotheses, data for all the variables (dependent, 
independent and control) adopted in this study were collected from the respective 
companies’ annual reports. This approach to data collection can potentially posit as a 
further limitation due to the amount and type of data that can be collected. Such an 
example can be the proxies used to measure for the auditor attributes adopted in this 
study. Whilst there can be other alternative proxies, these are excluded due to their 
firm-specific nature. 
Fourth, even though this study includes a large number of control variables (in 
addition to the independent variables) in the tests performed so as to control for 
additional possible influencers of the likelihood of financial distress, it is without doubt 
that there are additional factors that may impact financial distress. For example, 
corporate culture, economic, and management style and integrity may impact the risk 
of financial distress but were omitted from this study due to their lack of effective 
measurements.  
Fifth, for data collection purposes, sample firms selected was done by matching 
distressed firms (measured by the Zmijewski ZFC-Score) with the closest comparable 
healthy firms (based on year, size, and industry). Admittedly, the use of matching 
based solely on the Zmijewski ZFC-Score rather than using both the Zmijewski ZFC-
Score and the Altman Z2-Score has limitations. However, these two models show an 
agreeance (whereby both models agree on either a firm-year observation being healthy 
or distressed) of 79%. Furthermore, this study adopts the use of the Zmijewski ZFC-
Score model as the main proxy for financial distress. The Altman Z2-Score is only 
used to provide robustness to the main findings. Therefore, the consequence of this 
issue may not be significant in affecting the findings of this study. 
Sixth, data of this study is collected from only Australia. Therefore, to countries 
with different institutional settings; the results of this study may not be generalized.   
While the limitations are acknowledged, these do not offset this study’s 
findings, strengths or contributions highlighted. 
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1.5 THESIS OUTLINE 
The The remainder of the chapters in this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 
Two provides an in-depth literature review on capital markets, financial distress, and 
audit quality. This chapter also provides a comprehensive background to the 
relationship between the auditor and the Australian regulatory parties. The implication 
of this study are also relevant to key regulators such as the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission (ASIC) ; the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) and to key 
legislation such as CLERP 9 and the ASX Listing Rules.  
Chapter Three discusses the theoretical framework of this study and the 
empirical literature linking to the research questions testing the different hypotheses. 
The theories underpinning the concept of corporate governance, specifically the 
external audit component of the corporate governance mosaic, are discussed and 
contrasted. A discussion on the empirical literature relating to each of the four key 
auditor attributes selected for the purpose of this study is provided together with 
justification for the expected association of each auditor attributes with financial 
distress.  
Chapter Four provides details of the research methods employed to test the 
hypotheses of this study. Justification of the source documentation, sample selected 
and the time period is provided in the first part of the chapter. This is then followed by 
details on the measurement of financial distress (the dependent variable of this study). 
Measures to operationalize the auditor attributes analysed in this study are then 
provided (that is, measures for Big 4 auditor, non-audit fees, audit tenure and audit 
fees). Then, the sensitivity tests to be undertaken are identified and outlined after the 
statistical tests and regression models utilized to test the hypothesis.  
Chapter Five provides a review of the descriptive statistics for the different 
variables used for the purpose of this study by first outlining the steps undertaken in 
the final sample selection. Descriptive statistics for the dependent variables (namely 
the Zmijewski ZFC-Score and the Altman Z2-Score), the independent variables 
(namely Big 4 auditor, Auditor tenure, the provision of non-audit services [auditor 
independence] and audit fees), and control variables are provided.  
Chapter Six examines the main empirical results of this study. The examination 
of key auditor attributes is divided into three parts. The first part examines the 
association of key auditor attributes with the financial distress model. The second part 
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examines the lagged effect of key auditor attributes with the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
The third part examines the association of key auditor attributes in unison (composite 
score) with the financial distress model. In so doing, the lag effect of the composite 
auditor attributes with the Zmijewski ZFC-Score will also be examined.  
Chapter Seven then discusses the robustness and sensitivity of the main results 
found in Chapter Six. In so doing, alternative measures for the four key auditor 
attributes are used and regressed against alternative proxy for financial distress. 
Logistic regressions are also performed to analyse the lagged effect of key auditor 
attributes using the alternative measures with two different models proxying for 
financial distress. Composite score calculated using the alternative measures of 
financial distress are also regressed against both models proxying for financial distress. 
Chapter Eight reviews the major conclusions and implications of this study. 
Determination of acceptance or rejection of the hypotheses based on empirical results 
is made, henceforth leading to the key findings of this study. This is then followed by 
a discussion on the implications and contributions with limitations and future research 
opportunities also emphasized. Last, an overarching summary of this study is provided. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTER 
Chapter Two begins by presenting a discussion on the theoretical framework 
underpinning the capital market. An analysis of the various theories that are used by 
firms in their capital structure determinants is provided within this section, along with 
the risks associated with incorrect capital structure decisions. This is followed by a 
comprehensive examination and discussion on the key financial distress literature 
which includes both accounting and non-accounting-based prediction models. The link 
between capital market, financial distress and external auditor attributes is then 
discussed by examining the four major components of corporate governance namely, 
the audit committee, the board of directors, the internal audit function and the external 
auditor. A comprehensive overview of the four pivotal audit quality attributes adopted 
by this study namely, big 4 auditor, the provision of non-audit services, audit tenure 
and audit fee are provided based on key prior literature. Last, a summary of the chapter 
is provided. 
2.2 CAPITAL MARKETS 
This section of the chapter provides a comprehensive overview of capital 
markets, its structure, determinants and risks. 
2.2.1 Background and Introduction 
Financial markets exist to facilitate the sale and purchase of financial 
instruments and it involves two major markets, the capital market and the money 
market. The difference between the capital market and the money market is that the 
capital market mostly deals with medium to long-term investments (with maturity of 
more than one year) while the money market deals with only short-term investments 
(with maturity of up to one year). The capital market provides an avenue for issuers to 
raise capital from investors. The capital market can be categorised into two segments: 
primary and secondary market. Primary market is largely used for the first-time issue 
of a category of capital by making initial public offers (IPOs) and the secondary market 
provides liquidity to these instruments, through trading and settlement on the stock 
exchanges. Capital market is therefore, important for raising funds and forms a very 
vital link for economic progress of the economy (Titman and Wessels 1988). 
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Amidst extant literature, the efficient market hypothesis constitute the 
benchmark for evaluating capital market efficiency and subsequently, the economic 
health. Fama (1965) introduces, and makes significant contributions to the refinement 
and empirical testing of the efficient markets hypothesis and states that “in an efficient 
market, competition will cause the full effects of new information on intrinsic values 
to be reflected instantaneously in actual prices” Fama (1965, p. 4). Relying upon the 
market efficiency hypothesis, researchers have shown growing interest within capital 
markets research in accounting. Ball and Brown (1968, p. 160) assert that capital 
market efficiency provides “justification for selecting the behaviour of security prices 
as an operational test of usefulness” of information in financial statements. Similar 
argument on capital market is also postulated by Beaver (1968).  
Capital markets are generally operated by independent bodies. In the United 
States, the primary equity markets are the New York Stock Exchange Euronext 
(NYSE) and the NASDAQ Stock Market. The NYSE as at the 02nd September 2014 
consist of 1,867 listed companies with 19% of these companies being foreign and 50 
of the largest 100 NYSE-listed companies being non-US entities. The NYSE, as the 
world’s largest stock exchange, has a total market capitalization of its listed companies 
as of September 2014 of over US$16.613 trillion with an average daily trading value 
of approximately US$150 billion (New York Stock Exchange Euronext (Nyse)  2014). 
The NASDAQ Stock Market operates the Global Market and the Capital Market and 
is considered the largest single cash equities securities market in the world in terms of 
share value traded (Nasdaq  2014). The securities market in the US is regulated by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority (FINRA). The SEC is an independent US government agency with the 
purpose of regulating public companies’ disclosure of financial and non-financial 
information to the public, and overseeing securities exchanges, securities brokers and 
dealers, investment advisers, and mutual funds (Securities and Exchange Commission  
2013). The FINRA is dedicated to the protection of investor and the market integrity 
through effective and efficient regulation (Financial Industry Regulatory Authority  
2013).  
Australia, commonly referred to as a market-oriented economy, ranks as the 
13th largest economy in the world (measured by GDP) and the 3rd largest in the Asia 
Pacific region. The capital market operates via the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) 
with a total market capitalization of $1.4 trillion and 2,184 listed companies as of the 
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31st July 2014 (Australian Stock Exchange Group  2014). Similar to the US, the capital 
market in Australia is also regulated by independent bodies: The Australian Securities 
and Investment Commission (ASIC) and the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) 
(Australian Stock Exchange Group  2014). The prevalent roles of the ASX Compliance 
section are as follows: (1) to monitor compliance with the ASX operating regulations; 
(2) to promote efficient standards of corporate governance among Australia’s public 
listed companies; and (3) to ensure the assurance of transparent markets to investors 
by providing clear and efficient regulation procedures (Australian Stock Exchange 
Group  2013). 
2.2.2 Determinants of Capital Structure 
2.2.2.1 The Modigliani and Miller theory 
Myers (1984, p. 575) defines capital structure as the way a company finances 
its operations and assets through a combination of equity, debt or hybrid instruments 
such as bonds and convertible debentures. The development of theoretical capital 
structure literature started with the influential work of Modigliani and Miller (M&M) 
(1958) in which the authors state that under a set of strict assumptions, the capital 
structure of a firm is irrelevant. Subsequently, they (Modigliani and Miller 1963) 
lessen their above argument to state that when taxes are introduced into the capital 
structure model, a firm will start benefiting from using more debt after accounting for 
the tax deduction associated with the interest payments, thereby increasing its value. 
However, the authors warn that firms will not necessarily maximize their values by 
using 100 percent debt due to the cost of bankruptcy. This implies that each firm has 
an optimal level of capital structure3 (proportion of debt to proportion of equity) and 
the value of the firm will fall should the amount of debt go beyond the optimal level.  
2.2.2.2 The trade-off theory 
Since the studies by Modigliani and Miller, there have been a significant 
number of capital structure researches undertaken in an aim to better understand the 
optimal capital structure predicament, among which are the influential work by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) who introduce the concept of agency costs and its association 
with an optimal capital structure. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that every publicly 
traded firm faces conflict between the shareholders and the managers. They further 
                                                     
3  Modigliani and Miller (1963) state that an optimal level of capital structure is attained when the firm’s marginal benefits of 
debt equal the firm’s marginal costs of debt. 
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explain that the conflict between the shareholders and managers arise when managers, 
being a characteristically separate entity from the shareholders, have the incentive to 
consume perquisites at the expense of the shareholders. This concept has since been 
commonly referred to as the agency theory. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that 
by increasing the level of debt and maintaining the level of manager’s equity constant, 
firms can effectively mitigate the agency problem since the managers now own a larger 
proportion of the firm. Jensen and Meckling (1976) view is that the benefit of using 
debt does not arise from the tax shield as suggested by Modigliani and Miller (1963) 
but comes from the lower likelihood that managers will pursue activities that do not 
maximize the value of the firm due to their ownership in the firm. Thus, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) argue that even if there are no taxes, which is in opposition to the 
M&M Theory, an optimal capital structure can still be obtained by trading off the 
agency costs of debt and the benefits of debt. 
2.2.2.3 The signalling theory 
Ross (1977) states that managers, who know better about the firm’s expected 
cash flows than the investors due to information asymmetry, can use the capital 
structure of a firm to send out signals to investors about the future performance of the 
firm. Based on Ross (1977) arguments, by using a greater level of debt, managers can 
send out a positive signal to the investors that the future performance of the firm is 
optimistic. Relying on the seminal work of Ross (1977), Krishnan and Schauer (2000) 
defines information asymmetry as the difference in the types and levels of information 
made available to managers and other stakeholders. They further state that information 
asymmetry renders instability in the capital market due to an increase in uncertainty 
and riskiness by restricting access to equity funding or increasing cost of capital. 
2.2.2.4 The pecking order theory 
Myers (1984) states that issuing equity may not be optimal for a firm. Myers 
(1984) explains that when managers are better informed than investors, managers may 
decide to venture in a project if such venture requires the firm to issue equity at a lower 
price (due to the information asymmetry that may be in existence, investors may not 
know the real condition of the firm thereby placing a lower valuation). Thus, Myers 
(1984) argues that a firm prefers internal capital to external capital when the firm needs 
resources and he also provides an explanation as to why firms do not use as much debt 
as suggested by the trade-off theory. He argues that by accumulating cash and 
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marketable securities, the firm should never have to issue equity at a lower price just 
to undertake a positive net present value (NPV) project. Relying upon these arguments, 
the pecking order theory states that the order in which investments and financing 
decisions are to be made is first the use of retained earnings (due to the absence of any 
cost of equity or cost of debt), second the use of borrowings (due to the interest tax 
shield as suggested by the M&M and trade-off theories) and last the new issue of 
equity. The pecking order theory is attractive because it explains why there is a 
negative relationship between leverage and profitability. The pecking order model also 
implies that firms do not have a target leverage ratio when they make capital structure 
decisions. 
There are many empirical studies testing the pecking order theory among 
which are the studies of Titman and Wessels (1988) and Helwege and Liang (1996) 
who find that more profitable firms use less leverage and firms with surplus internal 
funds avoid going public. These findings are consistent with the pecking order theory.  
2.2.3 Risk of capital structure 
Ball and Brown (1968) state that the deeper the market economic system is, the 
more dependence there will be on firm’s capital structure. They further state that the 
main functions of capital markets are to offer varying kinds of arrangements for 
exchanging securities, converting deposits into investments and overall, pulling the 
development of integral economy by the openness of investment activities. These are 
achieved by the implementation of diversifying investment portfolio and subsequently, 
the investment risk. Firms are often responsible for the corresponding operation risks 
when pursuing business ventures, whereby the more future benefits a venture is 
expected to gain, the more risks it holds, thereby the higher risk higher return analogy 
within the financial market sphere.  
However, companies, investors and potential investors are able to manipulate 
and diversify the level of risks by applying a diversification investment strategy. By 
doing so, these entities are effectively decreasing the non-systematic risks (also 
commonly referred to as the firm specific risks). Capital structure offer varying kinds 
of securities and debts with different properties, deadlines, and risks for firms to 
choose. In order to make an informed decision on which securities or debt obligations 
to issue (or invest in), firms (or potential investors) need to research into the varying 
options with different anticipated costs or returns and investment risks. The risk – 
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return analogy again comes in play when deciding on the type of security in which to 
invest, regardless of their risk tolerance. Consequently, it is primordial to correctly 
assess the riskiness of a security in order to determine whether the return associated 
with the desired security is adequate. Beaver (1968) states that incorrect risk 
assessment may possibly lead to investment in incorrect securities which in turn may 
lead to an inefficient diversification process. Consequently, incorrect risk assessment 
may result in investors incurring significant financial losses and subsequently may lead 
to market collapse.  
2.3 FINANCIAL REPORTING QUALITY 
Titman and Wessels (1988) argue that due to the high risk involved in the 
incorrect determination of capital structure, it is important for investors and potential 
investors to accurately research the market before making investment decisions. They 
(Titman and Wessels 1988) further state that the most common way of researching the 
market is to analyse firm specific accounting information namely, the audited financial 
reports. This denotes the importance of having true and fair financial reports that 
comply with current legislations. This is decidedly dependent on the quality of the 
audit performed.  
A higher audit quality will ensure the disclosure of crucial events to investors 
to enable them to make justified investment decisions. Conversely, a poor-quality audit 
may lead to investors making the wrong investment decisions. Similarly, inaccurate 
capital structure decisions may lead to firms facing a financially distressed situation, 
which could lead to insolvency if such a financial position persists over an extended 
period of time. Given the upmost importance of the understanding and assessment of 
securities’ risks in making investment decisions, researchers have been looking into 
various financial tools of risks assessments. However, most of the financial tools used 
in the risks assessments of securities rely on accounting information provided in the 
financial statements.  
Lintner (1965) states that the valid capital market is prominently characterized 
by the validity of information, meaning that price related information are promptly and 
fully reflected in the capital market. Should invalid or misleading information be 
reported in their financial reports, firms face the risk of reduced access to capital 
market as well as incorrect capital structure decisions, which could potentially mean 
the incorrect rejection of highly viable and profitable projects. Concurrently, the poor 
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reporting quality along with the inability to invest in viable projects may harm 
shareholders’ confidence. The combined and amplified effect of these factors may 
potentially lead to the firm facing financial distress, and if such financial conditions 
persist over an extended period of time, lead to bankruptcy. 
2.4 FINANCIAL DISTRESS 
The following section of the chapter provides a comprehensive overview of 
financial distress. Different prediction models are examined and compared. 
2.4.1 Bankruptcy v/s Insolvency v/s Financial Distress 
Extant literature has provided varying definitions for bankruptcy, among which 
Altman (1968, p.1) defines bankruptcy as “a situation in which a company cannot pay 
lenders, preferred stock, shareholders, suppliers, or a bill is overdrawn, or the company 
is bankrupt according to the law”. Altman (2000) further states that a firm is bankrupt 
when its liabilities exceed the value of its assets. Overall, bankruptcy is commonly 
defined as a condition where a business is unable to continue its operations due to its 
inability to meet its debt obligations. However, under Australian Law, the term 
bankruptcy can only apply to individuals. In Australia, the term insolvency is 
commonly used as a proxy for companies facing financial difficulties which includes 
liquidity and performance inefficiency (Altman and Hotchkiss 2006). Consequently, 
insolvency is commonly defined as a firm with a negative economic net worth or a 
firm with a negative net present value (Keating et al. 2005; Altman, 1983). Firms 
facing an insolvent financial situation can seek voluntary administration, or creditors 
can place the company into receivership or liquidation. Liquidation is the term 
commonly referred to when firms need to sell their assets as a result of insolvency in 
order to redistribute the proceeds to claimants (Wruck 1990). Among all these terms 
and definitions, a common ground stands among extant literature that firm facing each 
of the stated financial uncertainty would first encounter financial distress.  
However, scholars provide a significant number of varying definitions of 
financial distress, and to date, there is not (to the author’s knowledge) unanimously 
accepted definition. Zmijewski (1984 p.63) defines financial distress as the “act of 
filing a petition for bankruptcy”. Grice, Stephen, and Ingram (2001) define distressed 
firms as those satisfying one of these conditions: (1) Chapter 7 liquidation; (2) Chapter 
11 bankruptcy; (3) low stock ratings; or (4) risky bonds. Similarly, Kane, Richardson, 
and Graybeal (1996 p.638) define distress as “Failure as event as the date of occurrence 
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of the Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition filing, or the date of initiation of an 
involuntary liquidation proceeding as provided by the Wall Street Journal Index”. Platt 
and Platt (2004) define distressed firms as firms with negative EBIT, low interest 
coverage ratio, or negative net income before special items. Platt and Platt (2002) 
postulate a distress position as a result of a number of consecutive negative net 
operating income, or deferment of dividend payment, or layoffs. 
Nonetheless, extant literature commonly agree that a distressed situation can 
be reversed, identified as the “turnaround process” by Smith and Graves (2005), if 
management make the proper decision to improve internal control, efficiency and 
stakeholders’ (suppliers, creditors, shareholders and customers) support. On the 
contrary, a prolonged distressed financial position may eventually lead to liquidation 
(Wruck 1990; Gilson 1989). 
2.4.2 Background and introduction to financial distress 
The search for the knowledge of financial distress can be dated back to the 
1960s with the work of Altman (1968) and Beaver (1966). Since then, there have been 
several studies on the determinants, the measurements, and the factors that may 
exacerbate or mitigate the effects of financial distress. Recently, the global financial 
crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis plus the large corporate collapses in the 
early 2000s have further accentuated the necessity to comprehend financial crisis.  
One of the most accepted definitions of financial distress in extent literature is 
“a situation where cash flow is insufficient to cover current obligations such as unpaid 
debts to suppliers and employees, or actual or potential damages from litigation” 
Wruck (1990, 421). Gilson (1989, p.243) similarly defined financial distress as an 
“inability to meet fixed payment obligation on debt”. According to Wruck (1990), 
firms experiencing financial distress face the likelihood of an increase in expenditures 
due to the direct and indirect cost of financial distress. This may potentially lead to a 
reduction in the firm’s liquidity and profitability; ultimately to an increase in the firm’s 
likelihood of liquidation (Janes 2005). Furthermore, firms facing financial distress 
need to divert corporate resources from sustainable projects to debt restructuring 
processes (Gilson 1989). These acts may result in a fall in shareholders’, creditors’ and 
investors’ trust which sequentially leads to the erosion of the company’s wealth by the 
depletion of the company’s share value, and net worth (Liou and Smith 2007).  
Moreover, firm’s encountering a financially distressed situation may choose to 
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reduce its workforce in a desperate attempt to try to avoid bankruptcy, which as the 
result creates unemployment. Hence, financial distress can potentially negatively 
affect not only shareholders, investors and creditors but also the capital market as well 
as the economy as a whole. On the other hand, mitigating financial distress can 
indirectly lead to an enhancement of market capitalization, attributable to a rise in 
stakeholders’ confidence (Wruck 1990). 
2.4.3 Implications of financial distress 
Previous studies on the implications of financial distress merely focus on the 
costs of financial distress while neglecting its potential benefit. One such crucial 
example is the research conducted by Brealey and Myers (1988) who present the 
following formula for the value of a levered firm: 
Value of Levered Firm = Value of firm + Value of Equity Financing + PV of 
Tax Shield – PV of Cost of Financial Distress (Brealey and Myers 1988, p. 421). 
Accordingly, this formula relies on the belief that firms make borrowing 
decisions by balancing the tax benefits of taking debts against the costs of an increase 
in the likelihood as well as intensity of financial distress. Wruck (1990, p. 430) 
however states that “this analysis is incomplete because it ignores both the non-tax 
benefits of leverage and the benefits of financial distress.  Therefore, it understates the 
amount a firm should borrow”. 
2.4.3.1 Benefits of financial distress 
While financial distress is known to have significant downsides to the 
subsistence of firms, some studies have argued that financial distress could potentially 
carry some benefits. Some of the most commonly argued benefits are management 
turnover and changes in organizational strategy and structure as a direct consequence 
of financial distress (Gilson 1989; Wruck 1990). Gilson (1989) finds that distressed 
firms experience a 52% annual turnover of top management. Wruck (1990, p. 433) 
states that “poor stock price performance is not enough to remove incumbent 
managers, but financial distress provides a mechanism to initiate top management 
changes”.  
Gilson (1989) also finds that director turnover is also high (that is, over 53%) 
in the event of financial distress. Wruck (1990) argues that firms undergoing financial 
distress often undergo significant organizational strategy and structure changes in an 
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attempt to regain financial stability. Such restructuring can often add value to the firm 
by increasing shareholder’s confidence. Wruck (1990, p. 434) further states that 
“financial distress can force managers to undertake value increasing organizational 
changes they would not have otherwise undertaken”. However, with the impulse 
provided by the distress situation, and the increase in likelihood for management and 
governance turnover, executives consequently have the incentives to take on riskier 
ventures as well as restructuring in order to minimize the distressed effects (Khurana 
and Lippincott 2000). 
2.4.3.2 Costs of financial distress 
Extant literature on financial distress has traditionally differentiated two types 
of financial distress costs, direct and indirect costs (Kim 1978). Wruck (1990) states 
that the direct costs (which is also commonly referred to as the out-of-pocket costs) 
are the easiest to measure. These costs usually include legal, advisory and 
administrative fees paid by the company as a result of the distressed situation. Prior 
studies on the direct costs of financial distress are all in agreement that such costs are 
usually quite small. Wruck (1990) finds that these costs usually average between 3%  
to 4.5% of the market value of the firm. Other similar studies find very similar averages 
for the direct cost of financial distress: Altman (1984)  finds the cost to be 4.3% of the 
firm’s market value one year before bankruptcy; Weiss (1990) finds the average to be 
3.1% of the market value at the end of the financial year before bankrupty; and Ang, 
Chua, and McConnell (1982) conclude that the mean direct costs to be 7.5% of the 
liquidated value of firms at the end of the bankruptcy process. 
Wruck (1990, p. 437) defines the indirect costs of financial distress as the 
“opportunity costs imposed on the firm because financial distress affects its ability to 
conduct business as usual”. The indirect costs of financial distress are commonly 
considered to be threefold. First, distressed firms have limited rights and ability to 
make certain decisions without legal approval. This limits the investment and 
financing decisions that management can make in order to amend the distressed 
situation. Due to its unobservable nature, this costs is commonly referred in extant 
literature as an opportunity cost (Warner 1977).  
Second, distressed firms may be inflected with reduce demand for the firm’s 
products as well as increase in production costs. Gilson, John, and Lang (1990) explain 
that demand falls if the value of the product to customers depends on the firm’s future 
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performance and financial distress threatens the firm’s ability to survive. Weiss (1990) 
indicates that increased production costs are a result of the firm’s inability to negotiate 
prices and credit terms. Weiss (1990) further explains that suppliers often charge a risk 
premium through higher prices, or constricted credit terms due to the distress firm’s 
potential inability to repay the debt.  
Third, prior studies have considered the time that management spends in 
resolving financial distress as an opportunity cost (Gilson, John, and Lang 1990; Weiss 
1990). However, Wruck (1990, p. 438) argues that “when management is engaged in 
productive restructuring and in implementing strategic change, it is using its time to 
increase the firm’s value. Unless the time could have been spent more productively 
elsewhere, its value should not be considered an indirect cost”. 
2.4.4 Financial distress / bankruptcy prediction models 
The measurement of financial distress has been a topic of significant emphasis 
during the recent decades. Researchers have instigated this question by developing 
various approaches for forecasting and predicting financial distress and bankruptcy 
from the economic, financial, accounting and statistical point of view. Jostarndt and 
Sautner (2008) state that most of these studies can be chronologically stratified into 
two distinct categories: pre-1990’s and post-1990’s. Before the 1990’s, most of the 
financial distress assessments relied upon single-period models by trying to find key 
characteristics that distinguish distressed firms from non-distressed ones. Altman 
(1984), Jones (1987), Foster (1986) and Zavgren (1983) provide extensive reviews of 
these single-period classification models. With the post-1990’s era, researchers realize 
that no single characteristic or variable can be used to predict financial distress and 
bankruptcy; instead, dynamic models incorporating different characteristics and 
variables were developed in order to determine firms’ distress risk at varying point in 
time. Mosmann et al. (1998), Altman and Hotchkiss (2005)4, Cybinsky (2003) and 
Weckbach (2004) provide an extensive review comparing the post 1990’s techniques 
with previous pre-1990’s discriminant models. Cybinski (2003, p. 131) states that 
“within the recent decades no new methodology has been introduced. Most extensions 
of the already existent models occur when either a new statistical technique or a new 
                                                     
4  Altman and Hotchkiss (2005) provide a chronological classification of existing forecasting models. These models are grouped 
as: (1) Qualitative analysis (subjective models); (2) Univariate Analysis the use of accounting based ratios for the prediction of 
financial distress as used by Beaver (1966); (3) Multivariate Analysis (which include Discriminant, Logit, Probit, and Neural 
Networks analysis); (4) Artificial Intelligence System (Expert Systems, Neural Networks Credit Model) and (5) Contingent 
Claim Models (KMV Credit Monitor Model). 
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database becomes available. In the absence of theory, extensions to the available 
techniques concentrate on the analysis of accuracy of forecasts and the manner of its 
improvement”.  
As opposed to the chronological classification suggested by Altman and 
Hotchkiss (2005) a more preferred classication is suggested by Wruck (1990). She 
(Wruck, 1990) classified all relevant models which are widely used in empirical 
studies into two groups depending on the type of data applied. These are (i) models 
relying on accounting information which are commonly referred as accounting based 
models and (ii) market based models relying upon capital market information. This 
form of classification is preferred since this study aims at determining and utilizing the 
most reliable measure for the prediction of financial distress. Extant literature has 
argued that the term market-based model can either be the use of stock market data 
using a statistical model of bankruptcy prediction such as the logit model or bankruptcy 
prediction based on option pricing model which is based on the Merton’s Option 
Pricing Model (Merton 1974). In comparison between the traditional statistical 
approach and the structure approach, extant literature commonly use the term 
accounting (ratio) based model for the former and market based model for the latter. 
2.4.4.1 Market-based (non-accounting based) models 
Hillegeist et al. (2004) propose that market based models endeavor to estimate 
the firms bankruptcy risk by assessing a combination of the firm’s liability structure 
and its assets market prices. They (Hillegeist et al. 2004) further offer that the 
fundamental supposition of market based models is that the probability of default can 
be determined by the market values which contain all information relevant to creditors 
and investors.  
2.4.4.1.1 The Merton’s (1974) option to default model 
Merton (1974) is commonly viewed as the pioneer of the market based model 
for the prediction of bankruptcy. He (Melton 1974) uses the option pricing 
methodology established by Black and Scholes (1973) to the valuation of a leveraged 
firm and relates the default risk to the capital structure of the company. According to 
this model, he (Melton 1974, p. 176) suggests that “the firm's equity can be seen as a 
European call option on the firm's assets with a strike price equal to the book value of 
the firm's liabilities”. In addition, Merton (1974) also proposes that the "option-like" 
property of the firm's equity is derived from the unconditional rule to which 
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shareholders are viewed as residual claimants with limited liability. Based on this 
limited liability rule,  shareholders are thus given the option, but not the obligation to 
pay off creditors and can be entitled to the  remaining assets of the company. Counting 
on the assumption that all liabilities are due at the maturity of the option, if the market 
value of the firm's assets is greater than the book value of liabilities at maturity, the 
shareholders would therefore exercise their options on the assets. As the result, the 
shareholders pay off the debt-holders and the firm continues to exist. If the market 
value of the firm's assets is lower than the book value of liabilities, the shareholders 
will let the option lapse therefore the equity value is deemed to be zero and the firm 
defaults. In this case the firm value is transferred to the debtholders.  
Though the Merton's model is considered to be a relatively robust and simple 
technique, which buils a general framework for the valuation of contingent claims 
conditional on the firm’s current asset value, leverage, market risk free interest rate, 
and debt structure, the different assumptions on which it relies may not hold in reality5. 
These limitations have led to the development of a number of variations to the 
Merton’s model. One of the most successful methods based on the Merton model was 
developed by Kealhofer and Vasicek (1995) which is a proprietary model of the KMV 
Model (1995). 
2.4.4.1.2 The KMV (1995) Model  
The The KMV model is commonly considered as a generalization of the 
Merton’s model but it allow more flexibility for different classes and different 
maturities of liabilities (Kealhofer and Vasicek 1995). In contrast to the application of 
Merton model, when using the KMV Model- the firm is treated as a perpetual entity 
that is continuously borrowing and repaying debt. Furthermore, the model takes into 
account all classes of liabilities and equity when calculating fixed cash payouts such 
as coupon and dividend payments. The KMV Model also suggests that default can 
occur both at and before the maturity date6. Kealhofer (2003) emphasizes that while 
the Merton model is aimed at the estimation of the company's debt value based on its 
asset value and volatility, the KMV model centers on the relationship between the 
                                                     
5  Black and Cox (1976) finds that the assumptions on which Merton (1974) relies does not hold in reality: (1) Merton (1974) 
assumes that all debt will have the same maturity date whereas in practice, the capital structure of firms will incorporate many 
classes of debt with different maturity; (2) In the Merton’s model, the bond is seen as a zero coupon bond whereas in practice, 
many corporate bonds have coupon payments attached; (3) In the Merton’s model, default can only happen at the time of 
maturity of the debt, but in reality, default can happen at any time during the life of the bond; (4) Merton assumes a constant 
asset volatility and risk free rate which is not the case in reality. 
6  The KMV Model relies on the assumption that company defaults on its obligations if the market value of equity falls below a 
certain value called a default point. 
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firm's equity and asset characteristics which works out for a robust measure of the 
company's default risk. 
Even though the commercial version of Kealhofer and Vasicek (1995) KMV 
model is widely used among financial practitioners as well as often applied to 
empirical research, it is not without limitation. Two of the limitations of the KMV 
model are its complexity and expensiveness (Shumway, 2001).  
 (Shumway, 2001).  
2.4.4.1.3 The Shumway’s (2001) simple hazard model 
A main difference between the Simple Hazard Model by Shumway (2001) and 
the previous discussed market based approach (that is, the Merton and KMV Models) 
is that while the latter are static models (not accounting for time) the Simple Hazard 
Model controls each firm for a number of periods at distress risk. Shumway (2001) 
finds that some companies will default after many years of being financially distressed 
whereas other firms may default in their first year of financial distress. Shumway 
(2001) states that the hazard rate models stipulate the probability per unit of time for a 
firm that has survived to the beginning of the respective period will fall in this time 
period. The other previous structure models originate the probability of liquidation 
from the capital structure; however, hazard models links probability of default to the 
intensity of default.  
Altman (1968) and Zmijewski (1984) discover that the explicit accounting for 
time allows researchers to capture the changes in the default risk through time and to 
adjust varying intensity of default automatically. Three market driven variables are 
used in the Shumway model to compute the accuracy of the market data to the results 
of a hazard  model. He concludes that a substantial number of the accounting variables 
used in the Merton’s and KMV’s models are poor predictors of default. In contrary, 
market driven variables such as market size, volatility and past stock returns are 
strongly related to the probability of default and allow analyzing the probability of 
default for periods the company spent in financial distress prior to default. 
2.4.4.1.4 The neural networks model 
Odom and Sharda (1990) introduce the Neural Networks technique to assist 
with corporate bankruptcy prediction in 1990. Recent studies in Neural Networks 
(NNs) show that they are appropriate for many tasks in pattern recognition and pattern 
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classification (Rudorfer, 1995). NNs have non linear, non parametric adaptive learning 
properties in modelling and forecasting (Zhang, Hu, Patuwo and Indro, 1999). There 
are other studies using the NNs technique such as Altman et al. (1997), Altman et al. 
(1994), Wilson and Sharda (1994), Coats and Fant (1992), Tam and Kiang (1992), 
Cadden (1991). Most neural network methods to bankruptcy prediction use a multi 
layer perceptron (MLP). Zhang et al. (1999) describe that in MLP, all nodes and layers 
are mananged in a feed forward manner. The feed forward layered network covers 
three kinds of layers. The first layer is called the input layer where external information 
is received. The last layer is called the output layer where the network produces the 
final solution. In between, there are one or more internal or hidden layers. As the 
number of hidden layers increases, the network becomes more complex (Zhang et al. 
1999). Odom and Sharda (1990) used Altman's financial ratios as inputs to the NNs, 
with most of the data used for the bankrupt firms gathered the last financial statement 
before declaring bankdruptcy. Odom and Sharda (1990) apply the three layer feed 
forward MLP in their research. They find that NNs provides a more precise and robust 
prediction ability than other market based models7. 
Though the NNs technique appears to do well in insolvency forecast, it also 
has some serious limitations. The most significant problem related to the use of NNs 
technique is the “black box problem” which criticised that NNs do not reveal the 
significance and role of each of the variable being analyzed. (Cybinski, 2001; Coats 
and Fant, 1993; Hawley et al. 1990). 
2.4.4.1.5 The survival analysis model 
The use of survival analysis to financial distress modelling started in the 1980s 
and grew in use through the 1990s (Helwege, 1996; George, Spiceland and George, 
1996; Crapp and Stevenson, 1987; Lane, Looney and Wansley, 1986). Survival 
analysis is deeded to be the best choice for insolvency forecast since it allows the 
estimation of the probability that a firm will survive or will go into bankruptcy at each 
point in time over the period being forecasted (Cole and Wu, 2009; Campbell, 
Hilscher, and Szilagyi, 2008; Parker, Peters and Tmetsky, 2002; Partington, Russel, 
Stevenson and Torbey, 2001; Shumway, 2001). While other statistical models inspect 
                                                     
7  Many researchers put emphasis on the superiority of the NNs technique over classical techniques for various reasons. First, 
NNs can recognize complex patterns with better accuracy, and they are able to learn from training samples without any prior 
knowledge about the underlying problems (Back et al., 1996). Second, Coats and Fant (1993) found that non numeric data can 
be easily included in an NN because the input data do not need to conform to some linearity assumption. Third, an NN is 
perfectly suited for pattern recognition and classification in unstructured environments with incomplete or inconsistent data 
(Hawley, Johnson and Raina, 1990).  
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an event's probability using variables based on data at one point in time, survival 
analysis is run on data collected across time. Moreover, survival analysis not only 
estimates the probability of the event but also investigates the fluctuations in variables 
over time and their impact before the event occurs.  
Hillegeist et al. (2004) advised disassembling the dependent variables into 
lagged levels and changes, in order to extract additional information from historical 
data so as to improve the predictive accuracy of a model. Likewise, Jones and Hensher 
(2004) used lagged changes of a variable in an attempt to combine the accumulating 
effect of changing financial characteristics over time. 
To summarize, the main limitation of market based models is that the market 
may not correctly reflect all the information disclosed in financial statements in reality 
(Jones and Hensher 2004). In addition to this, the efficient market hypothesis 
underlying the theory of market based models; which uses strong assumption and thus 
it can lead to potential biases in estimated probabilities of default (Gharghori, Chan 
and Faff 2007). One more weakness is that market-based models require stocks to be 
listed on the stock exchange, which is not applicable for private firms (Hillegeist et al. 
2004). However, Hillegeist et al. (2004)  argue that in comparison to the accounting 
based models, market based models are still more flexible and provide superior 
information to researchers interested in the bankruptcy prediction8 study.  
In Australia, Gharghori et al. (2007) compared the effectiveness of the 
accounting based and market based models and concluded that market based models 
outperform the accounting based models in predicting bankruptcy. Tanthanongsakkun 
et al. (2009) have a similar conclusion as Gharghori et al. (2007). They 
(Tanthanongsakkun et al. 2009), however suggested that while the market based 
models performed better, the performance of the accounting based models (that is, the 
Zmijewski, Altman and the Ohlson models) were still suitable and preferred for the 
determination of financial distress rather than for predicting bankruptcy. This view is 
also shared by Grice et al. (2001, p. 53) who state that accounting based models like 
                                                     
8  Hillegeist et al. (2004) find accounting based models to have the following limitations. First, they state that accounting-ratio 
analysis is backward-looking, while bankruptcy prediction is ideally conducted in a forward-looking manner. Second, due to 
the conservatism principle, book values of firm assets are often understated compared to their market values, which may lead 
to overstatement of accounting-based leverage figures which may limit the performance of any accounting based measure of 
bankruptcy likelihood. Third, although the volatility of the firm’s assets is considered one of the key variables in predicting 
bankruptcy probability, it is not reported in financial statements Forth, Hillegeist et al. (2004) state the data used in accounting 
based models are often incomplete especially for distressed firms due to the interruption of regular financial reporting when 
firms face a financially distressed situation. 
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the ZFC and O Scores are still the most relevant methods for predicting financial 
distress conditions other than bankruptcy.  
On an international perspective, a large number of studies still prefer the use of 
accounting based models for the determination of default risk (Fargher and Kalotay, 
2009; Agarwal and Taffler, 2008; Bharath and Shumway, 2008; Campbell, Hilscher, 
and Szilagyi, 2008; Agarwal and Taffler 2008; Reisz and Perlich, 2007; Brockman 
and Tmile, 2003; Taffler 1984). Similar research within an Australian setting for the 
prediction of bankruptcy are conducted by Hensher et al. (2007) and Jones and Hensher 
(2004).  
While this study acknowledges the findings of Hillegeist et al. (2004) and the 
limitations associated with accounting based models, the latter are still preferred as 
this study aims predominantly at determining financial distress rather than the 
prediction of bankruptcy. This study will, however, still take the findings of Hillegeist 
et al. (2004), Shumway (2001) and the Survival Analysis Model and use both lagged 
data as well as data collected across time (over time). 
2.4.4.2 Accounting based models 
2.4.4.2.1 The Beaver’s (1966) univariate analysis of financial ratios 
Beaver (1966), is considered one of the pioneers in the determination of 
financial distress using accounting based methods. He introduces a univariate 
approach which classify companies into two groups by using financial ratios: 
financially sound and financially distressed. Beaver (1966) performs comparison of 
the means of failed firms with sound (non distressed) companies and finds that failed 
firms have lower financial ratios. Beaver (1966) also finds that the financial ratios of 
the failed firms are substantially lower that the ratios of sound firms as early as five 
years prior to bankruptcy. Furthermore, Beaver (1966) also finds that the ratios keep 
deteriorating as default approaches. Based on his findings, Beaver performs a 
dichotomous classification test of the predictive ability of the chosen accounting 
measures and identifies the six most powerful ratios: (1) cash flow to total debt, (2) 
net income to total assets, (3) total debt to total assets, (4) working capital to total 
assets, (5) current ratio, and (6) no credit interval. After further analysis, Beaver (1966) 
concludes that the cash flow to total debt ratio was the single most important factor in 
the prediction of financial distress. However, Beaver’s univariate analysis is often 
criticized of lacking practicality and being too simple. Dimitras et al. (1996) argue that 
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there are several factors which can portray the financial position of a company. Thus 
they (Dimitras et al. 1996) assert that no single ratio is good enough to provide 
sufficient information to thoroughly estimate the probability of financial distress. 
Taking into account the weaknesses of Beaver’s (1966) univariate analysis, Altman 
(1968) developed the Altman’s Z-Score which is based on multiple discriminant 
analysis. 
2.4.4.2.2 The Ohlson’s (1980) O-Score 
Ohlson (1980) criticizes the restrictive assumptions of multiple discriminant 
analysis and the output of this technique. He argues that the single dichotomous score 
obtained does not provide a probability of default; it merely provides an indication on 
whether the firm is facing financial distress while failing to provide any indication on 
the intensity of the distressed situation (if any). To mitigate these problems, he 
introduces an altemative econometric technique based on the logistic transformations 
(logit model). Comparable to the discriminant analysis, this technique weights the 
independent variables and assigns a score. Yet, unlike discriminant analysis, this 
method estimates the probabilities of default for each company in a sample. Using the 
Ohlson’s O-Score, the higher the 0-Score, the higher the bankruptcy risk. Based on his 
findings, Ohlson states that the size of the company is the most significant predictor 
of financial distress (Ohlson 1980). The Ohlson’s O-Score is defined as: 
𝑂𝑂 − 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = −1.32 − 0.407 𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴−𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  +  6.03 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴Total Assets − 1.43 Working CapitalTotal Assets +0.076 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇 𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴 − 1,72 (1 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙 > 𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙, 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆 0) − 2.37 𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴 −1.83 𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼 𝑂𝑂𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 0.285 (1 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡 𝑛𝑛𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑆𝑆 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 𝑦𝑦𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆 𝑧𝑧𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆) – 0.521 
𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 (𝑇𝑇)−𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 (𝑇𝑇−1)
𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 (𝑇𝑇) + 𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 (𝑇𝑇−1) 
However, Keasey and Watson (1991, p. 92) postulate that, "logit analysis offers as 
much as any other technique to the user". Keasey and Watson (1991) compare the predictive 
accuracy of the logit model with multivariate discriminant analysis. They (Keasey and Watson 
1991) use the same set of variables with the same sample and conclude that the improvement 
in reliability or level of information provided by the O-Score as compared to other models is 
insignificant. 
2.4.4.2.3 The Altman’s (1968) Z-Score 
Altman (1968) first used Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA) in the Z-score 
model as the fitting statistical technique for the purpose of detecting bankruptcy. 
Altman (1968) selected a sample of 33 bankrupt and 33 non-bankrupt companies from 
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1946 to 1965, and constructed a five-variable model to separate bankrupted and non 
bankrupted companies into two groups. The following variables are used in Altman's 
Z- score model and these financial ratios have been widely used as inputs for many 
other models (Hillegeist, Keating, Cram and Lundstedt 2004; Altman, 2000; Atiya, 
2001; Grice and Ingram, 2001; Shumway, 2001; Dimitras, Zanakis and Zopounidis, 
1996; and Odom and Sharda, 1990) 
𝑍𝑍 = 1.2 𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴  +  1.4 Retained EarningsTotal Assets + 3.3 EBITTotal Assets + 0.6 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 0.999 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴  
Altman (1968) finds that a Z-Score of 2.99 or over indicates that the firm’s 
financial position is healthy, while a score below 1.81 indicates an unhealthy financial 
position which equates to a higher likelihood of going bankrupt. A Z-score of 2.675 is 
the critical point separating bankrupt and non-bankrupt companies. However, the 
Altman’s model fails to predict the Z-Score of some firms that fall within a “gray area” 
(i.e. firms with a Z-Score between 1.81 and 2.99). This is the cause why Altman (1968, 
p. 596) suggests that “it is desirable to establish a guideline for classifying firms in the 
gray area”. In addition, the Altman’s Z-Score merely provides a view on how healthy 
(or unhealthy) a firm is, and its reliability should be questioned (Dimitras et al. 1996; 
Atiya, 2001; Grice and Ingram 200l). Whilst the Altman Z-Score is better suited for 
manufacturing industry firms, the Altman Z2-Score model is a modified version of the 
previous model to include non-manufacturing industry firms (Altman et al. 2017). The 
Altman Z2-Score is therefore not specific to any industry (Grice, Stephen and Ingram 
2001). For these reasons, the Altman’s Z-Score model is not the desired measure for 
this research.  
2.4.4.2.4 The Zmijewski’s (1984) financial (ZFC) Score 
Zmijewski and Dietrich (1984) Zmijewski and Dietrich (1984) suggest the use 
of a different method for the determination of financial distress. This method is 
commonly referred to as the Zmijewski’s Financial Condition score. Since Zmijewski 
came up with the ZFC in 1984, the model has been far and wide used, and is still 
considered  as reliable as newer prediction models (Wertheim and Robinson 2011). 
The ZFC score is calculated as follows (Walker and Hay 2009): 
𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍 =  −4.336− 4.513𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇  (𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅) + 5.679 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴  (𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆) + 0.004 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇 𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  (𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦)  
There are numerous studies that use the ZFC Score for the purpose of measuring the 
likelihood of financial distress: Geiger and Rama (2003); Geiger, Raghunandan, and Rama 
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(2006); Carey, Kortum, and Moroney (2011); Francis, Reichelt, and Wang (2005). Using the 
ZFC method, a higher (lower) value will indicate a higher (lower) likelihood of financial 
distress. The findings reached is therefore easy to understand and to analyse for comparison 
purposes. In opposition to the Altman’s Z-Score, the ZFC Score provides a probability of 
facing financial difficulty whereas the Z-Score only provides a guideline on the firm’s 
financial healthiness. When compared with the Ohlson’s Logistic Regression model, the ZFC 
Score still manages to provide equally reliable information as the former while also being 
easier to use and to comprehend (Keasey and Watson 1991). In addition, all the data required 
to calculate the ZFC score can be obtained from databases or the audited financial statements 
of the sampled companies. The Zmijewski ZFC score is therefore the preferred method for this 
research as it provides a reliable probability score. 
2.4.5 Financial distress – A meta-analysis 
A considerable number of papers has been published both nationally and 
internationally underpinning the effect of certain factors on financial distress. For the 
purpose of this research, these factors will be clustered under firm characteristics, 
earnings quality, and corporate governance. 
2.4.5.1 Financial distress and firm’s characteristics 
The degree of financial distress is admitted in extant literature to be in direct 
association with certain firm characteristics such as the firm’s maturity, size, industry, 
and complexity (Chancharat et al. 2010; Jostarndt and Sautner 2008; Hou and Chuang 
2007; Dimitras, Zanakis, and Zopounidis 1996). Jostarndt and Sautner (2008) discover 
that mature firms are less likely to suffer from financial distress. The reason behind 
that is established firms generally have greater access to capital market, with a more 
dependable clientele base, and more tolerant suppliers. Firm complexity is connected 
with the number of subsidiaries. Chancharat et al. (2010) find that the more 
subsidiaries a company has, the lower the chance of it suffering financial distress. 
Chancharat et al. (2010) explain that firms with a large number of subsidiaries often 
operate in different market and industry groups. Thereby, should one subsidiary within 
one industry not perform at par, the parent company can rely on other subsidiaries 
operating in other industry to compensate for the loss. Janes (2005) finds the firm’s 
riskiness (measured by the degree of financial leverage) and profitability have a direct 
correlation with the intensity of the distressed condition. He (Janes 2005) explains that 
firms with a high degree of financial leverage and/or a poor profitability have a reduced 
access to capital market, consequently render the harder turnaround process from 
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financial difficulty situations. 
2.4.5.2 Financial distress and earnings quality 
The extant literature provides ample quantity of papers analysing the effect of 
some earnings quality measures on financial distress. The main measures commonly 
used are earnings management and abnormal accrual. Sweeney (1994) analyses the 
relationship between financial distress and earnings management and discovers that 
earnings management does not in itself give rise to financial distress. However, 
Sweeney concludes that financial distress provides an incentive for corporate 
governance body to manipulate earnings so as to satisfy debt covenants, to meet market 
expectations, to understate losses or declines in earnings. Sweeney’s conclusions are 
in accordance with several other literature (e.g., Janes 2005; Jaggi and Lee 2002; 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner 1994; DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994) . 
2.4.5.3 Financial distress and corporate governance 
Porter (2009) postulates that an effective corporate governance made up of a 
robust and autonomous component of the “tripartite audit function” (the external audit 
function, the internal audit function and the audit committee) is required to ensure 
corporate accountability. There are currently considerable literature examining the 
effect between financial distress and corporate governance factors like audit 
committee, management turnover and internal control structure.  Lapointe (1997) 
looks into the correlation between financial distress and the entity’s internal control 
structure and concluded that financial distress results in poor internal control structure 
which mainly due to the firms’ lack of financial ability to improve or maintain its 
internal control structure. Noted that his research could not demonstrate that poor 
internal control structure leads to financial distress directly. Jerry, June, and Joon 
(2006) examine the association between financial distress and audit committee. They 
(Jerry, June, and Joon 2006) use size, financial expertise of the committee 
independence, meeting frequency and attendance as proxies to measure the efficiency 
of the audit committee. They conclude that audit committee does not directly affect 
financial distress. However, these authors mention that the efficiency of the audit 
committee is related with the quality of financial reporting which in turn may affect 
financial distress (Jerry, June, and Joon 2006). Jerry, June, and Joon (2006) conclude 
that the higher (lower) the quality of the financial reporting, the lower (higher) the 
likelihood of financial distress. These findings are consistent with another study 
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conducted by Noor and Wan (2009). In addition, Jostarndt and Sautner (2008) tested 
whether management turnover reduces the likelihood of financial distress but find the 
results to be inconclusive. They (Jostarndt and Sautner 2008) find that in many 
situations, management turnover follows as a result of financial instability but they fail 
to find any evidence to show that a restructuring in the board of management can 
prevent (or even reduce the effects of) financial distress. Jostarndt and Sautner (2008) 
findings are coherent with other literature: Liou and Smith (2007), Smith and Graves 
(2005),Gilson (1989).   
Similar to other studies on different corporate governance elements and 
financial distress, some scholars have researched the final key element of an effective 
corporate governance (in addition to board of directors, audit committee and internal 
audit function), that is, the external audit function, with financial distress.  
Existing literature have analysed the link between financial distress and the 
type of auditor’s opinion issued such the issuance of going-concern reports, or the 
likelihood of receiving a modified auditor’s opinion (Chi and Chin 2011; Stanley 2011; 
Carey and Simnett 2006; Liu and Wang 2005; Choi, Doogar, and Ganguly 2004; 
Carcello and Neal 2000). Balsam, Krishnan, and Yang (2003, p. 86) postulate that 
“because audit quality is multidimensional and inherently unobservable, no single 
auditor characteristic can be used to proxy for it”. Accordingly, Balsam (2003, p. 86) 
describes that in order to obtain a reliable measure for audit quality, several proxies 
need to be jointly employed due to the unavailability of any specific measure for audit 
quality.  
Lu and Ma (2016) proxy audit quality with the engagement of a Big 4 auditor 
and finds a negative correlation with financial distress, which is proxied for using the 
Altman’s (1983) Z-Score. Jin, Kanagaretnam, and Lobo (2011) investigate the effect 
of audit quality on financial distress in the banking sector by proxying audit quality 
with Big 4 auditor and auditor specialization and financial distress with banking 
specific factors such as non-performing loans, loan loss provisions, and proportion of 
securitized loans. However, Francis (2004) funds audit quality to be hard to measure, 
and Blasam, Krishnan, and Yang 2003 (2003) conclude that due to audit quality being 
unobservable and multidimensional, different auditor characteristics (as opposed to 
only one auditor characteristic) is required to proxy for it (that is, audit quality).  
Whilst the study conducted by Jin, Kanagaretnam and Lobo (2011) use two 
different auditor attributes to proxy for audit quality (namely, Big 4 auditor and auditor 
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specialization), they proxy financial distress with banking specific variables which 
renders the findings non-generalisable to other industries (other than the banking 
industry). Lu and Ma (2016) solve this issue by proxying financial distress with the 
Altman’s Z-Score. However, the Altman Z-Score (as opposed to the Altman Z2-Score) 
does not consider non-manufacturing industries. In addition, by only proxying audit 
quality with Big 4 auditor, the multidimensional nature of audit quality as specified by 
Blasam, Krishnan, and Yang 2003 (2003) is ignored. 
2.5 AUDIT QUALITY 
Berle and Means (1932) raised concerns about issues associated with 
separation of ownership and management, namely information asymmetry and agency 
costs. A significant number of scholars studying agency theory have emphasised the 
necessity of audit function in monitoring the alignment of the interest between 
shareholders (the principal) and management (the agent) (Clinch, Stokes and Zhu 
2012; Arrunada 2000; Benston 1985; Chow 1982; Watts and Zimmerman 1980; Watts 
1977; Jensen and Meckling 1976). Subsequently, firms need to ensure that the quality 
of the audit performed is reliable for its stakeholders. Audit quality is a broad term for 
various factors affecting the quality of the audit performed such as recruitment of firm 
auditors, accounting and auditing standards, code of ethics subjected to professional 
accountancy bodies, professional attributes of auditors, audit regulators involved in the 
audit review process, the corporate culture of the audit firm and audit methodology 
used by the audit firm (Simunic 1980).  
2.5.1 Concept and definition 
A definition of audit quality is proposed by DeAngelo in 1981 and is widely 
recognised as the ability of the auditor to detect and report any material misstatements 
and breaches in accounting standard that impact the contract between company 
management and shareholders. According to DeAngelo (1981b), auditor quality is 
perceived as a composition of auditor’s competence and auditor’s independence which 
respectively refer to the auditor’s ability to detect and report any material 
misstatements and breaches in accounting standard. 
DeAngelo (1981b) further points out the quality of an audit does not reflect the 
degree of information available to the public and is not directly noticeable. Palmrose 
(1988) agrees to the fact that external financial statement users do not generally 
recognise the level of the quality of an audit. Various scholars have identified the 
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primary determinants of audit quality to be the number and extant of audit procedures 
applied (Hribar, Kravet and Wilson 2014; Chaney, Jeter, and Shivakumar 2004; Turpin 
1995; Chan, Ezzamel, and Gwilliam 1993; Chung and Lindsay 1988; Taffler and 
Ramalingam 1982; Simunic 1980). Since these audit procedures cannot be observed 
explicitly in audit working papers, it is essential to have alternative measures to proxy 
for these audit procedures (Dechow, Ge, and Schrand 2010). Audit quality proxies 
used in prior literature regarding auditor differentiation include fraud frequencies 
(Beneish 1999b; Farber 2005), analyst forecast accuracy (Lawrence, Minutti-Meza, 
and Zhang 2011; Behn, Choi, and Kang 2008), discretionary accruals (Lawrence, 
Minutti-Meza, and Zhang 2011; Francis, Maydew and Sparks 1999), ex-ante cost of 
equity capital (Lawrence, Minutti-Meza, and Zhang 2011; Khurana and Raman 2004), 
and litigation (Feroz, Park, and Pastena 1991; Palmrose 1988).  
2.5.2 Impact of auditor quality 
External auditor is of paramount importance for ensuring high alignment of 
interests between principal and agent by verifying the reliability of the company’s 
financial statement (Clinch, Stokes and Zhu 2012; Ferguson, Francis and Stokes 2003; 
Leftwich 1980). Hence, auditor quality is one of the critical components affecting 
auditing profession (Vanstraelen 2000). The external audit function acts as a key 
corporate governance mechanism in the information market place (Gay and Simnett 
2012). Chang, Dasgupta and Hilary (2009) postulate that the quality of the auditor will 
affect the firm’s debt-equity appetite. For instance, firms with a higher quality auditor 
tend to rely more on equity financing and have lower debt ratios (Chang, Dasgupta and 
Hilary 2009). In this case, equity market participants and debt providers highly value 
quality auditors and client firms often enjoy benefits associated with high quality 
auditors, namely- lower contracting costs and increase in market value of equity 
(Chang, Desgupta, and Hilary 2009; Hope et al. 2009; Ahmed, Rasmussen, and Tse 
2008; Khurana and Raman 2004; Mansi, Maxwell, and Miller 2004; Pittman and 
Fortin 2004; Vanstraelen 2000; Crawford, and Johnson 1998; Moreland 1995; Franz). 
High quality auditors are perceived to possess better monitoring skills in 
ensuring the credibility of the financial report of the firm (Dunn, Hillier, and Marshall 
1999; Klock 1994; Eichenseher, Hagigi, and Shields 1989; Nichols and Smith 1983; 
Fried and Schiff 1981). High quality auditors are often characterised by the ability to 
assess audit risks accurately and to detect errors and misstatements, improve earnings 
quality and render credibility to financial statements (Caramanis and Lennox 2008; 
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Balsam, Krishnan, and Yang 2003; Krishnan 2003; Francis, Maydew, and Sparks 
1999; Becker et al. 1998; Beatty 1989; Jensen 1986). In addition, high quality auditors 
are also less likely to be allied with managerial unscrupulous behaviours (Sun and Liu 
2013; Krishnan 2003; Francis, Maydew, and Sparks 1999). Often, firms with high 
quality auditors avoid poor disclosure quality (Chu, Mathieu, and Mbagwu 2013; Dunn 
and Mayhew 2004;) and financial fraud (Lennox and Pittman 2010; Farber 2005; 
Carcello and Nagy2004). In addition, to improve the quality of the audit performed, 
auditors also provide additional value-added services to promote the reliability of the 
firm’s internal control as well as the credibility of financial report. These non-audit 
services include identifying business risks, reporting on internal control weaknesses, 
and providing non-audit services such as tax advisory and risk management 
assessments (Gay and Simnett 2012; Hamilton Li, and Stokes 2008; Zhang 2007). 
2.5.3 Determinants of auditor quality 
Auditor quality is a complex and innately unobservable concept (Balsam, 
Krishnan and Yang 2003). It is often difficult to create proxies for auditor 
effort/effectiveness due to limited information (Dechow, Ge and Schrand 2010). The 
auditor quality proxies mushroomed to a series of auditor attributes in extant literature, 
namely audit fees (Gul, Jaggi and Krishnan 2007; Francis and Ke 2006; Larcker and 
Richardson 2004; Ashbaugh, LaFond, and Maayhew 2003; Frankel, Johnson, and 
Nelson 2002), auditor brand name (Lai et al. 2013; Behn, Choi and Kang 2008; Dye 
1993; Palmrose 1988; DeAngelo 1981b), auditor independence (Salehi 2009; Chaney 
and Philipich 2002; Craswell 1999), auditor tenure (Chen, Lin and Lin 2008; Ghosh 
and Moon 2005; Johnson, Khurana, and Reynolds 2002), auditor specialisation 
(Balsam, Krishnan, and Yang 2003; Krishnan 2003; Zhou and Elder 2002), auditor 
size (Kim, Chung, and Firth 2003; Francis, Maydew, and Sparks 1999; Becker et al. 
1998;), auditor gender (Gold, Hunton, and Gomaa 2009; Bernardi and Arnold 1997), 
time spent on the audit (Caramanis and Lennox 2008; Ettredge, Li, and Sun 2006), 
delay of auditor report (Schwartz and Soo 1996; Bamber, Bamber, and Schoderbek 
1993; Ashton, Graul, and Newton 1989; Newton and Ashton 1989), and auditor 
workload compression (Lopez and Peters 2011). Out of these, there are four critical 
components that have drawn considerable attention in extend literature and are widely 
accepted as adequate proxies of audit quality. These four pivotal auditor attributes, 
therefore pertinent to this study, are (a) Big 4 auditors; (b) the provision of non-audit 
services; (c) audit tenure; and (d) audit fee.  
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2.5.3.1 Big 4 auditor / auditor brand name 
There have been extensive studies conducted on using auditor brand name as a 
proxy for audit quality globally. Speaking of brand name, it directly signifies the four 
largest audit firms that completely dominate the industry – KPMG, Price Waterhouse-
Coopers, Ernst & Young and Deloitte Touche Ross, which collectively known as the 
Big Four worldwide. Within a non-Australian context, Reynolds and Francis (2001) 
stated that whilst there exist incentives for big 4 auditors to pursue a higher quality 
audit, incentives for firms to contract such auditors also subsists. The thought behind 
their statements (Reynolds and Francis 2001) revolves around the reputation capital 
perceived for such auditors.  It is commonly believed that financial statements audited 
by big 4 auditors “should” be more reliable and consequently reflect a more truthful 
portrait of the financial situation of such auditees. Due to this perceived reputation 
capital, many firms prefer to contract with “branded” auditors so as to provide greater 
perceived assurance that their financial statements provide a true and fair view of their 
financial condition (Ali Abedalqader et al. 2011; Choi et al. 2010; Reynolds and 
Francis 2001; Colbert and Murray 1998).   
According to Lennox (1999, p 217) “the reputation argument suggests that 
large auditors suffer a greater loss as a result of inaccurate reporting”. Lennox (1999) 
further explains that bigger firms have a greater proportion of reputation capital at risk 
than smaller companies, thereby they should have greater emphasis on providing 
higher quality audits. This view is also shared by Dye (1993) and DeAngelo (1981). 
Likewise, Dye (1993) states that larger audit firms have a bigger motivation to deliver 
higher quality audit so as to reduce litigation risk. The reasoning behind Dye’s (1993) 
argument is that stakeholders are more likely to target bigger audit firms in the event 
of litigation due to the shared belief that such firms have ‘deeper pockets’ than smaller 
firms and will as a result have more resources to make compensation on any legal 
indemnities (Lennox 1999).  
Big 4 auditors are known to have national training programs, standardized audit 
programs, and firm-wide knowledge sharing practices which are supported by updated 
information technology (Francis and Yu 2009). Large firms also employ more 
employees; therefore, auditors working in such firms have more in-house support and 
more colleagues to consult with (Vera-Munoz et al. 2006). Danos et al. (1989, p.102) 
reported that “auditors are most likely to consult their peers within the same office 
when problems arise rather than broader consultation with colleagues in competing 
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firms”. Furthermore, Francis and Yu (2009) proclaim that big 4 auditors are 
commonly, highly specialized within the specific industry assigned to them.  
Existing literature also includes some research on the subject matter within an 
Australian context. Coram et al. (2008) studied the relationship between big 4 auditors 
and the audit quality and claimned that big 4 auditors generally yield higher quality 
audit due to the specialized nature of such auditors. Studies using Australian data to 
analyse the relationship between auditor size and audit quality include those by 
Stringer and Adamidis (2010); Coram et al. (2008); Boon et al. (2008); Coram et al. 
(2003); Green and Simnett (1993).   
However, there are contrasting voices from empirical studies claiming that both 
brand name and non-brand name auditors exert about the same amount of effort in the 
production of an audit and it is the characteristics of client firm that influence the 
distinctions in the quality of an audit between brand name and non-brand name 
auditors (Lawrence, Minutti-Meza, and Zhang 2011; Blokdijk et al. 2006). 
2.5.3.2 Provision of non-audit services 
The provision of non-audit services by incumbent auditors result in diverging 
views in extent literature. On one side, scholars favour the “economic bonding” 
hypothesis as impairing the independence of the auditor. Lennox (2005, p.219) defines 
auditor independence as the auditor being free from any financial interest in the 
auditee. When defining auditor independence, it is essential to first differentiate 
between independence in fact and independence in appearance (DeAngelo 1981). 
Should the auditors’ independence appear to have been compromised, the result may 
be a decrease in credibility of the audited reports which may sequentially impose an 
increase in the auditee’s cost of capital (Jackson et al. 2008; Schneider et al. 2006; 
DeAngelo 1981). However, should a breach in the auditor’s independence be factual 
(that is, proven), the consequences will be considerably costlier both for the auditee 
and the auditor. However, in a study conducted by Olazabal and Almer (2001), the 
authors claim that an impairment in the auditor’s independence in appearance can 
potentially be as detrimental to both the auditor and the auditee as a breach in 
independence in fact. Scholars who support the ‘economic bonding’ hypothesis 
proposed that a violation of auditor independence is accused when there is economic 
bond between the auditor and its client (DeAngelo 1981b; Chaney and Philipich 2002; 
Salehi 2009). Though legislations contained in CLERP 9 does not ban auditors from 
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providing non-audit services to auditees, it however imposes extensive disclosure 
requirements in regards to the provision of non-audit services by the incumbent auditor 
thereby effectively favouring the “economic bonding” hypothesis.  
On the contrary, other scholars favour the provision of non-audit services by 
incumbent auditors because of the “knowledge spilled-over” hypothesis whereby the 
knowledge acquired through the provision of non-audit services to an audit client may 
“spill over” to the production of the audit, subsequently increasing the auditor 
independence, audit quality and reduce audit costs (Stanley 2011; Griffin and Lont 
2010; Callaghan et al. 2009; Gul et al. 2007; Schneider et al. 2006; Lennox 2005; 
Larcker and Richardson 2004; Menon and Williams 2004; Geiger and Rama 2003; 
Barkess et al. 2002; Franker et al. 2002; Beaver 1966). These scholars also justify the 
positivity of the provision of non-audit services by incumbent auditors as the risks 
associated with an impairment of independence (such as reputation loss and litigation) 
(Knechel, Sharme, and Sharma 2012; Dopuch, King and Schwartz 2003; Arrunada 
1999; Wallman 1996; Simunic 1984).  
2.5.3.3 Audit tenure 
Johnson et al. (2002) define auditor tenure as the length of time that the auditor 
held office. Current literature provides diverging views on the effect of audit tenure on 
audit quality. Theoretical models defined in the present literature usually embody 
either a ‘learning hypothesis’ (also commonly referred as the Knowledge Spillover 
Hypothesis) or a ‘bonding hypothesis’ perspective towards audit tenure (Brooks 2011). 
The ‘learning hypothesis’ perspective implies that the longer an auditor holds office, 
the more client-specific knowledge he/she will possess, and the more efficient he/she 
will be at detecting material misstatements. Ali Abedalqader et al. (2011) describe the 
learning effect as a spill-over of information that the auditors possess on the auditee 
after delivering auditing service for the company for a few successive years. The 
familiarity between the auditor and the company renders it easier for the former to 
analyse the financial statements and operations of the company, and consequently, 
increases the likelihood of finding misstatements. The outcome is a higher audit 
quality. Likewise, Simunic (1980) argues that the knowledge and understanding the 
auditor has of the firm’s industry, operations and accounting system will grow deeper 
as the relationship between auditor and the firm continues and as a result improving 
the audit quality. There currently exist a large number of literature that support this 
view (Brooks 2011; Myers et al. 2003; Geiger and Rama 2003; Johnson et al. 2002; 
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Solomon et al. 1999; Beck et al. 1998; Knapp 1991).     
In the contrary, other literature strongly support the ‘bonding hypothesis’. The 
supporters of this hypothesis argue that the longer an auditor remains in office, the 
higher the likelihood of their independence being compromised (Bedard and Johnstone 
2010; Brooks 2011; Johnson et al. 2002; Raghunandan et al. 1994; DeAngelo 1981). 
The enthusiasts of this hypothesis assert that the longer the relationship between the 
auditor and the auditee, the higher the familiarity threat which may result in the auditor 
not being meticulous with his audit procedures. They also argue that the longer the 
relationship, the more financially dependent the auditor is on the client (Johnson et al. 
2002; Raghunandan et al. 1994; DeAngelo 1981). Due to this reason, the auditor may 
be reluctant to give an unfavourable audit opinion due to the perceiverisk of losing a 
high fee-paying client. A policy of mandatory auditor partner rotation through CLERP 
9 has been introduced and exercised as a means of improving audit quality by 
promoting auditor independence in terms of reducing the risk associated with 
familiarity threat and auditors’ conflicts of interest (Jenkins and Vermeer 2013). Extant 
literature agrees this strategy to be successful for Big 4 auditors to achieve a better-
quality audit, however, finds this detrimental to non-Big 4 auditors suggesting that the 
learning experience obtained through longer audit partner tenure to be crucial for 
smaller sized auditors. This has resulted in scholars questioning the ‘one size fits all’ 
requirements for audit partner rotation (Hamilton et al 2005). Carey and Simnett 
(2006) state that a long duration of auditor tenure can lead to reduced auditor 
independence and objectivity, and consequently, result in reduced audit quality. 
Additionally, some researchers also claimed that time may deteriorate the auditor’s 
ability to detect critical error (Mansi, Maxwell, and Miller 2004). However, the results 
from Carey and Simnett (2006) show no evidence of the negative association between 
auditor tenure and audit quality.  
2.5.3.4 Audit fee 
Financial report users and clients expect that a higher audit fee indicates a 
higher quality audit will be performed. It is always a dilemma common to both the 
auditor and the client when it comes to determining an audit fee which is mutually 
acceptable by both parties. For auditors, they deserve to be compensated fairly for 
services provided, whereas from the client point of view, they should be provided with 
audit work align with the audit fees paid (Maher, Tiessen, Colson, and Broman 1992). 
Several scholars have stated that the primary determinants of audit fees should be the 
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number and extant of audit procedures (Hay et al. 2006; Chung and Lindsay 1988; 
Turpin 1995; Chan et al. 1993; Taffler and Ramalingan 1982; Simunic 1980). 
Essentially, alternative measures should be in place to proxy for the audit procedures 
due to audit procedures being not directly observable in the audit working papers. 
Empirical studies on audit fee commonly find a positive association between audit fee 
and the quality of the audit. 
Prior researchers have identified audit fee variation through investigation of 
numerous firms and auditor attributes based on the seminal work by Simunic (1980), 
that includes firm size, complexity, risk, auditor size and specialisation. These 
attributes have been recognized to be consistent with the identification across a wide 
array of studies, sample sizes and regions (Hay et al. 2006). For instance, larger audit 
firms provide better quality audits than smaller audit firms, hence they are paid at a 
higher compensation. Consistent with the auditor expertise hypothesis, audit quality 
increases with specialisation in industry as they acquire in-depth knowledge over time 
within that specific industry and achieve a competitive advantage in identifying the 
high-risk area for aggressive accounting, and as a result, detect any material 
misstatement (Gul, Fung, and Jaggi 2009; Geiger and Raghunandan 2002; Solomon, 
Shields, and Whittington 1999; Knapp 1991; Beck, Frecka, and Solomon 1988; Hoyle 
1978).  
Another similar study is Wuchun (2011) who finds a positive association 
between audit fee and audit quality and further explains the higher fees to be as a 
consequence of more time spent on the audit, the hiring of more experienced auditors, 
and the higher level of training and support provided to the audit team. These findings 
are also consistent with other extant literature looking into the impact of variations of 
audit fees on the quality of the audit (Reichelt and Wang 2010; Romanus et al. 2008; 
David et al. 2006; Reynolds et al. 2004; Frankel et al. 2002; Craswell et al. 2002; 
DeFond et al. 2002; Becker et al. 1998; Craswell et al. 1995; Teoh and Wong 1993). 
The increase in audit fee as a result of the increased in time spent on the audit process, 
the increased level of training, and the assignment of more experienced auditors on the 
audit team thereby leads to an increased in the quality of the audit. 
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2.6 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER 
Chapter Two began by providing a definition, overview and determinants of the 
capital markets. Risks of capital structure were discussed along with the importance of 
financial reporting quality. These then funnel down to financial distress, whereby various 
definitions were discussed and compared, its implications and finally its measurement. A 
general discussion followed on the concept of audit quality and the important role an 
auditor plays in the financial reporting system. Finally, proxies for audit quality were 
discussed. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTER 
Chapter Three discusses the theoretical framework of this study and the 
empirical literature relating to the research questions testing the different hypotheses. 
The theories underpinning the concept of corporate governance, specifically the 
external audit component of the corporate governance mosaic, are discussed and 
contrasted. These theories are agency theory; institutional theory; stewardship theory; 
resource dependency theory; and stakeholder theory are discussed and compared. A 
discussion on the empirical literature relating to each of the four key auditor attributes 
selected for the purpose of this study is provided together with justification for the 
expected association of each auditor attributes with financial distress. Finally, a 
conceptual schema is provided to outline the relationships examined in this study.  
3.2 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE – CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Extant literature commonly provides for five main theories used to underpin 
the concept of corporate governance. These are agency theory, institutional theory,  
stewardship theory, resource dependency theory, and stakeholder theory. Whilst this 
study uses the agency theory as the tenet of corporate governance, the following sub-
sections nonetheless provide a discussion of each of these theories together with their 
association with firms’ corporate governance structures and validate the use of the 
agency theory. 
3.2.1 Agency theory 
Agency theory as introduced by Berle and Means (1932), explains the 
relationship between any entity delegating work (the principal) and any entity to whom 
work is being delegated (the agent). As a consequence of this delegation of power and 
authority, the likelihood of conflicts between the principal and agent is quite high (that 
is, there is a high risk of the agent making decisions for their own personal benefit and 
at the expense of the principal) (Hendry 2002; Eisenhardt and Bourgeois 1988). This 
under-fulfilment of the principals’ interests is commonly referred to as the agency loss9 
                                                     
9  Jensen and Meckling 1976 define agency loss as the difference between the returns to the shareholders as a consequence of 
delegation and the returns from the best possible consequence that would have resulted if the owners exercised direct control 
over the corporation. 
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(Jensen and Meckling 1976). The agency loss situation can be worsened when 
information asymmetry occurs (that is, when the principals do not gain access to all 
relevant information by the relevant time) and thereby are incapable of determining 
whether the agents’ actions are in the firms’ (or principals’) best interests (Scapens 
1985). For firms, the directors and managers (being the agents) are hired by the owners 
or shareholders (the principals) to assume a stewardship function in making decisions 
relating to the company’s operations in the best interests of the latter. This situation 
may lead to conflicts given the information asymmetry that may prevail (whereby the 
directors or managers hold on to more information) and the costs and difficulties 
involved for the owners or shareholders to ascertain whether the decisions made by 
managers are in the firm’s best interests or in their (that is, the directors or managers) 
personal interests (such as employment opportunities or financial rewards). These 
potential conflicts between the principal and agent may lead to uncertainties on the 
reliability of information which are produced by the agents (Shleifer and Vishny 1986; 
Jensen and Meckling 1976). Given the diverging objectives between both parties, 
agency theory drives on the alignment of the owners’ and managers’ interests (that is, 
goal congruence) thereby operationalizing mechanisms to reduce agency loss (Fama 
and Jensen 1983; Fama 1980; Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
Corporate governance structures such as the external audit function, the 
internal audit function, the board of directors, other committees (such as the audit 
committees or the remuneration committee) are widely acknowledge to be important 
mechanisms to monitor and control the agent’s (that is, managers and directors) 
behaviour and overcome agency conflicts (Stiles and Taylor 2001; Adams 1994;  
Williamson 1984; Fama and Jensen 1983).  
3.2.2 A critical analysis of agency theory with other theoretical approaches 
Following the discussion of the literature pertaining to the five theoretical 
perspectives, this study now proceeds with a critical analysis and comparison of these 
theories. Agency theory, being the dominant theoretical perspective within the 
corporate governance domain, provides the benchmark against which the other 
theories are compared and evaluated. 
3.2.2.1 Agency theory and institutional theory 
Whilst both the agency and institutional theories look at the diverging interests 
of the principal (shareholders) and agent (management), agency theory is driven by 
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financial motivations (Donaldson and Davis 1991) whereas institutional theory is 
driven by non-economic motivations (such as the desire for legitimacy) (Eisenhardt 
and Bourgeois 1988). As such, agency theorists commonly view entities as self-
interested rationalists whereas institutional theorists view individuals as legitimacy-
seeking entities (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois 1988; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Berle and 
Means 1932). Eisenhardt and Bourgeois (1988) find the principle notion within agency 
theory is that much managerial action is resulted from efficient information and risk-
bearing costs while they (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois 1988) find the key idea behind 
institutional theory is that much managerial action is resulted from imitative forces and 
corporate customs that over time have gain legitimacy within the organization.  
3.2.2.2 Agency theory and stakeholder theory 
Whilst agency theory considers the relationship between the agent and the 
principal, stakeholder theory broadens this view to incorporate other stakeholders. For 
this reason, scholars view stakeholder theory as an extension of agency theory 
(Donaldson and Preston 1995; Evan and Freeman 1993; Hill and Jones 1992). Under 
agency theory, monitoring controls are required to achieve goal congruence (that is, to 
align the goals of management with those of the principal). Stakeholder theorists, 
however, argue that rather than only considering the goals of the principal, goals of all 
other stakeholders must also be considered. Such stakeholders include the creditors, 
employees, customers and the community (Freeman 1984). Hill and Jones (1992) state 
that rather than being only shareholders’ agents, managers are considered 
stakeholders’ agents, thereby asserting that management decisions should aim at 
protecting the interest of each stakeholder group. 
Though both the agency and stakeholder theories share some common group, 
they have different underlying perspectives. Agency theory focuses on the extrinsic 
motivations viewing management as utility maximizers and motivated by monetary 
benefits (Hillman and Dalziel 2003; Donaldson and Davis 1991). Stakeholder theory, 
in contrast, focuses on a more social oriented perspective while accentuating firms’ 
social responsibilities (Blair 1995). 
3.2.2.3 Agency theory and resource dependency theory 
The resource role of board of directors, being a well acknowledged mechanism 
of corporate control, is the focus of agency theory. Resource dependency theory 
focuses on the role played by the board of directors in securing resources through 
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external sources. Whilst, both of these theories focus on the behavioural aspect of the 
board of directors with emphasis on having external outside members, they both differ 
in the justification underlying this recommendation. 
Dalton et al. (2007) find that in efficient markets, agency theory assumes 
rational actors contract for profits and views outside board members as mechanisms of 
corporate control, thereby focusing on how external players to the firm can control 
managerial opportunism. In contrast, resource dependency theory views outside board 
members to be important boundary spanners who provide timely information and 
convey critical resources to a firm through linkages with the external environment 
thereby focusing on how the management team can control external players to the firm 
for gaining access to critical resources (Pfeffer 1972; Zald 1967). The inclusion of 
different stakeholders (that is, external players) is therefore acknowledged by the 
resource dependency theory but generally ignored by the agency theory. This therefore 
justifies some scholars finding resource dependency theory to provide a broader 
understanding of corporate governance mechanisms (Usaysankar 2008; Zahra and 
Pearce 1989). 
3.2.2.4 Agency theory and stewardship theory 
Both agency and stewardship theories focus on the relationship between the 
principal (shareholders) and the agents (managers) and view the board of directors as 
a corporate governance mechanism to create shareholder wealth (Donaldson and Davis 
1991). However, whilst agency theory views the agents as self-serving individuals 
being motivated by extrinsic factors, stewardship theory postulate managers’ 
behaviour as collectivistic and pro-organization and motivated by a desire to perform, 
achieve and gain satisfaction (Donaldson and Davis 1991). 
While acknowledging the complexity of organizational behaviour, stewardship 
theorists suggest a number of psychological and cultural factors that lead management 
to either be an agent or a steward (Davis et al. 1997; Donaldson and Davis 1991). Davis 
et al. (1997) find such a factor to be the perceived risk of the principal and the managers 
and the degree of trust towards the other party. They (Davis et al. 1997) further state 
that agency costs are minimized when principals and managers chose an agent-
principle relationship and utility maximization is achieved when parties chose a 
steward-principal relationship. Therefore, a steward-principal relationship is 
appropriate if both parties (principals and managers) are collectivists and an agent-
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principal relationship is appropriate if both parties are individualists. 
3.2.3 Theory selection 
Whist no one particular theory will fully provide a complete description about 
the behaviour of players in the corporate governance mosaic, this study favours the 
agency theory as the most complete one. As per Jensen and Meckling (1976), agency 
problems occur because of (1) diverging motivations between the agent and the 
principal; and (2) information asymmetries that exist between the information 
available to the managers and made available to the principals. These can lead to 
uncertainties about the reliability of information provided by the agents and 
subsequently compromise the corporate financial reporting process. The principal 
benefit from the external audit function is the ability of external auditor to provide an 
independent assurance on the quality and reliability of the financial information 
prepared by the agent (Lennox 2005; Jensen and Meckling 1976).  
Therefore, the presence of an external audit function along with all the 
underlying regulation is premised on agency theory in an attempt to achieve goal 
congruence between the principal and the agent. While there are five main theories 
underpinning corporate governance mechanisms, specifically the external audit 
determinant, agency theory is used for this study, given the close association of 
external audit quality and financial distress to agency conflicts and contractual 
arrangements. 
3.3 KEY AUDITOR ATTRIBUTES AND IMPACT ON FINANCIAL 
DISTRESS 
This study examines the influence of four pivotal auditor attributes on the 
auditee’s likelihood of facing financial distress. The four attributes of interest are: (1) 
Big 4 auditor; (2) provision of non-audit services; (3) auditor (firm) tenure; and (4) 
audit fees. The four attributes are selected as they are frequently cited in empirical 
audit quality literature as having a significant influence on audit quality (Knechel et al. 
2013; Behn, Choi, and Kang 2008; Chen, Lin, and Lin 2008; Balsam, Krishnan, and 
Yang 2003; Krishnan 2003; Becker et al. 1998; DeAngelo 1981). Hypotheses related 
to the four auditor attributes are individually developed in the following sub-sections. 
3.3.1 Big Firm auditor/auditor brand name: Big4 
Lower likelihood of financial distress is expected when an external audit 
function is deemed to be of superior quality. A large body of empirical studies on audit 
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quality documents a positive association between auditor reputation (that is, Big 4 
auditor) and audit quality. Extant literature explain this positive association as a 
consequence of greater expertise, higher resources, and market based incentives (that 
is, protecting their reputational capital, and mitigating the litigation risk) (Khurana and 
Raman 2004; Lennox 1999; Becker et al. 1998; Craswell et al. 1995; DeAngelo 1981). 
Jin, Kanagaretnam, and Lobo (2011) investigate the effect of audit quality and the 
likelihood of financial distress in the banking sector only and find auditees hiring Big 
4 auditors to have a lower risk of financial distress. They however, only use Big 4 
auditor and Auditor specialization to proxy for audit quality, thereby not fully 
capturing the multinational nature of audit quality. This association can be explained 
as Big 4 auditors, given their reputation to preserve, their expertise and resource 
available can be more selective in their client selection, better understand business 
risks that could be an insight into possible financial distress, and provide more 
intelligence to firms to mitigate investment and risks thereby effectively assisting in 
maintaining profitability. 
Although empirical studies on audit quality and financial distress is very 
limited, thereby a gap in the literature (as discussed in section 2.4.5 above), the 
following hypothesis, based on agency theory, is proposed to test the association 
between a Big 4 auditor and financial distress: 
H1: Client firms engaging a Big4 auditor will be less likely to suffer financial 
distress than client firms engaging a non-Big4 auditor. 
3.3.2 The provision of non-audit services 
For decades, regulatory bodies have continuously aimed to address concerns 
over the provision of non-audit services by the incumbent auditor (CLERP 9 Act 2004; 
US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 1977; 1978; 1979; 1980; 1981; 1982; 
2000; 2003). Extant literature on the impact of the provision of non-audit services on 
audit quality provide diverging views. First, extant literature favouring the economic 
bonding hypothesis have shown concerns that if an auditor earns a high level of non-
audit fees from the auditee, then the auditor’s independence may be impacted so as to 
exploit the prospect to retain clients due to the greater incremental economic bonding 
and the possible loss of revenues earned from the provision of non-audit services 
(Reynolds, Deis, and Francis 2004; Wallman 1996; DeAngelo 1981). This may 
compromise the reliability and quality of financial reporting, leading to a reduction in 
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the quality of the audit and consequently, an increase in the firm’s financial distress 
risks. In contrast to the economic bonding theorists, other researchers postulate that 
incumbent auditors also providing non-audit services can in fact improve the audit 
process through enhanced economies of scale. This view is commonly referred to as 
the knowledge spill-over hypothesis which states that the provision of non-audit 
services by the incumbent auditor increase the auditor’s knowledge about the auditee 
and consequently an improvement in the efficiency in detecting misstatements 
(Stanley 2011; Griffin and Lont 2010; Callaghan et al. 2009; Gul et al. 2007; Schneider 
et al. 2006; Lennox 2005; Larcker and Richardson 2004; Menon and Williams 2004; 
Geiger and Rama 2003; Barkess et al. 2002; Franker et al. 2002; Beaver 1966). The 
knowledge spill-over and enrichment in economies of scale may improve the reliability 
and quality of financial reporting, leading to an enhancement in the quality of the audit 
and consequently, a decrease in the firm’s financial distress risks. 
Given the strict regulations in place in Australia aiming towards the 
preservation of auditors’ independence, this study favours the knowledge spilled over 
hypothesis which provides for a positive association between the provision of non-
audit services and the quality and efficiency of the audit. Although empirical studies 
on the provision of non-audit services and financial distress is non-existent (based on 
the author’s knowledge), thereby a gap in the literature (as discussed in section 2.4.5 
above), the following hypothesis, based on the agency theory, is proposed to test the 
association between the provision of non-audit services and financial distress: 
H2: Client firms paying higher non-audit service fees to the incumbent auditor 
will be less likely to suffer financial distress than client firms paying 
lower non-audit service fees to the incumbent auditor. 
3.3.3 Auditor tenure 
Regulators and extant literature have commonly investigated auditor tenure at 
two levels; namely at the firm level (that is, audit firm tenure) and at the partner level 
(that is, audit partner tenure). The auditing profession and most extant literature have 
commonly opposed auditor rotation, thereby asserting the costly implications of 
auditor rotation (that is, the steep learning curve involved) and favouring lengthier 
audit tenure to assist in improving client specific knowledge (Fargher, Lee, and Mande 
2008; Carey and Simnett 2006; Carcello and Nagy 2004; PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(PWC) 2002; American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) 1992; 
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DeAngelo 1981; Simunic and Stein 1987). This improvement in client specific 
knowledge may lead to an increase in the efficiency of the quality of the audit and 
consequently, a reduction in the auditee’s financial distress risks. However, some 
scholars find longer tenure leads to the auditor to become complacent due to excessive 
familiarity with the auditee; thereby leading to the deterioration in the quality of the 
audit (Chi, Lisic, and Pevzner 2011; Gul, Jaggi, and Krishnan 2007; Chi et al. 2005). 
Whilst empirical studies on auditor tenure and financial distress is non-existent 
(based on the author’s knowledge), empirical literature on the impact of audit tenure 
on the quality of the audit is mixed, the general findings that the longer tenure, leading 
to the learning effect hypothesis which provides for an improvement in client specific 
knowledge is favoured. This knowledge spill over consequently leads to an increased 
in the quality of the audit and by association, may assist in reducing the firm’s financial 
distress risks. Relying upon the agency theory, the following hypothesis is proposed 
to test the association between auditor tenure and financial distress: 
H3: Client firms with longer audit firm tenure will be less likely to suffer 
financial distress than client firms with shorter audit firm tenure. 
3.3.4 Audit fee 
Empirical studies on audit fee commonly find a positive association between 
audit fee and the quality of the audit. One such study is Wuchun (2011) who finds such 
a positive association and further explains the higher fees to be as a consequence of 
more time spent on the audit, the hiring of more experienced auditors, and the higher 
level of training and support provided to the audit team. These findings are also 
consistent with other extant literature looking into the impact of variations of audit fees 
on the quality of the audit (Reichelt and Wang 2010; Romanus et al. 2008; David et 
al. 2006; Reynolds et al. 2004; Frankel et al. 2002; Craswell et al. 2002; DeFond et al. 
2002; Becker et al. 1998; Craswell et al. 1995; Teoh and Wong 1993). The increase in 
audit fee as a result of the increased in time spent on the audit process, the increased 
level of training, and the assignment of more experienced auditors on the audit team 
thereby leads to an increased in the quality of the audit and by association, 
consequently may assist in reducing the firm’s financial distress risks. 
Although empirical studies on audit fee and the likelihood of financial distress 
is non-existent (based on the author’s knowledge), thereby a gap in the literature (as 
discussed in section 2.4.5 above), the following hypothesis, based on the agency 
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theory, is proposed to test the association between audit fee and financial distress: 
H4: Client firms paying higher audit fees to the incumbent auditor will be less 
likely to suffer financial distress than client firms paying lower audit fees. 
3.3.5 Lagged auditor attributes 
As it can be argued that the quality of the audit will only impact the likelihood 
of a firm’s financial distress after some time, the above hypotheses (H1 to H4) are 
reformulated to analyse the pre-one, two, and three years effect of each auditor 
attributes (that is, t-1, t-2, and t-3) on the likelihood of financial distress at t0. The 
following hypotheses are therefore proposed: 
For hypothesis H5 on Big4 auditor: 
H5a: Client firms engaging a Big4 auditor in one will be less likely to suffer 
financial distress one year later. 
H5b: Client firms engaging a Big4 auditor in one year will be less likely to 
suffer financial distress two years later. 
H5c: Client firms engaging a Big4 auditor in one year will be less likely to 
suffer financial distress three years later. 
For hypothesis H6 on non-audit services: 
H6a: Client firms paying higher non-audit service fees to the incumbent auditor 
in one year will be less likely to suffer financial distress one year later. 
H6b: Client firms paying higher non-audit service fees to the incumbent auditor 
in one year will be less likely to suffer financial distress two years later. 
H6c: Client firms paying higher non-audit service fees to the incumbent auditor 
in one year will be less likely to suffer financial distress three years later. 
For hypothesis H7 on audit firm tenure: 
H7a: Client firms with longer audit firm tenure in one year will less be likely to 
suffer financial distress one year later. 
H7b: Client firms with longer audit firm tenure in one year will be less likely to 
suffer financial distress two years later. 
H7c: Client firms with longer audit firm tenure in one year will be less likely to 
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suffer financial distress three years later. 
For hypothesis H8 on audit fees: 
H8a: Client firms paying higher audit fees to the incumbent auditor in one year 
will be less likely to suffer financial distress one year later. 
H8b: Client firms paying higher audit fees to the incumbent auditor in one year 
will be less likely to suffer financial distress two years later. 
H8c: Client firms paying higher audit fees to the incumbent auditor in one year 
will be less likely to suffer financial distress three years later. 
3.3.6 Composite auditor attributes and lagged composite auditor attributes 
So as to capture the multidimensional nature of audit quality (as suggested by 
Balsam 2003 and discussed in section 2.4.5.3), extent literature have commonly used 
a composite score based on different proxies of audit quality. For the purpose of this 
study, to determine the combined influence of the four pivotal auditor attributes on the 
likelihood of financial distress, a composite score based on the four proxy measures 
for auditor quality (namely, big 4 auditor, provision of non- audit services, length of 
audit firm tenure and audit fee) is developed. Therefore, the following hypothesis is 
therefore proposed to test the association between the composite auditor attributes and 
financial distress: 
H9: Client firms engaging an auditor composed of a higher set of quality 
attributes will be less likely to suffer financial distress than client firms 
engaging an auditor composed of a lower set of quality attributes. 
Last, as it can be argued that the quality of the audit will only impact the 
likelihood of a firm’s financial distress after some time, the above hypothesis is 
reformulated to analyse the pre-one, two, and three years effect of the composite 
auditor attributes (that is, t-1, t-2, and t-3) on the likelihood of financial distress at t0. 
From the above, the following hypotheses are therefore proposed: 
H10a: Client firms engaging an auditor composed of a higher set of quality 
attributes in one year will be less likely to suffer financial distress one 
year later. 
H10b: Client firms engaging an auditor composed of a higher set of quality 
attributes in one year will be less likely to suffer financial two years later. 
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H10c: Client firms engaging an auditor composed of a higher set of quality 
attributes in one year will be less likely to suffer financial distress three 
years later. 
3.4 CONCEPTUAL SCHEMA 
The conceptual schema shown in Figures 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 graphically 
illustrates a set of testable hypotheses that were formed with reference to the prior 
literature. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Conceptual Schema for individual auditor attributes 
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Figure 3.2: Conceptual Schema for individual lagged auditor attributes 
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Figure 3.3: Conceptual Schema for composite auditor attributes 
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Figure 3.4: Conceptual Schema for composite lagged auditor attributes 
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3.5 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER 
Chapter Three discussed five main underlying theoretical perspectives 
underpinning corporate governance before adopting agency theory as the most 
appropriate for this thesis. The empirical literature relating to each of the four pivotal 
auditor attributes examined in this study was discussed and the justification for each 
auditor attributes’ expected relationship to financial distress detailed resulting in the 
formulation of a set of testable hypotheses. Finally, conceptual schemas illustrating 
each of these hypotheses were provided. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
RESEARCH METHOD 
4.1 OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTER 
Chapter Four provides details of the research method used to assess the 
hypotheses of this study. Reasoning of the sample selected, the source documentation, 
and the time period is provided in the first part of the chapter. This is then followed by 
details on the measurement of financial distress (the dependent variable of this study). 
Measures to operationalize the auditor attributes analysed in this study are then 
provided. The sensitivity tests to be undertaken are subsequently identified after the 
statistical tests and regression models utilized to test the hypothesis are outlined. 
Finally, a summary of chapter Four is provided. 
4.2 SAMPLE, DOCUMENTATION AND TIME PERIOD 
The following sub-sections provide a justification of the sample firms selected, 
source documentation chosen, and time period analysed. 
4.2.1 Selection justification 
The sample that is used for testing purposes of this study consists of a total of 
2,438 firm-year deemed to be distressed and the same number of firms deemed to be 
healthy (as determined by the Zmijewski ZFC-Score), yielding a total of 4,876 firm-
years observations (spanning over a period of 7 years, that is, from 2008 to 2014 
inclusive). This sample was selected after taking various exclusions into account; as 
detailed below. 
The sample consists of ASX listed firms for the period 2008 to 2014. Initially, 
all of the listed firms (on the ASX) in accordance with the DatAnalysis database are 
obtained for the period 2008 to 2014. The ASX listed firms are chosen because listed 
organizations provide readily accessible information in a suitable operational form. 
Consistent with prior empirical study, banks, financial institutions, stock brokerages, 
insurance and trusts entities are excluded as the financial statements of such entities 
are subject to special accounting regulations (Ferguson; Krishnan, Su, and Zhang 
2011; Fargher, Lee, and Mande 2008; Givoly, Hayn, and Natarajan 2007; Ruddock, 
Taylor, and Taylor 2006; Carey and Simnett 2006; Wu 2004; Givoly and Hayn 2000). 
Furthermore, consistent with Clifford and Evans (1997), unit trusts are excluded since 
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such firms’ financial statements may not be prepared in accordance with the normal 
disclosure requirements as for other firms listed on the ASX. For the firms remaining, 
data required to calculate the Zmijewski ZFC-Score is gathered (downloaded and/or 
hand calculated) and the ZFC-Score10 (as will be outlined in Section 4.3 below) is 
calculated for each of these firms.  
We find a total of 2,438 firm-year observations as distressed firms for the 
period 2008 to 2014. The year wise breakdown shows a total of 496 firms to be 
distressed in 2008, 437 firms in 2009, 326 firms in 2010, 306 firms in 2011, 268 firms 
in 2012, 316 firms in 2013 and 289 distressed firms in 2014. In the second stage, the 
firm-years deemed to be healthy (per the ZFC-Score) are then matched to the closest 
comparable 2,438 distressed firm, based on year, size (proxied by total assets) and 
industry11. The resulting sample provides 4,876 firm-year observations for subsequent 
testing.  
4.2.2 Source documentation justification 
Data for this study are obtained from archival data12 from a number of 
resources namely, Annual Reports Collection (Connect 4 Pty Ltd), Morningstar’s 
DatAnalysis Premium, Osiris, Sirca Corporate Governance Database and Capital IQ. 
Since some of these databases provide similar data (such as financial amounts, which 
can be obtained from DatAnalysis, Osiris, Capital IQ as well as annual reports 
collection (manual collection), steps to verify the accuracy of the information provided 
from these databases are taken. First, sample data for 50 firm-year observations are 
downloaded from each of the three databases (namely, DatAnalysis, Osiris and Capital 
IQ). The same data are then hand-collected and these are then compared to find the 
most accurate database for a given variable13. For some of the variables, since the data 
provided by these databases differs significantly from the data available from financial 
reports, hand-collection of the data is done so as to ensure accuracy of the data used 
for testing in this study. Similar procedures are employed for gathering data for the 
                                                     
10 ZFC_Scoreit = For firm i for time period t, a value of “1” will be assigned if the calculated results using the Zmijewski model 
is equal to or greater than 0.5, otherwise a value “0” will be assigned 
11 Admittedly, the use of matching based solely on the Zmijewski ZFC-Score rather than using both the Zmijewski ZFC-Score 
and the Altman Z2-Score has limitations. However, as will be explained in Chapter Five, these two models show an agreeance 
(whereby both models agree on either a firm-year observation being healthy or distressed) of 79%. Furthermore, this study 
adopts the use of the Zmijewski ZFC-Score model as the main proxy for financial distress. The Altman Z2-Score is only used 
to provide robustness to the main findings. 
12Archival data was selected due to: (1) the inherent limitations of survey research (Baxter and Pragasam 1999); (2) the 
availability of annual reports from a variety of electronic databases (that is, the use of data does not suffer from non-response 
bias); and (3) the objective measures for all the variables of interest can be obtained from data in annual reports. 
13 Though not part of this study, it is important to note that whilst completing these steps to select the most appropriate database 
for each respective variable, significant variations between these databases for the same variable(s) are noted.  
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dependent, independent and control variables (both for the main and sensitivity 
analyses)14,15. Once these are completed, a data verification check is undertaken by 
randomly selecting a sample of 20 firms per calendar year under observation (from 
2008 to 2014) and data further verified to the respective financial reports. 
4.2.3 Time period selection 
This study includes a collective analysis spanning over the 2008 to 2014 
calendar years (inclusive). This time-frame is selected as this period orbits around key 
phases in the corporate governance and financial accounting landscape in Australia as 
well as key global economic events16. Such events include the revisions to the ASX 
CGCs corporate governance guidelines, the execution of CLERP 9 recommendations, 
and the adoption of IFRS as outlined below. 
The first edition of the corporate governance guidelines, Principles of Good 
Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations, was introduced by ASX 
CGC on the 1st January 2003 so as to improve compliance with corporate governance 
practices. The second edition of the Principles of Good Corporate Governance and 
Best Practice Recommendations was released in August 2007 and further amendments 
made on the 30th June 2010 with implementation from the 1st January 201117. Given 
that the period of interest for this study spans from 2008 to 2014 (inclusive), all 
revisions issues by the ASX CGC will be captured. 
Significant changes were made to the Australian auditing and financial 
reporting landscape with the enactment of CLERP 9 in July 2004. This enactment 
became fully effective from the July 2006 financial year (Fargher, Lee, and Mande 
2008). One such example is the necessity of mandatory audit partner rotation every 
five years or less followed by a two-year cooling off period has been effective from 1 
July 2006. The observation window that is used for subsequent testing in this study 
(2008 to 2014) therefore covers these CLERP 9 changes.  
From balance date 30th June 2006, the Australian equivalent of the IFRS 
became applicable to all Australian listed companies meaning the change from 
Australian Generally Accepted Accounting Principles to the Australian equivalent 
                                                     
14 As part of the data collection process, among all databases available, DatAnalysis Premium is found to be most reliable database 
(data closest to the financial report) for statement amounts, and Sirca for corporate governance information. 
15 Consistent with other empirical studies, this study winsorizes all continuous variables at the 1 and 99 percent levels (Pizzini, 
Lin, and Ziegenfuss 2015; Lin et al. 2011; Feng, Li, and McVay 2009). 
16 Market volatility arose from the global financial crisis (GFC) in July 2007 with the sub-prime crisis and the collapse of the US 
housing bubble, resulting in a severe global economic recession in 2008 and 2009 (Roxburgh et al. 2009). 
17 These revisions to the corporate governance guidelines are made so as to improve general business practices and financial 
reporting quality (Australian Securities Exchange Corporate Governance Council (ASX CGC) 2007, 2010). 
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International Financial Reporting Standards. So as to consider the time lag 
consequence with this post-harmonization stage, the year 2008 is selected as the first 
year. This study does not use earlier data as this was under the previous regulations 
outlined above and are therefore of less relevance to the time of interest. In addition, 
this study does not consider any data post 2014 with that year being the most recent 
data available when data collection occurred. 
The findings from this study, for the period selected (2008 to 2014 calendar 
years), will therefore, provide significant implication to regulators by examining the 
impact (if any) of the recommendations related to the auditing discipline in the 
corporate governance reforms in Australia (such as the implementation of CLERP 9 
recommendations) on the auditor attributes/financial distress association.  
The subsequent sections outline the measurement of the dependent variable 
(the Zmijewski ZFC-Score) and independent variables (auditor attributes). 
4.3 MEASUREMENT OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Extant empirical literature on financial distress commonly finds the Zmijewski 
ZFC-Score model to be the most reliable among other accounting ratios model in the 
prediction of financial distress (Carey, Kortum, and Moroney 2011; Wu, Gaunt and 
Gray 2010; Geiger, Raghunandan, and Rama 2006). Wu, Gaunt and Gray (2010) find 
the Zmijewski’s probit model to be the preferred one in the prediction of financial 
distress (not bankruptcy) in comparison with the Altman Z-Score MDA model 
(Multivariate Discriminant Analysis based on accounting ratios) and the Ohlson’s logit 
model (with the use of accounting ratios) because it (the Zmijewski’s model) 
outperforms the Altman’s and Ohlson’s models. Grice, Stephen and Ingram (2001) 
find the Altman Z-Score model to be a useful predictor of financial distress. Dugan 
and Zaygren (1988) find that though the Altman Z-Score only uses manufacturing 
industry firms as in-data, the model is commonly adopted by external auditors to assess 
auditees’ abilities to continue as going concern. Whilst the Altman Z-Score is better 
suited for manufacturing industry firms, the Altman Z2-Score model is a modified 
version of the previous model to include non-manufacturing industry firms (Altman et 
al. 2017). The Altman Z2-Score is therefore not specific to any industry (Grice, 
Stephen and Ingram 2001). Both the Zmijewski’s and Altman’s models are listed by 
Wallace (2004) as tools for predicting financial distress. As a result, both the 
Zmijewski ZFC-Score (1984) and the Altman Z2-Score (1983) are preferred models 
for predicting financial distress for this study. Between these two, this study favours 
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the use of the Zmijewski ZFC-Score model due to the grey area that exists in the 
Altman Z2-Score model which is a score between 1.1 and 2.6 (Altman et al. 2016; 
Danescu and Marginean 2015; Onyiri 2014)18. As such, for the main analysis of this 
study, the Zmijewski ZFC-Score will be used as proxy for financial distress. The 
Altman Z2-Score will be used as an alternate proxy for financial distress for sensitivity 
and robustness testings. 
For the Zmijewski ZFC-Score, firms obtaining scores (probability scores) 
greater or equal to 0.5 are interpreted as distressed whereas firms with probabilities 
less than 0.5 are classified as healthy (Zmijewski 1984). For the Altman Z2-Score, 
firms obtaining a score of less or equal to 2.6 are interpreted as distressed19 (Onyiri 
2014). The dichotomous variables proxying for financial distress, the Zmijewski ZFC-
Score and the Altman Z2-Score models are specified as follows: 
The Zmijewski ZFC-Score is calculated as: 
ZFC-Scoreit =  1
1+𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 (𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖_𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇);  
ZFC-Scoreit is the calculated Zmijewski ZFC-Score (1984) for 
firm i at the period t year. Using this model, a calculated score 
of greater or equal to 0.5 is interpreted as a distressed firm. 
Therefore, a value of one (1) is assigned to firms with a 
calculated score of greater or equal (>=) to 0.5, otherwise, a 
value of zero (0) is assigned.  
Where: 
β0  = -4.336; β1 = -4.513; β2 = 5.679; β3 = 0.004; 
ROAit  = Net Income / Total Asset for firm i in the period t; 
Fin_Levit  = Total Liabilities / Total Assets for firm i in the period t; 
Liquidityit  = Current Assets / Current Liabilities for firm i in the period t. 
  
                                                     
18 Due to the existence of the grey area (between 1.1 and 2.6) extend literature commonly assume a Z2-Score between this grey    
area to most likely experience financial distress if appropriate financial planning is not implemented. 
19 Given the grey area for the Altman’s model, a score < 1.1 is considered distressed, and a score <2.6 (but above 1.1) is interpreted 
as most likely to experience financial distress if no appropriate financial planning is implemented. Extent literature therefore 
use a score <2.6 to be interpreted as distressed (Danescu and Marginean 2015; Onyiri 2014). 
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The Altman Z2-Score is calculated as: 
Z2-Scoreit = β0 + 6.56X1it + 3.26X2it + 6.72X3it + 1.05X4it; 
Z2-Scoreit is the calculated Altman Z2-Score (1983) for firm i at 
the period t year. Using this model, a calculated score of less than 
2.6 is interpreted as a distressed firm. Therefore, a value of one 
(1) is assigned to firms with a calculated score less than 2.6 
otherwise, a value of zero (0) is assigned. β0 (which equals 3.25) 
is not applicable since Australia is not considered an emerging 
market economy. 
Where: 
X1it  = Working Capital/Total Assets for firm i in the period t;  
X2it  = Retained Earnings/Total Assets for firm i in the period t;  
X3it  = EBIT/ Total Assets for firm i in the period t; 
X4it  = Equity/Total Liabilities for firm i in the period t. 
4.4 MEASUREMENT OF THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
The independent variables considered for this study are a number of carefully 
chosen pivotal auditor attributes. Data for the independent variables is collected from 
the financial reports of 4,876 Australian publicly listed firms (as at their respective 
reporting dates) for the calendar years spanning from 2008 to 2014. Measurement 
proxies for the independent variables (used in both the main and sensitivity analyses) 
are detailed in the subsections 4.4.1 to 4.4.4. 
4.4.1 Big firm auditor/auditor reputation (BIG4it/Aud_Spec_30it) 
Extant literature postulate that non-Big 4 auditors may be correlated with lower 
quality audits due to the use of greater “accounting flexibility” (Becker et al. 1998). In 
contrast, Big 4 auditors may be linked with higher quality audits due to the higher risk 
of litigation exposure and loss of reputation (Krishnan 2003; Francis and Schipper 
1999; Becker et al. 1998). For the purpose of this study and as a proxy for Big 4 
auditors, the dichotomous variable BIG4it is used whereby an auditee i is scored a one 
(1) if in the time period t the incumbent auditor is a Big 4 auditor; otherwise a score 
zero (0) is awarded. 
Regarding the dichotomous variable BIG4it for sensitivity purpose of this 
study, extant literature does not provide any other measure to operationalize this 
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variable. However, similar to Big 4 auditors, auditor specialization is also commonly 
associated with auditor reputation in prior empirical studies on audit quality 
(DeBoskey and Jiang 2012; Balsam, Krishnan, and Yang 2003; Krishnan 2003). 
Auditors with industry specialization possess higher industry knowledge as opposed 
to non-industry specialist auditors. This is a consequence of specialized staff training, 
extensive auditing experience, and widespread investments in information technology, 
physical amenities, and organizational control systems. This in turn leads to 
specialized auditors earning a better reputation  (Gramling, Johnson, and Khurana 
1999; Dopuch and Simunic 1980). 
Given the unobservable nature of industry specialization, prior studies have 
used several different proxies to measure this attribute. Such proxies include the 
market leadership, dominance, and market shares approaches (Balsam, Krishnan, and 
Yang 2003; DeFond, Raghunandan, and Subramanyam 2002; Hogan and Jeter 1999; 
Craswell, Francis, and Taylor 1995). Relying on the hypothesis that industry expertise 
is built on reiteration in similar settings, market share is the most frequently used proxy 
to measure auditor industry specialization (Knechel, Naiker, and Pacheco 2007; 
Krishnan 2003; Balsam, Krishnan, and Yang 2003; Carcello and Nagy 2004). From 
the market share approach, an industry specialist is defined as an audit firm that 
distinguishes itself from other audit firms based on its market share within a specific 
industry (Krishnan 2003). A specialist auditor (based on the above definition) can yield 
a higher quality audit and consequently a higher reputation due to the reflection of 
higher sophisticated industry specific audit technology (Mayhew and Wilkins 2003). 
 This study will therefore adopt the market share approach to proxy for auditor 
specialization. Consistent with previous scholars (Knechel and Vanstraelen 2007; 
Jenkins, Kane, and Velury 2006; Ferguson and Stokes 2002) auditor specialization is 
calculated using the sum of sales of all clients of an audit firm in a specific industry 
over the sales of all clients (whether audited by a Big 4 or non-Big 4 auditor) in that 
respective industry. Using a conservatism approach, an auditor with a 30% market 
share is then defined as a specialist auditor. Therefore, for Aud_Spec_30it, a client firm 
i in industry k is scored one (1) if in time period t an auditor defined as an industry 
specialist in industry k is engaged; otherwise client firm i is scored zero (0). 
4.4.2 Non-audit services (RNon-Auditit, and CNon-Auditit) 
Extant literature provides two diverging views when it comes to the provision 
of non-audit services. The first is against incumbent auditors providing non-audit 
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services due to the risk of impacting on the auditors’ independence. This can be as a 
result of financial dependence (especially if the auditors earn more from the provision 
of non-audit services) whereby auditors may harm their independence over potential 
reputation loss or litigation (DeAngelo 1981; Reynolds, Deis, and Francis 2004). The 
other view is knowledge spilled-over hypothesis which states that if incumbent 
auditors are to also provide the auditee with non-audit services, this will result in an 
increase in the auditor knowledge about the auditee and consequently an improvement 
in the efficiency in detecting misstatements (Stanley 2011; Griffin and Lont 2010; 
Callaghan et al. 2009; Geiger and Rama 2003; Gul et al. 2007; Schneider et al. 2006; 
Lennox 2005; Larcker and Richardson 2004; Menon and Williams 2004; Barkess et 
al. 2002; Franker et al. 2002; Beaver 1966). Given the strict regulations in place in 
Australia aiming towards the preservation of auditors’ independence, this study 
favours the knowledge spilled over hypothesis which provides for a positive 
association between the provision of non-audit services and the quality and efficiency 
of the audit. 
Empirical research on the provision of non-audit services commonly uses one 
continuous measure of non- audit fees (RNon-Auditit), namely, the ratio of non-audit 
fees to total fees and one dichotomous measure (CNon-Auditit) whereby a firm i in 
time period t is scored 1 if the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees (RNon-Auditit) is less 
than or equal to 25%  (Huang, Mishra, and Raghunandan 2007; Reynolds, Deis, and 
Francis 2004; Ashbaugh, LaFond, and Mayhew 2003; Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson 
2002). So as to capture the broad extant of economic bonding between the auditor and 
the auditee, this study will use both of these proxies for the provision of non-audit 
services. The continuous measure, RNon-Auditit will be used for the main testings of 
the hypotheses and the dichotomous measure, CNon-Auditit will be used in the 
sensitivity tests. 
4.4.3 Audit tenure (Ln_Aud_Tenit and Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit) 
The audit tenure variable is operationalized by the length of time (in years) 
during which the incumbent audit firm has been acting as the incumbent auditor for 
the client firm. Empirical studies on audit tenure have commonly used either audit firm 
tenure or audit partner tenure as proxy for audit tenure (Fargher, Lee, and Mande 2008; 
Carey and Simnett 2006; Carcello and Nagy 2004; Simunic and Stein 1987; DeAngelo 
1981). As with the provision of non-audit services, in order to comprehensively 
capture the influence of the audit engagement tenure, this study will use both proxies 
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of audit tenure. Consistent with extant literature, logarithmic transformation of the 
audit tenure variable is necessary so as to ensure a better linear fit. The continuous 
measure representing audit firm tenure, Ln_Aud_Tenit will be used for the main 
testings of the hypotheses and the continuous measure representing audit partner 
tenure, Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit will be used in the sensitivity tests. 
4.4.4 Audit fee (Ln_Aud_Feeit and Prop_Aud_Feeit) 
Empirical studies on audit fee commonly conclude a positive association 
between audit fee and the quality of the audit. One such study is Wuchun (2011) which 
finds such a positive association and further explains the higher fees to be as a 
consequence of more time spent on the audit, the hiring of more experienced auditors, 
and the higher level of training and support provided to the audit team. These findings 
are also consistent with other extant literature looking into the impact of variations of 
audit fees on the quality of the audit (Reichelt and Wang 2010; David et al. 2006; 
Romanus et al. 2008; Reynolds et al. 2004; Frankel et al. 2002; Craswell et al. 2002; 
DeFond et al. 2002; Becker et al. 1998; Craswell et al. 1995; Teoh and Wong 1993).  
As is common in the prior studies looking into audit fee, data for audit fees 
usually requires transformation due to issues with linearity (Simunic 1980; Hair et al. 
1995). Extant literature typically adopts two different approaches to achieve this. First, 
a logarithm transformation is performed so as to ensure a better linear fit in order to 
undertake subsequent regression testing. The second approach to ensure linearity is to 
deflate audit fees by the auditee size (such as total assets held by the auditee) so that 
any variation in audit fees is unlikely to be due to the size of the auditee. In order to 
comprehensively capture the influence of audit fee, this study will use both approaches 
to capture audit fee. The continuous measure representing the natural log of audit fee, 
Ln_Aud_Feeit will be used for the main testings of the hypotheses and the continuous 
measure representing proportion of audit fee to total assets held by the auditee, 
Prop_Aud_Feeit will be used in the sensitivity tests. 
4.4.5 Composite auditor attributes for audit quality (AQit) 
To determine the combined influence of the four pivotal auditor attributes on 
the likelihood of financial distress, a composite score based on the four proxy measures 
for auditor quality (namely, big 4 auditor, provision of non- audit services, length of 
audit firm tenure and audit fee) is used. Where the variables are continuous, they will 
be transformed to a dichotomous variable by assigning a value of one (1) if the value 
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is above the mean of the respective variable; otherwise a value of zero (0) is assigned 
(Prawitt, Smith and Wood 2009). This composite score is denoted as AQit. Thus, the 
AQ score for auditee i in time period t is equal to Big4it + RNon-Auditit + Ln_Aud_Tenit 
+ Ln_Aud_Feeit (whereby all variables are transformed to dichotomous variables).  
4.5 MEASUREMENT OF THE CONTROL VARIABLES 
4.5.1 Justification for inclusion of control variables 
4.5.1.1 Firm characteristics 
There are numerous diverse features of firm characteristics which may have an 
influence on the firm’s financial distress. The following sub-sections explain these. 
4.5.1.1.1 Firm’s size 
Firm size is commonly found to influence financial distress in extant literature 
(Baxter 2006) and is also associated with successful turnaround of firms’ distressed 
position (Smith and Grave 2005). Usually, firm size is measured by market 
capitalization, total assets, total sales and number of employees (Gul, Jaggi, and 
Krishnan 2007; Rosner 2003; Altman 1968). For the purpose of analysis, this study 
proxies size of firm i at time period t with (a) the natural log of total assets 
Ln_Total_Assetsit and (b) the square root of number of employees Sq_Empit for the 
main analyses and (c) natural log of market capitalization Ln_Market_Capit and (d) 
natural log of sales Ln_Salesit for the sensitivity analyses. 
4.5.1.1.2 Firm’s risk 
There are a number of different aspects to firms’ risks which can impact on 
financial distress. Extant literature commonly agrees that firms with reported 
consecutive losses are deemed riskier and as such more prone to facing financial 
distress (Wu, Gaunt, and Gray 2010; Beaver, McNichols, and Rhie 2005). Similarly, 
firms with reported higher level of leverage are deemed riskier and lead to an increase 
in the distressed level. Consistent with prior literature, leverage is measured as the ratio 
of total debt to total assets (Gul, Jaggi, and Krishnan 2007; Balsam, Krishnan, and 
Yang 2003). Last, extant literature also finds return of assets (ROA) to impact on 
financial distress. Previous studies find the lower the return (on assets), the poorer the 
firm’s financial performance and consequently, the higher the likelihood of financial 
distress. Consistent with prior literature, this study measures return on assets (ROA) as 
the earnings before interest and tax over the total assets at year-end. For the purpose of 
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the main analyses, this study proxies risk of firm i at time period t with (a) a 
dichotomous variable representing loss Lossit, (b) the leverage Leverageit and (c) the 
return of assets ROAit 20. 
4.5.1.1.3 Firm’s complexity 
There are a number of different aspects to firm complexity which may impact 
on financial distress. Studies have been conducted using the number of business 
(geographic) segments as a measure of firm complexity (Wu, Gaunt, and Gay 2010; 
Choi et al. 2004; Francis and Simon 1987; Francis 1984). It is anticipated that firms 
with a higher number of business segments face a lower likelihood of financial distress. 
The rationale for this is that firms with different business segments are not influenced 
as much by adverse effects affecting one specific segment and as such, are able to 
hedge their risks (Wu, Gaunt, and Gay 2010). Similarly, segment (offshore) sales are 
expected to reduce the likelihood of financial distress since firms making offshore sales 
have access to a greater market base (therefore well diversified) and as such are able 
to hedge their risk of market fluctuations in their base country (Wu, Gaunt, and Gay 
2010; Taylor 1997).  Consistent with prior literature, this study measures firm’s 
complexity with proportion of segment sales Prop_Segment_Salesit for the main 
analysis and number of geographic segments No_Geographic_Segementsit for 
sensitivity testings. 
4.5.1.1.4 Firm’s maturity 
Firm’s maturity is also found to be a common factor in extant literature which 
may impact on financial distress. Older, larger and well diversified firms are found to 
be more able to trade through difficult times (such as economic downturns) and as 
such, less likely to face financial distress or more likely to reverse a previously 
distressed position (Wu, Gaunt, and Gray 2010; Beaver, McNichols, and Rhie 2005; 
Denis, Denis, and Sarin 1997). As such, consistent with prior literature, this study 
measures firm’s maturity with the natural log of age Ln_Ageit. 
4.5.1.2 Accounting discretion and other auditor attribute 
Regarding accounting discretion and other auditor attributes (not included as 
an independent variable for the purpose of this study, such as auditor opinion) extant 
                                                     
20 Since the inclusions of variables representing financial leverage Leverageit and return on assets ROAit can be argued since these 
variables are also used in the Zmijewski ZFC-Score model, analyses will be re-run and the control variables Leverageit and ROAit 
will then be omitted. 
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literature shows the possibility of the following impacting financial distress. 
4.5.1.2.1 Earnings quality 
Warfield, Wild, and Wild (1995) suggest that the use of abnormal accruals to 
reduce the perception of risk by firms deemed riskier can be common practice. With 
the use of abnormal accruals, such firms may be able to show a positive performance 
and hence a lower risk of being distressed in the shorter term only before such a 
(hidden) distressed position results in insolvency. The valuation of normal and 
abnormal accruals was first introduced by Jones (1991) and subsequently adopted or 
modified by other scholars to test year and industry performance-matched 
discretionary accruals. Such scholars include Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995); 
Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005); Louis (2004); Bowen, Rajgopal, and 
Venkatachalam (2008) and Klein (2002). The Jones (1991) model, as follows, will be 
used in this study as a proxy of discretionary-accruals.  
TACit/TAit-1 = β1(1/TAit-1) + β2((ΔRevit /TAit-1 -ΔARit/TAit-1) + β3PPEit/TAit-1 + εit 
 
Where: 
β1,2,3    = Estimated coefficients; 
TACit = Total accruals in time period t for firm i; 
ΔREVit  =Revenue in time period t less revenue in time period t-1 for firm i; 
ΔARit  =Account receivables in time period t less account receivable in 
time period t-1 for firm i; 
PPEit  = Gross property, plant, and equipment in time period t for firm i; 
TAit-1  = Total assets in time period t-1 for firm i; 
εit = Error term representing discretionary accruals in period t for 
firm i. 
|Earnings_Quality_EQ|it, a continuous variable, will be the absolute value of the εit for firm i at time 
period t, after the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model is run. The cash-flow statement 
approach by Collins and Hribar (2002) is used to determine the level of discretionary accruals: 
TACit = NIit – CFOit 
 
Where: 
TACit  = Total accruals in time period t for firm i; 
NIit  = Earnings before extraordinary items & discontinued operations in time period t for firm 
i; 
CFOit  = Net cash flow from operating activities (taken directly from the statement of cash flows) 
in time period t for firm i. 
4.5.1.2.2 Auditor opinion 
Butler, Leone, and Willenborg (2004) finds firms issued with going-concern 
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auditor’s report are likely undergoing severe financial distress. Other similar prior 
studies have examined the association between financial distress and the type of 
auditor’s opinion issued such the issuance of going-concern reports, and the likelihood 
of receiving a modified auditor’s opinion (Chi and Chin 2011; Liu and Wang 2005; 
Stanley 2011; Carey and Simnett 2006; Choi et al. 2004; Carcello and Neal 2000)  and 
find a significant positive association. As such, consistent with prior literature, this 
study controls for the auditor’s opinion with the use of the dichotomous variable 
Aud_Opinionit21. 
4.5.1.3 Firm corporate governance characteristics 
There are numerous diverse features of firm corporate governance 
characteristics which may have an influence on the firm’s financial distress. The 
following sub-sections explain these. 
4.5.1.3.1 Board of directors 
Prior studies find the board of directors play an important role in ensuring the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the financial reporting process. Board of directors of 
firms have a fiduciary duty to ensure the integrity of the firm’s process of financial 
reporting. Extant literature commonly use the following proxies for an effective and 
efficient board of directors: (1) Board independence (Defond, Hann, and Hu 2005; 
Lee, Mande, and Ortman 2004; Denis, Denis, and Sarin 1997); (2) Board tenure 
(Carcello et al. 2002; Denis, Denis, and Sarin 1997; Karamanou and Vafeas 2005); (3) 
CEO duality (Lee, Mande, and Ortman 2004; Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb 2004) and 
(4) Board financial expertise (Singh 2010; Carcello et al. 2002). 
For this study, for firm i in the period t, the measurements for the above 
variables are as follow: (1) Board independence, Prop_BoD_Indit, will be assigned the 
percentage of independent directors to total number of directors on the board; (2) Board 
tenure, BoD_Tenureit, will be assigned the average number of years the member have 
served on the board; (3) CEO duality, CEO_Dualityit, will be assigned a dummy 
variable, whereby a value of one (1) is awarded if the CEO and Chair of the board are 
the same person; and (4) Board financial expertise, BoD_Financial_Expertiseit, will be 
assigned a dummy variable,  whereby a value of one (1) if the board consists of at least 
                                                     
21 This study does not include audit opinion as an independent variable for the analysis because (1) audit opinion is not one of the 
pivotal proxy for audit quality in extant literature and (2) there also exist studies looking at the association between financial 
distress and auditor’s opinion in extant literature (Chi and Chin 2011; Stanley 2011; Carey and Simnett 2006;  Liu and Wang 
2005; Choi et al. 2004; Carcello and Neal 2000). 
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50% financial expert during the year22. 
4.5.1.3.2 Audit committee 
Prior studies find a firm’s audit committee plays an important role in ensuring 
the effectiveness and efficiency of the financial reporting process. The quality and 
existence of the audit committee is commonly proxied with: (1) the existence of an 
audit committee (Carcello et al. 2011; Krishnan 2005); (2) the number of members on 
the audit committee board (Krishnan 2005); (3) the audit committee independence 
(Carcello et al. 2011; Chen and Zhou 2007; Xie, Davidson, and Dadalt 2003; Abbott et 
al. 2003; Klein 2002); (4) the number of audit committee meetings (Stewart and Munro 
2007; Abbott, Parker, and Peters 2004; Abbott et al. 2003); and (5) financial expertise 
(Krishnan and Visvanathan 2007; Dhaliwal et al. 2006; Defond et al. 2005). 
For this study, for firm i in the period t, the measurements of the above 
variables are as follow: (1) the existence of an audit committee, Aud_Comit, will be 
assigned a dichotomous variable whereby a value of one (1) is awarded if the firm has 
an audit committee during the year; (2) the number of members on the audit committee 
board, AC_Sizeit, will be assigned the number of members on the audit committee 
board; (3) the audit committee independence which is calculated as the proportion of 
independent members in the audit committee board, Prop_Aud_Com_Indit; (4) the 
number of audit committee meetings; Aud_Com_Meetit, will be assigned the number 
of audit committee meetings held during the year; and (5) the audit committee financial 
expertise, Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit, will be assigned a dummy variable,  
whereby a value of one (1) if the board consists of at least 50% financial expert during 
the year23. 
4.5.1.4 Industry effects 
For the purposes of this study, impact of specific industry (Industryit) is 
controlled due to the likelihood of sample firms to concentrate on a small number of 
industries. Consequently, the variable Industryit controls variances in the likelihood of 
financial distress between sectors. For empirical testing of this study, the variable 
Industryit is assigned a value of one (1) if the client firm i in the time period t is from 
                                                     
22 Following Agrawal and Knoeber (1996); and Klein (1998), a value of 1 is awarded if 50% of more of the members of the board 
have financial expertise; otherwise 0 is awarded. Financial Expertise is measured as (1) Financial Related Qualification (CA, 
or CPA); and (2) Over 5 years’ experience as a member of a board. 
23 Following Klein (1998) and Krishnan and Visvanathan (2007), a value of 1 is awarded if 50% of more of the members of the 
board have financial expertise; otherwise 0 is awarded. Financial Expertise is measured as (1) Financial Related Qualification 
(CA, or CPA); and (2) Over 5 years’ experience as a member of a board. 
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one respective GICS industry; otherwise a value of zero (0) is assigned. This study 
uses nine industry classifications namely, Materials, Energy, Industrials, Consumer 
Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Health Care, Information Technology, 
Telecommunication Services, and Utilities. 
4.5.1.5 Year effects 
Since the magnitude of financial distress can vary by year, year dummies, 
Yearit, are also used in this study to control for fixed year effects. The variable Yearit 
represent series indicator variables controlling for time temporal variances of reporting 
periods for each firm-year observations whereby a score of one (1) is awarded to firm 
i if the data corresponds to time period t; otherwise a value of zero (0) is assigned. 
Analyses of this study will be performed over the calendar years spanning from 2008 
to 2014 (that is, a seven-year observation window). 
4.6 STATISTICAL REGRESSION MODEL 
This study uses linear regression models to test the hypotheses formulated from 
the association between financial distress and pivotal external auditor attributes. In so 
doing, a range of factors likely to influence financial distress will be controlled for. In 
addition to examining the impact of each individual auditor attributes in isolation, this 
study will also investigate the unison effect of all four pivotal auditor attributes on 
financial distress. Last, for each of the analyses stated above, the lagged effect of the 
four pivotal auditor attributes (both in isolation and in unison) will be examined. 
The linear regression analyses used to examine the predicted relationships of 
the auditor attributes are as follows: 
 
ZFCit = β0+β1Big4it+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β4AC_Sizeit+β5Prop_Aud_Co
m_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7Prop_Segment_Salesit+β8Ln_Total_Assetsit+β9
Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12Lossit+β13Leverageit+β14ROAit+β15Aud
_Opinionit+β16Industryit+β17Yearit+εit; 
 
[1] 
ZFCit = β0+β1RNon_Auditit+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β4AC_Sizeit+β5Prop_
Aud_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7Prop_Segment_Salesit+β8Ln_Total_As
setsit+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12Lossit+β13Leverageit+β14ROAit
+β15Aud_Opinionit+β16Industryit+β17Yearit+εit; 
 
[2] 
ZFCit = β0+β1Aud_Tenit+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β4AC_Sizeit+β5Prop_Aud
_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7Prop_Segment_Salesit+β8Ln_Total_Assetsit
+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12Lossit+β13Leverageit+β14ROAit+β15
Aud_Opinionit+β16Industryit+β17Yearit+εit; 
 
[3] 
ZFCit = β0+β1Aud_Feeit+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β4AC_Sizeit+β5Prop_Aud
_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7Prop_Segment_Salesit+β8Ln_Total_Assetsit
+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12Lossit+β13Leverageit+β14ROAit+β15
Aud_Opinionit+β16Industryit+β17Yearit+εit; 
 
[4] 
ZFCit = β0+β1Big4it+β2RNon_Auditit+β3Aud_Tenit+β4Aud_Feeit+β5Prop_BoD_Indit+β6BoD_Financia [5] 
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l_Expertiseit+β7AC_Sizeit+β8Prop_Aud_Com_Indit+β9Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β10Pr
op_Segment_Salesit+β11Ln_Total_Assetsit+β12Sq_Empit+β13Ln_Ageit+β14Earnings_Quality_E
Qit+β15Lossit+β16Leverageit+β17ROAit+β18Aud_Opinionit+ β19Industryit+β20Yearit+εit. 
 
The linear regression analyses used to examine the predicted relationships of 
the lagged auditor attributes are as follows: 
 
For a one-year lag: 
 
ZFCit = β0+β1L.Big4it+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β4AC_Sizeit+β5Prop_Aud_
Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7Prop_Segment_Salesit+β8Ln_Total_Assetsit
+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12Lossit+β13Leverageit+β14ROAit+β15
Aud_Opinionit+β16Industryit+β17Yearit+ εit; 
 
[6] 
ZFCit = β0+β1L.RNon_Auditit+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β4AC_Sizeit+β5Prop
_Aud_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7Prop_Segment_Salesit+β8Ln_Total_A
ssetsit+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12Lossit+β13Leverageit+β14ROAi
t+β15Aud_Opinionit+β16Industryit+β17Yearit+ εit; 
 
[7] 
ZFCit = β0+β1L.Aud_Tenit+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β4AC_Sizeit+β5Prop_A
ud_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7Prop_Segment_Salesit+β8Ln_Total_Asse
tsit+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12Lossit+β13Leverageit+β14ROAit+β
15Aud_Opinionit+β16Industryit+β17Yearit+ εit; 
 
[8] 
ZFCit = β0+β1L.Aud_Feeit+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β4AC_Sizeit+β5Prop_A
ud_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7Prop_Segment_Salesit+β8Ln_Total_Asse
tsit+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12Lossit+β13Leverageit+β14ROAit+β
15Aud_Opinionit+β16Industryit+β17Yearit+ εit; 
 
[9] 
ZFCit = β0+β1L.Big4it+β2L.RNon_Auditit+β3L.Aud_Tenit+β4L.Aud_Feeit+β5Prop_BoD_Indit+β6BoD_
Financial_Expertiseit+β7AC_Sizeit+β8Prop_Aud_Com_Indit+β9Aud_Com_Financial_Expertis
eit+β10Prop_Segment_Salesit+β11Ln_Total_Assetsit+β12Sq_Empit+β13Ln_Ageit+β14Earnings_Q
uality_EQit+β15Lossit+β16Leverageit+β17ROAit+β18Aud_Opinionit+ β19Industryit+β20Yearit + 
εit; 
 
For a two-years lag: 
 
[10] 
ZFCit = β0+β1L2.Big4it+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β4AC_Sizeit+β5Prop_Aud_
Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7Prop_Segment_Salesit+β8Ln_Total_Assetsit
+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12Lossit+β13Leverageit+β14ROAit+β15
Aud_Opinionit+β16Industryit+β17Yearit+ εit; 
 
[11] 
ZFCit = β0+β1L2.RNon_Auditit+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β4AC_Sizeit+β5Pro
p_Aud_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7Prop_Segment_Salesit+β8Ln_Total_
Assetsit+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12Lossit+β13Leverageit+β14RO
Ait+β15Aud_Opinionit+β16Industryit+β17Yearit+ εit; 
 
[12] 
ZFCit = β0+β1L2.Aud_Tenit+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β4AC_Sizeit+β5Prop_
Aud_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7Prop_Segment_Salesit+β8Ln_Total_As
setsit+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12Lossit+β13Leverageit+β14ROAit
+β15Aud_Opinionit+β16Industryit+β17Yearit+ εit; 
 
[13] 
ZFCit = β0+β1L2.Aud_Feeit+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β4AC_Sizeit+β5Prop_
Aud_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7Prop_Segment_Salesit+β8Ln_Total_As
setsit+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12Lossit+β13Leverageit+β14ROAit
+β15Aud_Opinionit+β16Industryit+β17Yearit+ εit; 
 
[14] 
ZFCit = β0+β1L2.Big4it+β2L2.RNon_Auditit+β3L2.Aud_Tenit+β4L2.Aud_Feeit+β5Prop_BoD_Indit+β6B
oD_Financial_Expertiseit+β7AC_Sizeit+β8Prop_Aud_Com_Indit+β9Aud_Com_Financial_Exp
ertiseit+β10Prop_Segment_Salesit+β11Ln_Total_Assetsit+β12Sq_Empit+β13Ln_Ageit+β14Earnin
gs_Quality_EQit+β15Lossit+β16Leverageit+β17ROAit+β18Aud_Opinionit+ 
β19Industryit+β20Yearit+ εit; 
[15] 
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For a three-years lag: 
 
ZFCit = β0+β1L3.Big4it+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β4AC_Sizeit+β5Prop_Aud
_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7Prop_Segment_Salesit+β8Ln_Total_Assetsit
+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12Lossit+β13Leverageit+β14ROAit+β15
Aud_Opinionit+β16Industryit+β17Yearit+ εit; 
 
[16] 
ZFCit = β0+β1L3.RNon_Auditit+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β4AC_Sizeit+β5Pro
p_Aud_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7Prop_Segment_Salesit+β8Ln_Total_
Assetsit+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12Lossit+β13Leverageit+β14RO
Ait+β15Aud_Opinionit+β16Industryit+β17Yearit+ εit; 
 
[17] 
ZFCit = β0+β1L3.Aud_Tenit+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β4AC_Sizeit+β5Prop_
Aud_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7Prop_Segment_Salesit+β8Ln_Total_As
setsit+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12Lossit+β13Leverageit+β14ROAit
+β15Aud_Opinionit+β16Industryit+β17Yearit+ εit; 
 
[18] 
ZFCit = β0+β1L3.Aud_Feeit+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β4AC_Sizeit+β5Prop_
Aud_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7Prop_Segment_Salesit+β8Ln_Total_As
setsit+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12Lossit+β13Leverageit+β14ROAit
+β15Aud_Opinionit+β16Industryit+β17Yearit+ εit; 
 
[19] 
ZFCit = β0+β1L3.Big4it+β2L3.RNon_Auditit+β3L3.Aud_Tenit+β4L3.Aud_Feeit+β5Prop_BoD_Indit+β6B
oD_Financial_Expertiseit+β7AC_Sizeit+β8Prop_Aud_Com_Indit+β9Aud_Com_Financial_Exp
ertiseit+β10Prop_Segment_Salesit+β11Ln_Total_Assetsit+β12Sq_Empit+β13Ln_Ageit+β14Earnin
gs_Quality_EQit+β15Lossit+β16Leverageit+β17ROAit+β18Aud_Opinionit+ 
β19Industryit+β20Yearit+ εit. 
 
[20] 
The linear regression analysis used to examine the predicted relationships of 
the auditor attributes in unison is as follows: 
 
ZFCit = β0+β1AQit+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β4AC_Sizeit+β5Prop_Aud_Com
_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7Prop_Segment_Salesit+β8Ln_Total_Assetsit+β9S
q_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12Lossit+β13Leverageit+β14ROAit+β15Aud_
Opinionit+ β16Industryit+β17Yearit+εit,. 
 
[21] 
Finally, the linear regression analyses used to examine the predicted 
relationships of the lagged auditor attributes in unison are as follows: 
 
ZFCit = β0+β1L.AQit+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β4AC_Sizeit+β5Prop_Aud_Co
m_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7Prop_Segment_Salesit+β8Ln_Total_Assetsit+β9
Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12Lossit+β13Leverageit+β14ROAit+β15Aud
_Opinionit+β16Industryit+β17Yearit+ εit; 
 
[22] 
ZFCit = β0+β1L2.AQit+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β4AC_Sizeit+β5Prop_Aud_C
om_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7Prop_Segment_Salesit+β8Ln_Total_Assetsit+β
9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12Lossit+β13Leverageit+β14ROAit+β15Au
d_Opinionit+β16Industryit+β17Yearit+εit; 
 
[23] 
ZFCit = β0+β1L2.AQit+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β4AC_Sizeit+β5Prop_Aud_C
om_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7Prop_Segment_Salesit+β8Ln_Total_Assetsit+β
9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12Lossit+β13Leverageit+β14ROAit+β15Au
d_Opinionit+β16Industryit+β17Yearit+ εit. 
[24] 
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Where (for [1] to [24]): 
β0 to β20  = coefficients; 
ZFCit = For firm i for time period t, a value of “1” will be assigned if the 
calculated results using the Zmijewski model is equal to or greater than 
0.5, otherwise a value “0” will be assigned;  
Big4it  = A dichotomous indicator variable representing Big N auditors; where a 
score of one (1) will be given to firm i if the auditor contracted during 
period t is from a big 4 accounting firm (i.e. KPMG, 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte and Touche and Ernst and Young); 
otherwise a score of zero (0) will be awarded;  
L. / L2. / L3.Big4it  = A dichotomous indicator variable representing lagged Big N auditors; 
where a score of one (1) will be given to firm i if the auditor contracted 
during period t (where t = t-1, t-2, and t-3)24 is from a big 4 accounting firm 
(i.e. KPMG, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte and Touche and Ernst and 
Young); otherwise a score of zero (0) will be awarded;  
RNon-Auditit  = A continuous measure denoting the ratio of fee charged by the auditor 
for the provision of non-audit services to total fees paid to the auditor j by 
auditee i during time period t. Following Palmrose (1986) non-audit 
services is calculated as the fee charged for accounting related 
management advisory services + the fee charged for non-accounting 
related management services + the fee charged for taxation services;  
L. / L2. / L3.RNon-Auditit  = A continuous measure denoting the lagged ratio of fee charged by the 
auditor for the provision of non-audit services to total fees paid to the 
auditor j by auditee i during time period t (where t = t-1, t-2, and t-3). 
Following Palmrose (1986) non-audit services is calculated as the fee 
charged for accounting related management advisory services + the fee 
charged for non-accounting related management services + the fee charged 
for taxation services;  
Aud_Tenit = Natural log of continuous measure denoting the actual number of years 
the auditor (audit firm) held office will be used;  
L. / L2. / L3.Aud_Tenit = Natural log of continuous measure denoting lagged the actual number of 
years the auditor (audit firm) held office will be used during time period t 
(where t = t-1, t-2, and t-3); 
Aud_Feeit    = Natural log of audit fee paid by firm i at the end of time period t; 
L. / L2. / L3.Aud_Feeit  = Natural log of audit fee paid by firm i at the end of time period t (where 
t = t-1, t-2, and t-3); 
AQit   = Sum of the individual component scores underpinning auditor quality 
(i.e. Big4 (Big4it); Non-audit services (RNon-Auditit); audit tenure 
(Aud_Tenit); and audit fee (Aud_Feeit) for firm i at the end of time period 
t; 
L. / L2. / L3.AQit  = Sum of the lagged individual component scores underpinning auditor 
quality (i.e. Big4 (Big4it); Non-audit services (RNon-Auditit); audit tenure 
(Aud_Tenit); and audit fee (Aud_Feeit) for firm i at the end of time period t 
(where t = t-1, t-2, and t-3). 
 
Please refer to Appendix-1 for definitions of all other variables used as part of this study (including 
the control variables.  
 
                                                     
24 Whereby L. represents T-1 as a lag of one year, L2. Represents T-2 as a lag of two years, and L3. Represents 
T-3 as a lag of three years. 
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The set of regressions to test the hypotheses H1, to H10 of this study are 
performed in Chapter Six by regressing independent and control variables in 
Equations [1] to [24] above against the financial distress proxy ZFCit, which is the 
Zmijewski ZFC-Score. Considering that the dependent variable (financial distress) is 
a dichotomous variable, a logistic regression analysis is considered to be a powerful 
technique (Hutcheson and Sofroniou 1999). Therefore, this study focuses on logistic 
regression. 
4.7 CLEANING OF THE DATA 
Verification such as accuracy of data, ascertaining missing values, and 
normality tests are performed prior to commencing data analysis. As outlined in 
Chapter Four, data readily available from databases was downloaded as well as hand-
collected from the respective financial reports. The database (for each respective 
variable) providing the most accurate data was used. If none of the database available 
provided accurate data, these were hand-collected. Once these are completed, a data 
authentication check is further undertaken by randomly selecting a sample of 20 firms 
per calendar year under observation (from 2008 to 2014) and data verified to the 
respective financial reports. 
Consistent with empirical audit quality literature, continuous variables such 
as audit fee are transformed using both natural logarithm and winsorisation in order to 
provide a better linear fit with the dependent variable and increase confidence in 
subsequent regression tests to be undertaken (Wan-Hussin and Bamahros 2013; Lin et 
al. 2011; Hoitash, Hoitash, and Bedard 2009). Extent studies on audit quality find the 
process of winsorising continuous variables to improve robustness of the results 
(Pizzini, Lin, and Ziegenfuss 2015; Lin et al. 2011; Feng, Li, and McVay 2009). 
Consistent with prior literature, this study winsorises all continuous variables at the 1 
and 99 percent levels. Undefined values obtained as a result of natural logarithm are 
replaced to the lowest values. These are performed to remove the effect of influential 
eccentric observations. 
Normality test involves examining each continuous variables skewness and 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov p-value. Though not all variables result in normal distributions, 
these are still included in this study as justified by prior empirical research (Gopalan 
and Jayaraman 2012; Chi, Lisic, and Pevzner 2011; Carcello and Nagy 2004; Balsam, 
Krishnan, and Yang 2003). 
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4.8 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Sensitivity tests will be undertaken to validate the robustness of the findings. 
For the purposes of main analysis, this study proxies financial distress with the use of 
the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. For the purpose of sensitivity analysis, the Altman Z2-
Score will be use. Similarly, alternate measures of the independent variables will be 
used and the regressions mentioned above re-run. As per section 4.4 above, the 
regression models utilized amend Big4it with Aud_Spec_30it; RNon-Auditit with 
Cnon_Auditit; Ln_Aud_Tenit with Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit; and Ln_Aud_Feeit with 
Prop_Aud_Feeit simultaneously. These alternative measures of auditor attributes are 
derived so as to help determine whether the main regressions results are influenced by 
the measures used to proxy for these auditor attributes. 
4.9 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER 
Chapter Four detailed the research method used to test the hypotheses of this 
study. Initially, reasoning of the sample selected, source documentation chosen and 
time period analysed was provided. Subsequently, measures for the dependent 
(financial distress) and independent variables (external auditor attributes) used in this 
study were outlined before the main empirical tests to be performed in this study 
identified. 
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Table 4.1: Details of Control Variables  
Explanatory Variable 
Definition of proxy measure 
Expected 
direction of 
relationship 
(proxy measure) 
Auditee Size    
Ln_Market_Capit  Natural Log of Market capitalisation for firm 
i at the end of time period t.  - 
Ln_Total_Assetsit  Natural log of total assets for firm i at the end 
of time period t.  - 
Ln_Salesit  Natural log of sales / revenue during the year 
for firm i at the end of time period t.  - 
Sq_Empit  Square root of the number of employees for 
firm i at the end of time period t.  ? 
Auditee Risk   
Lossit  A dichotomous indicator variable where firm 
i is given a score of one (1) if the firm 
reported a loss in year t; otherwise, firm i is 
scored zero (0).  
+ 
Leverageit  Total debt to total assets of firm i at the end 
of time period t.  + 
ROAit  The return on assets of firm i at the end of 
time period t.  - 
Aud_Opinionit A dichotomous indicator variable whereby 
firm i is given a score of one (1) if during 
time period t the firm received a qualified 
audit opinion; otherwise, firm i is scored zero 
(0). 
+ 
Auditee Complexity    
Prop_Segment_Salesit  Proportion of offshore sales for firm i at the 
end of time period t.  - 
No_Geographic_Segmentsit  Number of segments outside Australia for 
firm i at the end of time period t.  - 
Auditee Maturity    
Ln_Ageit Natural Log of age of firm i in the period t. - 
Corporate Governance Factors   
Board of Directors   
Prop_BoD_Indit  The proportion of independent directors to 
total number of directors on the board of the 
firm i at the end of time period t.  
- 
BoD_Tenureit  The average number of years for which the 
members on the board of a firm i have served 
on the board at the end of time period t.  
? 
CEO_Dualityit  A dichotomous indicator variable 
representing CEO Duality whereby 1 is 
awarded is the CEO and Chair of the Board 
are the same person; otherwise 0 is awarded. 
- 
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BoD_Financial_Expertiseit  A dichotomous indicator variable 
representing Board of Directors Financial 
Expertise. Following Agrawal and Knoeber 
1996; and Klein 1998, a value of 1 is awarded 
if 50% of more of the members of the board 
have financial expertise; otherwise 0 is 
awarded. Financial Expertise is measured as 
(1) Financial Related Qualification (CA, or 
CPA); and (2) Over 5 years' experience as a 
member of a board. 
- 
Audit Committee   
Aud_Comit  A dichotomous indicator variable 
representing the existence of an audit 
committee for firm i at the end of time period 
t.  
- 
AC_Sizeit The number of member on the Audit 
Committee board for firm i in period t. ? 
Prop_Aud_Com_Indit  The proportion of independent directors to 
total number of directors on the audit 
committee of the firm i at the end of time 
period t.  
- 
Aud_Com_Meetit  The number of audit committee meetings per 
year of firm i at the end of time period t.  - 
Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit  A dichotomous indicator variable 
representing Audit Committee Financial 
Expertise. Following Klein 1998, a value of 
1 is awarded if over 50% of the members of 
the board have financial expertise; otherwise 
0 is awarded. Financial Expertise is 
measured as (1) Financial Related 
Qualification; and (2) Over 5 years’ 
experience as in a finance related role. 
- 
Auditee Industry    
ConsumerDiscit  A dichotomous indicator variable where a 
firm i is given a score one (1) if during the 
time period t the firm belonged to the 
consumer discretionary sector as per the 
GICS standardized classification system; 
otherwise, firm i is scored zero (0).  
? 
ConsumerStapit  A dichotomous indicator variable where a 
firm i is given a score one (1) if during the 
time period t the firm belonged to the 
consumer staples sector as per the GICS 
standardized classification system; 
otherwise, firm i is scored zero (0).  
? 
Energyit  A dichotomous indicator variable where a 
firm i is given a score one (1) if during the 
time period t the firm belonged to the energy 
sector as per the GICS standardized 
classification system; otherwise, firm i is 
scored zero (0).  
? 
76  
HealthCareit  A dichotomous indicator variable where a 
firm i is given a score one (1) if during the 
time period t the firm belonged to the health 
care sector as per the GICS standardized 
classification system; otherwise, firm i is 
scored zero (0).  
? 
Industrialsit  A dichotomous indicator variable where a 
firm i is given a score one (1) if during the 
time period t the firm belonged to the 
industrial sector as per the GICS 
standardized classification system; 
otherwise, firm i is scored zero (0).  
? 
ITit  A dichotomous indicator variable where a 
firm i is given a score one (1) if during the 
time period t the firm belonged to the 
information technology sector as per the 
GICS standardized classification system; 
otherwise, firm i is scored zero (0).  
? 
Materialsit  A dichotomous indicator variable where a 
firm i is given a score one (1) if during the 
time period t the firm belonged to the 
materials sector as per the GICS standardized 
classification system; otherwise, firm i is 
scored zero (0).  
? 
Tel_Servit  A dichotomous indicator variable where a 
firm i is given a score one (1) if during the 
time period t the firm belonged to the 
telecommunication services sector as per the 
GICS standardized classification system; 
otherwise, firm i is scored zero (0).  
? 
Utilitiesit  A dichotomous indicator variable where a 
firm i is given a score one (1) if during the 
time period t the firm belonged to the utilities 
sector as per the GICS standardized 
classification system; otherwise, firm i is 
scored zero (0).  
? 
Other Characteristics   
Earnings_Quality_EQit The modified traditional discretionary 
accrual measures Jones (1995) model. TAit 
= β0(1/ASSETSit-1) + β1(ΔSALESit - 
ΔReceivableit) + β3PPEit + εit (Kothari, 
Leone and Wasley 2005). 
- 
Industry_Dummy Dummy variable for industry of firm i at the 
end of time period t. ? 
Year_Dummy Series indicator variables controlling time 
temporal differences of reporting periods for 
firm-year observations with firm i scored one 
(1) if financial data corresponds to time 
period t; otherwise scored zero (0). 
? 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
5.1 OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTER 
Chapter Five provides a review of the descriptive statistics for the different 
variables used for the purpose of this study by first outlining the steps undertaken in 
the final sample selection. The subsequent sections of this chapter outline the 
descriptive statistics for the dependent variables (namely the Zmijewski ZFC-Score 
and the Altman Z2-Score), the independent variables (namely Big 4 auditor, Auditor 
tenure, the provision of non-audit services [auditor independence] and audit fees), and 
control variables. The association between the two alternative dependent variables is 
then examined prior to a summary to end Chapter Five. 
5.2 BASIC SAMPLE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
5.2.1 Sample selection process and industry breakdown 
The final usable sample for this study consists of 4,876 firm-year observations 
(between 2008 to 2014). Table 5.1 provides a total of 496 distressed firms in 2008, 
437 firms in 2009, 326 firms in 2010, 306 firms in 2011, 268 firms in 2012, 316 firms 
in 2013 and 289 distressed firms in 2014. From this initial sample, firm-years deemed 
to be distressed (per the ZFC-Score) are then matched to the closest comparable 
healthy firm, based on year, size (proxied by total assets) and industry.  
 Table 5.1: Sample Breakdown for Distressed / Healthy Firms for the Period 2008 to 2014 
 Overall % 2008 % 2009 % 2010 % 2011 % 2012 % 2013 % 2014 % 
Distressed firm: 2438 50.00 496 50.00 437 50.00 326 50.00 306 50.00 268 50.00 316 50.00 289 50.00 
Healthy firm: 2438 50.00 496 50.00 437 50.00 326 50.00 306 50.00 268 50.00 316 50.00 289 50.00 
Sub-Total: 4876   992   874   652   612   536   632   578   
Consumer Discretionary 335 6.85 71 7.16 40 4.58 28 4.29 29 4.74 36 6.72 62 9.81 68 11.76 
Consumer Staples 168 3.45 36 3.63 24 2.75 24 3.68 18 2.94 20 3.73 22 3.48 24 4.15 
Energy 764 15.67 134 13.51 145 16.59 116 17.79 108 17.65 88 16.42 94 14.87 74 12.80 
Health Care 452 9.27 102 10.28 92 10.53 66 10.12 44 7.19 40 7.46 66 10.44 42 7.27 
Industrials 593 12.16 94 9.48 83 9.50 86 13.19 80 13.07 52 9.70 82 12.97 116 20.07 
Information Technology 353 7.24 77 7.76 74 8.47 50 7.67 54 8.82 28 5.22 24 3.80 46 7.96 
Materials 2007 41.16 434 43.75 376 43.02 252 38.65 255 41.67 246 45.90 262 41.46 182 31.49 
Teleommunication Services 94 1.93 20 2.02 14 1.60 8 1.23 14 2.29 12 2.24 10 1.58 16 2.77 
Utilities 116 2.38 24 2.42 26 2.97 22 3.37 10 1.63 14 2.61 10 1.58 10 1.73 
Total firm-years 4876   992   874   652   612   536   632   578   
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Table 5.1 shows final sample size to be 992 firms in 2008, 874 firms in 2009, 
652 firms in 2010, 612 firms in 2011, 536 firms in 2012, 632 firms in 2013 and 578 
firms in 2014 (each consisting of 50% healthy and 50% distressed firms (as scored by 
the ZFC-Score). 
Table 5.1 above also presents the industry breakdown of the sample firms. 
Overall, the table reveals that the Materials industry (41.16%) is the most prominent 
sector in the sample, followed by Energy (15.67%). This suggests that over 50% of 
firms sampled (4,876 firm-year observations) for this study is collectively represented 
by the Materials and Energy industry sector (56.83%). On the other hand, the Utilities 
(2.38%) and Telecommunication Services (1.93%) are the least represented sectors in 
the final sample. The representation of firms within each industry contains enough 
observations in the final sample used in this study to control for the industry effects in 
subsequent analysis. 
5.2.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 5.2 shows that the mean of the Zmijewski ZFC-Score (firms facing 
financial distress computed using this model) ZFC_Scoreit is 0.50 (due to the fact that 
this model was use to match distressed firms to healthy firms on a 50:50 ratio) and the 
Altman Z2-Score (firms facing financial distress computed using the Altman model) 
Z2_Scoreit has a mean of 0.32. The implication of this is that 50% and 32% of firms in 
the sample are deemed to be facing financial distress calculated using the Zmijewski 
ZFC-Score and the Altman Z2-Score models.  
Table 5.2 also shows descriptive statistics for the independent variables in the 
sample. The mean of the presence of a Big 425 auditor Big4 it is 0.28 which implies that 
28% of the sampled firms hire a big 4 auditor. Other independent variables in the 
sample, namely the provision of non-audit services RNon-Auditit, auditor tenure 
Aud_Tenit, and audit fee Aud_Feeit have a mean (median) of 0.25 (0.19), 6.91 (3.00) 
and 180,000 (69,000) respectively. That is, sampled firms on average have 25% of 
their total fees charged by the auditor as a fee for the provision of non-audit services, 
the average auditor tenure for the sampled firms is 6.91 years and the average audit fee 
charged to the sampled firms is $180,000. 
                                                     
25The Big-4/brand name audit firms comprise the four largest international accounting/auditing practices, namely, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), KPMG, Ernst & Young (EY), and Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (DTT) (Leung et al. 2011). 
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Table 5.3 also shows descriptive statistics for continuous independent variables 
in relation to ranges of percentiles from 25th percentile to 75th percentile. The RNon-
Auditit ranges from 0.01 (25th percentile) to 0.42 (75th percentile). The Aud_Tenit ranges 
from 2.00 (25th percentile) to 10.00 (75th percentile). The Aud_Feeit ranges from 
408,000 (25th percentile) to 144,000 (75th percentile). 
Pertaining to the dichotomous control variables used in the main analysis of 
this study, the mean for the board of director’s financial expertise 
BoD_Financial_Expertiseit26 being 0.43 signifies that 43% of the sampled firm has at 
least 50% of board members possess a financial related qualification (such as a CA or 
CPA qualification). Similarly, the mean for the audit committee’s financial expertise 
Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit 27 being 0.25 signifies that 25% of the sampled firm 
has at least 50% of the audit committee members with possess a financial related 
qualification and over five years’ experience in a finance related role. The third 
dichotomous control variable, Aud_Opinionit has a mean of 0.23 which means that 23% 
of the firm year observations were issued with a qualified opinion during that year. 
The final dichotomous control variable, Lossit has a mean of 0.48 which means that 
48% of the firm year observations encountered a loss during that year. This value is 
higher than reported in extent literature since half of the sample is distressed. 
In relation to the continuous control variables used in this study, board of 
director independence BoD_Indit has a mean, median and standard deviation of 1.27, 
1.19 and 0.26. The audit committee size AC_Sizeit has a mean, median and standard 
deviation of 3.45, 2.12 and 1.22. The audit committee independence Aud_Com_Indit28 
has a mean, median and standard deviation of 0.18, 0.00 and 0.32. The proportion of 
offshore sales Prop_Segment_Salesit has a mean, median and standard deviation of 
1.19, 1.00 and 0.44. The total assets Total_Assetsit (000’s) has a mean, median and 
standard deviation of 238,000, 14,100 and 95,400. The age of the sampled firm Ageit 
has a mean, median and standard deviation of 19.76, 15.00 and 15.28. The modified 
traditional discretionary accrual Earnings_Quality_EQit has a mean, median and 
standard deviation of 0.15, 0.06 and 0.24. The total liabilities over total assets 
                                                     
26 A dichotomous indicator variable representing Board of Directors Financial Expertise. Following Agrawal and Knoeber 1996; 
and Klein 1998, a value of 1 is awarded if 50% of more of the members of the board have financial expertise; otherwise 0 is 
awarded. Financial Expertise is measured as possessing Financial Related Qualification (such as CA, or CPA). 
27 A dichotomous indicator variable representing Audit Committee Financial Expertise. Following Klein 1998, a value of 1 is 
awarded if over 50% of the members of the board have financial expertise; otherwise 0 is awarded. Financial Expertise is 
measured as (1) Financial Related Qualification; and (2) Over 5 years’ experience as in a finance related role. 
28 The proportion of independent directors to total number of directors on the audit committee of the firm i at the end of time 
period t. 
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Leverageit has a mean, median and standard deviation of 0.48, 0.45 and 0.42. The 
return on assets ROAit has a mean, median and standard deviation of -0.45, -0.17 and 
0.87. 
Last, Table 5.3 further shows descriptive statistics for continuous control 
variables in relation to ranges of percentiles from 25th percentile to 75th percentile. 
Board of director independence BoD_Indit ranges from 1.19 (25th percentile) to 1.46 
(75th percentile).  The audit committee size AC_Sizeit ranges from 1.20 (25th percentile) 
to 4.00 (75th percentile).  The audit committee independence Aud_Com_Indit ranges 
from 0.00 (25th percentile) to 0.26 (75th percentile).  The proportion of offshore sales 
Prop_Segment_Salesit ranges from 1.00 (25th percentile) to 1.00 (75th percentile).  The 
total assets Total_Assetsit (000’s) ranges from 5,163 (25th percentile) to 51,700 (75th 
percentile).  The age of the sampled firm Ageit ranges from 10.00 (25th percentile) to 
26.00 (75th percentile). The modified traditional discretionary accrual 
Earnings_Quality_EQit ranges from 0.10 (25th percentile) to 0.93 (75th percentile).  
The total liabilities over total assets Leverageit ranges from 0.12 (25th percentile) to 
0.57 (75th percentile).  Finally, the return on assets ROAit ranges from -0.58 (25th 
percentile) to 0.03 (75th percentile). The average return on assets being negative 
suggests that firms are losing value, rather than gaining value as measured by the net 
income earned by the firm over the total assets held by the firm. The data is consistent 
with the fact that 48% of all the sampled firms reported a loss. 
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Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Median Std Dev P25 P75 
ZFC_Score it 0.50     
Z2_Scoreit 0.32     
Big4 it 0.28     
RNon-Audit it 0.25 0.19 0.25 0.01 0.42 
Aud_Ten it 6.91 3.00 7.98 2.00 10.00 
Aud_Fee it (000's) 180 69 408 36 144 
BoD_Ind it 1.27 1.19 0.26 1.19 1.46 
BoD_Financial_Expertise it 0.43     
AC_Size it 3.45 2.12 1.22 1.20 4.00 
Aud_Com_Ind it 0.18 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.26 
Aud_Com_Financial_Expertise it  0.25     
Prop_Segment_Sales it 1.19 1.00 0.44 1.00 1.00 
Total_Assets it (000's) 238,000  14,100  95,400  5,163  51,700  
Age it 19.76 15.00 15.28 10.00 26.00 
Earnings_Quality_EQ it 0.15 0.06 0.24 0.10 0.93 
Loss it 0.48     
Leverage it 0.48 0.45 0.42 0.12 0.57 
ROA it -0.45 -0.17 0.87 -0.58 0.03 
Aud_Opinion it 0.23     
Pease refer to Appendix-1 for variables definition. 
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5.3 CORRELATION ANALYSIS 
Table 5.3 presents a correlation matrix reporting Pearson listwise correlation 
coefficients for both the continuous and dichotomous variables used in the main analysis of 
this study. The abovementioned table includes the financial distress proxy, calculated using 
both the Zmijewski ZFC-Score (ZFC_Scoreit) (which will be used for the main analyses) and 
the Altman Z2-Score (Z2_Scoreit) (which will be used for the sensitivity analyses). An 
examination of the correlation coefficients of Table 5.3 reveals that both of these variables are 
significantly correlated with all four key auditor attributes instigated as part of this study (that 
is, the existence of a Big 4 auditor (Big4 it), the ratio of fee charged by the auditor for the 
provision of non-audit services to total fees paid to the auditor (RNon-Auditit), the actual 
number of years the auditor (audit firm) held office (Aud_Tenit), and the total audit fee paid to 
the auditor (Aud_Feeit). All the four independent variables show a negative correlation with 
both proxies for financial distress. For the Zmijewski ZFC-Score, Table 5.3 shows the 
correlation between all four independent variables to be significant at the 0.01 level. In 
addition, Table 5.3 also displays that for the Altman Z2-Score, the correlation between the 
independent variables is also significant at the 0.01 level for three of the independent variables 
(namely, Big4it, RNon-Auditit, and Aud_Tenit). However, the correlation between the 
Z2_Scoreit and the Aud_Feeit is only significant at the 0.05 level (though still negatively 
correlated). 
Further review of the correlation coefficients in Table 5.3 highlights a number of 
significant correlations between the proxies for financial distress and a number of control 
variables. First, there is a significant correlation between the proxies of financial distress and 
the proxy that measures firm size (in this case, the total assets of the firm Total_Assetsit, 
showing smaller firms are more prone to being distressed). Second, Table 5.3 also shows a 
significant correlation between the proxies for financial distress and the proxies for firm risk 
(in this case, Lossit, Leverageit, ROAit and Aud_Opinionit). This is expected since two of those 
proxies (namely, Leverageit and ROAit) are included in the dependent variable calculation. 
Firm complexity (proxied by Prop_Segment_Salesit) also shows a significant correlation with 
both the ZFC_Scoreit and the Z2_Scoreit. Last, key number of proxies for corporate 
governance show strong correlation with both the ZFC_Scoreit and the Z2_Scoreit (namely, 
BoD_Indit, BoD_Financial_Expertiseit, AC_Sizeit, and Aud_Com_Indit). These significant 
correlations between the dependent variables and the control variables are as expected as 
firm’s size, firm’s risk, firm’s complexity and firm’s corporate governance structure are 
expected to affect firm’s likelihood of financial distress. 
Last, Table 5.3 shows no major multicollinearity issues are found since all coefficients 
are within the critical multicollinearity limit of 0.8 (Hair et al. 2010).
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Table 5.3: Pearson Correlation Matrix 
Variables ZFC_Score it Z2_Scorei it Big4 it 
RNon-Audit 
it Aud_Ten it 
Aud_Fee it 
(000's) BoD_Ind it 
BoD_Financ
ial_Expertis
e it 
AC_Size it 
Aud_Com_I
nd it 
Aud_Com_
Financial_E
xpertise it 
Prop_Segme
nt_Sales it 
Total_Asset
s it (000's) Age it 
Earnings_Q
uality_EQ it Loss it Leverage it ROA it 
Aud_Opinio
n it 
ZFC_Score it                    
Z2_Scorei it 0.42***                   
Big4 it -0.30*** -0.31***                  
RNon-Audit it -0.40*** -0.26*** 0.36***                 
Aud_Ten it -0.33*** -0.31*** 0.15*** 0.12***                
Aud_Fee it (000's) -0.08*** -0.04** 0.15*** -0.02 -0.13***               
BoD_Ind it 0.06*** 0.05*** -0.00 -0.06*** -0.25*** 0.33***              
BoD_Financial_Expertise it -0.15*** -0.17*** 0.20*** 0.07*** 0.42*** -0.17*** -0.12***             
AC_Size it 0.04*** 0.03** 0.09*** 0.01 -0.12*** 0.23*** 0.18*** -0.08***            
Aud_Com_Ind it 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.11*** -0.01 -0.16*** 0.31*** 0.55*** -0.14*** 0.61***           
Aud_Com_Financial_Expertise it  0.02 0.03** 0.03* -0.01 -0.05*** 0.08*** 0.04*** 0.02* 0.29*** 0.23***          
Prop_Segment_Sales it -0.12*** -0.08*** 0.17*** 0.07*** -0.00 -0.01 0.04*** 0.06*** 0.03* 0.05*** 0.00         
Total_Assets it (000's) -0.07*** -0.04*** 0.13*** 0.01 -0.14*** 0.69*** 0.34*** -0.15*** 0.18*** 0.26*** 0.06*** -0.02        
Age it 0.02 0.02* 0.09*** -0.00 -0.08*** 0.37*** 0.00 -0.09*** 0.18*** 0.10*** 0.05*** -0.03** 0.33***       
Earnings_Quality_EQ it -0.03** -0.02 0.08*** 0.01 -0.03* 0.11*** 0.05*** -0.07*** 0.03* 0.06*** -0.03* 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.05***      
Loss it -0.23*** -0.41*** 0.01 -0.15*** 0.18*** -0.14*** -0.05*** 0.04** -0.05*** -0.08*** -0.03** -0.03** -0.14*** -0.08*** -0.10***     
Leverage it 0.25*** 0.18*** -0.10*** 0.04*** -0.42*** 0.11*** 0.13*** -0.31*** 0.05*** 0.08*** 0.00 -0.08*** 0.11*** 0.08*** -0.03* 0.01    
ROA it -0.35*** -0.26*** 0.11*** -0.15*** -0.06*** 0.16*** 0.05*** 0.01 0.04*** 0.06*** 0.02 0.01 0.14*** 0.10*** 0.03* -0.23*** 0.11***   
Aud_Opinion it 0.44*** 0.74*** -0.24*** -0.18*** -0.23*** 0.03* 0.05*** -0.11*** 0.01 0.04*** 0.01 -0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.00 -0.53*** 0.14*** 0.22***  
Pease refer to Appendix-1 for variables definition. 
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5.4 ANALYSIS OF THE ZMIJEWSKI ZFC-SCORE AND THE ALTMAN 
Z2-SCORE 
5.4.1 Two-way table between the Zmijewski ZFC-Score and the Altman Z2-
Score 
Table 5.4 presents a four-way table analysing the results obtained from the 
determination of the Zmijewski ZFC-Score and the Altman Z2-Score. From the table, 
it can be seen that the Zmijewski ZFC-Score returns a total of 2,438 healthy firms and 
2,438 distressed firms (as also detailed in section 5.3.1). In contrast, the Altman Z2-
Score, for the same firm-year observations, returns a total of 3,315 healthy firms (68%) 
and 1,561 distressed firms (32%). 
Further review of Table 5.4 shows that between the two models, there is an 
agreeance (whereby both models agree on either a firm-year observation being healthy 
or distressed) of 79%. From the disagreement of 21%, there is a total of 958 firm-year 
observations that the Zmijewski’s model qualify as distressed which is however 
qualified as healthy by the Altman’s model and a total of 81 firm-year observations 
that the Zmijewski’s model qualify as healthy which the Altman’s model does not. 
This disagreement of 21% can be due to these two proxies measuring different aspect 
of what is deemed to be distressed though they both aim at measuring the same event 
(that is a distressed situation) and the oversampling of distressed firms when using the 
ZFC-Score.   
Table 5.4: Two-way table between Zmijewski ZFC-Score and Altman Z2-Score 
ZFC_Score Z2_Score 
0 % 1 % Total 
0 2357 48.34 81 1.66 2438 
1 958 19.65 1480 30.35 2438 
Total 3315 67.99 1561 32.01 4876 
 
5.4.2 Scatter plot between the Zmijewski ZFC-Score and the Altman Z2-Score 
Figure 5.1 presents a scatter plot between the two proxies of financial distress 
namely, the Zmijewski ZFC-Score (ZFC_Scoreit) and the Altman Z2-Score 
(Z2_Scoreit). In order to do so, the continuous value for these variables are used (prior 
to dichotomising). An examination of the scatter plot reveals a declining line of good-
fit between the two variables (which implies that as the value for the ZFC-Score 
increases, the value for the Z2-Score decreases).  
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So as to understand the correlation between these two variables, it is first 
imperative to understand how the raw (continuous values) of these two variables are 
calculated.  
The Zmijewski ZFC-Score is calculated using:  
ZFC-Scoreit =  1
1+𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 (𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖_𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇);  
ZFC-Scoreit is the calculated Zmijewski ZFC-Score (1984) 
for firm i at the period t year. Using this model, a calculated 
score of greater or equal to 0.5 is interpreted as a distressed 
firm. Therefore, a value of one (1) is assigned to firms with 
a calculated score of greater or equal (>=) to 0.5, otherwise, 
a value of zero (0) is assigned.  
Where: 
β0  = -4.336; β1 = -4.513; β2 = 5.679; β3 = 0.004; 
ROAit  = Net Income / Total Asset for firm i in the period t; 
Fin_Levit  = Total Liabilities / Total Assets for firm i in the period t; 
Liquidityit = Current Assets / Current Liabilities for firm i in the period t. 
The Altman Z2-Score is calculated as: 
Z2-Scoreit = β0 + 6.56X1it + 3.26X2it + 6.72X3it + 1.05X4it; 
Z2-Scoreit is the calculated Altman Z2-Score (1983) for firm i 
at the period t year. Using this model, a calculated score of less 
than 2.6 (cut-off) is interpreted as a distressed firm. Therefore, 
a value of one (1) is assigned to firms with a calculated score 
less than 2.6 otherwise, a value of zero (0) is assigned. β0 (which 
equals 3.25) is not applicable since Australia is not considered 
an emerging market economy. 
Where: 
X1it  = Working Capital/Total Assets for firm i in the period t;  
X2it  = Retained Earnings/Total Assets for firm i in the period t;  
X3it  = EBIT/ Total Assets for firm i in the period t; 
X4it  = Equity/Total Liabilities for firm i in the period t. 
From the above calculations, it can be noted that the Altman Z2-Score merely 
provide a cut-off figure, whereby if the figure obtained is below that cut-off point, a 
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value of 1 is awarded, otherwise a value of 0 is awarded. In comparison, when 
calculating the Zmijewski ZFC-Score, a probability score is obtained (rather than a 
cut-off point). This, therefore show that these two models (prior to dichotomising) are 
providing two different benchmarks to determining distress. 
Figure 5.1: Scatter Plot between ZFC-Score and Z2-Score 
 
 
5.5 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER 
Chapter Five provides the descriptive statistics for the data examined in this 
study. Details of the sample selection is provided. An industry breakdown of the final 
usable sample is provided before a comprehensive review undertaken of the 
descriptive statistics of variables. Subsequently, results from correlations were 
reported and discussed. Finally, a scatter-plot and two-way table is provided so as to 
enhance understanding of the two proxies for financial distressed used in this study, 
namely the Zmijewski ZFC-Score and the Altman Z2-Score showing that these two 
proxies for financial distress may be measuring different aspects of financial distress. 
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CHAPTER SIX: 
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS – MULTIPLE REGRESSIONS 
6.1 OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTER 
Chapter Six examines the main empirical results of this study that aim to 
answer the research hypotheses. The examination of key auditor attributes is divided 
into three parts. The first part examines the association of key auditor attributes with 
the Zmijewski ZFC-Score financial distress model. The second part look into the 
lagged effect of key auditor attributes (T-1, T-2 and T-3) with the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
The third part examines the association of key auditor attributes in unison (composite 
score) with the Zmijewski ZFC-Score financial distress model. In so doing, the lag 
effect of the composite auditor attributes (T-1, T-2 and T-3) with the Zmijewski ZFC-
Score will also be examined. All three analyses are completed for a pooled sample of 
firm-year observations. Finally, a summary of Chapter Six is presented. 
6.2 REGRESSION RESULTS 
The subsections in this chapter include the presentation and discussion on the 
outcomes of the multivariate analyses on key auditor attributes on financial distress 
proxied by the likelihood of financial distress (a dichotomous variable) calculated 
using the Zmijewski ZFC-Score model for a pooled sample of firm-year observations 
(sample size n=4,876) over a period from year 2008 to 2014. As stated in Chapter 
Four, logistic regression is used since the dependent variable (financial distress) is a 
dichotomous variable. 
6.2.1 Existence of a key auditor attribute impact on financial distress: The 
Zmijewski Base Model 
Table 6.1 below presents the results of binary logistic regressions where the four 
key auditor attributes used in this study (the existence of a Big 4 auditor (Big4it), the 
ratio of fee charged by the auditor for the provision of non-audit services to total fees 
paid to the auditor (RNon-Auditit), the natural log of the actual number of years the 
auditor (audit firm) held office (Ln_Aud_Tenit), and the natural log of the total audit 
fee paid to the auditor (Ln_Aud_Feeit), are (logistically) regressed against financial 
distress, calculated using Zmijewski ZFC-Score (ZFCit) model with no control 
variables.  
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6.2.1.1 Independent variables 
As shown in column 1 of Table 6.1, the coefficient of the independent variable 
Big 4 auditor (Big4it) is reported to be negative and statistically significant (β = -
20.096, z-statistics (Wald) = -1.423, and p < 0.01). This result is as expected and 
implies that with the use of no control variable, the use of a Big 4 auditor decreases 
the likelihood of financial distress with a goodness-of-fit of 6.63% (that is, Pseudo R2 
of 0.0663). 
Column 2 of Table 6.1 below shows the coefficient of the independent variable 
proxying for the provision for non-audit services, calculated as the ratio of fee charged 
by the auditor for the provision of non-audit services to total fees paid to the auditor 
(RNon-Auditit) is reported to be negative and statistically significant (β = -24.103, z-
statistics (Wald) = -3.801, and p < 0.01). This result is as expected and implies that 
with the use of no control variable, audit firm tenure decreases the likelihood of 
financial distress with a goodness-of-fit of 12.4% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.124). 
Column 3 of Table 6.1 below shows the coefficient of the independent variable 
proxying for the natural log of the actual number of years the auditor (audit firm) held 
office (Ln_Aud_Tenit) is reported to be negative and statistically significant (β = -
23.053, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.703, and p < 0.01). This result is as expected and 
implies that with the use of no control variable, audit firm tenure decreases the 
likelihood of financial distress with a goodness-of-fit of 8.86% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 
0.0886). 
Column 4 of Table 6.1 below shows the coefficient of the independent variable 
proxying the natural log of the total audit fee paid to the auditor (Ln_Aud_Feeit) is 
reported to be positive and statistically significant (β = 5.683, z-statistics (Wald) = 
0.174, and p < 0.01) though a negative coefficient is expected. This result implies that 
with the use of no control variable the higher the fee paid to the auditor the higher 
likelihood of financial distress with a goodness-of-fit of 6.12% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 
0.00612). 
Last column 5 of Table 6.1 shows that when all four independent variables are 
simultaneously regressed (logistically) against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score, comparable 
results to as outlined above is obtained (Big4it  - β = -8.717, z-statistics (Wald) = -
0.784, and p < 0.01, RNon-Auditit - β = -17.560, z-statistics (Wald) = -3.607, and p < 
0.01, Ln_Aud_Tenit - β = -19.700, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.684 and p < 0.01, 
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Ln_Aud_Feeit - β = 4.485, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.163, and p < 0.01) and an overall 
goodness-of-fit of 22.50% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.225) which implies that that unison 
effect of all four independent variables affect the Zmijewski ZFC-Score by 22.50%. 
In this case (when all four independent variables are simultaneously regressed) the 
coefficient and statistical significance are comparable to when each variable is 
independently regressed. 
Table 6.1: Logistic Regression Results - Key Auditor Attributes and Zmijewski ZFC 
Score – Base Model 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Big4it -1.423***    -0.784*** 
 (-20.096)    (-8.717) 
RNon-Auditit  -3.801***   -3.607*** 
  (-24.103)   (-17.560) 
Ln_Aud_Tenit   -0.703***  -0.684*** 
   (-23.053)  (-19.700) 
Ln_Aud_Feeit    0.174*** 0.163*** 
    (5.683) (4.485) 
Constant 0.376*** 0.926*** 0.942*** -2.028*** 0.109 
 (10.963) (20.212) (18.253) (-5.829) (0.259) 
Observations 4,876 4,876 4,876 4,876 4,876 
Year_Dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry_Dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Log_Pseudolikelihood -3160 -2965 -3084 -2673 -2084 
Pseudo_R2 0.0663 0.124 0.0886 0.00612 0.225 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Pease refer to Appendix-1 for variables definition. 
 
Column 1 based on Equation [1], Column 2 based on Equation [2], Column 3 based on Equation 
[3], Column 4 based on Equation [4] and Column 5 based on Equation [5]. 
 
ZFCit = β0 + β1 Big4it + εit                                                                                                                    [1]  
ZFCit = β0 + β1 RNon-Auditit + εit                                                                                                    [2]  
ZFCit = β0 + β1 Ln_Aud_Tenit + εit                                                                                                         [3]  
ZFCit = β0 + β1 Ln_Aud_Feeit + εit                                                                                                           [4]  
ZFCit = β0 + β1 Big4it + β2 RNon-Auditit + β3 Ln_Aud_Tenit + β4 Ln_Aud_Feeit + εit         [5] 
 
6.2.1.2 Summary 
As shown in Table 6.1 above, the goodness-of-fit (or coefficient of 
determinant, Pseudo R2) for logistic regression shown in columns 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 as 
0.0663, 0.124, 0.0886, 0.00612 and 0.225 respectively. This implies that the 
independent variables in the regression models explain 6.63%, 12.4%, 8.86%, 6.12% 
and 22.5% of the variation in the dependent variable (the Zmijewski ZFC-Score). 
These results may imply three out of the four auditor attributes under consideration 
for this study may significantly assist the firm to lower the likelihood of financial 
distress. 
In summary, the results from Table 6.1 using the Zmijewski ZFC-Score model 
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provide support for the hypotheses H1, H2, and H3, showing that big 4 auditor (Big4it), 
provision for non-audit services (RNon-Auditit) and auditor tenure (Ln_Aud_Tenit) 
have a statistically significant association with financial distress with all coefficients 
being negative. However, Table 6.1 using the Zmijewski ZFC-Score model rejects the 
hypothesis H4 showing that audit fee (Ln_Aud_Feeit) has a statistically significant 
association with financial distress but with a positive coefficient.  
6.2.2 Existence of a key auditor attribute impact on financial distress: The 
Zmijewski Full Model 
Table 6.2 below presents the results of binary logistic regressions where the four 
key auditor attributes used in this study are (logistically) regressed against financial 
distress, calculated using Zmijewski ZFC-Score model with added control variables. 
The discussion of the results from this analysis is split into consideration of the audit 
quality independent variables and the control variables in the following two 
subsections. 
6.2.2.1 Independent variables 
As shown in column 1 of Table 6.2, the coefficient of the independent variable 
Big 4 auditor (Big4it) is reported to be negative and statistically significant (β = -
17.040, z-statistics (Wald) = -1.617, and p < 0.01). This result is as expected and 
implies that with the use of added control variables, the use of a Big 4 auditor decreases 
the likelihood of financial distress with a goodness-of-fit of 34.9% (that is, Pseudo R2 
of 0.349). 
Column 2 of Table 6.2 below shows the coefficient of the independent variable 
proxying for the provision for non-audit services calculated as the ratio of fee charged 
by the auditor for the provision of non-audit services to total fees paid to the auditor 
(RNon-Auditit) is reported to be negative and statistically significant (β = -20.261, z-
statistics (Wald) = -4.015, and p < 0.01). This result is as expected and implies that 
with the use of added control variables, an increase in the provision of non-audit 
services decreases the likelihood of financial distress with a goodness-of-fit of 38.1% 
(that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.381). 
Column 3 of Table 6.2 below shows the coefficient of the independent variable 
proxying for the natural log of the actual number of years the auditor (audit firm) held 
office (Ln_Aud_Tenit) is reported to be negative and statistically significant (β = -
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10.679, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.488, and p < 0.01). This result is as expected and 
implies that with the use of added control variables, audit firm tenure decreases the 
likelihood of financial distress with a goodness-of-fit of 31.7% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 
0.317). 
Column 4 of Table 6.2 below shows the coefficient of the independent variable 
proxying the natural log of the total audit fee paid to the auditor (Ln_Aud_Feeit) is 
reported to be negative and statistically significant (β = -4.737, z-statistics (Wald) = -
0.300, and p < 0.01). As column 4 of Table 6.2 shows, while the coefficient obtained 
was a positive one with no control variables (from Table 6.1), with added control 
variables, the coefficient obtained is now a negative one. This result is as expected and 
implies that with the use of added control variables, an increase in audit fee paid to the 
auditor decreases the likelihood of financial distress with a goodness-of-fit of 29.4% 
(that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.294). 
Last column 5 of Table 6.2 shows that when all four independent variables are 
simultaneously regressed (logistically) against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score, comparable 
results to as outlined above is obtained (Big4it  - β = -7.031, z-statistics (Wald) = -
0.794, and p < 0.01, RNon-Auditit - β = -14.374, z-statistics (Wald) = -4.039, and p < 
0.01, Ln_Aud_Tenit - β = -7.318, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.392 and p < 0.01, 
Ln_Aud_Feeit - β = -6.223, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.477, and p < 0.01) and an overall 
goodness-of-fit of 40.3% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.403) which implies that that unison 
effect of all four independent variables affect the Zmijewski ZFC-Score by 40.3%. 
6.2.2.2 Control variables 
As shown in column 1 of Table 6.2 below, where the independent variable 
Big4it is regressed with the control variables against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score, control 
variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the variables 
Prop_BoD_Indit (β = -3.853, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.722, and p < 0.01), 
Prop_Aud_Com_Indit (β = 2.442, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.459, and p < 0.05), 
Prop_Segment_Salesit (β = -4.128, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.377, and p < 0.01), 
Ln_Total_Assetsit (β = -8.225, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.219, and p < 0.01), Ln_Ageit (β 
= -6.318, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.380, and p < 0.01), Earnings_Quality_EQit (β = -
3.889, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.159, and p < 0.01),  Lossit (β = 4.447, z-statistics (Wald) 
= 0.389, and p < 0.01),  Leverageit (β = 8.073, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.096, and p < 0.01),  
ROAit (β = -10.269, z-statistics (Wald) = -1.733, and p < 0.01),  and Aud_Opinionit (β 
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= 17.601, z-statistics (Wald) = 2.095, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 1 of Table 6.2) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable Big4it 
against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
From column 2 of Table 6.2 below, where the independent variable RNon-
Auditit is regressed with the control variables against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score, 
control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the 
variables Prop_BoD_Indit (β = -4.385, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.865, and p < 0.01), 
Prop_Aud_Com_Indit (β = 1.726, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.334, and p < 0.1), 
Prop_Segment_Salesit (β = -4.907, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.477, and p < 0.01), 
Ln_Total_Assetsit (β = -5.170, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.135, and p < 0.01), Sq_Empit (β 
= 1.868, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.006, and p < 0.1), Ln_Ageit (β = -7.504, z-statistics 
(Wald) = -0.488, and p < 0.01), Earnings_Quality_EQit (β = -3.916, z-statistics (Wald) 
= -0.179, and p < 0.01),  Lossit (β = -2.810, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.293, and p < 0.01),  
Leverageit (β = 10.550, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.109, and p < 0.01),  ROAit (β = -8.108, 
z-statistics (Wald) = -1.212, and p < 0.01),  and Aud_Opinionit (β = 15.292, z-statistics 
(Wald) = 2.072, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 2 of Table 6.2) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable RNon-
Auditit against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
As shown in column 3 of Table 6.2 below, where the independent variable 
Ln_Aud_Tenit is regressed with the control variables against the Zmijewski ZFC-
Score, control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the 
variables Prop_BoD_Indit (β = -5.226, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.990, and p < 0.01), 
Prop_Aud_Com_Indit (β = 1.781, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.322, and p < 0.1), 
Prop_Segment_Salesit (β = -6.750, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.567, and p < 0.01), 
Ln_Total_Assetsit (β = -4.778, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.122, and p < 0.01), Sq_Empit (β 
= 1.827, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.006, and p < 0.1), Ln_Ageit (β = -6.682, z-statistics 
(Wald) = -0.398, and p < 0.01), Earnings_Quality_EQit (β = -4.171, z-statistics (Wald) 
= -0.170, and p < 0.01),  Lossit (β = 5.863, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.502, and p < 0.01),  
Leverageit (β = 5.914, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.056, and p < 0.01),  ROAit (β = -10.048, 
z-statistics (Wald) = -1.517, and p < 0.01),  and Aud_Opinionit (β = 20.727, z-statistics 
(Wald) = 2.383, and p < 0.01). 
94  
The remaining control variables (as per column 3 of Table 6.2) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable 
Ln_Aud_Tenit against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
From column 4 of Table 6.2 below, where the independent variable 
Ln_Aud_Feeit is regressed with the control variables against the Zmijewski ZFC-
Score, control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the 
variables Prop_Segment_Salesit (β = -5.580, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.537, and p < 0.01), 
Ln_Total_Assetsit (β = -7.795, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.294, and p < 0.01), Sq_Empit (β 
= 1.920, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.006, and p < 0.1), Ln_Ageit (β = -6.955, z-statistics 
(Wald) = -0.471, and p < 0.01), Earnings_Quality_EQit (β = -3.569, z-statistics (Wald) 
= -0.160, and p < 0.01),  Lossit (β = 4.327, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.406, and p < 0.01),  
Leverageit (β = 8.121, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.098, and p < 0.01),  ROAit (β = -7.270, z-
statistics (Wald) = -1.233, and p < 0.01),  and Aud_Opinionit (β = 19.090, z-statistics 
(Wald) = 2.400, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 4 of Table 6.2) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable 
Ln_Aud_Feeit against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
Last from column 5 of Table 6.2 below, where the four independent variables 
Big4it, RNon-Auditit, Ln_Aud_Tenit and Ln_Aud_Feeit are regressed with the control 
variables against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score, control variables which are reported to 
have statistical significance include the variables Prop_BoD_Indit (β = -5.058, z-
statistics (Wald) = -1.093, and p < 0.01), BoD_Financial_Expertiseit (β = 3.752, z-
statistics (Wald) = 0.404, and p < 0.1), Prop_Aud_Com_Indit (β = 2.794, z-statistics 
(Wald) = 0.626, and p < 0.1), Prop_Segment_Salesit (β = -3.498, z-statistics (Wald) = 
-0.369, and p < 0.01), Ln_Total_Assetsit (β = -8.838, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.403, and 
p < 0.01), Sq_Empit (β = 3.294, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.012, and p < 0.1), Ln_Ageit (β = 
-3.991, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.299, and p < 0.01), Earnings_Quality_EQit (β = -3.390, 
z-statistics (Wald) = -0.170, and p < 0.01),  Lossit (β = -2.655, z-statistics (Wald) = -
0.360, and p < 0.01),  Leverageit (β = 6.597, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.078, and p < 0.01),  
ROAit (β = -4.955, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.816, and p < 0.01),  and Aud_Opinionit (β = 
10.159, z-statistics (Wald) = 1.579, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 5 of Table 6.2) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variables against 
the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
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Since the inclusions of variables representing financial leverage Leverageit and 
return on assets ROAit can be argued given that these variables are also used in the 
Zmijewski ZFC-Score model, the above regressions were re-run and the control 
variables Leverageit and ROAit were omitted. The results obtained did not significantly 
defer to those explained in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2: Logistic Regression Results - Key Auditor Attributes and Zmijewski ZFC Score – 
Full Model 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Big4it -1.617***    -0.794*** 
 (-17.040)    (-7.031) 
RNon-Auditit  -4.015***   -4.039*** 
  (-20.261)   (-14.374) 
Ln_Aud_Tenit   -0.488***  -0.392*** 
   (-10.679)  (-7.318) 
Ln_Aud_Feeit    -0.300*** -0.477*** 
    (-4.737) (-6.223) 
Prop_BoD_Indit -0.722*** -0.865*** -0.990*** -0.292 -1.093*** 
 (-3.853) (-4.385) (-5.226) (-1.444) (-5.058) 
BoD_Financial_Expertiseit 0.081 -0.094 0.142 -0.071 0.404*** 
 (0.991) (-1.127) (1.632) (-0.817) (3.752) 
AC_Sizeit 0.013 0.008 -0.012 0.024 0.011 
 (0.597) (0.351) (-0.576) (1.021) (0.404) 
Prop_Aud_Com_Indit 0.459** 0.334* 0.322* 0.171 0.626*** 
 (2.442) (1.726) (1.781) (0.865) (2.794) 
Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit -0.075 -0.126 -0.067 -0.008 -0.117 
 (-0.856) (-1.381) (-0.777) (-0.089) (-1.085) 
Prop_Segment_Salesit -0.377*** -0.477*** -0.567*** -0.537*** -0.369*** 
 (-4.128) (-4.907) (-6.750) (-5.580) (-3.498) 
Ln_Total_Assetsit -0.219*** -0.135*** -0.122*** -0.294*** -0.403*** 
 (-8.225) (-5.170) (-4.778) (-7.795) (-8.838) 
Sq_Empit 0.004 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.012*** 
 (1.400) (1.868) (1.827) (1.920) (3.294) 
Ln_Ageit -0.380*** -0.488*** -0.398*** -0.471*** -0.299*** 
 (-6.318) (-7.504) (-6.682) (-6.955) (-3.991) 
Earnings_Quality_EQit -0.159*** -0.179*** -0.170*** -0.160*** -0.170*** 
 (-3.889) (-3.916) (-4.171) (-3.569) (-3.390) 
Lossit 0.386*** -0.293*** 0.502*** 0.406*** -0.360*** 
 (4.447) (-2.810) (5.863) (4.327) (-2.655) 
Leverageit 0.096*** 0.109*** 0.056*** 0.098*** 0.078*** 
 (8.073) (10.550) (5.914) (8.121) (6.597) 
ROAit -1.733*** -1.212*** -1.517*** -1.233*** -0.816*** 
 (-10.269) (-8.108) (-10.048) (-7.270) (-4.955) 
Aud_Opinionit 2.095*** 2.072*** 2.383*** 2.400*** 1.579*** 
 (17.601) (15.292) (20.727) (19.090) (10.159) 
Constant -0.920* 1.935*** 1.365*** 0.382 2.768*** 
 (-1.825) (3.715) (2.895) (0.691) (4.355) 
Observations 4,876 4,876 4,876 4,876 4,876 
Year_Dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry_Dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Log_Pseudolikelihood -2196 -2089 -2305 -1897 -1603 
Pseudo_R2 0.349 0.381 0.317 0.294 0.403 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Pease refer to Appendix-1 for variables definition. 
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Column 1 based on Equation [6], Column 2 based on Equation [7], Column 3 based on Equation 
[8], Column 4 based on Equation [9] and Column 5 based on Equation [10]. 
 
ZFCit = β0+β1Big4it+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β4AC_Sizeit+β5Prop
_Aud_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7Prop_Segment_Salesit+β8Ln
_Total_Assetsit+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12Lossit+β13L
everageit+β14ROAit+β15Aud_Opinionit+εit 
[6] 
ZFCit = β0+β1RNon_Auditit+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β4AC_Sizeit+
β5Prop_Aud_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7Prop_Segment_Salesi
t+β8Ln_Total_Assetsit+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12Lossi
t+β13Leverageit+β14ROAit+β15Aud_Opinionit+εit 
[7] 
ZFCit = β0+β1Ln_Aud_Tenit+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β4AC_Sizeit
+β5Prop_Aud_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7Prop_Segment_Sal
esit+β8Ln_Total_Assetsit+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12Lo
ssit+β13Leverageit+β14ROAit+β15Aud_Opinionit+εit 
[8] 
ZFCit = β0+β1Ln_Aud_Feeit+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β4AC_Sizeit
+β5Prop_Aud_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7Prop_Segment_Sal
esit+β8Ln_Total_Assetsit+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12Lo
ssit+β13Leverageit+β14ROAit+β15Aud_Opinionit+εit 
[9] 
ZFCit = β0+β1Big4it+β2RNon_Auditit+β3Ln_Aud_Tenit+β4Ln_Aud_Feeit+β5Prop_BoD_Indit
+β6BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β7AC_Sizeit+β8Prop_Aud_Com_Indit+β9Aud_Com_
Financial_Expertiseit+β10Prop_Segment_Salesit+β11Ln_Total_Assetsit+β12Sq_Empit+
β13Ln_Ageit+β14Earnings_Quality_EQit+β15Lossit+β16Leverageit+β17ROAit+β18Aud_
Opinionit+εit 
[10] 
6.2.2.3 Summary 
As shown in Table 6.2 above, the goodness-of-fit (or coefficient of 
determinant, Pseudo R2) for logistic regression shown in columns 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 as 
0.349, 0.381, 0.317, 0.294 and 0.403 respectively. This implies that the independent 
variables and control variables in the regression models explain 34.9%, 38.1%, 31.7%, 
29.4% and 40.3% of the variation in the dependent variable (the Zmijewski ZFC-
Score). These results may imply that all of the four key auditor attributes under 
consideration for this study may significantly assist the firm to lower the likelihood of 
financial distress and the results are robust to the inclusion of control variables. 
In summary, the results from Table 6.2 using the Zmijewski ZFC-Score model 
provide support for the hypotheses H1, H2, H3, and H4 showing that big 4 auditor 
(Big4it), the provision for non-audit services (RNon-Auditit), auditor tenure 
(Ln_Aud_Tenit) and audit fee (Ln_Aud_Feeit) have a statistically significant 
association with financial distress with all coefficients being negative.  
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6.2.3 Existence of a lagged one-year key auditor attribute impact on financial 
distress in year zero: The Zmijewski Full Model 
Table 6.3 below presents the results of binary logistic regressions where the 
lagged one year (T-1) four key auditor attributes used in this study (are (logistically) 
regressed against financial distress, calculated using Zmijewski ZFC-Score model 
with added control variables.  
6.2.3.1 Independent variables 
As shown in column 1 of Table 6.3 below, the coefficient of the lagged one 
year (T–1) independent variable Big 4 auditor (L.Big4it) is reported to be negative and 
statistically significant (β = -7.064, z-statistics (Wald) = -1.048, and p < 0.01). This 
result is as expected and implies that with the use of added control variables, the use 
of a Big 4 auditor in the year T–1 decreases the likelihood of financial distress in the 
year T0 with a goodness-of-fit of 36.1% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.361). 
Column 2 of Table 6.3 below shows the coefficient of the lagged one year (T–
1) independent variable proxying for the provision for non-audit services, calculated 
as the ratio of fee charged by the auditor for the provision of non-audit services to total 
fees paid to the auditor (L.RNon-Auditit) is reported to be negative and statistically 
significant (β = -9.334, z-statistics (Wald) = -2.378, and p < 0.01). This result is as 
expected and implies that with the use of added control variables, an increase in the 
provision of non-audit services in the year T–1 decreases the likelihood of financial 
distress in the year T0 with a goodness-of-fit of 37.6% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.376). 
Column 3 of Table 6.3 below shows the coefficient of the lagged one year (T–
1) independent variable proxying for the natural log of the actual number of years the 
auditor (audit firm) held office (L.Ln_Aud_Tenit) is reported to be negative and 
statistically significant (β = -4.801, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.356, and p < 0.01). This 
result is as expected and implies that with the use of added control variables, audit 
firm tenure in the year T–1 decreases the likelihood of financial distress in the year T0 
with a goodness-of-fit of 35.1% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.351). 
Column 4 of Table 6.3 below shows the coefficient of the lagged one year (T–
1) independent variable proxying the natural log of the total audit fee paid to the 
auditor (L.Ln_Aud_Feeit) is reported to be negative and statistically significant (β = -
4.559, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.442, and p < 0.01). This result is as expected and implies 
that with the use of added control variables, an increase in audit fee paid to the auditor 
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in the year T–1 decreases the likelihood of financial distress in the year T0 with a 
goodness-of-fit of 33.1% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.331). 
Last column 5 of Table 6.3 shows that when all four lagged one year (T–1) 
independent variables are simultaneously regressed (logistically) against the 
Zmijewski ZFC-Score, comparable results to as outlined above is obtained (L.Big4it  - 
β = -3.109, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.507, and p < 0.01, L.RNon-Auditit - β = -7.642, z-
statistics (Wald) = -2.280, and p < 0.01, L.Ln_Aud_Tenit - β = -3.876, z-statistics 
(Wald) = -0.311 and p < 0.01, L.Ln_Aud_Feeit - β = -4.761, z-statistics (Wald) = -
0.498, and p < 0.01) and an overall goodness-of-fit of 37.8% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 
0.378) which implies that that unison effect of all four independent variables in the 
year T–1 affect the Zmijewski ZFC-Score in the year T0 by 37.8%. 
6.2.3.2 Control variables 
As shown in column 1 of Table 6.3 below, where the independent variable 
L.Big4it is regressed with the control variables against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score, 
control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the 
variables Prop_BoD_Indit (β = -2.872, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.835, and p < 0.01), 
BoD_Financial_Expertiseit (β = -1.952, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.257, and p < 0.1), 
Prop_Aud_Com_Indit (β = 2.061, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.637, and p < 0.05), 
Prop_Segment_Salesit (β = -3.587, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.534, and p < 0.01), 
Ln_Total_Assetsit (β = -2.265, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.103, and p < 0.05), Ln_Ageit (β 
= -3.217, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.307, and p < 0.01), Earnings_Quality_EQit (β = -
3.712, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.222, and p < 0.01),  Lossit (β = 3.219, z-statistics (Wald) 
= 0.477, and p < 0.01), ROAit (β = -5.919, z-statistics (Wald) = -2.260, and p < 0.01),  
and Aud_Opinionit (β = 12.878, z-statistics (Wald) = 2.771, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 1 of Table 6.3) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable L.Big4it 
against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
From column 2 of Table 6.3 below, where the independent variable L.RNon-
Auditit is regressed with the control variables against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score, 
control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the 
variables Prop_BoD_Indit (β = -3.077, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.848, and p < 0.01), 
BoD_Financial_Expertiseit (β = -2.295, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.298, and p < 0.05), 
Prop_Aud_Com_Indit (β = 2.032, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.622, and p < 0.05), 
99  
Prop_Segment_Salesit (β = -4.267, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.616, and p < 0.01), 
Sq_Empit (β = 1.757, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.008, and p < 0.1), Ln_Ageit (β = -3.802, z-
statistics (Wald) = -0.365, and p < 0.01), Earnings_Quality_EQit (β = -3.575, z-
statistics (Wald) = -0.209, and p < 0.01),  Lossit (β = 2.945, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.431, 
and p < 0.01), ROAit (β = -6.133, z-statistics (Wald) = -2.303, and p < 0.01),  and 
Aud_Opinionit (β = 13.249, z-statistics (Wald) = 2.892, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 2 of Table 6.3) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable L.RNon-
Auditit against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
As shown in column 3 of Table 6.3 below, where the independent variable 
L.Ln_Aud_Tenit is regressed with the control variables against the Zmijewski ZFC-
Score, control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the 
variables Prop_BoD_Indit (β = -3.316, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.894, and p < 0.01), 
BoD_Financial_Expertiseit (β = -1.933, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.250, and p < 0.1),  
Prop_Aud_Com_Indit (β = 2.061, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.605, and p < 0.05), 
Prop_Segment_Salesit (β = -3.936, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.575, and p < 0.01), Ln_Ageit 
(β = -3.908, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.365, and p < 0.01), Earnings_Quality_EQit (β = -
3.604, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.216, and p < 0.01),  Lossit (β = 3.716, z-statistics (Wald) 
= 0.546, and p < 0.01),  ROAit (β = -6.149, z-statistics (Wald) = -2.342, and p < 0.01),  
and Aud_Opinionit (β = 13.574, z-statistics (Wald) = 2.971, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 3 of Table 6.3) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable 
L.Ln_Aud_Tenit against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
From column 4 of Table 6.3 below, where the independent variable 
L.Ln_Aud_Feeit is regressed with the control variables against the Zmijewski ZFC-
Score, control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the 
variables Prop_BoD_Indit (β = -1.906, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.560, and p < 0.1), 
Prop_Aud_Com_Indit (β = 1.759, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.574, and p < 0.1), 
Prop_Segment_Salesit (β = -3.729, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.585, and p < 0.1), 
Ln_Total_Assetsit (β = -4.054, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.229, and p < 0.01), Ln_Ageit (β 
= -2.789, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.271, and p < 0.01), Earnings_Quality_EQit (β = -
3.469, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.220, and p < 0.01),  Lossit (β = 2.322, z-statistics (Wald) 
= 0.365, and p < 0.05),  ROAit (β = -4.715, z-statistics (Wald) = -1.928, and p < 0.01),  
and Aud_Opinionit (β = 12.022, z-statistics (Wald) = 2.670, and p < 0.01). 
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The remaining control variables (as per column 4 of Table 6.3) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable 
L.Ln_Aud_Feeit against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
Last from column 5 of Table 6.3 below, where the four independent variables 
L.Big4it, L.RNon-Auditit, L.Ln_Aud_Tenit and L.Ln_Aud_Feeit are regressed with the 
control variables against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score, control variables which are 
reported to have statistical significance include the variables Prop_BoD_Indit (β = -
2.084, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.624, and p < 0.01), Prop_Aud_Com_Indit (β = 1.761, z-
statistics (Wald) = 0.617, and p < 0.1), Prop_Segment_Salesit (β = -3.446, z-statistics 
(Wald) = -0.560, and p < 0.01), Ln_Total_Assetsit (β = -4.708, z-statistics (Wald) = -
0.286, and p < 0.01), Ln_Ageit (β = -1.979, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.204, and p < 0.05), 
Earnings_Quality_EQit (β = -3.395, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.215, and p < 0.01),  Lossit 
(β = 2.201, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.367, and p < 0.05),  ROAit (β = -4.500, z-statistics 
(Wald) = -1.870, and p < 0.01),  and Aud_Opinionit (β = 11.189, z-statistics (Wald) = 
2.575, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 5 of Table 6.3) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variables against 
the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
Since the inclusions of variables representing financial leverage Leverageit and 
return on assets ROAit can be argued given that these variables are also used in the 
Zmijewski ZFC-Score model, the above regressions were re-run and the control 
variables Leverageit and ROAit were omitted. The results obtained did not significantly 
defer to those explained in Table 6.3. 
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Table 6.3: Logistic Regression Results – Lagged Key (one year) Auditor Attributes and 
Zmijewski ZFC Score – Full Model 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
L.Big4it -1.048***    -0.507*** 
 (-7.064)    (-3.109) 
L.RNon-Auditit  -2.378***   -2.280*** 
  (-9.334)   (-7.642) 
L.Ln_Aud_Tenit   -0.356***  -0.311*** 
   (-4.801)  (-3.876) 
L.Ln_Aud_Feeit    -0.442*** -0.498*** 
    (-4.559) (-4.761) 
Prop_BoD_Indit -0.835*** -0.848*** -0.894*** -0.560* -0.624** 
 (-2.872) (-3.077) (-3.316) (-1.906) (-2.084) 
BoD_Financial_Expertiseit -0.257* -0.298** -0.250* -0.176 -0.004 
 (-1.952) (-2.295) (-1.933) (-1.278) (-0.029) 
AC_Sizeit -0.007 -0.021 -0.029 -0.010 0.007 
 (-0.202) (-0.593) (-0.817) (-0.255) (0.168) 
Prop_Aud_Com_Indit 0.637** 0.622** 0.605** 0.574* 0.617* 
 (2.061) (2.032) (2.061) (1.759) (1.761) 
Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit -0.041 -0.060 -0.030 0.012 -0.008 
 (-0.312) (-0.454) (-0.236) (0.090) (-0.055) 
Prop_Segment_Salesit -0.534*** -0.616*** -0.575*** -0.585*** -0.560*** 
 (-3.587) (-4.267) (-3.936) (-3.729) (-3.446) 
Ln_Total_Assetsit -0.103** -0.025 -0.000 -0.229*** -0.286*** 
 (-2.265) (-0.590) (-0.005) (-4.054) (-4.708) 
Sq_Empit 0.007 0.008* 0.007 0.007 0.008 
 (1.522) (1.757) (1.505) (1.495) (1.548) 
Ln_Ageit -0.307*** -0.365*** -0.365*** -0.271*** -0.204** 
 (-3.217) (-3.802) (-3.908) (-2.789) (-1.979) 
Earnings_Quality_EQit -0.222*** -0.209*** -0.216*** -0.220*** -0.215*** 
 (-3.712) (-3.575) (-3.604) (-3.469) (-3.395) 
Lossit 0.477*** 0.431*** 0.546*** 0.365** 0.367** 
 (3.219) (2.945) (3.717) (2.322) (2.201) 
Leverageit 0.017 0.013 0.011 0.008 0.002 
 (1.165) (1.032) (0.803) (0.603) (0.116) 
ROAit -2.260*** -2.303*** -2.342*** -1.928*** -1.870*** 
 (-5.919) (-6.133) (-6.149) (-4.715) (-4.500) 
Aud_Opinionit 2.771*** 2.892*** 2.971*** 2.670*** 2.575*** 
 (12.878) (13.249) (13.574) (12.022) (11.189) 
Constant 1.463 3.438*** 3.523*** 3.561*** 4.000*** 
 (1.613) (4.021) (4.123) (3.733) (3.742) 
Observations 2,082 2,082 2,082 2,082 2,082 
Year_Dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry_Dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Log_Pseudolikelihood -895.1 -874.6 -909.8 -781.6 -725.8 
Pseudo_R2 0.361 0.376 0.351 0.331 0.378 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Pease refer to Appendix-1 for variables definition. 
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Column 1 based on Equation [11], Column 2 based on Equation [12], Column 3 based on Equation 
[13], Column 4 based on Equation [14] and Column 5 based on Equation [15]. 
 
ZFCit = β0+β1L.Big4it+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β4AC_Sizeit+β5Pr
op_Aud_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7Prop_Segment_Salesit+β8
Ln_Total_Assetsit+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12Lossit+β1
3Leverageit+β14ROAit+β15Aud_Opinionit+ β16Industryit+β17Yearit+εit 
[11] 
ZFCit = β0+β1L.RNon_Auditit+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β4AC_Sizei
t+β5Prop_Aud_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7Prop_Segment_Sal
esit+β8Ln_Total_Assetsit+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12Lo
ssit+β13Leverageit+β14ROAit+β15Aud_Opinionit+ β16Industryit+β17Yearit+εit 
[12] 
ZFCit = β0+β1L.Ln_Aud_Tenit+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β4AC_Size
it+β5Prop_Aud_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7Prop_Segment_Sal
esit+β8Ln_Total_Assetsit+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12Lo
ssit+β13Leverageit+β14ROAit+β15Aud_Opinionit+ β16Industryit+β17Yearit+εit 
[13] 
ZFCit = β0+β1L.Ln_Aud_Feeit+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β4AC_Siz
eit+β5Prop_Aud_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7Prop_Segment_S
alesit+β8Ln_Total_Assetsit+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12
Lossit+β13Leverageit+β14ROAit+β15Aud_Opinionit+ β16Industryit+β17Yearit+εit 
[14] 
ZFCit = β0+β1L.Big4it+β2L.RNon_Auditit+β3L.Ln_Aud_Tenit+β4L.Ln_Aud_Feeit+β5Prop_B
oD_Indit+β6BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β7AC_Sizeit+β8Prop_Aud_Com_Indit+β9Au
d_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β10Prop_Segment_Salesit+β11Ln_Total_Assetsit+β12Sq
_Empit+β13Ln_Ageit+β14Earnings_Quality_EQit+β15Lossit+β16Leverageit+β17ROAit+
β18Aud_Opinionit+ β19Industryit+β20Yearit+εit 
 
  [15] 
6.2.3.3 Summary 
As shown in Table 6.3 above, the goodness-of-fit (or coefficient of 
determinant, Pseudo R2) for logistic regression shown in columns 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 as 
0.361, 0.379, 0.351, 0.331 and 0.378 respectively. This implies that the lagged 
independent variables in the regression models explain 36.1%, 37.9%, 35.1%, 33.1% 
and 37.8% of the variation in the dependent variable (the Zmijewski ZFC-Score). 
These results may imply that all of the four key auditor attributes under consideration 
for this study using the lagged effect (T -1) may significantly assist the firm to lower 
the likelihood of financial distress. 
In summary, the results from Table 6.3 using the Zmijewski ZFC-Score model 
provide support for the hypotheses H5a, H6a, H7a, and H8a showing that lagged (T –1) 
big 4 auditor (L.Big4it), lagged (T –1) the provision for non-audit services (L.RNon-
Auditit), lagged (T –1) auditor tenure (L.Ln_Aud_Tenit) and lagged (T –1) audit fee 
(L.Ln_Aud_Feeit) have a statistically significant association with financial distress 
with all coefficients being negative.  
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6.2.4 Existence of a lagged two-years key auditor attribute impact on financial 
distress in year zero: The Zmijewski Full Model 
Table 6.4 below presents the results of binary logistic regressions where the 
lagged two-years (T-2) four key auditor attributes used in this study (the existence of a 
Big 4 auditor (L2.Big4it), the ratio of fee charged by the auditor for the provision of 
non-audit services to total fees paid to the auditor (L2.RNon-Auditit), the natural log 
of the actual number of years the auditor (audit firm) held office (L2.Ln_Aud_Tenit), 
and the natural log of the total audit fee paid to the auditor (L2.Ln_Aud_Feeit),  are 
(logistically) regressed against financial distress, calculated using Zmijewski ZFC-
Score model with added control variables.  
6.2.4.1 Independent variables 
As shown in column 1 of Table 6.4 below, the coefficient of the lagged two 
years (T–2) independent variable Big 4 auditor (L2.Big4it) is reported to be negative 
and statistically significant (β = -5.092, z-statistics (Wald) = -1.002, and p < 0.01). 
This result is as expected and implies that with the use of added control variables, the 
use of a Big 4 auditor in the year T–2 decreases the likelihood of financial distress in 
the year T0 with a goodness-of-fit of 40.9% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.409). 
Column 2 of Table 6.4 below shows the coefficient of the lagged two years 
(T–2) independent variable proxying for the provision for non-audit services, 
calculated as the ratio of fee charged by the auditor for the provision of non-audit 
services to total fees paid to the auditor (L2.RNon-Auditit) is reported to be negative 
and statistically significant (β = -6.426, z-statistics (Wald) = -2.315, and p < 0.01). 
This result is as expected and implies that with the use of added control variables, an 
increase in the provision of non-audit services in the year T–2 decreases the likelihood 
of financial distress in the year T0 with a goodness-of-fit of 42.3% (that is, Pseudo R2 
of 0.423). 
Column 3 of Table 6.4 below shows the coefficient of the lagged two years 
(T–2) independent variable proxying for the natural log of the actual number of years 
the auditor (audit firm) held office (L2.Ln_Aud_Tenit) is reported to be negative and 
statistically significant (β = -2.421, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.240, and p < 0.01). This 
result is as expected and implies that with the use of added control variables, audit 
firm tenure in the year T–2 decreases the likelihood of financial distress in the year T0 
with a goodness-of-fit of 39.7% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.397). 
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Column 4 of Table 6.4 below shows the coefficient of the lagged two years 
(T–2) independent variable proxying the natural log of the total audit fee paid to the 
auditor (L2.Ln_Aud_Feeit) is reported to be negative and statistically significant (β = 
-3.922, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.502, and p < 0.01). This result is as expected and 
implies that with the use of added control variables, an increase in audit fee paid to the 
auditor in the year T–2 decreases the likelihood of financial distress in the year T0 with 
a goodness-of-fit of 39.0% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.390). 
Last column 5 of Table 6.4 shows that when all four lagged two years (T–2) 
independent variables are simultaneously regressed (logistically) against the 
Zmijewski ZFC-Score, comparable results to as outlined above is obtained (L2.Big4it  
- β = -2.796, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.5614, and p < 0.01, L2.RNon-Auditit - β = -6.613, 
z-statistics (Wald) = -2.632, and p < 0.01, L2.Ln_Aud_Feeit - β = -3.963, z-statistics 
(Wald) = -0.564, and p < 0.01) and an overall goodness-of-fit of 43.6% (that is, Pseudo 
R2 of 0.436) which implies that that unison effect of three of the four independent 
variables (namely L2.Big4it, L2.RNon-Auditit and L2.Ln_Aud_Feeit in the year T–2 
affect the Zmijewski ZFC-Score in the year T0 by 43.6%. Column 5 of Table 6.4 
however shows that when looking at the unison effect of all four key auditor attributes, 
variable auditor tenure loses its significance, though still with a negative correlation 
(L2.Ln_Aud_Tenit - β = -0.448, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.050 and p > 0.1). 
6.2.4.2 Control variables 
As shown in column 1 of Table 6.4 below, where the independent variable 
L2.Big4it is regressed with the control variables against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score, 
control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the 
variables Prop_BoD_Indit (β = -1.932, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.775, and p < 0.1), 
Prop_Segment_Salesit (β = -3.069, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.568, and p < 0.01), Ln_Ageit 
(β = -3.082, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.424, and p < 0.01), Earnings_Quality_EQit (β = -
3.612, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.279, and p < 0.01),  Lossit (β = 4.521, z-statistics (Wald) 
= 1.006, and p < 0.01), Leverageit (β = 2.793, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.043, and p < 0.01), 
ROAit (β = -5.611, z-statistics (Wald) = -2.813, and p < 0.01),  and Aud_Opinionit (β = 
10.353, z-statistics (Wald) = 3.459, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 1 of Table 6.4) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable L2.Big4it 
against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
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From column 2 of Table 6.4 below, where the independent variable L2.RNon-
Auditit is regressed with the control variables against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score, 
control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the 
variables Prop_Segment_Salesit (β = -3.183, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.596, and p < 0.01), 
Ln_Ageit (β = -3.160, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.447, and p < 0.01), 
Earnings_Quality_EQit (β = -3.513, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.279, and p < 0.01),  Lossit 
(β = 4.109, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.922, and p < 0.01), Leverageit (β = 2.704, z-statistics 
(Wald) = 0.039, and p < 0.01), ROAit (β = -5.614, z-statistics (Wald) = -2.823, and p < 
0.01),  and Aud_Opinionit (β = 10.691, z-statistics (Wald) = 3.573, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 2 of Table 6.4) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable L2.RNon-
Auditit against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
As shown in column 3 of Table 6.4 below, where the independent variable 
L2.Ln_Aud_Tenit is regressed with the control variables against the Zmijewski ZFC-
Score, control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the 
variables Prop_BoD_Indit (β = -1.809, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.688, and p < 0.1), 
Prop_Aud_Com_Indit (β = 1.736, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.709, and p < 0.1), 
Prop_Segment_Salesit (β = -3.063, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.569, and p < 0.01), Ln_Ageit 
(β = -23.330, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.447 and p < 0.01), Earnings_Quality_EQit (β = -
3.575, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.287, and p < 0.01), Lossit (β = 4.715, z-statistics (Wald) 
= 1.027, and p < 0.01), Leverageit (β = 2.414, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.039, and p < 0.05),  
ROAit (β = -5.768, z-statistics (Wald) = -2.876, and p < 0.01),  and Aud_Opinionit (β = 
10.767, z-statistics (Wald) = 23.697, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 3 of Table 6.4) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable 
L2.Ln_Aud_Tenit against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
From column 4 of Table 6.4 below, where the independent variable 
L2.Ln_Aud_Feeit is regressed with the control variables against the Zmijewski ZFC-
Score, control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the 
variables AC_Sizeit (β = -1.649, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.088, and p < 0.1), 
Prop_Aud_Com_Indit (β = 2.114, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.890, and p < 0.05), 
Prop_Segment_Salesit (β = -2.228, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.435, and p < 0.05), 
Ln_Total_Assetsit (β = -1.827, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.119, and p < 0.1), Ln_Ageit (β = 
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-2.227, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.316, and p < 0.05), Earnings_Quality_EQit (β = -3.771, 
z-statistics (Wald) = -0.311, and p < 0.01),  Lossit (β = 3.788, z-statistics (Wald) = 
0.893, and p < 0.01),  Leverageit (β = 2.663, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.042, and p < 0.01), 
ROAit (β = -5.018, z-statistics (Wald) = -2.730, and p < 0.01),  and Aud_Opinionit (β = 
9.468, z-statistics (Wald) = 3.309, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 4 of Table 6.4) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable 
L2.Ln_Aud_Feeit against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
Last from column 5 of Table 6.4 below, where the four independent variables 
L2.Big4it, L2.RNon-Auditit, L2.Ln_Aud_Tenit and L2.Ln_Aud_Feeit are regressed with 
the control variables against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score, control variables which are 
reported to have statistical significance include the variables Prop_Segment_Salesit (β 
= -2.407, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.493, and p < 0.05), Ln_Total_Assetsit (β = -2.670, z-
statistics (Wald) = -0.190, and p < 0.01), Earnings_Quality_EQit (β = -3.659, z-
statistics (Wald) = -0.300, and p < 0.01),  Lossit (β = 3.075, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.785, 
and p < 0.01),  Leverageit (β = 2.700, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.039, and p < 0.01), ROAit 
(β = -4.708, z-statistics (Wald) = -2.615, and p < 0.01),  and Aud_Opinionit (β = 8.611, 
z-statistics (Wald) = 3.097, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 5 of Table 6.4) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variables against 
the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
Since the inclusions of variables representing financial leverage Leverageit and 
return on assets ROAit can be argued given that these variables are also used in the 
Zmijewski ZFC-Score model, the above regressions were re-run and the control 
variables Leverageit and ROAit were omitted. The results obtained did not significantly 
defer to those explained in Table 6.4. 
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Table 6.4: Logistic Regression Results – Lagged (two years) Key Auditor Attributes and Zmijewski ZFC Score – 
Full Model 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
L2.Big4it -1.002***    -0.614*** 
 (-5.092)    (-2.796) 
L2.RNon-Auditit  -2.315***   -2.632*** 
  (-6.426)   (-6.613) 
L2.Ln_Aud_Tenit   -0.240**  -0.050 
   (-2.421)  (-0.448) 
L2.Ln_Aud_Feeit    -0.502*** -0.564*** 
    (-3.922) (-3.963) 
Prop_BoD_Indit -0.775* -0.620 -0.688* -0.408 -0.392 
 (-1.932) (-1.520) (-1.809) (-1.018) (-0.924) 
BoD_Financial_Expertiseit -0.139 -0.159 -0.166 -0.155 -0.044 
 (-0.816) (-0.923) (-0.986) (-0.877) (-0.234) 
AC_Sizeit -0.047 -0.063 -0.067 -0.088* -0.078 
 (-0.967) (-1.286) (-1.409) (-1.649) (-1.334) 
Prop_Aud_Com_Indit 0.682 0.708 0.709* 0.890** 0.783 
 (1.579) (1.588) (1.736) (2.114) (1.595) 
Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit -0.069 0.020 -0.006 0.066 0.104 
 (-0.378) (0.107) (-0.034) (0.348) (0.495) 
Prop_Segment_Salesit -0.568*** -0.596*** -0.569*** -0.435** -0.493** 
 (-3.069) (-3.183) (-3.063) (-2.228) (-2.407) 
Ln_Total_Assetsit -0.007 -0.061 -0.061 -0.119* -0.190*** 
 (-0.131) (-1.121) (-1.150) (-1.827) (-2.670) 
Sq_Empit -0.000 0.006 0.001 0.002 0.008 
 (-0.034) (0.721) (0.095) (0.316) (0.949) 
Ln_Ageit -0.424*** -0.447*** -0.447*** -0.316** -0.203 
 (-3.082) (-3.160) (-3.330) (-2.227) (-1.333) 
Earnings_Quality_EQit -0.279*** -0.279*** -0.287*** -0.311*** -0.300*** 
 (-3.612) (-3.513) (-3.575) (-3.771) (-3.659) 
Lossit 1.006*** 0.922*** 1.027*** 0.893*** 0.785*** 
 (4.521) (4.109) (4.715) (3.788) (3.075) 
Leverageit 0.043*** 0.039*** 0.039** 0.042*** 0.039*** 
 (2.793) (2.704) (2.414) (2.663) (2.700) 
ROAit -2.813*** -2.823*** -2.876*** -2.730*** -2.615*** 
 (-5.611) (-5.614) (-5.768) (-5.018) (-4.708) 
Aud_Opinionit 3.459*** 3.573*** 3.697*** 3.309*** 3.097*** 
 (10.353) (10.691) (10.767) (9.468) (8.611) 
Constant 3.047*** 4.388*** 4.133*** 5.662*** 5.688*** 
 (2.621) (3.769) (3.708) (4.157) (3.925) 
Observations 1,172 1,172 1,172 1,172 1,172 
Year_Dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry_Dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Log_Pseudolikelihood -478.9 -467.7 -488.4 -439.5 -406.2 
Pseudo_R2 0.409 0.423 0.397 0.390 0.436 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Pease refer to Appendix-1 for variables definition. 
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Column 1 based on Equation [16], Column 2 based on Equation [17], Column 3 based on Equation 
[18], Column 4 based on Equation [19] and Column 5 based on Equation [20]. 
 
ZFCit = β0+β1L2.Big4it+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β4AC_Sizeit+β5Pr
op_Aud_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7Prop_Segment_Salesit+β8
Ln_Total_Assetsit+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12Lossit+β1
3Leverageit+β14ROAit+β15Aud_Opinionit+ β16Industryit+β17Yearit+εit 
[16] 
ZFCit = β0+β1L2.RNon_Auditit+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β4AC_Siz
eit+β5Prop_Aud_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7Prop_Segment_S
alesit+β8Ln_Total_Assetsit+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12
Lossit+β13Leverageit+β14ROAit+β15Aud_Opinionit+ β16Industryit+β17Yearit+εit 
[17] 
ZFCit = β0+β1L2.Ln_Aud_Tenit+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β4AC_Siz
eit+β5Prop_Aud_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7Prop_Segment_S
alesit+β8Ln_Total_Assetsit+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12
Lossit+β13Leverageit+β14ROAit+β15Aud_Opinionit+ β16Industryit+β17Yearit+εit 
[18] 
ZFCit = β0+β1L2.Ln_Aud_Feeit+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β4AC_Si
zeit+β5Prop_Aud_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7Prop_Segment_
Salesit+β8Ln_Total_Assetsit+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11Earnings_Quality_EQit+β1
2Lossit+β13Leverageit+β14ROAit+β15Aud_Opinionit+ β16Industryit+β17Yearit+εit 
[19] 
ZFCit = β0+β1L2.Big4it+β2L2.RNon_Auditit+β3L2.Ln_Aud_Tenit+β4L2.Ln_Aud_Feeit+β5Pro
p_BoD_Indit+β6BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β7AC_Sizeit+β8Prop_Aud_Com_Indit+β
9Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β10Prop_Segment_Salesit+β11Ln_Total_Assetsit+β
12Sq_Empit+β13Ln_Ageit+β14Earnings_Quality_EQit+β15Lossit+β16Leverageit+β17RO
Ait+β18Aud_Opinionit+ β19Industryit+β20Yearit+εit 
 
[20] 
6.2.4.3 Summary 
As shown in Table 6.4 above, the goodness-of-fit (or coefficient of 
determinant, Pseudo R2) for logistic regression shown in columns 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 as 
0.409, 0.423, 0.397, 0.390 and 0.436 respectively. This implies that the lagged 
independent variables in the regression models explain 40.9%, 42.3%, 39.7%, 39.0% 
and 43.6% of the variation in the dependent variable (the Zmijewski ZFC-Score). 
These results may imply that all of the four key auditor attributes under consideration 
for this study using the lagged effect (T -2) may significantly assist the firm to lower 
the likelihood of financial distress. 
In summary, the results from Table 6.4 using the Zmijewski ZFC-Score model 
provide support for the hypotheses H5b, H6b, H7b, and H8b showing that lagged (T – 2) 
big 4 auditor (L2.Big4it), lagged (T – 2) the provision for non-audit services (L2.RNon-
Auditit), lagged (T – 2) auditor tenure (L2.Ln_Aud_Tenit) and lagged (T – 2) audit fee 
(L2.Ln_Aud_Feeit) have a statistically significant association with financial distress 
with all coefficients being negative.  
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6.2.5 Existence of a lagged three-years key auditor attribute impact on financial 
distress in year zero: The Zmijewski Full Model 
Table 6.5 below presents the results of binary logistic regressions where the 
lagged three-years (T-3) four key auditor attributes used in this study (the existence of 
a Big 4 auditor (L3.Big4it), the ratio of fee charged by the auditor for the provision of 
non-audit services to total fees paid to the auditor (L3.RNon-Auditit), the natural log 
of the actual number of years the auditor (audit firm) held office (L3.Ln_Aud_Tenit), 
and the natural log of the total audit fee paid to the auditor (L3.Ln_Aud_Feeit),  are 
(logistically) regressed against financial distress, calculated using Zmijewski ZFC-
Score model with added control variables.  
6.2.5.1 Independent variables 
As shown in column 1 of Table 6.5 below, the coefficient of the lagged three 
years (T–3) independent variable Big 4 auditor (L3.Big4it) is reported to be negative 
and statistically significant (β = -3.892, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.829, and p < 0.01). 
This result is as expected and implies that with the use of added control variables, the 
use of a Big 4 auditor in the year T–3 decreases the likelihood of financial distress in 
the year T0 with a goodness-of-fit of 35.3% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.353). 
Column 2 of Table 6.5 below shows the coefficient of the lagged three years 
(T–3) independent variable proxying for the provision for non-audit services, 
calculated as the ratio of fee charged by the auditor for the provision of non-audit 
services to total fees paid to the auditor (L3.RNon-Auditit) is reported to be negative 
and statistically significant (β = -4.769, z-statistics (Wald) = -1.694, and p < 0.01). 
This result is as expected and implies that with the use of added control variables, an 
increase in the provision of non-audit services in the year T–3 decreases the likelihood 
of financial distress in the year T0 with a goodness-of-fit of 36.0% (that is, Pseudo R2 
of 0.360). 
Column 3 of Table 6.5 below shows the coefficient of the lagged three years 
(T–3) independent variable proxying for the natural log of the actual number of years 
the auditor (audit firm) held office (L3.Ln_Aud_Tenit) is reported to be negative and 
statistically significant (β = -1.763, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.179, and p < 0.1). This 
result is as expected and implies that with the use of added control variables, audit 
firm tenure in the year T–3 decreases the likelihood of financial distress in the year T0 
with a goodness-of-fit of 34.4% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.344). 
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Column 4 of Table 6.5 below shows the coefficient of the lagged three years 
(T–3) independent variable proxying the natural log of the total audit fee paid to the 
auditor (L3.Ln_Aud_Feeit) is reported to be negative and statistically significant (β = 
-3.471, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.453, and p < 0.01). This result is as expected and 
implies that with the use of added control variables, an increase in audit fee paid to the 
auditor in the year T–3 decreases the likelihood of financial distress in the year T0 with 
a goodness-of-fit of 33.4% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.334). 
Last column 5 of Table 6.5 shows that when all four lagged three years (T–3) 
independent variables are simultaneously regressed (logistically) against the 
Zmijewski ZFC-Score, comparable results to as outlined above is obtained (L3.Big4it  
- β = -1.851, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.431, and p < 0.1, L3.RNon-Auditit - β = -4.395, z-
statistics (Wald) = -1.733, and p < 0.01, L3.Ln_Aud_Feeit - β = -3.302, z-statistics 
(Wald) = -0.446, and p < 0.01) and an overall goodness-of-fit of 36.0% (that is, Pseudo 
R2 of 0.360) which implies that that unison effect of three of the four independent 
variables (namely L3.Big4it, L3.RNon-Auditit and L3.Ln_Aud_Feeit in the year T–3 
affect the Zmijewski ZFC-Score in the year T0 by 36.0%. Column 5 of Table 6.5 
however shows that when looking at the unison effect of all four key auditor attributes, 
variable auditor tenure loses its significance, though still with a negative correlation 
(L3.Ln_Aud_Tenit - β = -0.639, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.070 and p > 0.1). This is 
consistent with Table 6.4 when a lag of two-years was used. 
6.2.5.2 Control variables 
As shown in column 1 of Table 6.5 below, where the independent variable 
L3.Big4it is regressed with the control variables against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score, 
control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the 
variables Prop_BoD_Indit (β = -3.416, z-statistics (Wald) = -1.400, and p < 0.01), 
Bod_Financial_Expertiseit (β = -1.859, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.356, and p < 0.1), 
Prop_Aud_Com_Indit (β = 3.555, z-statistics (Wald) = 1.555, and p < 0.01), Ln_Ageit 
(β = -1.962, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.299, and p < 0.05), Earnings_Quality_EQit (β = -
2.666, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.217, and p < 0.01),  Lossit (β = 2.940, z-statistics (Wald) 
= 0.670, and p < 0.01), Leverageit (β = 3.329, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.063, and p < 0.01), 
ROAit (β = -3.950, z-statistics (Wald) = -2.274, and p < 0.01),  and Aud_Opinionit (β = 
9.160, z-statistics (Wald) = 3.002, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 1 of Table 6.5) return no 
111  
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable L3.Big4it 
against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
From column 2 of Table 6.5 below, where the independent variable L3.RNon-
Auditit is regressed with the control variables against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score, 
control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the 
variables Prop_BoD_Indit (β = -3.354, z-statistics (Wald) = -1.349, and p < 0.01), 
Bod_Financial_Expertiseit (β = -1.884, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.367, and p < 0.1), 
Prop_Aud_Com_Indit (β = 3.576, z-statistics (Wald) = 1.609, and p < 0.01), Ln_Ageit 
(β = -2.198, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.342, and p < 0.05), Earnings_Quality_EQit (β = -
2.461, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.214, and p < 0.05),  Lossit (β = 2.593, z-statistics (Wald) 
= 0.597, and p < 0.01), Leverageit (β = 3.659, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.063, and p < 0.01), 
ROAit (β = -4.001, z-statistics (Wald) = -2.289, and p < 0.01),  and Aud_Opinionit (β = 
9.191, z-statistics (Wald) = 2.996, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 2 of Table 6.5) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable L3.RNon-
Auditit against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
As shown in column 3 of Table 6.5 below, where the independent variable 
L3.Ln_Aud_Tenit is regressed with the control variables against the Zmijewski ZFC-
Score, control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the 
variables Prop_BoD_Indit (β = -3.262, z-statistics (Wald) = -1.303, and p < 0.01), 
Bod_Financial_Expertiseit (β = -1.944, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.372, and p < 0.1), 
Prop_Aud_Com_Indit (β = 3.537, z-statistics (Wald) = 1.498, and p < 0.01), Ln_Ageit 
(β = -2.219, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.335, and p < 0.05), Earnings_Quality_EQit (β = -
2.686, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.224, and p < 0.01),  Lossit (β = 2.922, z-statistics (Wald) 
= 0.652, and p < 0.01), Leverageit (β = 3.046, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.057, and p < 0.01), 
ROAit (β = -4.045, z-statistics (Wald) = -2.317, and p < 0.01),  and Aud_Opinionit (β = 
9.405, z-statistics (Wald) = 3.117, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 3 of Table 6.5) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable 
L3.Ln_Aud_Tenit against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
From column 4 of Table 6.5 below, where the independent variable 
L3.Ln_Aud_Feeit is regressed with the control variables against the Zmijewski ZFC-
Score, control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the 
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variables Prop_BoD_Indit (β = -2.574, z-statistics (Wald) = -1.083, and p < 0.05), 
Prop_Aud_Com_Indit (β = 3.371, z-statistics (Wald) = 1.488, and p < 0.01), 
Earnings_Quality_EQit (β = -2.674, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.219, and p < 0.01),  Lossit 
(β = 2.286, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.549, and p < 0.05), Leverageit (β = 2.972, z-statistics 
(Wald) = 0.058, and p < 0.01), ROAit (β = -3.560, z-statistics (Wald) = -2.178, and p < 
0.01),  and Aud_Opinionit (β = 8.325, z-statistics (Wald) = 2.762, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 4 of Table 6.5) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable 
L3.Ln_Aud_Feeit against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
Last from column 5 of Table 6.5 below, where the four independent variables 
L3.Big4it, L3.RNon-Auditit, L3.Ln_Aud_Tenit and L3.Ln_Aud_Feeit are regressed with 
the control variables against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score, control variables which are 
reported to have statistical significance include the variables Prop_BoD_Indit (β = -
2.924, z-statistics (Wald) = -1.267, and p < 0.01), Prop_Aud_Com_Indit (β = 3.338, z-
statistics (Wald) = 1.582, and p < 0.01), Aud_Com_Financial_Expertise (β = -1.870, 
z-statistics (Wald) = -0.397, and p < 0.1), Earnings_Quality_EQit (β = -2.396, z-
statistics (Wald) = -0.208, and p < 0.05),  Lossit (β = 2.035, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.514, 
and p < 0.05), Leverageit (β = 3.200, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.058, and p < 0.01), ROAit 
(β = -3.428, z-statistics (Wald) = -2.097, and p < 0.01),  and Aud_Opinionit (β = 7.717, 
z-statistics (Wald) = 2.608, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 5 of Table 6.5) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variables against 
the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
Since the inclusions of variables representing financial leverage Leverageit and 
return on assets ROAit can be argued given these variables are also used in the 
Zmijewski ZFC-Score model, the above regressions were re-run and the control 
variables Leverageit and ROAit were omitted. The results obtained did not significantly 
defer to those explained in Table 6.5. 
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Table 6.5: Logistic Regression Results – Lagged (three years) Key Auditor Attributes and 
Zmijewski ZFC Score – Full Model 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
L3.Big4it -0.829***    -0.431* 
 (-3.892)    (-1.851) 
L3.RNon-Auditit  -1.694***   -1.733*** 
  (-4.769)   (-4.395) 
L3.Ln_Aud_Tenit   -0.179*  -0.070 
   (-1.763)  (-0.639) 
L3.Ln_Aud_Feeit    -0.453*** -0.446*** 
    (-3.471) (-3.302) 
Prop_BoD_Indit -1.400*** -1.349*** -1.303*** -1.083** -1.267*** 
 (-3.416) (-3.354) (-3.262) (-2.574) (-2.924) 
BoD_Financial_Expertiseit -0.356* -0.367* -0.372* -0.249 -0.170 
 (-1.859) (-1.884) (-1.944) (-1.287) (-0.838) 
AC_Sizeit -0.055 -0.066 -0.066 -0.040 -0.037 
 (-1.180) (-1.377) (-1.419) (-0.812) (-0.743) 
Prop_Aud_Com_Indit 1.555*** 1.609*** 1.498*** 1.488*** 1.582*** 
 (3.555) (3.576) (3.537) (3.371) (3.338) 
Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit -0.299 -0.272 -0.275 -0.324 -0.397* 
 (-1.555) (-1.394) (-1.451) (-1.599) (-1.870) 
Prop_Segment_Salesit -0.077 -0.130 -0.123 -0.106 -0.117 
 (-0.382) (-0.637) (-0.601) (-0.515) (-0.548) 
Ln_Total_Assetsit -0.050 -0.100 -0.096 -0.052 -0.076 
 (-0.803) (-1.618) (-1.591) (-0.743) (-1.049) 
Sq_Empit -0.011 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.009 
 (-1.429) (-1.288) (-1.302) (-1.223) (-1.103) 
Ln_Ageit -0.299** -0.342** -0.335** -0.219 -0.166 
 (-1.962) (-2.198) (-2.219) (-1.395) (-0.995) 
Earnings_Quality_EQit -0.217*** -0.214** -0.224*** -0.219*** -0.208** 
 (-2.666) (-2.461) (-2.686) (-2.674) (-2.396) 
Lossit 0.670*** 0.597*** 0.652*** 0.549** 0.514** 
 (2.940) (2.593) (2.922) (2.286) (2.035) 
Leverageit 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.057*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 
 (3.329) (3.659) (3.046) (2.972) (3.200) 
ROAit -2.274*** -2.289*** -2.317*** -2.178*** -2.097*** 
 (-3.950) (-4.001) (-4.045) (-3.560) (-3.428) 
Aud_Opinionit 3.002*** 2.996*** 3.117*** 2.762*** 2.608*** 
 (9.160) (9.191) (9.405) (8.325) (7.717) 
Constant 4.260*** 5.519*** 5.056*** 6.804*** 6.999*** 
 (3.293) (4.303) (4.015) (4.504) (4.410) 
Observations 948 948 948 948 948 
Year_Dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry_Dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Log_Pseudolikelihood -422.7 -417.8 -428.4 -392.2 -377.2 
Pseudo_R2 0.353 0.360 0.344 0.334 0.360 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Pease refer to Appendix-1 for variables definition. 
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Column 1 based on Equation [21], Column 2 based on Equation [22], Column 3 based on Equation 
[23], Column 4 based on Equation [24] and Column 5 based on Equation [25]. 
 
ZFCit = β0+β1L3.Big4it+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β4AC_Sizeit+β5P
rop_Aud_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7Prop_Segment_Salesit+β
8Ln_Total_Assetsit+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12Lossit+β
13Leverageit+β14ROAit+β15Aud_Opinionit+ β16Industryit+β17Yearit+εit 
[21] 
ZFCit = β0+β1L3.RNon_Auditit+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β4AC_Siz
eit+β5Prop_Aud_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7Prop_Segment_S
alesit+β8Ln_Total_Assetsit+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12
Lossit+β13Leverageit+β14ROAit+β15Aud_Opinionit+ β16Industryit+β17Yearit+εit 
[22] 
ZFCit = β0+β1L3.Ln_Aud_Tenit+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β4AC_Siz
eit+β5Prop_Aud_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7Prop_Segment_S
alesit+β8Ln_Total_Assetsit+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12
Lossit+β13Leverageit+β14ROAit+β15Aud_Opinionit+ β16Industryit+β17Yearit+εit 
[23] 
ZFCit = β0+β1L3.Ln_Aud_Feeit+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β4AC_Si
zeit+β5Prop_Aud_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7Prop_Segment_
Salesit+β8Ln_Total_Assetsit+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11Earnings_Quality_EQit+β1
2Lossit+β13Leverageit+β14ROAit+β15Aud_Opinionit+ β16Industryit+β17Yearit+εit 
[24] 
ZFCit = β0+β1L3.Big4it+β2L3.RNon_Auditit+β3L3.Ln_Aud_Tenit+β4L3.Ln_Aud_Feeit+β5Pro
p_BoD_Indit+β6BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β7AC_Sizeit+β8Prop_Aud_Com_Indit+β
9Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β10Prop_Segment_Salesit+β11Ln_Total_Assetsit+β
12Sq_Empit+β13Ln_Ageit+β14Earnings_Quality_EQit+β15Lossit+β16Leverageit+β17RO
Ait+β18Aud_Opinionit+ β19Industryit+β20Yearit+εit 
 
[25] 
6.2.5.3 Summary 
As shown in Table 6.5 above, the goodness-of-fit (or coefficient of 
determinant, Pseudo R2) for logistic regression shown in columns 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 as 
0.353, 0.360, 0.344, 0.334 and 0.360 respectively. This implies that the lagged 
independent variables in the regression models explain 35.3%, 36.0%, 34.4%, 33.4% 
and 36.0% of the variation in the dependent variable (the Zmijewski ZFC-Score). 
These results may imply that all of the four key auditor attributes under consideration 
for this study using the lagged effect (T -3) may significantly assist the firm to lower 
the likelihood of financial distress. 
In summary, the results from Table 6.5 using the Zmijewski ZFC-Score model 
provide support for the hypotheses H5c, H6c, H7c, and H8c showing that lagged (T – 3) 
big 4 auditor (L3.Big4it), lagged (T – 3) the provision for non-audit services (L3.RNon-
Auditit), lagged (T – 3) auditor tenure (L3.Ln_Aud_Tenit) and lagged (T – 3) audit fee 
(L3.Ln_Aud_Feeit) have a statistically significant association with financial distress 
with all coefficients being negative. 
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6.2.6 Existence of a composite key auditor attribute and lagged (one, two and 
three years) composite key auditor attribute impact on financial distress 
in year zero: The Zmijewski Full Model 
Table 6.6 below presents the results of binary logistic regressions where the 
composite score (AQit) and lagged (one, two, and three years) composite score (L.AQit, 
L2.AQit, and L3.AQit respectively) of the four key auditor attributes used in this study 
calculated as ∑ (Big4it, RNon-Auditit, Ln_Aud_Tenit and Ln_Aud_Feeit) is (logistically) 
regressed against financial distress, calculated using Zmijewski ZFC-Score model 
with added control variables.  
6.2.6.1 Independent variables 
As shown in column 1 of Table 6.6 below, the coefficient of the independent 
variable composite auditor attributes (AQit) is reported to be negative and statistically 
significant (β = -21.348, z-statistics (Wald) = -1.409, and p < 0.01). This result is as 
expected and implies that with the use of added control variables, the use of a 
composite auditor attributes decreases the likelihood of financial distress with a 
goodness-of-fit of 49.7% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.497). 
Column 2 of Table 6.6 below shows the coefficient of the independent variable 
lagged one-year (T-1) composite auditor attributes (L.AQit) is reported to be negative 
and statistically significant (β = -12.697, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.831, and p < 0.01). 
This result is as expected and implies that with the use of added control variables, an 
increase in the in the composite auditor attributes in the year T-1 decreases the 
likelihood of financial distress in the year T0 with a goodness-of-fit of 40.9% (that is, 
Pseudo R2 of 0.409). 
Column 3 of Table 6.6 below shows the coefficient of the independent variable 
lagged two-years (T-2) composite auditor attributes (L2.AQit) is reported to be negative 
and statistically significant (β = -8.463, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.711, and p < 0.01). 
This result is as expected and implies that with the use of added control variables, an 
increase in the in the composite auditor attributes in the year T-2 decreases the 
likelihood of financial distress in the year T0 with a goodness-of-fit of 44.3% (that is, 
Pseudo R2 of 0.443). 
Last, column 4 of Table 6.6 below shows the coefficient of the independent 
variable lagged three-years (T-3) composite auditor attributes (L3.AQit) is reported to 
be negative and statistically significant (β = -6.247, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.522, and 
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p < 0.01). This result is as expected and implies that with the use of added control 
variables, with added control variables, an increase in the in the composite auditor 
attributes in the year T-3 decreases the likelihood of financial distress in the year T0 
with a goodness-of-fit of 37.2% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.372). 
6.2.6.2 Control variables 
As shown in column 1 of Table 6.6 below, where the independent variable AQit 
is regressed with the control variables against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score, control 
variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the variables 
Prop_BoD_Indit (β = -5.391, z-statistics (Wald) = -1.270, and p < 0.01), 
Bod_Financial_Expertiseit (β = 2.185, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.258, and p < 0.05), 
Prop_Aud_Com_Indit (β = 3.111, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.767, and p < 0.01), 
Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit (β = -1.955, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.227, and p < 0.1), 
Prop_Segment_Salesit (β = -4.125, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.496, and p < 0.01), 
Ln_Total_Assetsit (β = -7.580, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.305, and p < 0.01), 
Earnings_Quality_EQit (β = -3.469, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.162, and p < 0.01),  Lossit 
(β = 2.307, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.301, and p < 0.05),  ROAit (β = -8.053, z-statistics 
(Wald) = -2.552, and p < 0.01),  and Aud_Opinionit (β = 15.173, z-statistics (Wald) = 
2.698, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 1 of Table 6.6) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable AQit 
against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
From column 2 of Table 6.6 below, where the independent variable L.AQit is 
regressed with the control variables against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score, control 
variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the variables 
Prop_BoD_Indit (β = -2.918, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.830, and p < 0.01), 
Prop_Aud_Com_Indit (β = 2.322, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.717, and p < 0.05), 
Prop_Segment_Salesit (β = -4.054, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.612, and p < 0.01), 
Ln_Total_Assetsit (β = -4.217, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.187, and p < 0.01), 
Earnings_Quality_EQit (β = -3.354, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.196, and p < 0.01),  Lossit 
(β = 3.269, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.505, and p < 0.01),  ROAit (β = -5.810, z-statistics 
(Wald) = -2.325, and p < 0.01),  and Aud_Opinionit (β = 12.990, z-statistics (Wald) = 
2.840, and p < 0.01). 
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The remaining control variables (as per column 2 of Table 6.6) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable L.AQit 
against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
As shown in column 3 of Table 6.6 below, where the independent variable 
L2.AQit is regressed with the control variables against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score, 
control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the 
variables Prop_BoD_Indit (β = -1.814, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.727, and p < 0.1), 
Prop_Aud_Com_Indit (β = 1.844, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.817, and p < 0.1), 
Prop_Segment_Salesit (β = -3.668, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.706, and p < 0.01), 
Earnings_Quality_EQit (β = -3.678, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.272, and p < 0.01),  Lossit 
(β = 4.488, z-statistics (Wald) = 1.024, and p < 0.01), Leverageit (β = 1.870, z-statistics 
(Wald) = 0.032, and p < 0.1), ROAit (β = -5.437, z-statistics (Wald) = -2.915, and p < 
0.01),  and Aud_Opinionit (β = 10.386, z-statistics (Wald) = 3.504, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 3 of Table 6.6) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable L2.AQit 
against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
From column 4 of Table 6.6 below, where the independent variable L3.AQit is 
regressed with the control variables against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score, control variables 
which are reported to have statistical significance include the variables Prop_BoD_Indit 
(β = -3.423, z-statistics (Wald) = -1.362, and p < 0.01), Prop_Aud_Com_Indit (β = 3.605, 
z-statistics (Wald) = 1.572, and p < 0.01), Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit (β = -1.814, z-
statistics (Wald) = -0.356, and p < 0.1), Earnings_Quality_EQit (β = -2.645, z-statistics 
(Wald) = -0.216, and p < 0.01),  Lossit (β = 2.912, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.679, and p < 
0.01), Leverageit (β = 3.129, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.059, and p < 0.01), ROAit (β = -3.844, 
z-statistics (Wald) = -2.269, and p < 0.01),  and Aud_Opinionit (β = 9.170, z-statistics 
(Wald) = 2.982, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 4 of Table 6.6) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable L3.AQit 
against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
Since the inclusions of variables representing financial leverage Leverageit and 
return on assets ROAit can be argued given these variables are also used in the Zmijewski 
ZFC-Score model, the above regressions were re-run and the control variables Leverageit 
and ROAit were omitted. The results obtained did not significantly defer to those explained 
in Table 6.6. 
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Table 6.6: Logistic Regression Results – Composite Auditor Attributes (AQ) and 
lagged (one, two and three years) AQ with Zmijewski ZFC Score – Full Model 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
AQit -1.409***    
 (-21.348)    
L. AQit  -0.831***   
  (-12.697)   
L2. AQit   -0.711***  
   (-8.463)  
L3. AQit    -0.522*** 
    (-6.247) 
Prop_BoD_Indit -1.270*** -0.830*** -0.727* -1.362*** 
 (-5.391) (-2.918) (-1.814) (-3.423) 
BoD_Financial_Expertiseit 0.258** -0.189 -0.155 -0.321 
 (2.185) (-1.382) (-0.883) (-1.637) 
AC_Sizeit 0.023 -0.003 -0.050 -0.057 
 (0.804) (-0.069) (-1.021) (-1.201) 
Prop_Aud_Com_Indit 0.767*** 0.717** 0.817* 1.572*** 
 (3.111) (2.322) (1.844) (3.605) 
Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit -0.227* -0.088 -0.053 -0.356* 
 (-1.955) (-0.651) (-0.281) (-1.814) 
Prop_Segment_Salesit -0.496*** -0.612*** -0.706*** -0.173 
 (-4.125) (-4.054) (-3.668) (-0.851) 
Ln_Total_Assetsit -0.305*** -0.187*** -0.076 -0.013 
 (-7.580) (-4.217) (-1.330) (-0.208) 
Sq_Empit 0.004 0.008 0.003 -0.010 
 (1.016) (1.534) (0.372) (-1.246) 
Ln_Ageit -0.092 -0.114 -0.197 -0.130 
 (-1.202) (-1.161) (-1.377) (-0.826) 
Earnings_Quality_EQit -0.162*** -0.196*** -0.272*** -0.216*** 
 (-3.469) (-3.354) (-3.678) (-2.645) 
Lossit 0.301** 0.505*** 1.024*** 0.679*** 
 (2.307) (3.269) (4.488) (2.912) 
Leverageit -0.016 0.008 0.032* 0.059*** 
 (-0.810) (0.526) (1.870) (3.129) 
ROAit -2.552*** -2.325*** -2.915*** -2.269*** 
 (-8.053) (-5.810) (-5.437) (-3.844) 
Aud_Opinionit 2.698*** 2.840*** 3.504*** 2.982*** 
 (15.173) (12.990) (10.386) (9.170) 
Constant -0.116 0.414 2.074* 3.315*** 
 (-0.151) (0.456) (1.756) (2.602) 
Observations 4,876 2,082 1,172 948 
Year_Dummy Included Included Included Included 
Industry_Dummy Included Included Included Included 
Log_Pseudolikelihood -1186 -828.4 -451.5 -410.1 
Pseudo_R2 0.497 0.409 0.443 0.372 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Pease refer to Appendix-1 for variables definition. 
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Column 1 based on Equation [26], Column 2 based on Equation [27], Column 3 based on Equation 
[28] and Column 4 based on Equation [29]. 
 
ZFCit = β0+β1AQit+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β4AC_Sizeit+β5Prop_
Aud_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7Prop_Segment_Salesit+β8Ln_
Total_Assetsit+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12Lossit+β13Le
verageit+β14ROAit+β15Aud_Opinionit+ β16Industryit+β17Yearit+εit, 
 
[26] 
ZFCit = β0+β1L.AQit+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β4AC_Sizeit+β5Prop
_Aud_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7Prop_Segment_Salesit+β8Ln
_Total_Assetsit+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12Lossit+β13L
everageit+β14ROAit+β15Aud_Opinionit+β16Industryit+β17Yearit+ εit, 
 
[27] 
ZFCit = β0+β1L2.AQit+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β4AC_Sizeit+β5Pro
p_Aud_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7Prop_Segment_Salesit+β8L
n_Total_Assetsit+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12Lossit+β13
Leverageit+β14ROAit+β15Aud_Opinionit+β16Industryit+β17Yearit+εit, 
 
[28] 
ZFCit = β0+β1L2.AQit+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β4AC_Sizeit+β5Pro
p_Aud_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7Prop_Segment_Salesit+β8L
n_Total_Assetsit+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12Lossit+β13
Leverageit+β14ROAit+β15Aud_Opinionit+β16Industryit+β17Yearit+ εit,  
 
[29] 
6.2.6.3 Summary 
As shown in Table 6.6 above, the goodness-of-fit (or coefficient of 
determinant, Pseudo R2) for logistic regression shown in columns 1, 2, 3, and 4 as 
0.497, 0.409, 0.443 and 0.372 respectively. This implies that the independent variables 
in the regression models explain 49.7%, 40.9%, 44.3%, and 37.2% of the variation in 
the dependent variable (the Zmijewski ZFC-Score). These results may imply that the 
composite score of all of the four key auditor attributes along with the lagged 
composite auditor attributes under consideration for this study may significantly assist 
the firm to lower the likelihood of financial distress. 
In summary, the results from Table 6.6 (column 1) using the Zmijewski ZFC-
Score model provide support for the hypothesis H9 showing that composite auditor 
attributes (AQit) has a statistically significant association with financial distress with 
all coefficients being negative. In addition, results from Table 6.6 (columns 2, 3, and 
4) using the Zmijewski ZFC-Score model provide support for the hypotheses H10a, 
H10b, and H10c showing the lagged one, two, and three-years (T-1, T-2, and T-3) auditor 
attributes (L.AQit, L2.AQit, and L3.AQit respectively) have a statistically significant 
association with financial distress in the year T0 with all coefficients being negative.  
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6.3 RESULTS 
This section discusses the results shown in Tables 6.1 to 6.6. Results reported 
in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 suggest that firms meeting the criteria used in this study to proxy 
for key auditor attributes are less likely to suffer financial distress. Tables 6.3 to 6.5 
suggest a negative correlation between the lagged key auditor attributes and the 
likelihood of financial distress. These tables show a statistically significant (P-Value 
< 0.01) negative correlation between all the four key auditor attributes used in this 
study with the likelihood of financial distressed using the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
Results from Table 6.6 show a statistically significant (P-Value < 0.01) negative 
association when the composite auditor attributes29 score is logistically regressed 
against the dependent variable. Last, Table 6.6 also show that the impact of the 
composite auditor attributes score on the likelihood of financial distress is also 
negatively affected by time, yielding a statistically significant (P-Value < 0.01) 
negative association when a lagged of one, two, and three years are used. 
Results from Tables 6.1 to 6.6 shows that a number of control variables in used 
as part of this study remain statistically significant. These variables measure the 
proportion of board of director independence Prop_BoD_Indit, proportion segment 
sales Prop_Segment_Salesit, total assets Ln_Total_Assetsit, and audit opinion 
Aud_Opinionit. 
Furthermore, the directionality of the coefficients and the P-Values obtained 
clearly suggest a strong negative correlation with the hiring of big 4 auditors, who are 
independent, with longer tenure and are paid a higher audit fee premium and the 
likelihood of financial distress. These results may suggest that further research is 
required to provide readers with a comprehensive meaning in order to generalise the 
results. It is also suggested to broaden the number of key auditor attributes used so as 
to encompass enough attributes to measure audit quality in order to attain a conclusion 
on the relation between audit quality and financial distress. 
  
                                                     
29 Though the use of a composite auditor attributes score has been used as part of this study (so as to be consistent with extent 
literature on audit quality which commonly group the different attributes as a composite measure), this can be argued to be 
against the multi-dimensional nature of audit quality as suggested by Blasam, Krishnan, and Yang 2003 (2003) whereby 
different attributes (in isolation) are required to proxy for audit quality rather than a composite score. 
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6.4 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER 
Chapter Six presents and discusses the empirical results of this study. The first 
set of regression results examine the association between the four key auditor 
attributes and financial distress using the Zmijewski ZFC-Score for a pooled sample 
of firm-year observations between 2008 and 2014. The second set of regression results 
look into the lagged effect of the auditor attributes on financial distress using the 
Zmijewski ZFC-Score. The third set of regression results examine the association 
between a composite auditor attributes score and financial distress using the 
Zmijewski ZFC-Score. In doing so, the lagged effects of the composite auditor 
attributes in the year T-1, T-2, and T-3 on financial distress using the Zmijewski ZFC-
Score in the year T0 are also examined. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN:  
ROBUSTNESS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
7.1 OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTER 
Chapter Seven discusses the robustness and sensitivity of the main results in 
Chapter Six. In so doing, the main analysis of this study is repeated firstly with 
alternative measure of financial distress and secondly with alternative proxy measure 
of audit quality. Logistic regressions are also performed to analyse the lagged effect 
(one, two and three years) of key auditor attributes using the alternative measures with 
two different models proxying for financial distress. Composite score calculated using 
the alternative measures of financial distress are also regressed against both models 
proxying for financial distress. Finally, a summary of Chapter Seven is provided. 
Below is an outline of the analysis performed in this chapter: 
7.2.1 Audit Quality (AQ1) and Altman Z Score (DV2) – No Control Variable 
7.2.2 Audit Quality (AQ1) and Altman Z Score (DV2) – With Control Variables 
7.2.3 to 7.2.5 Lagged (one, two, and three years) Audit Quality (AQ1) and Altman Z Score (DV2) – With Control Variables 
7.2.6  Alternative Measure of Audit Quality (AQ2) and Zmijewski ZFC Score (DV1)– No Control Variable 
7.2.7  Alternative Measure of Audit Quality (AQ2) and Zmijewski ZFC Score (DV1)– With Control Variable 
7.2.8 to 7.2.10 Lagged (one, two, and three years) alternative Measure of Audit Quality (AQ2) and Zmijewski ZFC Score 
(DV1)– With Control Variable 
7.2.11  Alternative Measure of Audit Quality (AQ2) and Altman Z Score (DV2)– No Control Variable 
7.2.12  Alternative Measure of Audit Quality (AQ2) and Altman Z Score (DV2)– With Control Variable 
7.2.13 to 7.2.15  Lagged (one, two, and three years) alternative Measure of Audit Quality (AQ2) and Altman Z Score (DV2)– 
With Control Variable 
7.2.16 Composite Audit Quality score (AQ1) and Altman Z Score (DV2) (including lagged anaylysis) 
7.2.17 Composite alternative measure of Audit Quality score (AQ2) and Zmijewski ZFC Score (DV1) (including 
lagged anaylysis) 
7.2.18 Composite alternative measure of Audit Quality score (AQ2) and Altman Z Score (DV2) (including lagged 
anaylysis) 
Overall, the sensitivity tests support the main findings of this study (from 
Chapter Six) by consistently showing the four key auditor attributes adopted by this 
study to have a statistically significant negative association with the likelihood of 
financial distress (using both the Altman Z2-Score and the Altman Z2-Score 
models). 
7.2 ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF FINANCIAL DISTRESS AND KEY 
AUDITOR ATTRIBUTES 
The subsections that follows show the regression results when alternative 
measure of financial distress (that is, alternative measure for ZFCit) and alternative 
measures of auditor attributes (that is alternative measures for auditor attributes Big4it, 
RNon-Auditit, Ln_Aud_Tenit, and Ln_Aud_Feeit) are applied and the binary logistic 
regression results of Chapter Six re-run. Specifically, the regression models utilized 
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amend ZFCit with Z2it30, Big4it with Aud_Spec_30it31, RNon-Auditit with 
Cnon_Auditit32, Ln_Aud_Tenit with Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit33, and Ln_Aud_Feeit with 
Prop_Aud_Feeit34. These alternative measures of financial distress and auditor 
attributes are derived so as to help determine whether the main regressions results of 
Chapter Six are influenced by the measures used to proxy for these variables. 
The subsections in this chapter include the presentation and discussion of the 
outcomes of the multivariate analyses on key auditor attributes using alternative 
measures on financial distress proxied by the likelihood of financial distress (a 
dichotomous variable) calculated using both the Zmijewski ZFC-Score and Altman 
Z2- Score models for a pooled sample of firm-year observations (sample size n=4,876) 
over a period from year 2008 to 2014. 
7.2.1 Existence of a key auditor attribute impact on financial distress: The 
Altman Base Model 
Table 7.1 below presents the results of binary logistic regressions where the four 
key auditor attributes used in this study (the existence of a Big 4 auditor (Big4it), the 
ratio of fee charged by the auditor for the provision of non-audit services to total fees 
paid to the auditor (RNon-Auditit), the natural log of the actual number of years the 
auditor (audit firm) held office (Ln_Aud_Tenit), and the natural log of the total audit 
fee paid to the auditor (Ln_Aud_Feeit), are (logistically) regressed against financial 
distress, calculated using Altman Z2-Score model with no control variables.  
7.2.1.1 Independent variables 
As shown in column 1 of Table 7.1 below, the coefficient of the independent 
variable Big 4 auditor (Big4it) is reported to be negative and statistically significant (β 
= -19.560, z-statistics (Wald) = -2.035, and p < 0.01). This result is as expected and 
implies that with the use of no control variable, the use of a Big 4 auditor decreases 
the likelihood of financial distress with a goodness-of-fit of 9.24% (that is, Pseudo R2 
of 0.06924). 
                                                     
30 Z2it = The modified Altman Z2-Score calculated as per Chapter Four, section 4.3. 
31 Aud_Spec_30it = A dichotomous indicator variable representing Auditor Specialization, following the industry market share 
approach suggested by Krishnan (2003b); where a score of one (1) will be given to firm i if the auditor contracted during 
period t is considered an industry specialist for auditing purpose in the industry sector to which form i is categorized by the 
GICS codes (30% market share within the specific industry); otherwise a score of zero (0) will be awarded; 
32 Cnon_Auditit = A dichotomous indicator variable representing the provision for non-audit services; where a score of one 
(1) will be given to firm i if the auditor contracted during period t has a proportion of non-audit fees to total fees < or = to 
25%; 
33 Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit = Natural log of continuous measure denoting the actual number of years the audit partner held office 
will be used; 
34 Prop_Aud_Feeit = Proportion of audit fee paid / total assets held by firm i at the end of time period t. 
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Column 2 of Table 7.1 below shows the coefficient of the independent variable 
proxying for the provision for non-audit services, calculated as the ratio of fee charged 
by the auditor for the provision of non-audit services to total fees paid to the auditor 
(RNon-Auditit) is reported to be negative and statistically significant (β = -16.526, z-
statistics (Wald) = -2.708, and p < 0.01). This result is as expected and implies that 
with the use of no control variable, an increase in the provision of non-audit services 
decreases the likelihood of financial distress with a goodness-of-fit of 6.06% (that is, 
Pseudo R2 of 0.0606). 
Column 3 of Table 7.1 below shows the coefficient of the independent variable 
proxying for the natural log of the actual number of years the auditor (audit firm) held 
office (Ln_Aud_Tenit) is reported to be negative and statistically significant (β = -
24.145, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.780, and p < 0.01). This result is as expected and 
implies that with the use of no control variable, audit firm tenure decreases the 
likelihood of financial distress with a goodness-of-fit of 9.53% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 
0.0953). 
Column 4 of Table 7.1 below shows the coefficient of the independent variable 
proxying the natural log of the total audit fee paid to the auditor (Ln_Aud_Feeit) is 
reported to be positive and statistically insignificant (β = 0.675, z-statistics (Wald) = 
0.023, and p > 0.1) though a negative coefficient is expected. This result implies that 
with the use of no control variable the higher the fee paid to the auditor the higher 
likelihood of financial distress with a goodness-of-fit of 0.0103% (that is, Pseudo R2 
of 0.000103) – hence statistically insignificant. It is important to note that similar 
results were obtained for variable Ln_Aud_Feeit when using the Zmijewski’s model 
(as per Table 6.1). 
Last column 5 of Table 7.1 shows that when all four independent variables are 
simultaneously regressed (logistically) against the Altman Z2-Score, comparable 
results to as outlined above is obtained (Big4it  - β = -14.503, z-statistics (Wald) = -
0.1700, and p < 0.01, RNon-Auditit - β = -10.607, z-statistics (Wald) = -2.188, and p < 
0.01, Ln_Aud_Tenit - β = -19.348, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.719 and p < 0.01, 
Ln_Aud_Feeit - β = 3.120, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.115, and p < 0.01) and an overall 
goodness-of-fit of 21% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.210) which implies that that all four 
independent variables explain 21% of the variation in the Altman Z2-Score. 
Table 7.1: Logistic Regression Results - Key Auditor Attributes and Altman Z2 
Score – Base Model 
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VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Big4it -2.035***    -1.700*** 
 (-19.560)    (-14.503) 
RNon-Auditit  -2.708***   -2.188*** 
  (-16.526)   (-10.607) 
Ln_Aud_Tenit   -0.780***  -0.719*** 
   (-24.145)  (-19.348) 
Ln_Aud_Feeit    0.023 0.115*** 
    (0.675) (3.120) 
Constant -0.362*** -0.152*** 0.175*** -1.056*** -0.428 
 (-10.566) (-3.474) (3.569) (-2.753) (-1.018) 
Observations 4,876 4,876 4,876 4,876 4,876 
Year_Dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry_Dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Log_Pseudolikelihood -2777 -2874 -2768 -2404 -1900 
Pseudo_R2 0.0924 0.0606 0.0953 0.000103 0.210 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Pease refer to Appendix-1 for variables definition. 
 
Column 1 based on Equation [1], Column 2 based on Equation [2], Column 3 based on Equation 
[3], Column 4 based on Equation [4] and Column 5 based on Equation [5]. 
Z2it = β0  + β1 Big4it + εit                                                                                                                  [1]  
Z2it = β0  + β1 RNon-Auditit + εit                                                                                                 [2]  
Z2it = β0  + β1 Ln_Aud_Tenit + εit                                                                                                        [3]  
Z2it = β0  + β1 Ln_Aud_Feeit + εit                                                                                                           [4]  
Z2it = β0  + β1 Big4it + β2 RNon-Auditit + β3 Ln_Aud_Tenit  + β4 Ln_Aud_Feeit + εit               [5] 
7.2.1.2 Summary 
As shown in Table 7.1 above, the goodness-of-fit (or coefficient of determinant, 
Pseudo R2) for logistic regression shown in columns 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 as 0.0924, 0.0606, 
0.0953, 0.000103 and 0.210 respectively. This implies that the independent variables in 
the regression models explain 9.24%, 6.06%, 9.53%, 0.0103% and 21% of the variation 
in the dependent variable (the Altman Z2-Score). These results may imply three out of the 
four auditor attributes under consideration for this study may significantly assist the firm 
to lower the likelihood of financial distress. 
In summary, the results from Table 7.1 using the Altman Z2-Score model provide 
support for the hypotheses H1, H2, and H3, showing that big 4 auditor (Big4it), the provision 
for non-audit services (RNon-Auditit) and auditor tenure (Ln_Aud_Tenit) have a 
statistically significant association with financial distress with all coefficients being 
negative. However, Table 7.1 using the Altman Z2-Score model rejects the hypothesis H4 
showing that audit fee (Ln_Aud_Feeit) has a statistical insignificant positive association 
with financial distress. 
7.2.2 Existence of a key auditor attribute impact on financial distress: The 
Altman Full Model (with control variables) 
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Table 7.2 below presents the results of binary logistic regressions where the four 
key auditor attributes used in this study (the existence of a Big 4 auditor (Big4it), the 
ratio of fee charged by the auditor for the provision of non-audit services to total fees 
paid to the auditor (RNon-Auditit), the natural log of the actual number of years the 
auditor (audit firm) held office (Ln_Aud_Tenit), and the natural log of the total audit 
fee paid to the auditor (Ln_Aud_Feeit)),  are (logistically) regressed against financial 
distress, calculated using Altman Z2-Score model with added control variables.  
7.2.2.1 Independent variables 
As shown in column 1 of Table 7.2 below, the coefficient of the independent 
variable Big 4 auditor (Big4it) is reported to be negative and statistically significant (β 
= -15.089, z-statistics (Wald) = -2.318, and p < 0.01). This result is as expected and 
implies that with the use of added control variables, the use of a Big 4 auditor decreases 
the likelihood of financial distress with a goodness-of-fit of 55.3% (that is, Pseudo R2 
of 0.553). 
Column 2 of Table 7.2 below shows the coefficient of the independent variable 
proxying for the provision for non-audit services, calculated as the ratio of fee charged 
by the auditor for the provision of non-audit services to total fees paid to the auditor 
(RNon-Auditit) is reported to be negative and statistically significant (β = -10.763, z-
statistics (Wald) = -2.917, and p < 0.01). This result is as expected and implies that 
with the use of added control variables, an increase in the provision of non-audit 
services decreases the likelihood of financial distress with a goodness-of-fit of 53.6% 
(that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.536). 
Column 3 of Table 7.2 below shows the coefficient of the independent variable 
proxying for the natural log of the actual number of years the auditor (audit firm) held 
office (Ln_Aud_Tenit) is reported to be negative and statistically significant (β = -
12.505, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.715, and p < 0.01). This result is as expected and 
implies that with the use of added control variables, audit firm tenure decreases the 
likelihood of financial distress with a goodness-of-fit of 53% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 
0.530). 
Column 4 of Table 7.2 below shows the coefficient of the independent variable 
proxying the natural log of the total audit fee paid to the auditor (Ln_Aud_Feeit) is 
reported to be negative and statistically significant (β = -11.128, z-statistics (Wald) = 
-0.977, and p < 0.01). As column 4 of Table 7.2 shows, while the coefficient obtained 
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was a positive one with no control variables (from Table 7.1), with added control 
variables, the coefficient obtained is now a negative one. This result is as expected and 
implies that with the use of added control variables, an increase in audit fee paid to the 
auditor decreases the likelihood of financial distress with a goodness-of-fit of 53.1% 
(that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.531). 
Last column 5 of Table 7.2 shows that when all four independent variables are 
simultaneously regressed (logistically) against the Altman Z2-Score, comparable 
results to as outlined above is obtained (Big4it  - β = -10.821, z-statistics (Wald) = -
1.923, and p < 0.01, RNon-Auditit - β = -7.861, z-statistics (Wald) = -2.898, and p < 
0.01, Ln_Aud_Tenit - β = -9.379, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.631 and p < 0.01, 
Ln_Aud_Feeit - β = -9.769, z-statistics (Wald) = -1.039, and p < 0.01) and an overall 
goodness-of-fit of 61.2% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.612) which implies that all four 
independent variables explain 61.2% of the variation in the Altman Z2-Score. 
7.2.2.2 Control variables 
As shown in column 1 of Table 7.2 below, where the independent variable 
Big4it is regressed with the control variables against the Altman Z2-Score, control 
variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the variables 
Prop_BoD_Indit (β = -3.821, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.909, and p < 0.01), 
BoD_Financial_Expertiseit (β = -4.203, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.474, and p < 0.01), 
Prop_Aud_Com_Indit (β = 4.025, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.908, and p < 0.01), 
Prop_Segment_Salesit (β = -1.843, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.282, and p < 0.1), 
Ln_Total_Assetsit (β = -6.527, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.238, and p < 0.01), Ln_Ageit (β 
= -4.258, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.330, and p < 0.01), Earnings_Quality_EQit (β = -
2.564, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.170, and p < 0.05), Leverageit (β = 2.538, z-statistics 
(Wald) = 0.037, and p < 0.05),  ROAit (β = -4.068, z-statistics (Wald) = -1.010, and p < 
0.01),  and Aud_Opinionit (β = 27.619, z-statistics (Wald) = 4.516, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 1 of Table 7.2) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable Big4it 
against the Altman Z2-Score. 
From column 2 of Table 7.2 below, where the independent variable RNon-
Auditit is regressed with the control variables against the Altman Z2-Score, control 
variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the variables 
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Prop_BoD_Indit (β = -3.942, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.977, and p < 0.01), 
BoD_Financial_Expertiseit (β = -5.605, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.636, and p < 0.01), 
Prop_Aud_Com_Indit (β = 3.086, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.700, and p < 0.01), 
Prop_Segment_Salesit (β = -2.785, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.401, and p < 0.01), 
Ln_Total_Assetsit (β = -4.010, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.130, and p < 0.01), Ln_Ageit (β 
= -5.625, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.441, and p < 0.01), Earnings_Quality_EQit (β = -
2.915, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.200, and p < 0.01), Lossit  (β = -2.708, z-statistics (Wald) 
= -0.334, and p < 0.01), Leverageit  (β = 3.621, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.049, and p < 
0.01),  ROAit  (β = -3.319, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.652, and p < 0.01),  and 
Aud_Opinionit (β = 28.476, z-statistics (Wald) = 4.612, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 2 of Table 7.2) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable RNon-
Auditit against the Altman Z2-Score. 
As shown in column 3 of Table 7.2 below, where the independent variable 
Ln_Aud_Tenit is regressed with the control variables against the Altman Z2-Score, 
control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the 
variables Prop_BoD_Indit (β = -5.556, z-statistics (Wald) = -1.335, and p < 0.01), 
BoD_Financial_Expertiseit (β = -2.353, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.283, and p < 0.05), 
Prop_Aud_Com_Indit (β = 3.628, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.811, and p < 0.01), 
Prop_Segment_Salesit (β = -3.258, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.432, and p < 0.01), 
Ln_Total_Assetsit (β = -1.982, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.063), and p < 0.05, Sq_Empit (β 
= 1.786, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.007, and p < 0.1), Ln_Ageit (β = -4.742, z-statistics 
(Wald) = -0.350, and p < 0.01), Earnings_Quality_EQit (β = -2.760, z-statistics (Wald) 
= -0.166, and p < 0.01), ROAit (β = -4.494, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.998, and p < 0.01),  
and Aud_Opinionit (β = 28.756, z-statistics (Wald) = 4.701, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 3 of Table 7.2) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable 
Ln_Aud_Tenit against the Altman Z2-Score. 
From column 4 of Table 7.2 below, where the independent variable 
Ln_Aud_Feeit is regressed with the control variables against the Altman Z2-Score, 
control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the 
variables BoD_Financial_Expertiseit (β = -5.130, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.634, and p < 
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0.01), Prop_Aud_Com_Indit (β = 1.933, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.481, and p < 0.1), 
Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit (β = 2.282, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.283, and p < 0.05), 
Prop_Segment_Salesit (β = -3.152, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.473, and p < 0.01), 
Ln_Total_Assetsit (β = -9.684, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.527, and p < 0.01), Ln_Ageit (β 
= -3.105, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.256, and p < 0.01), Earnings_Quality_EQit (β = -
2.338, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.152, and p < 0.05), Leverageit (β = 2.370, z-statistics 
(Wald) = 0.050, and p < 0.05),  ROAit (β = -2.687, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.812, and p < 
0.01),  and Aud_Opinionit (β = 26.502, z-statistics (Wald) = 4.440, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 4 of Table 7.2) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable 
Ln_Aud_Feeit against the Altman Z2-Score. 
Last from column 5 of Table 7.2 below, where the four independent variables 
Big4it, RNon-Auditit, Ln_Aud_Tenit and Ln_Aud_Feeit are regressed with the control 
variables against the Altman Z2-Score, control variables which are reported to have 
statistical significance include the variables Prop_BoD_Indit (β = -4.209, z-statistics 
(Wald) = -1.215, and p < 0.01), Prop_Aud_Com_Indit (β = 3.862, z-statistics (Wald) = 
1.075, and p < 0.01), Ln_Total_Assetsit (β = -10.456, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.706, and 
p < 0.01), Sq_Empit (β = 2.364, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.011, and p < 0.05), 
Earnings_Quality_EQit (β = -2.068, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.142, and p < 0.05), Lossit 
(β = -2.600, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.429, and p < 0.01), Leverageit (β = -2.128, z-
statistics (Wald) = -0.031, and p < 0.05), and Aud_Opinionit (β = 21.527, z-statistics 
(Wald) = 4.190, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 5 of Table 7.2) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variables against 
the Altman Z2-Score. 
Since the inclusions of variables representing financial leverage Leverageit and 
return on assets ROAit can be argued as these variables are also used in the Altman Z2-
Score model, the above regressions were re-run and the control variables Leverageit and 
ROAit were omitted. The results obtained did not significantly defer to those explained in 
Table 7.2. 
Table 7.2: Logistic Regression Results - Key Auditor Attributes and Altman Z2 Score – Full 
Model 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Big4it -2.318***    -1.923*** 
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 (-15.089)    (-10.821) 
RNon-Auditit  -2.917***   -2.898*** 
  (-10.763)   (-7.861) 
Ln_Aud_Tenit   -0.715***  -0.631*** 
   (-12.505)  (-9.379) 
Ln_Aud_Feeit    -0.977*** -1.039*** 
    (-11.128) (-9.769) 
Prop_BoD_Indit -0.909*** -0.977*** -1.335*** -0.395 -1.215*** 
 (-3.821) (-3.942) (-5.556) (-1.550) (-4.209) 
BoD_Financial_Expertiseit -0.474*** -0.636*** -0.283** -0.634*** -0.125 
 (-4.203) (-5.605) (-2.353) (-5.130) (-0.874) 
AC_Sizeit -0.013 -0.022 -0.041 0.001 -0.022 
 (-0.487) (-0.809) (-1.465) (0.037) (-0.651) 
Prop_Aud_Com_Indit 0.908*** 0.700*** 0.811*** 0.481* 1.075*** 
 (4.025) (3.086) (3.628) (1.933) (3.862) 
Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit 0.090 0.042 0.073 0.283** 0.199 
 (0.802) (0.376) (0.662) (2.282) (1.448) 
Prop_Segment_Salesit -0.282* -0.401*** -0.432*** -0.473*** -0.201 
 (-1.843) (-2.785) (-3.258) (-3.152) (-1.284) 
Ln_Total_Assetsit -0.238*** -0.130*** -0.063** -0.527*** -0.706*** 
 (-6.527) (-4.010) (-1.982) (-9.684) (-10.456) 
Sq_Empit 0.006 0.006 0.007* 0.006 0.011** 
 (1.570) (1.472) (1.786) (1.496) (2.364) 
Ln_Ageit -0.330*** -0.441*** -0.350*** -0.256*** -0.032 
 (-4.258) (-5.625) (-4.742) (-3.105) (-0.349) 
Earnings_Quality_EQit -0.170** -0.200*** -0.166*** -0.152** -0.142** 
 (-2.564) (-2.915) (-2.760) (-2.338) (-2.068) 
Lossit -0.005 -0.334*** 0.146 0.006 -0.429*** 
 (-0.041) (-2.708) (1.249) (0.047) (-2.600) 
Leverageit 0.037** 0.049*** 0.004 0.050** -0.031** 
 (2.538) (3.621) (0.295) (2.370) (-2.128) 
ROAit -1.010*** -0.652*** -0.998*** -0.812*** -0.282 
 (-4.068) (-3.319) (-4.494) (-2.687) (-1.203) 
Aud_Opinionit 4.516*** 4.612*** 4.701*** 4.440*** 4.190*** 
 (27.619) (28.476) (28.756) (26.502) (21.527) 
Constant -2.742*** 0.024 1.226* 2.190*** 1.479* 
 (-3.841) (0.037) (1.953) (2.842) (1.772) 
Observations 4,876 4,876 4,876 4,876 4,876 
Year_Dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry_Dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Log_Pseudolikelihood -1364 -1417 -1434 -1128 -932.3 
Pseudo_R2 0.553 0.536 0.530 0.531 0.612 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Pease refer to Appendix-1 for variables definition. 
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Column 1 based on Equation [6], Column 2 based on Equation [7], Column 3 based on Equation 
[8], Column 4 based on Equation [9] and Column 5 based on Equation [10]. 
 
Z2it = β0+β1Big4it+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β4AC_Size
it+β5Prop_Aud_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7Prop_S
egment_Salesit+β8Ln_Total_Assetsit+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11Earning
s_Quality_EQit+β12Lossit+β13Leverageit+β14ROAit+β15Aud_Opinionit+ 
β16Industryit+β17Yearit+εit 
 
[6] 
Z2it = β0+β1RNon_Auditit+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β4
AC_Sizeit+β5Prop_Aud_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7
Prop_Segment_Salesit+β8Ln_Total_Assetsit+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11
Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12Lossit+β13Leverageit+β14ROAit+β15Aud_Opini
onit+ β16Industryit+β17Yearit+εit 
 
[7] 
Z2it = β0+β1Ln_Aud_Tenit+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β4
AC_Sizeit+β5Prop_Aud_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7
Prop_Segment_Salesit+β8Ln_Total_Assetsit+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11
Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12Lossit+β13Leverageit+β14ROAit+β15Aud_Opini
onit+ β16Industryit+β17Yearit+εit 
 
[8] 
Z2it = β0+β1Ln_Aud_Feeit+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β
4AC_Sizeit+β5Prop_Aud_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β
7Prop_Segment_Salesit+β8Ln_Total_Assetsit+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11
Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12Lossit+β13Leverageit+β14ROAit+β15Aud_Opini
onit+ β16Industryit+β17Yearit+εit 
 
[9] 
Z2it = β0+β1Big4it+β2RNon_Auditit+β3Ln_Aud_Tenit+β4Ln_Aud_Feeit+β5Prop_
BoD_Indit+β6BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β7AC_Sizeit+β8Prop_Aud_Com
_Indit+β9Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β10Prop_Segment_Salesit+β11L
n_Total_Assetsit+β12Sq_Empit+β13Ln_Ageit+β14Earnings_Quality_EQit+β1
5Lossit+β16Leverageit+β17ROAit+β18Aud_Opinionit+ 
β19Industryit+β20Yearit+εit 
[10] 
7.2.2.3 Summary 
As shown in Table 7.2 above, the goodness-of-fit (or coefficient of 
determinant, Pseudo R2) for logistic regression shown in columns 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 as 
0.553, 0.536, 0.530, 0.531 and 0.612 respectively. This implies that the independent 
variables in the regression models explain 55.3%, 53.6%, 53.0%, 53.1% and 61.2% of 
the variation in the dependent variable (the Altman Z2-Score). These results may 
imply that all of the four key auditor attributes under consideration for this study may 
significantly assist the firm to lower the likelihood of financial distress. 
In summary, the results from Table 7.2 using the Altman Z2-Score model 
provide support for the hypotheses H1, H2, H3, and H4 showing that big 4 auditor 
(Big4it), the provision for non-audit services (RNon-Auditit), auditor tenure 
(Ln_Aud_Tenit) and audit fee (Ln_Aud_Feeit) have a statistically significant 
association with financial distress with all coefficients being negative.  
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7.2.3 Existence of a lagged one-year key auditor attribute impact on financial 
distress in year zero: The Altman Base Model 
Table 7.3 below presents the results of binary logistic regressions where the 
lagged one year (T-1) four key auditor attributes used in this study (the existence of a 
Big 4 auditor (L.Big4it), the ratio of fee charged by the auditor for the provision of 
non-audit services to total fees paid to the auditor (L.RNon-Auditit), the natural log of 
the actual number of years the auditor (audit firm) held office (L.Ln_Aud_Tenit), and 
the natural log of the total audit fee paid to the auditor (L.Ln_Aud_Feeit),  are 
(logistically) regressed against financial distress, calculated using Altman Z2-Score 
model with added control variables.  
7.2.3.1 Independent variables 
As shown in column 1 of Table 7.3 below, the coefficient of the lagged one 
year (T–1) independent variable Big 4 auditor (L.Big4it) is reported to be negative and 
statistically significant (β = -8.653, z-statistics (Wald) = -1.784, and p < 0.01). This 
result is as expected and implies that with the use of added control variables, the use 
of a Big 4 auditor in the year T–1 decreases the likelihood of financial distress in the 
year T0 with a goodness-of-fit of 50.7% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.507). 
Column 2 of Table 7.3 below shows the coefficient of the lagged one year (T–
1) independent variable proxying for the provision for non-audit services, calculated 
as the ratio of fee charged by the auditor for the provision of non-audit services to total 
fees paid to the auditor (L.RNon-Auditit) is reported to be negative and statistically 
significant (β = -6.511, z-statistics (Wald) = -2.563, and p < 0.01). This result is as 
expected and implies that with the use of added control variables, an increase in the 
provision of non-audit services in the year T–1 decreases the likelihood of financial 
distress in the year T0 with a goodness-of-fit of 50.3% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.503). 
Column 3 of Table 7.3 below shows the coefficient of the lagged one year (T–
1) independent variable proxying for the natural log of the actual number of years the 
auditor (audit firm) held office (L.Ln_Aud_Tenit) is reported to be negative and 
statistically significant (β = -4.600, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.424, and p < 0.01). This 
result is as expected and implies that with the use of added control variables, audit 
firm tenure in the year T–1 decreases the likelihood of financial distress in the year T0 
with a goodness-of-fit of 48.6% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.486). 
Column 4 of Table 7.3 below shows the coefficient of the lagged one year (T–
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1) independent variable proxying the natural log of the total audit fee paid to the 
auditor (L.Ln_Aud_Feeit) is reported to be negative and statistically significant (β = -
6.175, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.700, and p < 0.01). This result is as expected and implies 
that with the use of added control variables, an increase in audit fee paid to the auditor 
in the year T–1 decreases the likelihood of financial distress in the year T0 with a 
goodness-of-fit of 48.4% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.484). 
Last column 5 of Table 7.3 shows that when all four lagged one year (T–1) 
independent variables are simultaneously regressed (logistically) against the Altman 
Z2-Score, comparable results to as outlined above is obtained (L.Big4it  - β = -5.771, 
z-statistics (Wald) = -1.256, and p < 0.01, L.RNon-Auditit - β = -4.779, z-statistics 
(Wald) = -2.087 and p < 0.01, L.Ln_Aud_Tenit - β = -3.542, z-statistics (Wald) = -
0.368 and p < 0.01, L.Ln_Aud_Feeit - β = -5.634, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.673, and p < 
0.01) and an overall goodness-of-fit of 53% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.530) which implies 
that that unison effect of all four independent variables in the year T–1 affect the 
Altman Z2-Score in the year T0 by 53%. 
7.2.3.2 Control variables 
As shown in column 1 of Table 7.3 below, where the independent variable 
L.Big4it is regressed with the control variables against the Altman Z2-Score, control 
variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the variables 
Prop_BoD_Indit (β = -4.616, z-statistics (Wald) = -1.587, and p < 0.01), AC_Sizeit (β = 
-2.995, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.123, and p < 0.01), Prop_Aud_Com_Indit (β = 5.024, 
z-statistics (Wald) = 1.613, and p < 0.01), Prop_Segment_Salesit (β = -1.979, z-
statistics (Wald) = -0.479, and p < 0.05), Ln_Total_Assetsit (β = -5.859, z-statistics 
(Wald) = -0.288, and p < 0.01), Ln_Ageit (β = -2.957, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.338, and 
p < 0.01), Earnings_Quality_EQit (β = -2.191, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.211, and p < 
0.05),  Leverageit (β = -1.769, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.026, and p < 0.1), ROAit (β = -
2.184, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.483, and p < 0.05),  and Aud_Opinionit (β = 18.386, z-
statistics (Wald) = 4.595, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 1 of Table 7.3) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable L.Big4it 
against the Altman Z2-Score. 
From column 2 of Table 7.3 below, where the independent variable L.RNon-
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Auditit is regressed with the control variables against the Altman Z2-Score, control 
variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the variables 
Prop_BoD_Indit (β = -4.812, z-statistics (Wald) = -1.669, and p < 0.01), AC_Sizeit (β = 
-3.282, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.137, and p < 0.01), Prop_Aud_Com_Indit (β = 4.704, 
z-statistics (Wald) = 1.567, and p < 0.01), Prop_Segment_Salesit (β = -2.396, z-
statistics (Wald) = -0.527, and p < 0.05), Ln_Total_Assetsit (β = -3.868, z-statistics 
(Wald) = -0.179, and p < 0.01), Ln_Ageit (β = -3.662, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.415, and 
p < 0.01), Earnings_Quality_EQit (β = -2.064, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.203, and p < 
0.05),  Leverageit (β = -2.059, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.029, and p < 0.05), ROAit (β = -
2.470, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.548, and p < 0.05),  and Aud_Opinionit (β = 19.410, z-
statistics (Wald) = 4.647, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 2 of Table 7.3) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable L.RNon-
Auditit against the Altman Z2-Score. 
As shown in column 3 of Table 7.3 below, where the independent variable 
L.Ln_Aud_Tenit is regressed with the control variables against the Altman Z2-Score, 
control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the 
variables Prop_BoD_Indit (β = -5.064, z-statistics (Wald) = -1.708, and p < 0.01), 
AC_Sizeit (β = -3.627, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.151, and p < 0.01), Prop_Aud_Com_Indit 
(β = 4.930, z-statistics (Wald) = 1.604, and p < 0.01), Prop_Segment_Salesit (β = -
2.301, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.507, and p < 0.05), Ln_Total_Assetsit (β = -3.011, z-
statistics (Wald) = -0.136, and p < 0.01), Ln_Ageit (β = -3.729, z-statistics (Wald) = -
0.417, and p < 0.01), Earnings_Quality_EQit (β = -2.209, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.203, 
and p < 0.05), Leverageit (β = -2.070, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.031, and p < 0.05), ROAit 
(β = -2.569, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.604, and p < 0.05),  and Aud_Opinionit (β = 18.669, 
z-statistics (Wald) = 4.685, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 3 of Table 7.3) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable 
L.Ln_Aud_Tenit against the Altman Z2-Score. 
From column 4 of Table 7.3 below, where the independent variable 
L.Ln_Aud_Feeit is regressed with the control variables against the Altman Z2-Score, 
control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the 
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variables Prop_BoD_Indit (β = -3.471, z-statistics (Wald) = -1.254, and p < 0.01), 
AC_Sizeit (β = -2.510, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.118, and p < 0.05), Prop_Aud_Com_Indit 
(β = 4.023, z-statistics (Wald) = 1.473, and p < 0.01), Prop_Segment_Salesit (β = -
1.896, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.442, and p < 0.1), Ln_Total_Assetsit (β = -6.142, z-
statistics (Wald) = -0.460, and p < 0.01), Ln_Ageit (β = -2.119, z-statistics (Wald) = -
0.250, and p < 0.05), Earnings_Quality_EQit (β = -2.296, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.226, 
and p < 0.05), Leverageit (β = -2.125, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.038, and p < 0.05), and 
Aud_Opinionit (β = 17.640, z-statistics (Wald) = 4.338, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 4 of Table 7.3) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable 
L.Ln_Aud_Feeit against the Altman Z2-Score. 
Last from column 5 of Table 7.3 below, where the four independent variables 
L.Big4it, L.RNon-Auditit, L.Ln_Aud_Tenit and L.Ln_Aud_Feeit are regressed with the 
control variables against the Altman Z2-Score, control variables which are reported to 
have statistical significance include the variables Prop_BoD_Indit (β = -3.359, z-
statistics (Wald) = -1.273, and p < 0.01), AC_Sizeit (β = -2.130, z-statistics (Wald) = -
0.106, and p < 0.05), Prop_Aud_Com_Indit (β = 4.074, z-statistics (Wald) = 1.559, and 
p < 0.01), Ln_Total_Assetsit (β = -6.985, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.544, and p < 0.01), 
Earnings_Quality_EQit (β = -2.231, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.229, and p < 0.05), 
Leverageit (β = -2.610, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.044, and p < 0.01), and Aud_Opinionit 
(β = 16.839, z-statistics (Wald) = 4.467, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 5 of Table 7.3) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variables against 
the Altman Z2-Score. 
Since the inclusions of variables representing financial leverage Leverageit and 
return on assets ROAit can be argued as these variables are also used in the Altman Z2-
Score model, the above regressions were re-run and the control variables Leverageit 
and ROAit were omitted. The results obtained did not significantly defer to those 
explained in Table 7.3. 
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Table 7.3: Logistic Regression Results – Lagged (on year) Key Auditor Attributes and 
Altman Z2 Score –Full Model 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
L.Big4it -1.784***    -1.256*** 
 (-8.653)    (-5.771) 
L.RNon-Auditit  -2.563***   -2.087*** 
  (-6.511)   (-4.779) 
L.Ln_Aud_Tenit   -0.424***  -0.368*** 
   (-4.600)  (-3.542) 
L.Ln_Aud_Feeit    -0.700*** -0.673*** 
    (-6.175) (-5.634) 
Prop_BoD_Indit -1.587*** -1.669*** -1.708*** -1.254*** -1.273*** 
 (-4.616) (-4.812) (-5.064) (-3.471) (-3.359) 
BoD_Financial_Expertiseit -0.062 -0.101 -0.064 -0.175 0.043 
 (-0.373) (-0.635) (-0.399) (-0.996) (0.231) 
AC_Sizeit -0.123*** -0.137*** -0.151*** -0.118** -0.106** 
 (-2.995) (-3.282) (-3.627) (-2.510) (-2.130) 
Prop_Aud_Com_Indit 1.613*** 1.567*** 1.604*** 1.473*** 1.559*** 
 (5.024) (4.704) (4.930) (4.023) (4.074) 
Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit 0.067 0.045 0.075 0.204 0.188 
 (0.414) (0.280) (0.479) (1.229) (1.062) 
Prop_Segment_Salesit -0.479** -0.527** -0.507** -0.442* -0.369 
 (-1.979) (-2.396) (-2.301) (-1.896) (-1.463) 
Ln_Total_Assetsit -0.288*** -0.179*** -0.136*** -0.460*** -0.544*** 
 (-5.859) (-3.868) (-3.011) (-6.142) (-6.985) 
Sq_Empit 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.009 0.009 
 (1.450) (1.521) (1.174) (1.517) (1.540) 
Ln_Ageit -0.338*** -0.415*** -0.417*** -0.250** -0.159 
 (-2.957) (-3.662) (-3.729) (-2.119) (-1.288) 
Earnings_Quality_EQit -0.211** -0.203** -0.203** -0.226** -0.229** 
 (-2.191) (-2.064) (-2.209) (-2.296) (-2.231) 
Lossit -0.103 -0.170 -0.027 -0.022 -0.033 
 (-0.660) (-1.102) (-0.173) (-0.129) (-0.183) 
Leverageit -0.026* -0.029** -0.031** -0.038** -0.044*** 
 (-1.769) (-2.059) (-2.070) (-2.125) (-2.610) 
ROAit -0.483** -0.548** -0.604** -0.350 -0.207 
 (-2.184) (-2.470) (-2.569) (-1.319) (-0.924) 
Aud_Opinionit 4.595*** 4.647*** 4.685*** 4.338*** 4.467*** 
 (18.386) (19.410) (18.669) (17.640) (16.839) 
Constant -2.546*** -0.009 0.503 1.336 0.125 
 (-2.690) (-0.010) (0.574) (1.309) (0.116) 
Observations 2,082 2,082 2,082 2,082 2,082 
Year_Dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry_Dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Log_Pseudolikelihood -682.3 -689.0 -711.8 -590.9 -538.3 
Pseudo_R2 0.507 0.503 0.486 0.484 0.530 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Column 1 based on Equation [11], Column 2 based on Equation [12], Column 3 based on 
Equation [13], Column 4 based on Equation [14] and Column 5 based on Equation [15]. 
 
Z2it = β0+β1L.Big4it+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β4AC_S
izeit+β5Prop_Aud_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7Prop
_Segment_Salesit+β8Ln_Total_Assetsit+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11Earni
ngs_Quality_EQit+β12Lossit+β13Leverageit+β14ROAit+β15Aud_Opinionit+ 
β16Industryit+β17Yearit+εit 
 
[11] 
Z2it = β0+β1L.RNon_Auditit+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+
β4AC_Sizeit+β5Prop_Aud_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+
β7Prop_Segment_Salesit+β8Ln_Total_Assetsit+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β1
1Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12Lossit+β13Leverageit+β14ROAit+β15Aud_Opini
onit+ β16Industryit+β17Yearit+εit 
 
[12] 
Z2it = β0+β1L.Ln_Aud_Tenit+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+
β4AC_Sizeit+β5Prop_Aud_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+
β7Prop_Segment_Salesit+β8Ln_Total_Assetsit+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β1
1Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12Lossit+β13Leverageit+β14ROAit+β15Aud_Opini
onit+ β16Industryit+β17Yearit+εit 
 
[13] 
Z2it = β0+β1L.Ln_Aud_Feeit+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+
β4AC_Sizeit+β5Prop_Aud_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+
β7Prop_Segment_Salesit+β8Ln_Total_Assetsit+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β1
1Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12Lossit+β13Leverageit+β14ROAit+β15Aud_Opini
onit+ β16Industryit+β17Yearit+εit 
 
[14] 
Z2it = β0+β1L.Big4it+β2L.RNon_Auditit+β3L.Ln_Aud_Tenit+β4L.Ln_Aud_Feeit+β
5Prop_BoD_Indit+β6BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β7AC_Sizeit+β8Prop_Aud
_Com_Indit+β9Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β10Prop_Segment_Salesit
+β11Ln_Total_Assetsit+β12Sq_Empit+β13Ln_Ageit+β14Earnings_Quality_E
Qit+β15Lossit+β16Leverageit+β17ROAit+β18Aud_Opinionit+ 
β19Industryit+β20Yearit+εit 
[15] 
7.2.3.3 Summary 
As shown in Table 7.3 above, the goodness-of-fit (or coefficient of 
determinant, Pseudo R2) for logistic regression shown in columns 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 as 
0.507, 0.503, 0.486, 0.484 and 0.530 respectively. This implies that the lagged 
independent variables in the regression models explain 50.7%, 50.3%, 48.6%, 48.4% 
and 53.0% of the variation in the dependent variable (the Altman Z2-Score). These 
results may imply that all of the four key auditor attributes under consideration for this 
study using the lagged effect (T -1) may significantly assist the firm to lower the 
likelihood of financial distress. 
In summary, the results from Table 7.3 using the Altman Z2-Score model 
provide support for the hypotheses H5a, H6a, H7a, and H8a showing that lagged (T – 1) 
big 4 auditor (L.Big4it), lagged (T – 1) the provision for non-audit services (L.RNon-
Auditit), lagged (T – 1) auditor tenure (L.Ln_Aud_Tenit) and lagged (T – 1) audit fee 
(L.Ln_Aud_Feeit) have a statistically significant association with financial distress 
with all coefficients being negative.  
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7.2.4 Existence of a lagged two-years key auditor attribute impact on financial 
distress in year zero: The Altman Base Model 
Table 7.4 below presents the results of binary logistic regressions where the 
lagged two-years (T-2) four key auditor attributes used in this study (the existence of a 
Big 4 auditor (L2.Big4it), the ratio of fee charged by the auditor for the provision of 
non-audit services to total fees paid to the auditor (L2.RNon-Auditit), the natural log 
of the actual number of years the auditor (audit firm) held office (L2.Ln_Aud_Tenit), 
and the natural log of the total audit fee paid to the auditor (L2.Ln_Aud_Feeit),  are 
(logistically) regressed against financial distress, calculated using Altman Z2-Score 
models with added control variables.  
7.2.4.1 Independent variables 
As shown in column 1 of Table 7.4 below, the coefficient of the lagged two 
years (T–2) independent variable Big 4 auditor (L2.Big4it) is reported to be negative 
and statistically significant (β = -7.354, z-statistics (Wald) = -2.209, and p < 0.01). 
This result is as expected and implies that with the use of added control variables, the 
use of a Big 4 auditor in the year T–2 decreases the likelihood of financial distress in 
the year T0 with a goodness-of-fit of 56.3% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.563). 
Column 2 of Table 7.4 below shows the coefficient of the lagged two years 
(T–2) independent variable proxying for the provision for non-audit services, 
calculated as the ratio of fee charged by the auditor for the provision of non-audit 
services to total fees paid to the auditor (L2.RNon-Auditit) is reported to be negative 
and statistically significant (β = -4.607, z-statistics (Wald) = -2.660, and p < 0.01). 
This result is as expected and implies that with the use of added control variables, an 
increase in the provision of non-audit services in the year T–2 decreases the likelihood 
of financial distress in the year T0 with a goodness-of-fit of 55.7% (that is, Pseudo R2 
of 0.557). 
Column 3 of Table 7.4 below shows the coefficient of the lagged two years 
(T–2) independent variable proxying for the natural log of the actual number of years 
the auditor (audit firm) held office (L2.Ln_Aud_Tenit) is reported to be negative and 
statistically significant (β = -1.663, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.215, and p < 0.1). This 
result is as expected and implies that with the use of added control variables, audit 
firm tenure in the year T–2 decreases the likelihood of financial distress in the year T0 
with a goodness-of-fit of 53.7% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.537). 
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Column 4 of Table 7.4 below shows the coefficient of the lagged two years 
(T–2) independent variable proxying the natural log of the total audit fee paid to the 
auditor (L2.Ln_Aud_Feeit) is reported to be negative and statistically significant (β = 
-5.553, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.928, and p < 0.01). This result is as expected and 
implies that with the use of added control variables, an increase in audit fee paid to the 
auditor in the year T–2 decreases the likelihood of financial distress in the year T0 with 
a goodness-of-fit of 56.4% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.564). 
Last column 5 of Table 7.4 shows that when all four lagged two years (T–2) 
independent variables are simultaneously regressed (logistically) against the Altman 
Z2-Score, comparable results to as outlined above is obtained (L2.Big4it  - β = -1.655, 
z-statistics (Wald) = -5.201, and p < 0.01, L2.RNon-Auditit - β = -3.684, z-statistics 
(Wald) = -2.160, and p < 0.01 and L2.Ln_Aud_Feeit - β = -4.926, z-statistics (Wald) = 
-0.926, and p < 0.01) and an overall goodness-of-fit of 59.9% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 
0.599) which implies that that unison effect of three of the four independent variables 
(namely L2.Big4it, L2.RNon-Auditit and L2.Ln_Aud_Feeit in the year T–2 affect the 
Altman Z2-Score in the year T0 by 59.9%. Column 5 of Table 7.4 however shows that 
when looking at the unison effect of all four key auditor attributes, variable auditor 
tenure shows a statistically insignificant correlation (L2.Ln_Aud_Tenit - β = 0.414, z-
statistics (Wald) = 0.059 and p > 0.1). 
7.2.4.2 Control variables 
As shown in column 1 of Table 7.4 below, where the independent variable 
L2.Big4it is regressed with the control variables against the Altman Z2-Score, control 
variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the variables 
Prop_BoD_Indit (β = -2.515, z-statistics (Wald) = -1.216, and p < 0.05), AC_Sizeit (β 
= -1.781, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.101, and p < 0.1), Prop_Aud_Com_Indit (β = 4.160, 
z-statistics (Wald) = 1.826, and p < 0.01), Ln_Total_Assetsit (β = -2.749, z-statistics 
(Wald) = -0.193, and p < 0.01), Sq_Empit (β = 1.808, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.015, and 
p < 0.1), Ln_Ageit (β = -2.261, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.376, and p < 0.05), 
Earnings_Quality_EQit (β = -1.862, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.293, and p < 0.1),  ROAit 
(β = -2.377, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.735, and p < 0.05),  and Aud_Opinionit (β = 13.301, 
z-statistics (Wald) = 5.111, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 1 of Table 7.4) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable L2.Big4it 
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against the Altman Z2-Score. 
From column 2 of Table 7.4 below, where the independent variable L2.RNon-
Auditit is regressed with the control variables against the Altman Z2-Score, control 
variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the variables 
Prop_BoD_Indit (β = -2.027, z-statistics (Wald) = -1.118, and p < 0.05), AC_Sizeit (β 
= -2.026, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.124, and p < 0.05), Prop_Aud_Com_Indit (β = 4.288, 
z-statistics (Wald) = 1.882, and p < 0.01), Sq_Empit (β = 2.138, z-statistics (Wald) = 
0.019, and p < 0.05), Ln_Ageit (β = -2.373, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.403, and p < 0.05), 
Earnings_Quality_EQit (β = -1.961, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.323, and p < 0.05),  ROAit 
(β = -2.394, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.722, and p < 0.05),  and Aud_Opinionit (β = 14.409, 
z-statistics (Wald) = 5.231, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 2 of Table 7.4) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable L2.RNon-
Auditit against the Altman Z2-Score. 
As shown in column 3 of Table 7.4 below, where the independent variable 
L2.Ln_Aud_Tenit is regressed with the control variables against the Altman Z2-Score, 
control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the 
variables Prop_BoD_Indit (β = -2.382, z-statistics (Wald) = -1.127, and p < 0.05), 
AC_Sizeit (β = -2.095, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.117, and p < 0.05), Prop_Aud_Com_Indit 
(β = 4.396, z-statistics (Wald) = 1.882, and p < 0.01), Sq_Empit (β = 1.679, z-statistics 
(Wald) = 0.014, and p < 0.1), Ln_Ageit (β = -2.611, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.426, and p 
< 0.01), Earnings_Quality_EQit (β = -1.961, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.328, and p < 0.05),  
ROAit (β = -2.531, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.835, and p < 0.05),  and Aud_Opinionit (β = 
14.003, z-statistics (Wald) = 5.231, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 3 of Table 7.4) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable 
L2.Ln_Aud_Tenit against the Altman Z2-Score. 
From column 4 of Table 7.4 below, where the independent variable 
L2.Ln_Aud_Feeit is regressed with the control variables against the Altman Z2-Score, 
control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the 
variables AC_Sizeit (β = -2.093, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.143, and p < 0.05), 
Prop_Aud_Com_Indit (β = 4.469, z-statistics (Wald) = 2.291, and p < 0.01), 
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Ln_Total_Assetsit (β = -4.054, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.424, and p < 0.01), Sq_Empit (β 
= 1.797, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.016, and p < 0.1), Ln_Ageit (β = -2.102, z-statistics 
(Wald) = -0.382, and p < 0.05), Earnings_Quality_EQit (β = -1.909, z-statistics (Wald) 
= -0.339, and p < 0.1), and Aud_Opinionit (β = 13.209, z-statistics (Wald) = 5.119, and 
p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 4 of Table 7.4) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable 
L2.Ln_Aud_Feeit against the Altman Z2-Score. 
Last from column 5 of Table 7.4 below, where the four independent variables 
L2.Big4it, L2.RNon-Auditit, L2.Ln_Aud_Tenit and L2.Ln_Aud_Feeit are regressed with 
the control variables against the Altman Z2-Score, control variables which are 
reported to have statistical significance include the variables AC_Sizeit (β = -1.721, z-
statistics (Wald) = -0.127, and p < 0.1), Prop_Aud_Com_Indit (β = 4.196, z-statistics 
(Wald) = 2.221, and p < 0.01), Ln_Total_Assetsit (β = -4.670, z-statistics (Wald) = -
0.507, and p < 0.01), Sq_Empit (β = 2.252, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.021, and p < 0.05), 
Earnings_Quality_EQit (β = -1.953, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.333, and p < 0.1), and 
Aud_Opinionit (β = 12.082, z-statistics (Wald) = 5.056, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 5 of Table 7.4) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variables against 
the Altman Z2-Score. 
Since the inclusions of variables representing financial leverage Leverageit and 
return on assets ROAit can be argued given that these variables are also used in the 
Altman Z2-Score model, the above regressions were re-run and the control variables 
Leverageit and ROAit were omitted. The results obtained did not significantly defer to 
those explained in Table 7.4. 
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Table 7.4: Logistic Regression Results – Lagged (two years) Key Auditor Attributes and 
Altman Z2 Score – Full Model 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
L2.Big4it -2.209***    -1.655*** 
 (-7.354)    (-5.201) 
L2.RNon-Auditit  -2.660***   -2.160*** 
  (-4.607)   (-3.684) 
L2.Ln_Aud_Tenit   -0.215*  0.059 
   (-1.663)  (0.414) 
L2.Ln_Aud_Feeit    -0.928*** -0.926*** 
    (-5.553) (-4.926) 
Prop_BoD_Indit -1.216** -1.118** -1.127** -0.813 -0.758 
 (-2.515) (-2.027) (-2.382) (-1.520) (-1.274) 
BoD_Financial_Expertiseit -0.076 -0.097 -0.118 -0.250 -0.126 
 (-0.339) (-0.431) (-0.537) (-1.015) (-0.481) 
AC_Sizeit -0.101* -0.124** -0.117** -0.143** -0.127* 
 (-1.781) (-2.026) (-2.095) (-2.093) (-1.721) 
Prop_Aud_Com_Indit 1.826*** 1.983*** 1.882*** 2.291*** 2.221*** 
 (4.160) (4.288) (4.396) (4.469) (4.196) 
Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit -0.179 -0.097 -0.126 -0.004 0.019 
 (-0.752) (-0.398) (-0.550) (-0.014) (0.067) 
Prop_Segment_Salesit -0.252 -0.277 -0.282 -0.153 -0.151 
 (-0.905) (-0.995) (-1.049) (-0.512) (-0.493) 
Ln_Total_Assetsit -0.193*** -0.110 -0.098 -0.424*** -0.507*** 
 (-2.749) (-1.503) (-1.456) (-4.054) (-4.670) 
Sq_Empit 0.015* 0.019** 0.014* 0.016* 0.021** 
 (1.808) (2.138) (1.679) (1.797) (2.252) 
Ln_Ageit -0.376** -0.403** -0.426*** -0.382** -0.263 
 (-2.261) (-2.373) (-2.611) (-2.102) (-1.366) 
Earnings_Quality_EQit -0.293* -0.323** -0.328** -0.339* -0.333* 
 (-1.862) (-1.961) (-1.961) (-1.909) (-1.953) 
Lossit 0.265 0.190 0.352 0.426 0.217 
 (1.099) (0.793) (1.455) (1.537) (0.772) 
Leverageit -0.011 -0.014 -0.015 -0.025 -0.023 
 (-0.621) (-0.872) (-0.776) (-1.100) (-1.201) 
ROAit -0.735** -0.722** -0.835** -0.598 -0.411 
 (-2.377) (-2.394) (-2.531) (-1.634) (-1.348) 
Aud_Opinionit 5.111*** 5.231*** 5.231*** 5.119*** 5.056*** 
 (13.301) (14.409) (14.003) (13.209) (12.082) 
Constant -2.135 -0.530 -0.561 3.149** 1.928 
 (-1.636) (-0.384) (-0.445) (2.019) (1.196) 
Observations 1,172 1,172 1,172 1,172 1,172 
Year_Dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry_Dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Log_Pseudolikelihood -327.2 -331.5 -346.8 -290.5 -266.9 
Pseudo_R2 0.563 0.557 0.537 0.564 0.599 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Pease refer to Appendix-1 for variables definition. 
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Column 1 based on Equation [16], Column 2 based on Equation [17], Column 3 based on 
Equation [18], Column 4 based on Equation [19] and Column 5 based on Equation [20]. 
 
Z2it = β0+β1L2.Big4it+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β4A
C_Sizeit+β5Prop_Aud_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7
Prop_Segment_Salesit+β8Ln_Total_Assetsit+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β1
1Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12Lossit+β13Leverageit+β14ROAit+β15Aud_Opi
nionit+ β16Industryit+β17Yearit+εit 
 
[16] 
Z2it = β0+β1L2.RNon_Auditit+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertisei
t+β4AC_Sizeit+β5Prop_Aud_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertis
eit+β7Prop_Segment_Salesit+β8Ln_Total_Assetsit+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ag
eit+β11Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12Lossit+β13Leverageit+β14ROAit+β15Aud
_Opinionit+ β16Industryit+β17Yearit+εit 
 
[17] 
Z2it = β0+β1L2.Ln_Aud_Tenit+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertise
it+β4AC_Sizeit+β5Prop_Aud_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Experti
seit+β7Prop_Segment_Salesit+β8Ln_Total_Assetsit+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_A
geit+β11Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12Lossit+β13Leverageit+β14ROAit+β15Au
d_Opinionit+ β16Industryit+β17Yearit+εit 
 
[18] 
Z2it = β0+β1L2.Ln_Aud_Feeit+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertise
it+β4AC_Sizeit+β5Prop_Aud_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Experti
seit+β7Prop_Segment_Salesit+β8Ln_Total_Assetsit+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_A
geit+β11Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12Lossit+β13Leverageit+β14ROAit+β15Au
d_Opinionit+ β16Industryit+β17Yearit+εit 
 
[19] 
Z2it = β0+β1L2.Big4it+β2L2.RNon_Auditit+β3L2.Ln_Aud_Tenit+β4L2.Ln_Aud_
Feeit+β5Prop_BoD_Indit+β6BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β7AC_Sizeit+β8
Prop_Aud_Com_Indit+β9Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β10Prop_Seg
ment_Salesit+β11Ln_Total_Assetsit+β12Sq_Empit+β13Ln_Ageit+β14Earnin
gs_Quality_EQit+β15Lossit+β16Leverageit+β17ROAit+β18Aud_Opinionit+ 
β19Industryit+β20Yearit+εit 
[20] 
7.2.4.3 Summary 
As shown in Table 7.4 above, the goodness-of-fit (or coefficient of 
determinant, Pseudo R2) for logistic regression shown in columns 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 as 
0.563, 0.557, 0.537, 0.564 and 0.599 respectively. This implies that the lagged 
independent variables in the regression models explain 56.3%, 55.7%, 53.7%, 56.4% 
and 59.9% of the variation in the dependent variable (the Altman Z2-Score). These 
results may imply that all of the four key auditor attributes under consideration for this 
study using the lagged effect (T -2) may significantly assist the firm to lower the 
likelihood of financial distress. 
In summary, the results from Table 7.4 using the Altman Z2-Score model 
provide support for the hypotheses H5b, H6b, H7b, and H8b showing that lagged (T – 2) 
big 4 auditor (L2.Big4it), lagged (T – 2) the provision for non-audit services (L2.RNon-
Auditit), lagged (T – 2) auditor tenure (L2.Ln_Aud_Tenit) and lagged (T – 2) audit fee 
(L2.Ln_Aud_Feeit) have a statistically significant association with financial distress 
with all coefficients being negative.  
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7.2.5 Existence of a lagged three-years key auditor attribute impact on financial 
distress in year zero: The Altman Base Model 
Table 7.5 below presents the results of binary logistic regressions where the 
lagged three-years (T-3) four key auditor attributes used in this study (the existence of 
a Big 4 auditor (L3.Big4it), the ratio of fee charged by the auditor for the provision of 
non-audit services to total fees paid to the auditor (L3.RNon-Auditit), the natural log 
of the actual number of years the auditor (audit firm) held office (L3.Ln_Aud_Tenit), 
and the natural log of the total audit fee paid to the auditor (L3.Ln_Aud_Feeit),  are 
(logistically) regressed against financial distress, calculated using Altman Z2-Score 
models with added control variables.  
7.2.5.1 Independent variables 
As shown in column 1 of Table 7.5 below, the coefficient of the lagged three 
years (T–3) independent variable Big 4 auditor (L3.Big4it) is reported to be negative 
and statistically significant (β = -5.566, z-statistics (Wald) = -1.859, and p < 0.01). 
This result is as expected and implies that with the use of added control variables, the 
use of a Big 4 auditor in the year T–3 decreases the likelihood of financial distress in 
the year T0 with a goodness-of-fit of 52.3% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.523). 
Column 2 of Table 7.5 below shows the coefficient of the lagged three years 
(T–3) independent variable proxying for the provision for non-audit services, 
calculated as the ratio of fee charged by the auditor for the provision of non-audit 
services to total fees paid to the auditor (L3.RNon-Auditit) is reported to be negative 
and statistically significant (β = -5.341, z-statistics (Wald) = -2.985, and p < 0.01). 
This result is as expected and implies that with the use of added control variables, an 
increase in the provision of non-audit services in the year T–3 decreases the likelihood 
of financial distress in the year T0 with a goodness-of-fit of 53.1% (that is, Pseudo R2 
of 0.531). 
Column 3 of Table 7.5 below shows the coefficient of the lagged three years 
(T–3) independent variable proxying for the natural log of the actual number of years 
the auditor (audit firm) held office (L3.Ln_Aud_Tenit) is reported to be negative and 
statistically significant (β = -2.264, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.298, and p < 0.05). This 
result is as expected and implies that with the use of added control variables, audit 
firm tenure in the year T–3 decreases the likelihood of financial distress in the year T0 
with a goodness-of-fit of 50.3% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.503). 
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Column 4 of Table 7.5 below shows the coefficient of the lagged three years 
(T–3) independent variable proxying the natural log of the total audit fee paid to the 
auditor (L3.Ln_Aud_Feeit) is reported to be negative and statistically significant (β = 
-4.478, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.790, and p < 0.01). This result is as expected and 
implies that with the use of added control variables, an increase in audit fee paid to the 
auditor in the year T–3 decreases the likelihood of financial distress in the year T0 with 
a goodness-of-fit of 51.9% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.519). 
Last column 5 of Table 7.5 shows that when all four lagged three years (T–3) 
independent variables are simultaneously regressed (logistically) against the Altman 
Z2-Score, comparable results to as outlined above is obtained (L3.Big4it  - β = -3.303, 
z-statistics (Wald) = -1.188, and p < 0.01, L3.RNon-Auditit - β = -4.199, z-statistics 
(Wald) = -2.386, and p < 0.01 and L3.Ln_Aud_Feeit - β = -3.781, z-statistics (Wald) = 
-0.702, and p < 0.01) and an overall goodness-of-fit of 55.7% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 
0.557) which implies that that unison effect of three of the four independent variables 
(namely L3.Big4it, L3.RNon-Auditit and L3.Ln_Aud_Feeit in the year T–3 affect the 
Altman Z2-Score in the year T0 by 55.7%. Column 5 of Table 7.5 however shows that 
when looking at the unison effect of all four key auditor attributes, variable auditor 
tenure loses its significance, though still with a negative correlation (L3.Ln_Aud_Tenit 
- β = -0.483, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.073 and p > 0.1). This is consistent with Table 
7.4 when a lag of two-years was used. 
7.2.5.2 Control variables 
As shown in column 1 of Table 7.5 below, where the independent variable 
L3.Big4it is regressed with the control variables against the Altman Z2-Score, control 
variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the variables 
Prop_BoD_Indit (β = -2.368, z-statistics (Wald) = -1.300, and p < 0.05), AC_Sizeit (β 
= -2.283, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.147, and p < 0.05), Prop_Aud_Com_Indit (β = 3.772, 
z-statistics (Wald) = 1.841, and p < 0.01), Ln_Total_Assetsit (β = -3.052, z-statistics 
(Wald) = -0.227, and p < 0.01), Earnings_Quality_EQit (β = -1.667, z-statistics (Wald) 
= -0.225, and p < 0.1),  ROAit (β = -1.710, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.439, and p < 0.1),  
and Aud_Opinionit (β = 11.778, z-statistics (Wald) = 4.970, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 1 of Table 7.5) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable L3.Big4it 
against the Altman Z2-Score. 
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From column 2 of Table 7.5 below, where the independent variable L3.RNon-
Auditit is regressed with the control variables against the Altman Z2-Score, control 
variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the variables 
Prop_BoD_Indit (β = -2.082, z-statistics (Wald) = -1.254, and p < 0.05), AC_Sizeit (β 
= -2.379, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.161, and p < 0.05), Prop_Aud_Com_Indit (β = 3.543, 
z-statistics (Wald) = 1.935, and p < 0.01), Ln_Total_Assetsit (β = -2.236, z-statistics 
(Wald) = -0.166, and p < 0.05), Earnings_Quality_EQit (β = -1.717, z-statistics (Wald) 
= -0.269, and p < 0.1),  ROAit (β = -1.921, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.497, and p < 0.1),  
and Aud_Opinionit (β = 13.191, z-statistics (Wald) = 4.988, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 2 of Table 7.5) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable L3.RNon-
Auditit against the Altman Z2-Score. 
As shown in column 3 of Table 7.5 below, where the independent variable 
L3.Ln_Aud_Tenit is regressed with the control variables against the Altman Z2-Score, 
control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the 
variables Prop_BoD_Indit (β = -2.257, z-statistics (Wald) = -1.212, and p < 0.05), 
AC_Sizeit (β = -2.521, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.162, and p < 0.05), Prop_Aud_Com_Indit 
(β = 3.785, z-statistics (Wald) = 1.807, and p < 0.01), Ln_Total_Assetsit (β = -2.072, z-
statistics (Wald) = -0.142, and p < 0.05), Sq_Empit (β = 1.648, z-statistics (Wald) = 
0.015, and p < 0.1), Earnings_Quality_EQit (β = -1.748, z-statistics (Wald) = -00.251, 
and p < 0.1),  ROAit (β = -1.939, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.557, and p < 0.1),  and 
Aud_Opinionit (β = 12.237, z-statistics (Wald) = 4.977, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 3 of Table 7.5) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable 
L3.Ln_Aud_Tenit against the Altman Z2-Score. 
From column 4 of Table 7.5 below, where the independent variable 
L3.Ln_Aud_Feeit is regressed with the control variables against the Altman Z2-Score, 
control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the 
variables AC_Sizeit (β = -2.725, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.175, and p < 0.01), 
Prop_Aud_Com_Indit (β = 3.808, z-statistics (Wald) = 1.863, and p < 0.01), 
Ln_Total_Assetsit (β = -3.913, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.390, and p < 0.01), and 
Aud_Opinionit (β = 11.763, z-statistics (Wald) = 4.808, and p < 0.01). 
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The remaining control variables (as per column 4 of Table 7.5) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable 
L3.Ln_Aud_Feeit against the Altman Z2-Score. 
Last from column 5 of Table 7.5 below, where the four independent variables 
L3.Big4it, L3.RNon-Auditit, L3.Ln_Aud_Tenit and L3.Ln_Aud_Feeit are regressed with 
the control variables against the Altman Z2-Score, control variables which are 
reported to have statistical significance include the variables AC_Sizeit (β = -2.337, z-
statistics (Wald) = -0.162, and p < 0.05), Prop_Aud_Com_Indit (β = 3.320, z-statistics 
(Wald) = 1.882, and p < 0.01), Ln_Total_Assetsit (β = -4.026, z-statistics (Wald) = -
0.426, and p < 0.01), and Aud_Opinionit (β = 10.937, z-statistics (Wald) = 4.855, and 
p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 5 of Table 7.5) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variables against the 
Altman Z2-Score. 
Since the inclusions of variables representing financial leverage Leverageit and 
return on assets ROAit can be argued given that these variables are also used in the 
Altman Z2-Score model, the above regressions were re-run and the control variables 
Leverageit and ROAit were omitted. The results obtained did not significantly defer to 
those explained in Table 7.5. 
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Table 7.5: Logistic Regression Results – Lagged (three years) Key Auditor Attributes and 
Altman Z2 Score – Full Model 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
L3.Big4it -1.859***    -1.188*** 
 (-5.566)    (-3.303) 
L3.RNon-Auditit  -2.985***   -2.386*** 
  (-5.341)   (-4.199) 
L3.Ln_Aud_Tenit   -0.298**  -0.073 
   (-2.264)  (-0.483) 
L3.Ln_Aud_Feeit    -0.790*** -0.702*** 
    (-4.478) (-3.781) 
Prop_BoD_Indit -1.300** -1.254** -1.212** -0.737 -0.958 
 (-2.368) (-2.082) (-2.257) (-1.295) (-1.478) 
BoD_Financial_Expertiseit 0.125 0.112 0.088 0.088 0.231 
 (0.520) (0.454) (0.374) (0.342) (0.831) 
AC_Sizeit -0.147** -0.161** -0.162** -0.175*** -0.162** 
 (-2.283) (-2.379) (-2.521) (-2.725) (-2.337) 
Prop_Aud_Com_Indit 1.841*** 1.935*** 1.807*** 1.863*** 1.882*** 
 (3.772) (3.543) (3.785) (3.808) (3.320) 
Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit -0.403 -0.328 -0.371 -0.115 -0.180 
 (-1.510) (-1.199) (-1.434) (-0.432) (-0.617) 
Prop_Segment_Salesit -0.314 -0.366 -0.411 -0.480 -0.461 
 (-1.137) (-1.317) (-1.472) (-1.524) (-1.499) 
Ln_Total_Assetsit -0.227*** -0.166** -0.142** -0.390*** -0.426*** 
 (-3.052) (-2.236) (-2.072) (-3.913) (-4.026) 
Sq_Empit 0.014 0.014 0.015* 0.016 0.016 
 (1.525) (1.524) (1.648) (1.581) (1.514) 
Ln_Ageit -0.251 -0.298 -0.298 -0.148 -0.022 
 (-1.330) (-1.578) (-1.607) (-0.747) (-0.104) 
Earnings_Quality_EQit -0.225* -0.269* -0.251* -0.205 -0.207 
 (-1.667) (-1.717) (-1.748) (-1.598) (-1.607) 
Lossit 0.049 -0.024 0.069 0.060 -0.001 
 (0.204) (-0.097) (0.283) (0.224) (-0.004) 
Leverageit 0.009 0.012 -0.000 -0.001 0.003 
 (0.334) (0.502) (-0.004) (-0.037) (0.096) 
ROAit -0.439* -0.497* -0.557* -0.317 -0.242 
 (-1.710) (-1.921) (-1.939) (-1.092) (-0.969) 
Aud_Opinionit 4.970*** 4.988*** 4.977*** 4.808*** 4.855*** 
 (11.778) (13.191) (12.237) (11.763) (10.937) 
Constant -2.702* -1.074 -1.104 2.049 1.142 
 (-1.948) (-0.755) (-0.832) (1.324) (0.672) 
Observations 948 948 948 948 948 
Year_Dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry_Dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Log_Pseudolikelihood -289.8 -284.8 -302.0 -261.0 -240.6 
Pseudo_R2 0.523 0.531 0.503 0.519 0.557 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Pease refer to Appendix-1 for variables definition. 
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Column 1 based on Equation [21], Column 2 based on Equation [22], Column 3 based on 
Equation [23], Column 4 based on Equation [24] and Column 5 based on Equation [25]. 
 
Z2it = β0+β1L3.Big4it+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β4AC_Si
zeit+β5Prop_Aud_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7Prop_Se
gment_Salesit+β8Ln_Total_Assetsit+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11Earnings_
Quality_EQit+β12Lossit+β13Leverageit+β14ROAit+β15Aud_Opinionit+ 
β16Industryit+β17Yearit+εit 
 
[21] 
Z2it = β0+β1L3.RNon_Auditit+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β
4AC_Sizeit+β5Prop_Aud_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7P
rop_Segment_Salesit+β8Ln_Total_Assetsit+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11Ear
nings_Quality_EQit+β12Lossit+β13Leverageit+β14ROAit+β15Aud_Opinionit+ 
β16Industryit+β17Yearit+εit 
 
[22] 
Z2it = β0+β1L3.Ln_Aud_Tenit+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+
β4AC_Sizeit+β5Prop_Aud_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7
Prop_Segment_Salesit+β8Ln_Total_Assetsit+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11Ea
rnings_Quality_EQit+β12Lossit+β13Leverageit+β14ROAit+β15Aud_Opinionit+ 
β16Industryit+β17Yearit+εit 
 
[23] 
Z2it = β0+β1L3.Ln_Aud_Feeit+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+
β4AC_Sizeit+β5Prop_Aud_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7
Prop_Segment_Salesit+β8Ln_Total_Assetsit+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11Ea
rnings_Quality_EQit+β12Lossit+β13Leverageit+β14ROAit+β15Aud_Opinionit+ 
β16Industryit+β17Yearit+εit 
 
[24] 
Z2it = β0+β1L3.Big4it+β2L3.RNon_Auditit+β3L3.Ln_Aud_Tenit+β4L3.Ln_Aud_Feeit
+β5Prop_BoD_Indit+β6BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β7AC_Sizeit+β8Prop_Au
d_Com_Indit+β9Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β10Prop_Segment_Salesit
+β11Ln_Total_Assetsit+β12Sq_Empit+β13Ln_Ageit+β14Earnings_Quality_EQit
+β15Lossit+β16Leverageit+β17ROAit+β18Aud_Opinionit+ 
β19Industryit+β20Yearit+εit 
[25] 
7.2.5.3 Summary 
As shown in Table 7.5 above, the goodness-of-fit (or coefficient of 
determinant, Pseudo R2) for logistic regression shown in columns 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 as 
0.523, 0.531, 0.503, 0.519 and 0.557 respectively. This implies that the lagged 
independent variables in the regression models explain 52.3%, 53.1%, 50.3%, 51.9% 
and 55.7% of the variation in the dependent variable (the Altman Z2-Score). These 
results may imply that all of the four key auditor attributes under consideration for this 
study using the lagged effect (T -3) may significantly assist the firm to lower the 
likelihood of financial distress. 
In summary, the results from Table 7.5 using the Altman Z2-Score model 
provide support for the hypotheses H5c, H6c, H7c, and H8c showing that lagged (T – 3) 
big 4 auditor (L3.Big4it), lagged (T – 3) the provision for non-audit services (L3.RNon-
Auditit), lagged (T – 3) auditor tenure (L3.Ln_Aud_Tenit) and lagged (T – 3) audit fee 
(L3.Ln_Aud_Feeit) have a statistically significant association with financial distress 
with all coefficients being negative. 
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7.2.6 Existence of a key auditor attribute (using alternative measures) impact 
on financial distress: The Zmijewski Base Model 
Table 7.6 below presents the results of binary logistic regressions where the four 
key auditor attributes used in this study (auditor specialist (Aud_Spec_30it), the 
provision of non-audit services (Cnon_Auditit), audit partner tenure 
(Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit), and proportion of audit fee paid / total assets (Prop_Aud_Feeit), 
are (logistically) regressed against financial distress, calculated using Zmijewski ZFC-
Score model with no control variables.  
7.2.6.1 Independent variables 
As shown in column 1 of Table 7.6 below, the coefficient of the independent 
variable auditor specialist (Aud_Spec_30it) is reported to be negative and statistically 
significant (β = -14.131, z-statistics (Wald) = -1.069, and p < 0.01). This result is as 
expected and implies that with the use of no control variable, the use of a specialist 
auditor decreases the likelihood of financial distress with a goodness-of-fit of 3.18% 
(that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.06318). 
Column 2 of Table 7.6 below shows the coefficient of the independent variable 
proxying for the provision of non-audit services (Cnon_Auditit) is reported to be 
negative and statistically significant (β = -16.829, z-statistics (Wald) = -1.005, and p 
< 0.01). This result is as expected and implies that with the use of no control variable, 
an increase in the provision of non-audit services decreases the likelihood of financial 
distress with a goodness-of-fit of 4.33% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.0433). 
Column 3 of Table 7.6 below shows the coefficient of the independent variable 
proxying for the number of years the audit partner held office (Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit) is 
reported to be negative and statistically significant (β = -20.760, z-statistics (Wald) = 
-0.362, and p < 0.01). This result is as expected and implies that with the use of no 
control variable, audit partner tenure decreases the likelihood of financial distress with 
a goodness-of-fit of 6.73% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.0673). 
Column 4 of Table 6.1 below shows the coefficient of the independent variable 
proxying the proportion of audit fee paid / total assets held by firm (Prop_Aud_Feeit) 
is reported to be negative and statistically significant (β = -7.884, z-statistics (Wald) = 
-6.524, and p < 0.01). This result is as expected and implies that with the use of no 
control variable the higher the proportion of audit fee paid to the auditor to total assets, 
the higher the likelihood of financial distress with a goodness-of-fit of 8.21% (that is, 
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Pseudo R2 of 0.00821). 
Last column 5 of Table 7.6 shows that when all four independent variables are 
simultaneously regressed (logistically) against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score, comparable 
results to as outlined above is obtained (Aud_Spec_30it  - β = -14.432, z-statistics 
(Wald) = -1.293, and p < 0.01, Cnon_Auditit - β = -15.026, z-statistics (Wald) = -1.158, 
and p < 0.01, Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit - β = -17.544, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.389 and p < 
0.01, Prop_Aud_Feeit - β = -7.067, z-statistics (Wald) = -5.793, and p < 0.01) and an 
overall goodness-of-fit of 22.8% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.228) which implies that that 
unison effect of all four independent variables affect the Zmijewski ZFC-Score by 
22.80%. 
Table 7.6: Logistic Regression Results – Alternative measure of key Auditor 
Attributes and Zmijewski ZFC Score – Base Model 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Aud_Spec_30it -1.069***    -1.293*** 
 (-14.131)    (-14.432) 
Cnon_Auditit  -1.005***   -1.158*** 
  (-16.829)   (-15.026) 
Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit   -0.362***  -0.389*** 
   (-20.760)  (-17.544) 
Prop_Aud_Feeit    -6.524*** -5.793*** 
    (-7.884) (-7.067) 
Constant 0.216*** -0.431*** 1.066*** 0.480*** 1.266*** 
 (6.665) (-11.072) (17.763) (7.802) (14.153) 
Observations 4,876 4,876 4,876 4,876 4,876 
Year_Dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry_Dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Log_Pseudolikelihood -3276 -3238 -3156 -2466 -2074 
Pseudo_R2 0.0318 0.0433 0.0673 0.0821 0.228 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Pease refer to Appendix-1 for variables definition. 
 
Column 1 based on Equation [30], Column 2 based on Equation [31], Column 3 based on Equation 
[32], Column 4 based on Equation [33] and Column 5 based on Equation [34]. 
ZFCit = β0 + β1 Aud_Spec_30it + εit                                                                                                                    [30]  
ZFCit = β0 + β1 Cnon_Auditit + εit                                                                                                       [31]  
ZFCit = β0 + β1 Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit + εit                                                                                                          [32]  
ZFCit = β0 + β1 Prop_Aud_Feeit + εit                                                                                                          [33]  
ZFCit = β0 + β1 Aud_Spec_30it + β2 Cnon_Auditit + β3 Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit + 
         β4 Prop_Aud_Feeit + εit                               [34] 
7.2.6.2 Summary 
As shown in Table 7.6 above, the goodness-of-fit (or coefficient of 
determinant, Pseudo R2) for logistic regression shown in columns 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 as 
0.0318, 0.0433, 0.0673, 0.0821 and 0.228 respectively. This implies that the 
independent variables in the regression models explain 3.18%, 4.33%, 6.73%, 8.21% 
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and 22.8% of the variation in the dependent variable (the Zmijewski ZFC-Score). 
These results may imply all four auditor attributes (using alternative measures) under 
consideration for this study may significantly assist the firm to lower the likelihood of 
financial distress. 
In summary, the results from Table 7.6 using the Zmijewski ZFC-Score model 
support the findings of Chapter Six in providing support for the hypotheses H1, H2, H3 
and H4 showing that specialist auditors (Aud_Spec_30it), the provision of non-audit 
services (Cnon_Auditit), audit partner tenure (Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit) and proportion of 
audit fee paid to total assets (Prop_Aud_Feeit) have a statistically significant 
association with financial distress with all coefficients being negative.  
7.2.7 Existence of a key auditor (using alternative measures) impact on 
financial distress: The Zmijewski Full Model 
Table 7.7 below presents the results of binary logistic regressions where the four 
key auditor attributes used in this study (the existence of a specialist auditor 
(Aud_Spec_30it), the provision of non-audit services (Cnon_Auditit), audit partner 
tenure (Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit), and proportion of audit fee paid / total assets 
(Prop_Aud_Feeit), are (logistically) regressed against financial distress, calculated 
using Zmijewski ZFC-Score model with added control variables. 
7.2.7.1 Independent variables 
As shown in column 1 of Table 7.7 below, the coefficient of the independent 
variable auditor specialist (Aud_Spec_30it) is reported to be negative and statistically 
significant (β = -15.550, z-statistics (Wald) = -1.310, and p < 0.01). This result is as 
expected and implies that with the use of added control variables, the use of a specialist 
auditor decreases the likelihood of financial distress with a goodness-of-fit of 10.5% 
(that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.105). 
Column 2 of Table 7.7 below shows the coefficient of the independent variable 
proxying for the provision of non-audit services (Cnon_Auditit) is reported to be 
negative and statistically significant (β = -14.536, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.993, and p 
< 0.01). This result is as expected and implies that with the use of added control 
variables, an increase in the provision of non-audit services decreases the likelihood 
of financial distress with a goodness-of-fit of 9.89% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.0989). 
Column 3 of Table 7.7 below shows the coefficient of the independent variable 
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proxying for the number of years the audit partner held office (Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit) is 
reported to be negative and statistically significant (β = -16.141, z-statistics (Wald) = 
-0.357, and p < 0.01). This result is as expected and implies that with the use of added 
control variables, an increase in the duration of audit partner tenure decreases the 
likelihood of financial distress with a goodness-of-fit of 10.7% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 
0.107). 
Column 4 of Table 7.7 below shows the coefficient of the independent variable 
proxying for the proportion of audit fee paid / total assets held by firm 
(Prop_Aud_Feeit) is reported to be negative and statistically significant (β = -4.854, z-
statistics (Wald) = -5.772, and p < 0.01). This result is as expected and implies that 
with the use of added control variables, an increase in the proportion of  audit fee paid 
to the auditor to total assets of the auditee decreases the likelihood of financial distress 
with a goodness-of-fit of 11.2% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.2112). 
Last column 5 of Table 7.7 shows that when all four independent variables are 
simultaneously regressed (logistically) against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score, comparable 
results to as outlined above is obtained (Aud_Spec_30it  - β = -12.753, z-statistics 
(Wald) = -1.271, and p < 0.01, Cnon_Auditit - β = -13.234, z-statistics (Wald) = -1.134, 
and p < 0.01, Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit - β = -14.120, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.382 and p < 
0.01, Prop_Aud_Feeit - β = -4.450, z-statistics (Wald) = -4.815, and p < 0.01) and an 
overall goodness-of-fit of 24.9% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.249) which implies that that 
unison effect of all four independent variables affect the Zmijewski ZFC-Score by 
24.9%. 
7.2.7.2 Control variables 
As shown in column 1 of Table 7.7 below, where the independent variable 
Aud_Spec_30it is regressed with the control variables against the Zmijewski ZFC-
Score, control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the 
variables CEO_Dualityit (β = 6.888, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.504, and p < 0.01), 
Aud_Comit (β = -2.110, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.170, and p < 0.05), 
No_Geographic_Segmentsit (β = -8.468, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.265, and p < 0.01), 
Ln_Market_Capit (β = -9.446, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.233, and p < 0.01) and Ln_Salesit 
(β = -3.748, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.071, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 1 of Table 7.7) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable 
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Aud_Spec_30it against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
From column 2 of Table 7.7 below, where the independent variable 
Cnon_Auditit is regressed with the control variables against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score, 
control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the 
variables BoD_Tenureit (β = 1.831, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.027, and p < 0.1), 
CEO_Dualityit (β = -4.338, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.324, and p < 0.01), 
Aud_Com_Meetit (β = -1.918, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.060, and p < 0.1), 
No_Geographic_Segmentsit (β = -6.952, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.215, and p < 0.01), 
Ln_Market_Capit (β = -10.272, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.241, and p < 0.01) and 
Ln_Salesit (β = -2.785, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.052, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 2 of Table 7.7) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable 
Cnon_Auditit against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
As shown in column 3 of Table 7.7 below, where the independent variable 
Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit is regressed with the control variables against the Zmijewski ZFC-
Score, control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the 
variables Aud_Comit (β = -1.786, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.147, and p < 0.1), 
Aud_Com_Meetit (β = -4.087, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.131, and p < 0.01), 
No_Geographic_Segmentsit (β = -8.651, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.273, and p < 0.01), 
Ln_Market_Capit (β = -7.729, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.190, and p < 0.01) and Ln_Salesit 
(β = -3.682, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.068, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 3 of Table 7.7) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable 
Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
From column 4 of Table 7.7 below, where the independent variable 
Prop_Aud_Feeit is regressed with the control variables against the Zmijewski ZFC-
Score, control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the 
variables BoD_Tenureit (β = 1.820, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.028, and p < 0.1), 
CEO_Dualityit (β = -2.081, z-statistics (Wald) = -00.175, and p < 0.05), 
No_Geographic_Segmentsit (β = -7.614, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.266, and p < 0.01), 
Ln_Market_Capit (β = -3.535, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.113, and p < 0.01) and Ln_Salesit 
(β = -2.383, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.050, and p < 0.05). 
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The remaining control variables (as per column 4 of Table 7.7) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable 
Prop_Aud_Feeit against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
Last from column 5 of Table 7.7 below, where the four independent variables 
Aud_Spec_30it, Cnon_Auditit, Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit and Prop_Aud_Feeit are regressed 
with the control variables against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score, control variables which 
are reported to have statistical significance include the variables BoD_Tenureit (β = 
1.684, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.030, and p < 0.1), Aud_Comit (β = -1.747, z-statistics 
(Wald) = -0.176, and p < 0.1), No_Geographic_Segmentsit (β = -8.071, z-statistics 
(Wald) = -0.315, and p < 0.01) and Ln_Market_Capit (β = -3.173, z-statistics (Wald) = 
-0.114, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 5 of Table 7.7) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variables against 
the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
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Table 7.7: Logistic Regression Results – Alternative measures of key auditor attributes 
and Zmijewski ZFC Score – Full Model 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Aud_Spec_30it -1.310***    -1.271*** 
 (-15.550)    (-12.753) 
Cnon_Auditit  -0.993***   -1.134*** 
  (-14.536)   (-13.234) 
Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit   -0.357***  -0.382*** 
   (-16.141)  (-14.120) 
Prop_Aud_Feeit    -5.772*** -4.450*** 
    (-4.854) (-4.815) 
BoD_Tenureit 0.025 0.027* 0.019 0.028* 0.030* 
 (1.613) (1.831) (1.307) (1.820) (1.684) 
CEO_Dualityit -0.504*** -0.324*** 0.110 -0.175** 0.059 
 (-6.888) (-4.338) (1.394) (-2.081) (0.616) 
Aud_Comit -0.170** -0.065 -0.147* -0.094 -0.176* 
 (-2.110) (-0.801) (-1.786) (-1.028) (-1.747) 
Aud_Com_Meetit -0.008 -0.060* -0.131*** -0.016 -0.001 
 (-0.264) (-1.918) (-4.087) (-0.479) (-0.030) 
No_Geographic_Segmentsit -0.265*** -0.215*** -0.273*** -0.266*** -0.315*** 
 (-8.468) (-6.952) (-8.651) (-7.614) (-8.071) 
Ln_Market_Capit -0.233*** -0.241*** -0.190*** -0.113*** -0.114*** 
 (-9.446) (-10.272) (-7.729) (-3.535) (-3.173) 
Ln_Salesit -0.071*** -0.052*** -0.068*** -0.050** -0.007 
 (-3.748) (-2.785) (-3.682) (-2.383) (-0.303) 
Constant -4.345*** -5.015*** -2.950*** -2.087*** -0.349 
 (-11.086) (-13.192) (-7.231) (-3.702) (-0.558) 
Observations 4,876 4,876 4,876 4,876 4,876 
Year_Dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry_Dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Log_Pseudolikelihood -2544 -2563 -2539 -2055 -1738 
Pseudo_R2 0.105 0.0989 0.107 0.112 0.249 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Pease refer to Appendix-1 for variables definition. 
 
Column 1 based on Equation [35], Column 2 based on Equation [36], Column 3 based on 
Equation [37], Column 4 based on Equation [38] and Column 5 based on Equation [39]. 
 
ZFCit = β0+β1Aud_Spec_30it+β2Bod_Tenureit+β3CEO_Dualityit+β4Aud_Com
it+β5Aud_Com_Meetit+β6No_Geographic_Segmentsit+β7Ln_Market_
Capit+β8Ln_Salesit+β9Industryit+β10Yearit +εit 
 
[35] 
ZFCit = β0+β1CNon_Auditit+β2Bod_Tenureit+β3CEO_Dualityit+β4Aud_Comit
+β5Aud_Com_Meetit+β6No_Geographic_Segmentsit+β7Ln_Market_
Capit+β8Ln_Salesit+β9Industryit+β10Yearit +εit 
 
[36] 
ZFCit = β0+β1Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit+β2Bod_Tenureit+β3CEO_Dualityit+β4Aud
_Comit+β5Aud_Com_Meetit+β6No_Geographic_Segmentsit+β7Ln_M
arket_Capit+β8Ln_Salesit+β9Industryit+β10Yearit +εit 
 
[37] 
ZFCit = β0+β1Prop_Aud_Feeit+β2Bod_Tenureit+β3CEO_Dualityit+β4Aud_C
omit+β5Aud_Com_Meetit+β6No_Geographic_Segmentsit+β7Ln_Mark
et_Capit+β8Ln_Salesit+β9Industryit+β10Yearit +εit 
 
[38] 
ZFCit = β0+β1Aud_Spec_30it+β2CNon_Auditit+β3Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit+β4Prop
_Aud_Feeit+β5Bod_Tenureit+β6CEO_Dualityit+β7Aud_Comit+β8Au
d_Com_Meetit+β9No_Geographic_Segmentsit+β10Ln_Market_Capit+
β11Ln_Salesit+β12Industryit+β13Yearit +εit 
[39] 
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7.2.7.3 Summary 
As shown in Table 7.7 above, the goodness-of-fit (or coefficient of 
determinant, Pseudo R2) for logistic regression shown in columns 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 as 
0.105, 0.0989, 0.107, 0.112 and 0.249 respectively. This implies that the independent 
variables in the regression models explain 10.5%, 9.89%, 10.7%, 11.2% and 24.9% of 
the variation in the dependent variable (the Zmijewski ZFC-Score). These results may 
imply that all of the four key auditor attributes under consideration for this study may 
significantly assist the firm to lower the likelihood of financial distress. 
In summary, the results from Table 7.7 using alternative measures for the four 
key auditor attributes and the Zmijewski ZFC-Score model support the findings of 
Chapter Six in providing support for the hypotheses H1, H2, H3, and H4 showing that 
auditor specialization (Aud_Spec_30it), the provision of non-audit services 
(Cnon_Auditit), audit partner tenure (Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit) and proportion of audit fee 
paid by the auditee to total assets of the auditee (Prop_Aud_Feeit) have a statistically 
significant association with financial distress with all coefficients being negative.  
7.2.8 Existence of a lagged one-year key auditor attribute (using alternative 
measures) impact on financial distress in year zero: The Zmijewski Full 
Model 
Table 7.8 below presents the results of binary logistic regressions where the 
lagged one year (T-1) four key auditor attributes used in this study (the existence of a 
specialist auditor (L.Aud_Spec_30it), the provision of non-audit services 
(L.Cnon_Auditit), audit partner tenure (L.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit), and the proportion of 
audit fee paid to the auditor over total assets of the auditee (L.Prop_Aud_Feeit),  are 
(logistically) regressed against financial distress, calculated using Zmijewski ZFC-
Score model with added control variables.  
7.2.8.1 Independent variables 
As shown in column 1 of Table 7.8 below, the coefficient of the lagged one 
year (T–1) independent variable auditor specialization (L.Aud_Spec_30it) is reported 
to be negative and statistically significant (β = -5.686, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.730, and 
p < 0.01). This result is as expected and implies that with the use of added control 
variables, the use of a specialist auditor in the year T–1 decreases the likelihood of 
financial distress in the year T0 with a goodness-of-fit of 7.79% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 
0.0779). 
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Column 2 of Table 7.8 below shows the coefficient of the lagged one year (T–
1) independent variable proxying for the provision of non-audit services 
(L.Cnon_Auditit) is reported to be negative and statistically significant (β = -6.546, z-
statistics (Wald) = -0.684, and p < 0.01). This result is as expected and implies that 
with the use of added control variables, an increase in the provision of non-audit 
services in the year T–1 decreases the likelihood of financial distress in the year T0 with 
a goodness-of-fit of 8.23% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.0823). 
Column 3 of Table 7.8 below shows the coefficient of the lagged one year (T–
1) independent variable proxying for the number of years the audit partner held office 
(L.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit) is reported to be negative though statistically significant (β = 
-0.798, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.028, and p < 0.1). This result is as expected and implies 
that with the use of added control variables, the audit partner tenure in the year T–1 
decreases the likelihood of financial distress in the year T0 with a goodness-of-fit of 
6.44% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.0644). 
Column 4 of Table 7.8 below shows the coefficient of the lagged one year (T–
1) independent variable proxying the proportion of audit fee paid / total assets held by 
the auditee (L.Prop_Aud_Feeit) is reported to be negative and statistically significant 
(β = -2.670, z-statistics (Wald) = -1.772, and p < 0.01). This result is as expected and 
implies that with the use of added control variables, an increase in the proportion of 
audit fee paid to the auditor over total assets of the auditee in the year T–1 decreases 
the likelihood of financial distress in the year T0 with a goodness-of-fit of 9.27% (that 
is, Pseudo R2 of 0.0927). 
Last column 5 of Table 7.8 shows that when all four lagged one year (T–1) 
independent variables are simultaneously regressed (logistically) against the 
Zmijewski ZFC-Score, comparable results to as outlined above is obtained 
(L.Aud_Spec_30it  - β = -5.547, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.768, and p < 0.01, 
L.Cnon_Auditit - β = -5.999, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.694, and p < 0.01, 
L.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit - β = -1.058, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.043 and p < 0.1, 
L.Prop_Aud_Feeit - β = -2.479, z-statistics (Wald) = -1.891, and p < 0.05) and an 
overall goodness-of-fit of 12.7% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.127) which implies that that 
unison effect of all four independent variables in the year T–1 affect the Zmijewski 
ZFC-Score in the year T0 by 12.7%. 
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7.2.8.2 Control variables 
As shown in column 1 of Table 7.8 below, where the independent variable 
L.Aud_Spec_30it is regressed with the control variables against the Zmijewski ZFC-
Score, control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the 
variables No_Geographic_Segmentsit (β = -5.418, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.254, and p < 
0.01), Ln_Market_Capit (β = -7.837, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.264, and p < 0.01) and 
Ln_Salesit (β = -2.318, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.062, and p < 0.05). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 1 of Table 7.8) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable 
L.Aud_Spec_30it against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
From column 2 of Table 7.8 below, where the independent variable 
L.Cnon_Auditit is regressed with the control variables against the Zmijewski ZFC-
Score, control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the 
variables, Aud_Com_Meetit (β = -1.834, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.085, and p < 0.1), 
No_Geographic_Segmentsit (β = -5.353, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.248, and p < 0.01), 
Ln_Market_Capit (β = -7.954, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.262, and p < 0.01) and Ln_Salesit 
(β = -2.324, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.061, and p < 0.05). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 2 of Table 7.8) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable 
L.Cnon_Auditit against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
As shown in column 3 of Table 7.8 below, where the independent variable 
L.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit is regressed with the control variables against the Zmijewski 
ZFC-Score, control variables which are reported to have statistical significance 
include the variables Aud_Com_Meetit (β = -1.803, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.083, and p 
< 0.1), No_Geographic_Segmentsit (β = -5.645, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.261, and p < 
0.01), Ln_Market_Capit (β = -7.492, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.250, and p < 0.01) and 
Ln_Salesit (β = -2.629, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.069, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 3 of Table 7.8) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable 
L.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
From column 4 of Table 7.8 below, where the independent variable 
L.Prop_Aud_Feeit is regressed with the control variables against the Zmijewski ZFC-
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Score, control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the 
variables No_Geographic_Segmentsit (β = -5.093, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.271, and p < 
0.01) and Ln_Market_Capit (β = -5.590, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.221, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 4 of Table 7.8) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable 
L.Prop_Aud_Feeit against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
Last from column 5 of Table 7.8 below, where the four independent variables 
L.Aud_Spec_30it, L.Cnon_Auditit, L.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit and L.Prop_Aud_Feeit are 
regressed with the control variables against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score, control 
variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the variables 
No_Geographic_Segmentsit (β = -4.744, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.258, and p < 0.01) and 
Ln_Market_Capit (β = -5.910, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.240, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 5 of Table 7.8) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variables against 
the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
  
161  
Table 7.8: Logistic Regression Results – Lagged (one year) Alternative Measure of Key 
Auditor Attributes and Zmijewski ZFC Score – Full Model 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
L.Aud_Spec_30it -0.730***    -0.768*** 
 (-5.686)    (-5.547) 
L.Cnon_Auditit  -0.684***   -0.694*** 
  (-6.546)   (-5.999) 
L.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit   -0.028*  -0.043 
   (-0.798)  (-1.058) 
L.Prop_Aud_Feeit    -1.772*** -1.891** 
    (-2.670) (-2.479) 
BoD_Tenureit 0.030 0.025 0.027 0.027 0.030 
 (1.346) (1.154) (1.259) (1.257) (1.302) 
CEO_Dualityit -0.032 0.039 0.021 0.085 0.085 
 (-0.260) (0.307) (0.173) (0.619) (0.605) 
Aud_Comit -0.134 -0.131 -0.125 -0.155 -0.188 
 (-1.094) (-1.058) (-1.028) (-1.146) (-1.354) 
Aud_Com_Meetit -0.054 -0.085* -0.083* -0.044 -0.024 
 (-1.161) (-1.834) (-1.803) (-0.915) (-0.494) 
No_Geographic_Segmentsit -0.254*** -0.248*** -0.261*** -0.271*** -0.258*** 
 (-5.418) (-5.353) (-5.645) (-5.093) (-4.744) 
Ln_Market_Capit -0.264*** -0.262*** -0.250*** -0.221*** -0.240*** 
 (-7.837) (-7.954) (-7.492) (-5.590) (-5.910) 
Ln_Salesit -0.062** -0.061** -0.069*** -0.038 -0.010 
 (-2.318) (-2.324) (-2.629) (-1.293) (-0.323) 
Constant -4.631*** -4.988*** -4.570*** -3.550*** -3.467*** 
 (-7.821) (-8.501) (-7.396) (-4.909) (-4.565) 
Observations 2,082 2,082 2,082 2,082 2,082 
Year_Dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry_Dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Log_Pseudolikelihood -1109 -1104 -1125 -933.4 -898.4 
Pseudo_R2 0.0779 0.0823 0.0644 0.0927 0.127 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Pease refer to Appendix-1 for variables definition. 
Column 1 based on Equation [40], Column 2 based on Equation [41], Column 3 based on 
Equation [42], Column 4 based on Equation [43] and Column 5 based on Equation [44]. 
 
ZFCit = β0+β1L.Aud_Spec_30it+β2Bod_Tenureit+β3CEO_Dualityit+β4A
ud_Comit+β5Aud_Com_Meetit+β6No_Geographic_Segmentsit+
β7Ln_Market_Capit+β8Ln_Salesit+β9Industryit+β10Yearit +εit 
 
[40] 
ZFCit = β0+β1L.CNon_Auditit+β2Bod_Tenureit+β3CEO_Dualityit+β4Au
d_Comit+β5Aud_Com_Meetit+β6No_Geographic_Segmentsit+β7
Ln_Market_Capit+β8Ln_Salesit+β9Industryit+β10Yearit +εit 
 
[41] 
ZFCit = β0+β1L.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit+β2Bod_Tenureit+β3CEO_Dualityit
+β4Aud_Comit+β5Aud_Com_Meetit+β6No_Geographic_Segme
ntsit+β7Ln_Market_Capit+β8Ln_Salesit+β9Industryit+β10Yearit 
+εit 
 
[42] 
ZFCit = β0+β1L.Prop_Aud_Feeit+β2Bod_Tenureit+β3CEO_Dualityit+β
4Aud_Comit+β5Aud_Com_Meetit+β6No_Geographic_Segmentsit
+β7Ln_Market_Capit+β8Ln_Salesit+β9Industryit+β10Yearit +εit 
 
[43] 
ZFCit = β0+β1L.Aud_Spec_30it+β2L.CNon_Auditit+β3L.Ln_Aud_Partne
r_Tenit+β4L.Prop_Aud_Feeit+β5Bod_Tenureit+β6CEO_Dualit
yit+β7Aud_Comit+β8Aud_Com_Meetit+β9No_Geographic_Segm
entsit+β10Ln_Market_Capit+β11Ln_Salesit+β12Industryit+β13Yea
rit +εit 
[44] 
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7.2.8.3 Summary 
As shown in Table 7.8 above, the goodness-of-fit (or coefficient of 
determinant, Pseudo R2) for logistic regression shown in columns 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 as 
0.0779, 0.0823, 0.0644, 0.0927 and 0.127 respectively. This implies that the lagged 
independent variables in the regression models explain 7.79%, 8.23%, 6.44%, 9.27% 
and 12.7% of the variation in the dependent variable (the Zmijewski ZFC-Score). 
These results may imply that all of the four key auditor attributes under consideration 
for this study using the lagged effect (T -1) may significantly assist the firm to lower 
the likelihood of financial distress. 
In summary, the results from Table 7.8 using the Zmijewski ZFC-Score model 
support the findings of Chapter Six in providing support for the hypotheses H5a, H6a, 
H7a, and H8a showing that lagged (T – 1) auditor specialization (L.Aud_Spec_30it), 
lagged (T – 1) the provision of non-audit services (L.Cnon_Auditit), lagged (T – 1) 
audit partner tenure (L.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit) and lagged (T – 1) proportion of audit fee 
over total assets of auditee (L.Prop_Aud_Feeit) have a statistically significant 
association with financial distress with all coefficients being negative.  
7.2.9 Existence of a lagged two-years key auditor attribute (using alternative 
measures) impact on financial distress in year zero: The Zmijewski Full 
Model 
Table 7.9 below presents the results of binary logistic regressions where the 
lagged two-years (T-2) four key auditor attributes used in this study (the existence of a 
specialist auditor (L2.Aud_Spec_30it), the provision of non-audit services 
(L2.Cnon_Auditit), audit partner tenure (L2.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit), and the proportion 
of the total audit fee paid to the auditor over total assets of the auditee 
(L2.Prop_Aud_Feeit),  are (logistically) regressed against financial distress, calculated 
using Zmijewski ZFC-Score model with added control variables.  
7.2.9.1 Independent variables 
As shown in column 1 of Table 7.9 below, the coefficient of the lagged two 
years (T–2) independent variable auditor specialization (L2.Aud_Spec_30it) is 
reported to be negative and statistically significant (β = -3.251, z-statistics (Wald) = -
0.520, and p < 0.01). This result is as expected and implies that with the use of added 
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control variables, the use of a specialist auditor in the year T–2 decreases the likelihood 
of financial distress in the year T0 with a goodness-of-fit of 5.19% (that is, Pseudo R2 
of 0.519). 
Column 2 of Table 7.9 below shows the coefficient of the lagged two years 
(T–2) independent variable proxying for the provision of non-audit services 
(L2.Cnon_Auditit) is reported to be negative and statistically significant (β = -4.702, 
z-statistics (Wald) = -0.638, and p < 0.01). This result is as expected and implies that 
with the use of added control variables, an increase in the provision of non-audit 
services in the year T–2 decreases the likelihood of financial distress in the year T0 with 
a goodness-of-fit of 6.05% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.0605). 
Column 3 of Table 7.9 below shows the coefficient of the lagged two years 
(T–2) independent variable proxying for the number of years the audit partner held 
office (L2.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit) is reported to be negative but statistically insignificant 
(β = -1.500, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.064, and p > 0.1). The negative correlation is as 
expected and implies that with the use of added control variables, audit partner tenure 
in the year T–2 decreases the likelihood of financial distress in the year T0 with a 
goodness-of-fit of 4.57% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.0457). Column 3 of Table 7.9 
however shows a loss of statistical significance for this variable (from a <0.1 
significance in lagged T-1 regression, and a <0.01 significance in initial (unlagged) 
regression). This loss of significance can be explained by the mandatory audit partner 
rotation requirement prevailing in Australia whereby an audit partner can only hold 
office for a maximum period of 5 years prior to partner rotation being required. 
Column 4 of Table 7.9 below shows the coefficient of the lagged two years 
(T–2) independent variable proxying the proportion of audit fee paid / total assets held 
by firm (L2.Prop_Aud_Feeit) is reported to be negative and statistically significant (β 
= -2.665, z-statistics (Wald) = -1.326, and p < 0.01). This result is as expected and 
implies that with the use of added control variables, an increase in the proportion of 
audit fee paid to the auditor over total assets held by the auditee in the year T–2 
decreases the likelihood of financial distress in the year T0 with a goodness-of-fit of 
6.58% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.0658). 
Last column 5 of Table 7.9 shows that when all four lagged two years (T–2) 
independent variables are simultaneously regressed (logistically) against the 
Zmijewski ZFC-Score, comparable results to as outlined above is obtained 
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(L2.Aud_Spec_30it  - β = -3.875, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.657, and p < 0.01, 
L2.Cnon_Auditit - β = -4.850, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.706, and p < 0.01 and 
L2.Prop_Aud_Feeit - β = -2.437, z-statistics (Wald) = -1.073, and p > 0.05) and an 
overall goodness-of-fit of 9.86% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.0986) which implies that that 
unison effect of three of the four independent variables (namely L2.Aud_Spec_30it, 
L2.Cnon_Auditit and L2.Prop_Aud_Feeit in the year T–2 affect the Zmijewski ZFC-
Score in the year T0 by 9.86%. Column 5 of Table 7.9 however shows that when 
looking at the unison effect of all four key auditor attributes, variable auditor tenure 
loses its significance, though still with a negative correlation (L2.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit 
- β = -1.065, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.049, and p > 0.1). 
7.2.9.2 Control variables 
As shown in column 1 of Table 7.9 below, where the independent variable 
L2.Aud_Spec_30it is regressed with the control variables against the Zmijewski ZFC-
Score, control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the 
variables Aud_Com_Meetit (β = -2.290, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.149, and p < 0.05), 
No_Geographic_Segmentsit (β = -3.379, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.195, and p < 0.01), 
Ln_Market_Capit (β = -4.638, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.208, and p < 0.01) and Ln_Salesit 
(β = -2.686, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.092, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 1 of Table 7.9) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable 
L2.Aud_Spec_30it against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
From column 2 of Table 7.9 below, where the independent variable 
L2.Cnon_Auditit is regressed with the control variables against the Zmijewski ZFC-
Score, control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the 
variables Aud_Com_Meetit (β = -2.684, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.177, and p < 0.01), 
No_Geographic_Segmentsit (β = -3.511, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.205, and p < 0.01), 
Ln_Market_Capit (β = -4.419, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.197, and p < 0.01) and Ln_Salesit 
(β = -2.438, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.083, and p < 0.05). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 2 of Table 7.9) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable 
L2.Cnon_Auditit against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
As shown in column 3 of Table 7.9 below, where the independent variable 
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L2.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit is regressed with the control variables against the Zmijewski 
ZFC-Score, control variables which are reported to have statistical significance 
include the variables Aud_Com_Meetit (β = -2.703, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.177, and p 
< 0.01), No_Geographic_Segmentsit (β = -3.613, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.209, and p < 
0.01), Ln_Market_Capit (β = -4.447, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.198, and p < 0.01) and 
Ln_Salesit (β = -2.598, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.089, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 3 of Table 7.9) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable 
L2.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
From column 4 of Table 7.9 below, where the independent variable 
L2.Prop_Aud_Feeit is regressed with the control variables against the Zmijewski ZFC-
Score, control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the 
variables Aud_Com_Meetit (β = -2.172, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.145, and p < 0.05), 
No_Geographic_Segmentsit (β = -3.591, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.228, and p < 0.01), 
Ln_Market_Capit (β = -3.602, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.175, and p < 0.01) and Ln_Salesit 
(β = -2.119, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.080, and p < 0.05). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 4 of Table 7.9) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable 
L2.Prop_Aud_Feeit against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
Last from column 5 of Table 7.9 below, where the four independent variables 
L2.Aud_Spec_30it, L2.Cnon_Auditit, L2.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit and L2.Prop_Aud_Feeit 
are regressed with the control variables against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score, control 
variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the variables 
Aud_Comit (β = -1.788, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.310, and p < 0.1), 
No_Geographic_Segmentsit (β = -3.145, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.205, and p < 0.01), 
Ln_Market_Capit (β = -4.008, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.195, and p < 0.01) and Ln_Salesit 
(β = -2.059, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.080, and p < 0.05). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 5 of Table 7.9) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variables against 
the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
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Table 7.9: Logistic Regression Results – Lagged (two years) Alternative Measure of Key 
Auditor Attributes and Zmijewski ZFC Score – Full Model 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
L2.Aud_Spec_30it -0.520***    -0.657*** 
 (-3.251)    (-3.875) 
L2.Cnon_Auditit  -0.638***   -0.706*** 
  (-4.702)   (-4.850) 
L2.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit   -0.064  -0.049 
   (-1.500)  (-1.065) 
L2.Prop_Aud_Feeit    -1.326*** -1.073** 
    (-2.665) (-2.437) 
BoD_Tenureit 0.005 -0.003 0.001 0.004 0.002 
 (0.171) (-0.109) (0.028) (0.154) (0.059) 
CEO_Dualityit 0.020 0.113 0.044 0.089 0.040 
 (0.131) (0.722) (0.279) (0.537) (0.231) 
Aud_Comit -0.148 -0.159 -0.107 -0.244 -0.310* 
 (-0.938) (-0.996) (-0.681) (-1.439) (-1.788) 
Aud_Com_Meetit -0.149** -0.177*** -0.177*** -0.145** -0.096 
 (-2.290) (-2.684) (-2.703) (-2.172) (-1.434) 
No_Geographic_Segmentsit -0.195*** -0.205*** -0.209*** -0.228*** -0.205*** 
 (-3.379) (-3.511) (-3.613) (-3.591) (-3.145) 
Ln_Market_Capit -0.208*** -0.197*** -0.198*** -0.175*** -0.195*** 
 (-4.638) (-4.419) (-4.447) (-3.602) (-4.008) 
Ln_Salesit -0.092*** -0.083** -0.089*** -0.080** -0.080** 
 (-2.686) (-2.438) (-2.598) (-2.119) (-2.059) 
Constant -4.298*** -4.339*** -4.376*** -3.498*** -4.089*** 
 (-5.236) (-5.285) (-5.196) (-3.902) (-4.610) 
Observations 1,172 1,172 1,172 1,172 1,172 
Year_Dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry_Dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Log_Pseudolikelihood -644.4 -638.6 -648.6 -568.0 -548.1 
Pseudo_R2 0.0519 0.0605 0.0457 0.0658 0.0986 
 Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Pease refer to Appendix-1 for variables definition. 
 
Column 1 based on Equation [45], Column 2 based on Equation [46], Column 3 based on 
Equation [47], Column 4 based on Equation [48] and Column 5 based on Equation [49]. 
 
ZFCit = β0+β1L2.Aud_Spec_30it+β2Bod_Tenureit+β3CEO_Dualityit+β4Aud_C
omit+β5Aud_Com_Meetit+β6No_Geographic_Segmentsit+β7Ln_Market
_Capit+β8Ln_Salesit+β9Industryit+β10Yearit +εit 
 
[45] 
ZFCit = β0+β1L2.CNon_Auditit+β2Bod_Tenureit+β3CEO_Dualityit+β4Aud_Co
mit+β5Aud_Com_Meetit+β6No_Geographic_Segmentsit+β7Ln_Market_
Capit+β8Ln_Salesit+β9Industryit+β10Yearit +εit 
 
[46] 
ZFCit = β0+β1L2.Aud_Part_Tenit+β2Bod_Tenureit+β3CEO_Dualityit+β4Aud_C
omit+β5Aud_Com_Meetit+β6No_Geographic_Segmentsit+β7Ln_Market
_Capit+β8Ln_Salesit+β9Industryit+β10Yearit +εit 
 
[47] 
ZFCit = β0+β1L2.Prop_Aud_Feeit+β2Bod_Tenureit+β3CEO_Dualityit+β4Aud
_Comit+β5Aud_Com_Meetit+β6No_Geographic_Segmentsit+β7Ln_Mar
ket_Capit+β8Ln_Salesit+β9Industryit+β10Yearit +εit 
 
[48] 
ZFCit = β0+β1L2.Aud_Spec_30it+β2L2.CNon_Auditit+β3L2.Aud_Part_Tenit+β4
L2.Prop_Aud_Feeit+β5Bod_Tenureit+β6CEO_Dualityit+β7Aud_Comit
+β8Aud_Com_Meetit+β9No_Geographic_Segmentsit+β10Ln_Market_C
apit+β11Ln_Salesit+β12Industryit+β13Yearit +εit 
 
[49] 
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7.2.9.3 Summary 
As shown in Table 7.9 above, the goodness-of-fit (or coefficient of 
determinant, Pseudo R2) for logistic regression shown in columns 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 as 
0.0591, 0.0605, 0.0457, 0.0658 and 0.0986 respectively. This implies that the lagged 
independent variables in the regression models explain 5.91%, 6.05%, 4.57%, 6.58% 
and 9.86% of the variation in the dependent variable (the Zmijewski ZFC-Score). 
These results may imply that all of the four key auditor attributes under consideration 
for this study using the lagged effect (T -2) may significantly assist the firm to lower 
the likelihood of financial distress. 
In summary, the results from Table 7.9 using the Zmijewski ZFC-Score model 
support the findings of Chapter Six in providing support for the hypotheses H5a, H6a, 
H7a, and H8a showing that lagged (T – 2) auditor specialization (L2.Aud_Spec_30it), 
lagged (T – 2) the provision of non-audit services (L2.Cnon_Auditit), lagged (T – 2) 
audit partner tenure (L2.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit) and lagged (T – 2) proportion audit fee / 
total assets (L2.Prop_Aud_Feeit) have a statistically significant association with 
financial distress with all coefficients being negative.  
7.2.10 Existence of a lagged three-years key auditor attribute (using alternative 
measures) impact on financial distress in year zero: The Zmijewski Full 
Model 
Table 7.10 below presents the results of binary logistic regressions where the 
lagged three-years (T-3) four key auditor attributes used in this study (auditor 
specialization  (L3.Aud_Spec_30it), the provision of non-audit services 
(L3.Cnon_Auditit), audit partner tenure (L3.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit), and the the 
proportion of total total audit fee paid to the auditor to total assets of the auditee 
(L3.Prop_Aud_Feeit),  are (logistically) regressed against financial distress, calculated 
using Zmijewski ZFC-Score model with added control variables.  
7.2.10.1 Independent variables 
As shown in column 1 of Table 7.10 below, the coefficient of the lagged three 
years (T–3) independent variable auditor specialization (L3.Aud_Spec_30it) is 
reported to be negative and statistically significant (β = -3.360, z-statistics (Wald) = -
0.603, and p < 0.01). This result is as expected and implies that with the use of added 
control variables, the use of a specialist auditor in the year T–3 decreases the likelihood 
of financial distress in the year T0 with a goodness-of-fit of 4.62% (that is, Pseudo R2 
168  
of 0.0462). 
Column 2 of Table 7.10 below shows the coefficient of the lagged three years 
(T–3) independent variable proxying for the provision of non-audit services 
(L3.Cnon_Auditit) is reported to be negative and statistically significant (β = -3.226, 
z-statistics (Wald) = -0.487, and p < 0.01). This result is as expected and implies that 
with the use of added control variables, an increase in the provision of non-audit 
services in the year T–3 decreases the likelihood of financial distress in the year T0 with 
a goodness-of-fit of 4.55% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.0455). 
Column 3 of Table 7.10 below shows the coefficient of the lagged three years 
(T–3) independent variable proxying for the number of years the audit partner held 
office (L3.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit) is reported to be negative but statistically insignificant 
(β = -0.843, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.040, and p > 0.1). The negative correlation is as 
expected and implies that with the use of added control variables, an increase in the 
duration of the audit partner tenure in the year T–3 decreases the likelihood of financial 
distress in the year T0 with a goodness-of-fit of 3.65% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.30365). 
The loss of statistical significance is consistent with the use of a lagged T-2 audit 
partner tenure as Tables 7.4 describes. 
Column 4 of Table 7.10 below shows the coefficient of the lagged three years 
(T–3) independent variable proxying the proportion of audit fee paid / total assets held 
by firm (L3.Prop_Aud_Feeit) is reported to be negative and statistically significant (β 
= -2.256, z-statistics (Wald) = -9.599, and p < 0.01). This result is as expected and 
implies that with the use of added control variables, an increase in the proportion of 
audit fee paid to the auditor over total assets held by the auditee in the year T–3 
decreases the likelihood of financial distress in the year T0 with a goodness-of-fit of 
4.90% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.0490). 
Last column 5 of Table 7.10 shows that when all four lagged three years (T–
3) independent variables are simultaneously regressed (logistically) against the 
Zmijewski ZFC-Score, comparable results to as outlined above is obtained 
(L3.Aud_Spec_30it  - β = -3.788, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.708, and p < 0.01, 
L3.Cnon_Auditit - β = -3.602, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.574, and p < 0.01, 
L3.Prop_Aud_Feeit - β = -2.127, z-statistics (Wald) = -9.806, and p < 0.05) and an 
overall goodness-of-fit of 7.57% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.0757) which implies that that 
unison effect of three of the four independent variables (namely L3.Aud_Spec_30it, 
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L3.Cnon_Auditit and L3.Prop_Aud_Feeit in the year T–3 affect the Zmijewski ZFC-
Score in the year T0 by 7.57%. Column 5 of Table 7.10 however shows that when 
looking at the unison effect of all four key auditor attributes, variable auditor tenure 
loses its significance, though still with a negative correlation (L3.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit 
- β = -0.851, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.043 and p > 0.1). This is consistent with Table 
7.4 when a lag of two-years was used. 
7.2.10.2 Control variables 
As shown in column 1 of Table 7.10 below, where the independent variable 
L3.Aud_Spec_30it is regressed with the control variables against the Zmijewski ZFC-
Score, control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the 
variables No_Geographic_Segmentsit (β = -2.032, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.124, and p < 
0.05), Ln_Market_Capit (β = -3.806, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.189, and p < 0.01) and 
Ln_Salesit (β = -2.575, z-statistics (Wald) = -00.090, and p < 0.05). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 1 of Table 7.10) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable 
L3.Aud_Spec_30it against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
From column 2 of Table 7.10 below, where the independent variable 
L3.Cnon_Auditit is regressed with the control variables against the Zmijewski ZFC-
Score, control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the 
variables Aud_Com_Meetit (β = -1.965, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.148, and p < 0.05), 
No_Geographic_Segmentsit (β = -2.160, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.133, and p < 0.05), 
Ln_Market_Capit (β = -3.627, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.177, and p < 0.01) and Ln_Salesit 
(β = -2.156, z-statistics (Wald) = -0..077, and p < 0.05). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 2 of Table 7.10) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable 
L3.Cnon_Auditit against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
As shown in column 3 of Table 7.10 below, where the independent variable 
L3.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit is regressed with the control variables against the Zmijewski 
ZFC-Score, control variables which are reported to have statistical significance 
include the variables Aud_Com_Meetit (β = -1.931, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.145, and p 
< 0.1), No_Geographic_Segmentsit (β = -2.190, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.134, and p < 
0.05), Ln_Market_Capit (β = -3.517, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.172, and p < 0.01) and 
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Ln_Salesit (β = -2.372, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.084, and p < 0.05). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 3 of Table 7.10) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable 
L3.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
From column 4 of Table 7.10 below, where the independent variable 
L3.Prop_Aud_Feeit is regressed with the control variables against the Zmijewski ZFC-
Score, control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the 
variables No_Geographic_Segmentsit (β = -2.336, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.154, and p < 
0.05), Ln_Market_Capit (β = -2.675, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.141, and p < 0.01) and 
Ln_Salesit (β = -1.802, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.068, and p < 0.1). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 4 of Table 7.10) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable 
L3.Prop_Aud_Feeit against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
Last from column 5 of Table 7.10 below, where the four independent variables 
L3.Aud_Spec_30it, L3.Cnon_Auditit, L3.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit and L3.Prop_Aud_Feeit 
are regressed with the control variables against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score, control 
variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the variables 
Aud_Comit (β = -1.930, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.362, and p < 0.1), 
No_Geographic_Segmentsit (β = -1.943, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.131, and p < 0.1), 
Ln_Market_Capit (β = -3.253, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.174, and p < 0.01) and Ln_Salesit 
(β = -1.787, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.069, and p < 0.1). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 5 of Table 7.10) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variables against 
the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
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Table 7.10: Logistic Regression Results – Lagged (three years) Alternative Measure 
of Key Auditor Attributes and Zmijewski ZFC Score –Full Model 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
L3.Aud_Spec_30it -0.603***    -0.708*** 
 (-3.360)    (-3.788) 
L3.Cnon_Auditit  -0.487***   -0.574*** 
  (-3.226)   (-3.602) 
L3.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit   -0.040  -0.043 
   (-0.843)  (-0.851) 
L3.Prop_Aud_Feeit    -9.599** -9.806** 
    (-2.256) (-2.127) 
BoD_Tenureit 0.015 0.011 0.011 0.019 0.025 
 (0.489) (0.365) (0.359) (0.620) (0.770) 
CEO_Dualityit -0.268 -0.184 -0.229 -0.090 -0.129 
 (-1.544) (-1.052) (-1.313) (-0.487) (-0.678) 
Aud_Comit -0.141 -0.112 -0.082 -0.277 -0.362* 
 (-0.802) (-0.634) (-0.467) (-1.504) (-1.930) 
Aud_Com_Meetit -0.110 -0.148** -0.145* -0.073 -0.028 
 (-1.487) (-1.965) (-1.931) (-0.977) (-0.383) 
No_Geographic_Segmentsit -0.124** -0.133** -0.134** -0.154** -0.131* 
 (-2.032) (-2.160) (-2.190) (-2.336) (-1.943) 
Ln_Market_Capit -0.189*** -0.177*** -0.172*** -0.141*** -0.174*** 
 (-3.806) (-3.627) (-3.517) (-2.675) (-3.253) 
Ln_Salesit -0.090** -0.077** -0.084** -0.068* -0.069* 
 (-2.575) (-2.156) (-2.372) (-1.802) (-1.787) 
Constant -3.955*** -3.890*** -3.816*** -2.877*** -3.616*** 
 (-4.464) (-4.377) (-4.229) (-3.040) (-3.783) 
Observations 948 948 948 948 948 
Year_Dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry_Dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Log_Pseudolikelihood -522.6 -523.0 -527.9 -475.3 -461.9 
Pseudo_R2 0.0462 0.0455 0.0365 0.0490 0.0757 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Pease refer to Appendix-1 for variables definition. 
 
Column 1 based on Equation [50], Column 2 based on Equation [51], Column 3 based on 
Equation [52], Column 4 based on Equation [53] and Column 5 based on Equation [54]. 
ZFCit = β0+β1L3.Aud_Spec_30it+β2Bod_Tenureit+β3CEO_Dualityit+β4
Aud_Comit+β5Aud_Com_Meetit+β6No_Geographic_Segmentsit
+β7Ln_Market_Capit+β8Ln_Salesit+β9Industryit+β10Yearit +εit 
 
[50] 
ZFCit = β0+β1L3.CNon_Auditit+β2Bod_Tenureit+β3CEO_Dualityit+β4A
ud_Comit+β5Aud_Com_Meetit+β6No_Geographic_Segmentsit+
β7Ln_Market_Capit+β8Ln_Salesit+β9Industryit+β10Yearit +εit 
 
[51] 
ZFCit = β0+β1L3.Aud_Part_Tenit+β2Bod_Tenureit+β3CEO_Dualityit+β4
Aud_Comit+β5Aud_Com_Meetit+β6No_Geographic_Segmentsit
+β7Ln_Market_Capit+β8Ln_Salesit+β9Industryit+β10Yearit +εit 
 
[52] 
ZFCit = β0+β1L3.Prop_Aud_Feeit+β2Bod_Tenureit+β3CEO_Dualityit
+β4Aud_Comit+β5Aud_Com_Meetit+β6No_Geographic_Segme
ntsit+β7Ln_Market_Capit+β8Ln_Salesit+β9Industryit+β10Yearit 
+εit 
 
[53] 
ZFCit = β0+β1L3.Aud_Spec_30it+β2L3.CNon_Auditit+β3L3.Aud_Part_T
enit+β4L3.Prop_Aud_Feeit+β5Bod_Tenureit+β6CEO_Dualityit
+β7Aud_Comit+β8Aud_Com_Meetit+β9No_Geographic_Segme
ntsit+β10Ln_Market_Capit+β11Ln_Salesit+β12Industryit+β13Yearit 
+εit 
[54] 
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7.2.10.3 Summary 
As shown in Table 7.10 above, the goodness-of-fit (or coefficient of 
determinant, Pseudo R2) for logistic regression shown in columns 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 as 
0.0462, 0.0455, 0.0365, 0.0490 and 0.0757 respectively. This implies that the lagged 
independent variables in the regression models explain 4.62%, 4.55%, 3.65%, 4.90% 
and 7.57% of the variation in the dependent variable (the Zmijewski ZFC-Score). 
These results may imply that all of the four key auditor attributes under consideration 
for this study using the lagged effect (T -3) may significantly assist the firm to lower 
the likelihood of financial distress. 
In summary, the results from Table 7.10 using the Zmijewski ZFC-Score 
model support the findings of Chapter Six in providing support for hypotheses H5c, 
H6c, H7c, and H8c showing that lagged (T – 3) specialist auditor (L3.Aud_Spec_30it), 
lagged (T – 3) the provision of non-audit services (L3.Cnon_Auditit), lagged (T – 3) 
auditor tenure (L3.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit) and lagged (T – 3) audit fee 
(L3.Prop_Aud_Feeit) have a statistically significant association with financial distress 
with all coefficients being negative. 
7.2.11 Existence of a key auditor attribute (using alternative measures) impact 
on financial distress:  The Altman Base Model 
Table 7.11 below presents the results of binary logistic regressions where the 
four key auditor attributes used in this study (the existence of a specialist auditor 
(Aud_Spec_30it), the provision of non-audit services (Cnon_Auditit), the number of 
years the auditor (audit partner) held office (Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit), and the proportion 
of the total audit fee paid to the auditor over total assets held by the auditee 
(Prop_Aud_Feeit), are (logistically) regressed against financial distress, calculated 
using Altman Z2-Score model with no control variables.  
7.2.11.1 Independent variables 
As shown in column 1 of Table 7.11 below, the coefficient of the independent 
variable auditor specialization (Aud_Spec_30it) is reported to be negative and 
statistically significant (β = -2.296, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.177, and p < 0.05). This 
result is as expected and implies that with the use of no control variable, the use of a 
specialist auditor decreases the likelihood of financial distress with a goodness-of-fit 
of 0.0875% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.000875). 
173  
Column 2 of Table 7.11 below shows the coefficient of the independent 
variable proxying for the provision of non-audit services (Cnon_Auditit) is reported to 
be negative and statistically significant (β = -9.046, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.560, and p 
< 0.01). This result is as expected and implies that with the use of no control variable, 
an increase in the provision of non-audit services decreases the likelihood of financial 
distress with a goodness-of-fit of 1.34% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.0134). 
Column 3 of Table 7.11 below shows the coefficient of the independent 
variable proxying for the number of years the audit partner held office 
(Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit) is reported to be negative and statistically significant (β = -
20.869, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.393, and p < 0.01). This result is as expected and 
implies that with the use of no control variable, audit partner tenure decreases the 
likelihood of financial distress with a goodness-of-fit of 7.32% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 
0.0732). 
Column 4 of Table 7.11 below shows the coefficient of the independent 
variable proxying the proportion of audit fee paid / total assets held by firm 
(Prop_Aud_Feeit) is reported to be positive and statistically insignificant (β = 0.675, 
z-statistics (Wald) = 0.023, and p > 0.1) though a negative coefficient is expected. This 
result implies that with the use of no control variable the higher the proportion of audit 
fee paid to the auditor to total assets, the higher likelihood of financial distress with a 
goodness-of-fit of 0.0103% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.000103) – hence statistically 
insignificant. It is important to note that similar results were obtained for variable 
Prop_Aud_Feeit when using the Zmijewski’s model (as per Table 7.1). 
Last column 5 of Table 7.11 shows that when all four independent variables 
are simultaneously regressed (logistically) against the Altman Z2-Score, comparable 
results to as outlined above is obtained (Aud_Spec_30it  - β = -0.460, z-statistics (Wald) 
= -0.040, and p > 0.1 (therefore statistically insignificant), Cnon_Auditit - β = -8.774, 
z-statistics (Wald) = -0.664, and p < 0.01, Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit - β = -20.223, z-statistics 
(Wald) = -0.460 and p < 0.01, Prop_Aud_Feeit - β = -0.4512, z-statistics (Wald) = -
0.163, and p < 0.01) and an overall goodness-of-fit of 10.8% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 
0.108) which implies that that unison effect of all four independent variables affect the 
Altman Z2-Score by 10.8%. 
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Table 7.11: Logistic Regression Results – Alternative measure of Key Auditor 
Attributes and Altman Z2 Score – Base Model 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Aud_Spec_30it -0.177**    -0.040 
 (-2.296)    (-0.460) 
Cnon_Auditit  -0.560***   -0.664*** 
  (-9.046)   (-8.774) 
Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit   -0.393***  -0.460*** 
   (-20.869)  (-20.223) 
Prop_Aud_Feeit    -0.023 -0.163*** 
    (-0.675) (-4.512) 
Constant -0.719*** -1.011*** 0.318*** -1.056*** 1.924*** 
 (-20.964) (-23.525) (5.476) (-2.753) (4.592) 
Observations 4,876 4,876 4,876 4,876 4,876 
Year_Dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry_Dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Log_Pseudolikelihood -3057 -3018 -2836 -2404 -2146 
Pseudo_R2 0.000875 0.0134 0.0732 0.000103 0.108 
 Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Pease refer to Appendix-1 for variables definition. 
 
Column 1 based on Equation [1], Column 2 based on Equation [2], Column 3 based on Equation 
[3], Column 4 based on Equation [4] and Column 5 based on Equation [5]. 
Z2it = β0 + β1 Aud_Spec_30it + εit                                                                                                                  [55]  
Z2it = β0 + β1 Cnon_Auditit + εit                                                                                                         [56]  
Z2it = β0 + β1 Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit + εit                                                                                                        [57]  
Z2it = β0 + β1 Prop_Aud_Feeit + εit                                                                                                           [58]  
Z2it = β0 + β1 Aud_Spec_30it + β2 Cnon_Auditit + β3 Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit +  
          β4 Prop_Aud_Feeit +εit                           [59] 
7.2.11.2 Summary 
As shown in Table 7.11 above, the goodness-of-fit (or coefficient of 
determinant, Pseudo R2) for logistic regression shown in columns 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 as 
0.000875, 0.0134, 0.0732, 0.000103 and 0.108 respectively. This implies that the 
independent variables in the regression models explain 0.0875%, 1.34%, 7.32%, 
0.0103% and 10.8% of the variation in the dependent variable (the Altman Z2-Score). 
These results may imply three out of the four auditor attributes under consideration 
for this study may significantly assist the firm to lower the likelihood of financial 
distress. 
In summary, the results from Table 7.11 using the Altman Z2-Score model 
support the findings of Chapter Six in providing support for hypotheses H1, H2, and 
H3, showing that specialist auditors (Aud_Spec_30it), the provision of non-audit 
services (Cnon_Auditit) and auditor tenure (Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit) have a statistically 
significant association with financial distress with all coefficients being negative. 
However, Table 7.11 using the Altman Z2-Score model rejects the hypothesis H4 
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showing that audit fee (Prop_Aud_Feeit) has a statistical insignificant negative 
association with financial distress. 
7.2.12 Existence of a key auditor attribute (using alternative measures) impact 
on financial distress: The Altman Full Model 
Table 7.12 below presents the results of binary logistic regressions where the 
four key auditor attributes used in this study (the existence of a specialist auditor 
(Aud_Spec_30it), the provision of non-audit services (Cnon_Auditit), the number of 
years the auditor (audit partner) held office (Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit), and the proportion 
of the total audit fee paid to the auditor over total assets held by the auditee 
(Prop_Aud_Feeit)),  are (logistically) regressed against financial distress, calculated 
using Altman Z2-Score model with added control variables.  
7.2.12.1 Independent variables 
As shown in column 1 of Table 7.12 below, the coefficient of the independent 
variable auditor specialization (Aud_Spec_30it) is reported to be negative and 
statistically significant (β = -4.340, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.355, and p < 0.01). This 
result is as expected and implies that with the use of added control variables, the use 
of a specialist auditor decreases the likelihood of financial distress with a goodness-
of-fit of 5.84% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.0584). 
Column 2 of Table 7.12 below shows the coefficient of the independent 
variable proxying for the provision of non-audit services (Cnon_Auditit) is reported to 
be negative and statistically significant (β = -8.141, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.572, and p 
< 0.01). This result is as expected and implies that with the use of added control 
variables, an increase in the provision of non-audit services decreases the likelihood 
of financial distress with a goodness-of-fit of 6.78% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.0678). 
Column 3 of Table 7.12 below shows the coefficient of the independent 
variable proxying for the number of years the audit partner held office 
(Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit) is reported to be negative and statistically significant (β = -
13.740, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.335, and p < 0.01). This result is as expected and 
implies that with the use of added control variables, an increase in the duration of the 
audit partner tenure decreases the likelihood of financial distress with a goodness-of-
fit of 9.41% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.0941). 
Column 4 of Table 7.12 below shows the coefficient of the independent 
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variable proxying the proportion of audit fee paid / total assets held by firm 
(Prop_Aud_Feeit) is reported to be negative and statistically significant (β = -12.168, 
z-statistics (Wald) = -0.751, and p < 0.01). This result is as expected and implies that 
with the use of added control variables, an increase in the proportion of audit fee paid 
to the auditor over total assets held by the auditee decreases the likelihood of financial 
distress with a goodness-of-fit of 9.97% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.0997). 
Last column 5 of Table 7.12 shows that when all four independent variables 
are simultaneously regressed (logistically) against the Altman Z2-Score, comparable 
results to as outlined above is obtained (Aud_Spec_30it  - β = -0.544, z-statistics (Wald) 
= -0.053, and p < 0.1 (Table 7.6 shows a statistically insignificant correlation, however 
with control variables, Table 7.12 now shows a statistically significant correlation), 
Cnon_Auditit - β = -9.359, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.814, and p < 0.01, 
Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit - β = -12.758, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.360 and p < 0.01, 
Prop_Aud_Feeit - β = -12.213, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.821, and p < 0.01) and an 
overall goodness-of-fit of 16.6% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.166) which implies that that 
unison effect of all four independent variables affect the Altman Z2-Score by 16.6%. 
7.2.12.2 Control variables 
As shown in column 1 of Table 7.12 below, where the independent variable 
Aud_Spec_30it is regressed with the control variables against the Altman Z2-Score, 
control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the 
variables CEO_Dualityit (β = -8.441, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.677, and p < 0.01), 
Aud_Comit (β = -1.856, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.157, and p < 0.1), 
No_Geographic_Segmentsit (β = -4.856, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.151, and p < 0.01) and 
Ln_Market_Capit (β = -9.537, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.230, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 1 of Table 7.12) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable 
Aud_Spec_30it against the Altman Z2-Score. 
From column 2 of Table 7.12 below, where the independent variable 
Cnon_Auditit is regressed with the control variables against the Altman Z2-Score, 
control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the 
variables CEO_Dualityit (β = -7.787, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.634, and p < 0.01, 
No_Geographic_Segmentsit (β = -4.183, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.131, and p < 0.01) and 
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Ln_Market_Capit (β = -10.015, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.241, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 2 of Table 7.12) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable 
Cnon_Auditit against the Altman Z2-Score. 
As shown in column 3 of Table 7.12 below, where the independent variable 
Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit is regressed with the control variables against the Altman Z2-
Score, control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the 
variables CEO_Dualityit (β = -2.820, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.249, and p < 0.01), 
Aud_Comit (β = -2.155, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.189, and p < 0.05), Aud_Com_Meetit 
(β = -2.918, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.092, and p < 0.01), No_Geographic_Segmentsit (β 
= -5.366, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.179, and p < 0.01) and Ln_Market_Capit (β = -7.873, 
z-statistics (Wald) = -0.192, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 3 of Table 7.12) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable 
Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit against the Altman Z2-Score. 
From column 4 of Table 7.12 below, where the independent variable 
CEO_Dualityit (β = -5.954, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.543, and p < 0.01), 
No_Geographic_Segmentsit (β = -4.620, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.170, and p < 0.01), 
Ln_Market_Capit (β = -13.630, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.436, and p < 0.01) and 
Ln_Salesit (β = -3.987, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.112, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 4 of Table 7.12) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable 
Prop_Aud_Feeit against the Altman Z2-Score. 
Last from column 5 of Table 7.12 below, where the four independent variables 
Aud_Spec_30it, Cnon_Auditit, Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit and Prop_Aud_Feeit are regressed 
with the control variables against the Altman Z2-Score, control variables which are 
reported to have statistical significance include the variables Aud_Comit (β = -1.721, 
z-statistics (Wald) = -0.181, and p < 0.1), No_Geographic_Segmentsit (β = -4.143, z-
statistics (Wald) = -0.160, and p < 0.01), Ln_Market_Capit (β = -13.047, z-statistics 
(Wald) = -0.430, and p < 0.01) and Ln_Salesit (β = -3.298, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.095, 
and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 5 of Table 7.12) return no 
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statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variables against 
the Altman Z2-Score. 
Table 7.12: Logistic Regression Results – Alternative measure of Auditor Attributes 
and Altman Z2 Score – Full Model 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Aud_Spec_30it -0.355***    -0.053* 
 (-4.340)    (-0.544) 
Cnon_Auditit  -0.572***   -0.814*** 
  (-8.141)   (-9.359) 
Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit   -0.335***  -0.360*** 
   (-13.740)  (-12.758) 
Prop_Aud_Feeit    -0.751*** -0.821*** 
    (-12.168) (-12.213) 
BoD_Tenureit 0.017 0.018 0.014 0.024 0.021 
 (1.141) (1.247) (0.950) (1.535) (1.315) 
CEO_Dualityit -0.677*** -0.634*** -0.249*** -0.543*** -0.148 
 (-8.441) (-7.787) (-2.820) (-5.954) (-1.434) 
Aud_Comit -0.157* -0.114 -0.189** -0.138 -0.181* 
 (-1.856) (-1.340) (-2.155) (-1.367) (-1.721) 
Aud_Com_Meetit -0.031 -0.046 -0.092*** 0.054 0.032 
 (-0.991) (-1.476) (-2.918) (1.539) (0.863) 
No_Geographic_Segmentsit -0.151*** -0.131*** -0.179*** -0.170*** -0.160*** 
 (-4.856) (-4.183) (-5.366) (-4.620) (-4.143) 
Ln_Market_Capit -0.230*** -0.241*** -0.192*** -0.436*** -0.430*** 
 (-9.537) (-10.015) (-7.873) (-13.630) (-13.047) 
Ln_Salesit -0.001 -0.013 -0.008 -0.112*** -0.095*** 
 (-0.061) (-0.671) (-0.435) (-3.987) (-3.298) 
Constant -4.142*** -4.516*** -2.603*** -1.222** 0.396 
 (-11.352) (-12.474) (-6.750) (-2.432) (0.734) 
Observations 4,876 4,876 4,876 4,876 4,876 
Year_Dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry_Dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Log_Pseudolikelihood -2437 -2413 -2345 -1879 -1740 
Pseudo_R2 0.0584 0.0678 0.0941 0.0997 0.166 
 Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Pease refer to Appendix-1 for variables definition. 
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Column 1 based on Equation [60], Column 2 based on Equation [61], Column 3 based on 
Equation [62], Column 4 based on Equation [63] and Column 5 based on Equation [64]. 
 
Z2it = β0+β1Aud_Spec_30it+β2Bod_Tenureit+β3CEO_Dualityit+β4Aud_Comit
+β5Aud_Com_Meetit+β6No_Geographic_Segmentsit+β7Ln_Market_Ca
pit+β8Ln_Salesit+β9Industryit+β10Yearit +εit 
 
[60] 
Z2it = β0+β1CNon_Auditit+β2Bod_Tenureit+β3CEO_Dualityit+β4Aud_Comit+
β5Aud_Com_Meetit+β6No_Geographic_Segmentsit+β7Ln_Market_Capi
t+β8Ln_Salesit+β9Industryit+β10Yearit +εit 
 
[61] 
Z2it = β0+β1Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit+β2Bod_Tenureit+β3CEO_Dualityit+β4Aud_
Comit+β5Aud_Com_Meetit+β6No_Geographic_Segmentsit+β7Ln_Mark
et_Capit+β8Ln_Salesit+β9Industryit+β10Yearit +εit 
 
[62] 
Z2it = β0+β1Prop_Aud_Feeit+β2Bod_Tenureit+β3CEO_Dualityit+β4Aud_Co
mit+β5Aud_Com_Meetit+β6No_Geographic_Segmentsit+β7Ln_Market_
Capit+β8Ln_Salesit+β9Industryit+β10Yearit +εit 
 
[63] 
Z2it = β0+β1Aud_Spec_30it+β2CNon_Auditit+β3Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit+β4Prop
_Aud_Feeit+β5Bod_Tenureit+β6CEO_Dualityit+β7Aud_Comit+β8Aud_
Com_Meetit+β9No_Geographic_Segmentsit+β10Ln_Market_Capit+β11L
n_Salesit+β12Industryit+β13Yearit +εit 
 
[64] 
7.2.12.3 Summary 
As shown in Table 7.12 above, the goodness-of-fit (or coefficient of 
determinant, Pseudo R2) for logistic regression shown in columns 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 as 
0.0584, 0.0678, 0.0941, 0.0997 and 0.166 respectively. This implies that the 
independent variables in the regression models explain 5.84%, 6.78%, 9.41%, 9.97% 
and 16.6% of the variation in the dependent variable (the Altman Z2-Score). These 
results may imply that all of the four key auditor attributes under consideration for this 
study may significantly assist the firm to lower the likelihood of financial distress. 
In summary, the results from Table 7.12 using the Altman Z2-Score model 
support the findings of Chapter Six in providing support for hypotheses H1, H2, H3, 
and H4 showing that specialist auditor (Aud_Spec_30it), the provision of non-audit 
services (Cnon_Auditit), auditor tenure (Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit) and audit fee 
(Prop_Aud_Feeit) have a statistically significant association with financial distress 
with all coefficients being negative.  
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7.2.13 Existence of a lagged one-year key auditor attribute (using alternative 
measures) impact on financial distress in year zero: The Altman Full 
Model 
Table 7.13 below presents the results of binary logistic regressions where the 
lagged one year (T-1) four key auditor attributes used in this study (the existence of a 
specialist auditor (L.Aud_Spec_30it), the provision of non-audit services 
(L.Cnon_Auditit), the number of years the auditor (audit partner) held office 
(L.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit), and the proportion of the total audit fee paid to the auditor 
over the total assets held by the auditee (L.Prop_Aud_Feeit),  are (logistically) 
regressed against financial distress, calculated using Altman Z2-Score model with 
added control variables.  
7.2.13.1 Independent variables 
As shown in column 1 of Table 7.13 below, the coefficient of the lagged one 
year (T–1) independent variable specialist auditor (L.Aud_Spec_30it) is reported to be 
negative and statistically significant (β = -1.221, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.154, and p < 
0.1). This result is as expected and implies that with the use of added control variables, 
the use of a specialist auditor in the year T–1 decreases the likelihood of financial 
distress in the year T0 with a goodness-of-fit of 4.61% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.0461). 
Column 2 of Table 7.13 below shows the coefficient of the lagged one year 
(T–1) independent variable proxying for the provision of non-audit services 
(L.Cnon_Auditit) is reported to be negative and statistically significant (β = -5.482, z-
statistics (Wald) = -0.558, and p < 0.01). This result is as expected and implies that 
with the use of added control variables, an increase in the provision of non-audit 
services in the year T–1 decreases the likelihood of financial distress in the year T0 with 
a goodness-of-fit of 5.81% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.0581). 
Column 3 of Table 7.13 below shows the coefficient of the lagged one year 
(T–1) independent variable proxying for the number of years the audit partner held 
office (L.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit) is reported to be negative and statistically significant (β 
= -0.562, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.020, and p < 0.1). This result is as expected and 
implies that with the use of added control variables, audit partner tenure in the year T–
1 decreases the likelihood of financial distress in the year T0 with a goodness-of-fit of 
4.56% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.0456). 
Column 4 of Table 7.13 below shows the coefficient of the lagged one year 
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(T–1) independent variable proxying the proportion of audit fee paid / total assets held 
by firm (L.Prop_Aud_Feeit) is reported to be negative and statistically significant (β 
= -2.304, z-statistics (Wald) = -3.380, and p < 0.05). This result is as expected and 
implies that with the use of added control variables, an increase in the proportion of 
audit fee paid to the auditor over total assets held by the auditee in the year T–1 
decreases the likelihood of financial distress in the year T0 with a goodness-of-fit of 
7.49% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.0749). 
Last column 5 of Table 7.13 shows that when all four lagged one year (T–1) 
independent variables are simultaneously regressed (logistically) against the Altman 
Z2-Score, comparable results to as outlined above is obtained (L.Aud_Spec_30it  - β = 
-0.731, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.098, and p < 0.1, L.Cnon_Auditit - β = -4.946, z-
statistics (Wald) = -0.550 and p < 0.01, L.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit - β = -0.239, z-statistics 
(Wald) = -0.009 and p < 0.1, L.Prop_Aud_Feeit - β = -2.269, z-statistics (Wald) = -
3.847, and p < 0.05) and an overall goodness-of-fit of 8.72% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 
0.0872) which implies that that unison effect of all four independent variables in the 
year T–1 affect the Altman Z2-Score in the year T0 by 8.72%. 
7.2.13.2 Control variables 
As shown in column 1 of Table 7.13 below, where the independent variable 
L.Aud_Spec_30it is regressed with the control variables against the Altman Z2-Score, 
control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the 
variables Aud_Com_Meetit (β = -2.680, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.118, and p < 0.01), 
No_Geographic_Segmentsit (β = -3.899, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.184, and p < 0.01), 
Ln_Market_Capit (β = -7.075, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.223, and p < 0.01) and Ln_Salesit 
(β = -1.883, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.050, and p < 0.1). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 1 of Table 7.13) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable 
L.Aud_Spec_30it against the Altman Z2-Score. 
From column 2 of Table 7.13 below, where the independent variable 
L.Cnon_Auditit is regressed with the control variables against the Altman Z2-Score, 
control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the 
variables Aud_Com_Meetit (β = -2.649, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.117, and p < 0.01), 
No_Geographic_Segmentsit (β = -3.532, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.168, and p < 0.01) and 
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Ln_Market_Capit (β = -7.371, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.231, and p < 0.01) . 
The remaining control variables (as per column 2 of Table 7.13) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable 
L.Cnon_Auditit against the Altman Z2-Score. 
As shown in column 3 of Table 7.13 below, where the independent variable 
L.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit is regressed with the control variables against the Altman Z2-Score, 
control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the variables 
Aud_Com_Meetit (β = -2.625, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.114, and p < 0.01), 
No_Geographic_Segmentsit (β = -3.849, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.181, and p < 0.01), 
Ln_Market_Capit (β = -7.013, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.222, and p < 0.01) and Ln_Salesit (β 
= -1.734, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.046, and p < 0.1). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 3 of Table 7.13) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable 
L.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit against the Altman Z2-Score. 
From column 4 of Table 7.13 below, where the independent variable 
L.Prop_Aud_Feeit is regressed with the control variables against the Altman Z2-Score, 
control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the variables 
Aud_Com_Meetit (β = -2.406, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.107, and p < 0.05), 
No_Geographic_Segmentsit (β = -2.969, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.157, and p < 0.01) and 
Ln_Market_Capit (β = -4.086, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.173, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 4 of Table 7.13) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable 
L.Prop_Aud_Feeit against the Altman Z2-Score. 
Last from column 5 of Table 7.13 below, where the four independent variables 
L.Aud_Spec_30it, L.Cnon_Auditit, L.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit and L.Prop_Aud_Feeit are 
regressed with the control variables against the Altman Z2-Score, control variables which 
are reported to have statistical significance include the variables Aud_Com_Meetit (β = -
2.414, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.111, and p < 0.05), No_Geographic_Segmentsit (β = -2.771, 
z-statistics (Wald) = -0.149, and p < 0.01) and Ln_Market_Capit (β = -4.249, z-statistics 
(Wald) = -0.181, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 5 of Table 7.13) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variables against the 
Altman Z2-Score.  
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Table 7.13: Logistic Regression Results – Lagged (one year) Alternative Measure of 
Key Auditor Attributes and Altman Z2 Score – Full Model 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
L.Aud_Spec_30it -0.154*    -0.098* 
 (-1.221)    (-0.731) 
L.Cnon_Auditit   - 0.558***   -0.550*** 
  (-5.482)   (-4.946) 
L.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit   -0.020*  -0.009* 
   (-0.562)  (-0.239) 
L.Prop_Aud_Feeit    -3.380** -3.847** 
    (-2.304) (-2.269) 
BoD_Tenureit 0.002 -0.000 0.002 0.005 0.003 
 (0.107) (-0.006) (0.109) (0.260) (0.146) 
CEO_Dualityit 0.092 0.108 0.091 0.056 0.095 
 (0.730) (0.848) (0.726) (0.403) (0.660) 
Aud_Comit 0.014 0.009 0.010 0.048 0.042 
 (0.115) (0.075) (0.081) (0.357) (0.310) 
Aud_Com_Meetit -0.118*** -0.117*** -0.114*** -0.107** -0.111** 
 (-2.680) (-2.649) (-2.625) (-2.406) (-2.414) 
No_Geographic_Segmentsit -0.184*** -0.168*** -0.181*** -0.157*** -0.149*** 
 (-3.899) (-3.532) (-3.849) (-2.969) (-2.771) 
Ln_Market_Capit -0.223*** -0.231*** -0.222*** -0.173*** -0.181*** 
 (-7.075) (-7.371) (-7.013) (-4.086) (-4.249) 
Ln_Salesit -0.050* -0.040 -0.046* -0.016 -0.008 
 (-1.883) (-1.494) (-1.734) (-0.550) (-0.274) 
Constant -4.860*** -5.045*** -4.716*** -3.236*** -3.504*** 
 (-9.186) (-9.681) (-8.538) (-4.153) (-4.309) 
Observations 2,082 2,082 2,082 2,082 2,082 
Year_Dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry_Dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Log_Pseudolikelihood -1136 -1121 -1136 -937.1 -924.6 
Pseudo_R2 0.0461 0.0581 0.0456 0.0749 0.0872 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Pease refer to Appendix-1 for variables definition. 
Column 1 based on Equation [65], Column 2 based on Equation [66], Column 3 based on Equation 
[67], Column 4 based on Equation [68] and Column 5 based on Equation [69]. 
 
Z2it = β0+β1L.Aud_Spec_30it+β2Bod_Tenureit+β3CEO_Dualityit+β4Aud_
Comit+β5Aud_Com_Meetit+β6No_Geographic_Segmentsit+β7Ln_M
arket_Capit+β8Ln_Salesit+β9Industryit+β10Yearit +εit 
 
[65] 
Z2it = β0+β1L.CNon_Auditit+β2Bod_Tenureit+β3CEO_Dualityit+β4Aud_C
omit+β5Aud_Com_Meetit+β6No_Geographic_Segmentsit+β7Ln_Ma
rket_Capit+β8Ln_Salesit+β9Industryit+β10Yearit +εit 
 
[66] 
Z2it = β0+β1L.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit+β2Bod_Tenureit+β3CEO_Dualityit+β4
Aud_Comit+β5Aud_Com_Meetit+β6No_Geographic_Segmentsit+β7
Ln_Market_Capit+β8Ln_Salesit+β9Industryit+β10Yearit +εit 
 
[67] 
Z2it = β0+β1L.Prop_Aud_Feeit+β2Bod_Tenureit+β3CEO_Dualityit+β4A
ud_Comit+β5Aud_Com_Meetit+β6No_Geographic_Segmentsit+β7L
n_Market_Capit+β8Ln_Salesit+β9Industryit+β10Yearit +εit 
 
[68] 
Z2it = β0+β1L.Aud_Spec_30it+β2L.CNon_Auditit+β3L.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit
+β4L.Prop_Aud_Feeit+β5Bod_Tenureit+β6CEO_Dualityit+β7Aud
_Comit+β8Aud_Com_Meetit+β9No_Geographic_Segmentsit+β10Ln_
Market_Capit+β11Ln_Salesit+β12Industryit+β13Yearit +εit 
 
[69] 
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7.2.13.3 Summary 
As shown in Table 7.13 above, the goodness-of-fit (or coefficient of 
determinant, Pseudo R2) for logistic regression shown in columns 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 
as 0.0461, 0.0581, 0.0456, 0.0749 and 0.0872 respectively. This implies that the 
lagged independent variables in the regression models explain 4.61%, 5.81%, 
4.56%, 7.49% and 8.72% of the variation in the dependent variable (the Altman 
Z2-Score). These results may imply that all of the four key auditor attributes under 
consideration for this study using the lagged effect (T -1) may significantly assist 
the firm to lower the likelihood of financial distress. 
In summary, the results from Table 7.13 using the Altman Z2-Score model 
support the findings of Chapter Six in providing support for hypotheses H5a, H6a, 
H7a, and H8a showing that lagged (T – 1) specialist auditor (L.Aud_Spec_30it), 
lagged (T – 1) the provision of non-audit services (L.Cnon_Auditit), lagged (T – 
1) auditor tenure (L.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit) and lagged (T – 1) audit fee 
(L.Prop_Aud_Feeit) have a statistically significant association with financial 
distress with all coefficients being negative.  
7.2.14 Existence of a lagged two-years key auditor attribute (using 
alternative measures) impact on financial distress in year zero: The 
Altman Full Model 
Table 7.14 below presents the results of binary logistic regressions where 
the lagged two-years (T-2) four key auditor attributes used in this study (the 
existence of a specialist auditor (L2.Aud_Spec_30it), the provision of non-audit 
services (L2.Cnon_Auditit), the actual number of years the auditor (audit partner) 
held office (L2.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit), and the proportion of the total audit fee paid 
to the auditor over the total assets held by the auditee (L2.Prop_Aud_Feeit),  are 
(logistically) regressed against financial distress, calculated using Altman Z2-
Score models with added control variables.  
7.2.14.1 Independent variables 
As shown in column 1 of Table 7.14 below, the coefficient of the lagged 
two years (T–2) independent variable auditor specialization (L2.Aud_Spec_30it) 
is reported to be negative and statistically significant (β = -1.139, z-statistics 
(Wald) = -0.188, and p < 0.1). This result is as expected and implies that with the 
use of added control variables, the use of a specialist auditor in the year T–2 
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decreases the likelihood of financial distress in the year T0 with a goodness-of-fit 
of 4.11% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.0411). 
Column 2 of Table 7.14 below shows the coefficient of the lagged two 
years (T–2) independent variable proxying for the provision of non-audit services 
(L2.Cnon_Auditit) is reported to be negative and statistically significant (β = -
2.983, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.422, and p < 0.01). This result is as expected and 
implies that with the use of added control variables, an increase in the provision 
of non-audit services in the year T–2 decreases the likelihood of financial distress 
in the year T0 with a goodness-of-fit of 4.73% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.0473). 
Column 3 of Table 7.14 below shows the coefficient of the lagged two 
years (T–2) independent variable proxying for the number of years the audit 
partner held office (L2.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit) is reported to be negative and 
statistically significant (β = -2.430, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.111, and p < 0.05). 
This result is as expected and implies that with the use of added control variables, 
an increase in duration of the audit partner tenure in the year T–2 decreases the 
likelihood of financial distress in the year T0 with a goodness-of-fit of 4.48% (that 
is, Pseudo R2 of 0.0448). 
Column 4 of Table 7.14 below shows the coefficient of the lagged two 
years (T–2) independent variable proxying the proportion of audit fee paid / total 
assets held by firm (L2.Prop_Aud_Feeit) is reported to be negative and 
statistically significant (β = -1.802, z-statistics (Wald) = -1.609, and p < 0.1). This 
result is as expected and implies that with the use of added control variables, an 
increase in the proportion of audit fee paid to the auditor over the total assets held 
by the auditee in the year T–2 decreases the likelihood of financial distress in the 
year T0 with a goodness-of-fit of 6.11% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.0611). 
Last column 5 of Table 7.14 shows that when all four lagged two years 
(T–2) independent variables are simultaneously regressed (logistically) against 
the Altman Z2-Score, comparable results to as outlined above is obtained 
(L2.Aud_Spec_30it  - β = -0.533, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.092, and p < 0.1, 
L2.Cnon_Auditit - β = -3.038, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.456, and p < 0.01, 
L2.Prop_Aud_Feeit - β = -2.180, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.105, and p < 0.05 and 
L2.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit - β = -1.783, z-statistics (Wald) = -1.837 and p > 0.1) and 
an overall goodness-of-fit of 7.38% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.0738) which implies 
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that that unison effect of three of the four independent variables (namely 
L2.Aud_Spec_30it, L2.Cnon_Auditit, L2.Prop_Aud_Feeit and 
L2.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit in the year T–2 affect the Altman Z2-Score in the year T0 
by 7.38%. 
7.2.14.2 Control variables 
As shown in column 1 of Table 7.14 below, where the independent 
variable L2.Aud_Spec_30it is regressed with the control variables against the 
Altman Z2-Score, control variables which are reported to have statistical 
significance include the variables Aud_Com_Meetit (β = -1.922, z-statistics (Wald) 
= -0.126, and p < 0.1), No_Geographic_Segmentsit (β = -3.083, z-statistics (Wald) 
= -0.193, and p < 0.01), Ln_Market_Capit (β = -4.395, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.197, 
and p < 0.01) and Ln_Salesit (β = -1.864, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.069, and p < 0.1). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 1 of Table 7.14) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable 
L2.Aud_Spec_30it against the Altman Z2-Score. 
From column 2 of Table 7.14 below, where the independent variable 
L2.Cnon_Auditit is regressed with the control variables against the Altman Z2-
Score, control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include 
the variables Aud_Com_Meetit (β = -1.750, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.113, and p < 
0.1), No_Geographic_Segmentsit (β = -2.902, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.181, and p < 
0.01), Ln_Market_Capit (β = -4.505, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.200, and p < 0.01) 
and Ln_Salesit (β = -1.835, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.068, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 2 of Table 7.14) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable 
L2.Cnon_Auditit against the Altman Z2-Score. 
As shown in column 3 of Table 7.14 below, where the independent 
variable L2.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit is regressed with the control variables against the 
Altman Z2-Score, control variables which are reported to have statistical 
significance include the variables Aud_Com_Meetit (β = -1.729, z-statistics (Wald) 
= -0.110, and p < 0.1), No_Geographic_Segmentsit (β = -2.907, z-statistics (Wald) 
= -0.182, and p < 0.01), Ln_Market_Capit (β = -4.535, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.205, 
and p < 0.01) and Ln_Salesit (β = -1.943, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.073, and p < 0.1). 
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The remaining control variables (as per column 3 of Table 7.14) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable 
L2.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit against the Altman Z2-Score. 
From column 4 of Table 7.14 below, where the independent variable 
L2.Prop_Aud_Feeit is regressed with the control variables against the Altman Z2-
Score, control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include 
the variables No_Geographic_Segmentsit (β = -2.745, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.191, 
and p < 0.01) and Ln_Market_Capit (β = -2.895, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.153, and 
p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 4 of Table 7.14) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable 
L2.Prop_Aud_Feeit against the Altman Z2-Score. 
Last from column 5 of Table 7.14 below, where the four independent 
variables L2.Aud_Spec_30it, L2.Cnon_Auditit, L2.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit and 
L2.Prop_Aud_Feeit are regressed with the control variables against the Altman 
Z2-Score, control variables which are reported to have statistical significance 
include the variables No_Geographic_Segmentsit (β = -2.726, z-statistics (Wald) 
= -0.193, and p < 0.01) and Ln_Market_Capit (β = -2.999, z-statistics (Wald) = -
0.159, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 5 of Table 7.14) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variables 
against the Altman Z2-Score. 
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Table 7.14: Logistic Regression Results – Lagged (two years) Alternative Measure of Key 
Auditor Attributes and Altman Z2 Score – Full Model 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
L2.Aud_Spec_30it -0.188*    -0.092* 
 (-1.139)    (-0.533) 
L2.Cnon_Auditit  -0.422***   -0.456*** 
  (-2.983)   (-3.038) 
L2.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit   -0.111**  -0.105** 
   (-2.430)  (-2.180) 
L2.Prop_Aud_Feeit    -1.609* -1.837* 
    (-1.802) (-1.783) 
BoD_Tenureit -0.020 -0.024 -0.022 -0.016 -0.024 
 (-0.740) (-0.838) (-0.781) (-0.551) (-0.830) 
CEO_Dualityit 0.126 0.133 0.061 0.072 0.063 
 (0.761) (0.803) (0.360) (0.409) (0.343) 
Aud_Comit -0.171 -0.201 -0.147 -0.222 -0.217 
 (-1.027) (-1.201) (-0.879) (-1.243) (-1.202) 
Aud_Com_Meetit -0.126* -0.113* -0.110* -0.089 -0.088 
 (-1.922) (-1.750) (-1.729) (-1.369) (-1.294) 
No_Geographic_Segmentsit -0.193*** -0.181*** -0.182*** -0.191*** -0.193*** 
 (-3.083) (-2.902) (-2.907) (-2.745) (-2.726) 
Ln_Market_Capit -0.197*** -0.200*** -0.205*** -0.153*** -0.159*** 
 (-4.395) (-4.505) (-4.535) (-2.895) (-2.999) 
Ln_Salesit -0.069* -0.068* -0.073* -0.065 -0.062 
 (-1.864) (-1.835) (-1.943) (-1.602) (-1.528) 
Constant -4.693*** -4.861*** -5.141*** -3.675*** -4.202*** 
 (-5.779) (-6.127) (-6.181) (-3.891) (-4.397) 
Observations 1,172 1,172 1,172 1,172 1,172 
Year_Dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry_Dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Log_Pseudolikelihood -599.1 -595.3 -596.9 -525.9 -518.8 
Pseudo_R2 0.0411 0.0473 0.0448 0.0611 0.0738 
 Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Pease refer to Appendix-1 for variables definition. 
 
Column 1 based on Equation [70], Column 2 based on Equation [71], Column 3 based on 
Equation [72], Column 4 based on Equation [73] and Column 5 based on Equation [74]. 
 
Z2it = β0+β1L2.Aud_Spec_30it+β2Bod_Tenureit+β3CEO_Dualityit+β4Aud_Co
mit+β5Aud_Com_Meetit+β6No_Geographic_Segmentsit+β7Ln_Market_C
apit+β8Ln_Salesit+β9Industryit+β10Yearit +εit 
 
[70] 
Z2it = β0+β1L2.CNon_Auditit+β2Bod_Tenureit+β3CEO_Dualityit+β4Aud_Comit
+β5Aud_Com_Meetit+β6No_Geographic_Segmentsit+β7Ln_Market_Capi
t+β8Ln_Salesit+β9Industryit+β10Yearit +εit 
 
[71] 
Z2it = β0+β1L2.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit+β2Bod_Tenureit+β3CEO_Dualityit+β4Aud
_Comit+β5Aud_Com_Meetit+β6No_Geographic_Segmentsit+β7Ln_Mark
et_Capit+β8Ln_Salesit+β9Industryit+β10Yearit +εit 
 
[72] 
Z2it = β0+β1L2.Prop_Aud_Feeit+β2Bod_Tenureit+β3CEO_Dualityit+β4Aud_
Comit+β5Aud_Com_Meetit+β6No_Geographic_Segmentsit+β7Ln_Market
_Capit+β8Ln_Salesit+β9Industryit+β10Yearit +εit 
 
[73] 
Z2it = β0+β1L2.Aud_Spec_30it+β2L2.CNon_Auditit+β3L2.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit+
β4L2.Prop_Aud_Feeit+β5Bod_Tenureit+β6CEO_Dualityit+β7Aud_Comit
+β8Aud_Com_Meetit+β9No_Geographic_Segmentsit+β10Ln_Market_Ca
pit+β11Ln_Salesit+β12Industryit+β13Yearit +εit 
 
[74] 
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7.2.14.3 Summary 
As shown in Table 7.14 above, the goodness-of-fit (or coefficient of 
determinant, Pseudo R2) for logistic regression shown in columns 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 as 
0.0411, 0.0473, 0.0448, 0.0611 and 0.0738 respectively. This implies that the lagged 
independent variables in the regression models explain 4.11%, 4.73%, 4.48%, 6.11% 
and 7.38% of the variation in the dependent variable (the Altman Z2-Score). These 
results may imply that all of the four key auditor attributes under consideration for this 
study using the lagged effect (T -2) may significantly assist the firm to lower the 
likelihood of financial distress. 
In summary, the results from Table 7.14 using the Altman Z2-Score model 
support the findings of Chapter Six in providing support for the hypotheses H5b, H6b, 
H7b, and H8b showing that lagged (T – 2) specialist auditor (L2.Aud_Spec_30it), lagged 
(T – 2) the provision of non-audit services (L2.Cnon_Auditit), lagged (T – 2) auditor 
tenure (L2.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit) and lagged (T – 2) audit fee (L2.Prop_Aud_Feeit) 
have a statistically significant association with financial distress with all coefficients 
being negative.  
7.2.15 Existence of a lagged three-years key auditor attribute (using alternative 
measures) impact on financial distress in year zero: The Altman Full 
Model 
Table 7.15 below presents the results of binary logistic regressions where the 
lagged three-years (T-3) four key auditor attributes used in this study (the existence of 
a specialist auditor (L3.Aud_Spec_30it), the provision of non-audit services 
(L3.Cnon_Auditit), the actual number of years the auditor (audit partner) held office 
(L3.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit), and the proportion of the total audit fee paid to the auditor 
over the total assets held by the auditee (L3.Prop_Aud_Feeit),  are (logistically) 
regressed against financial distress, calculated using Altman Z2-Score models with 
added control variables.  
7.2.15.1 Independent variables 
As shown in column 1 of Table 7.15 below, the coefficient of the lagged three 
years (T–3) independent variable auditor specialization (L3.Aud_Spec_30it) is 
reported to be negative and statistically significant (β = -0.461, z-statistics (Wald) = -
0.085, and p < 0.1). This result is as expected and implies that with the use of added 
control variables, the use of a specialist auditor in the year T–3 decreases the likelihood 
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of financial distress in the year T0 with a goodness-of-fit of 4.93% (that is, Pseudo R2 
of 0.0493). 
Column 2 of Table 7.15 below shows the coefficient of the lagged three years 
(T–3) independent variable proxying for the provision of non-audit services 
(L3.Cnon_Auditit) is reported to be negative and statistically significant (β = -3.449, 
z-statistics (Wald) = -0.539, and p < 0.01). This result is as expected and implies that 
with the use of added control variables, an increase in the provision of non-audit 
services in the year T–3 decreases the likelihood of financial distress in the year T0 with 
a goodness-of-fit of 6.06% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.0606). 
Column 3 of Table 7.15 below shows the coefficient of the lagged three years 
(T–3) independent variable proxying for the number of years the audit partner held 
office (L3.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit) is reported to be negative but statistically significant 
(β = -0.771, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.039, and p > 0.1). The negative correlation is as 
expected and implies that with the use of added control variables, an increase in 
duration of the audit partner tenure in the year T–3 decreases the likelihood of financial 
distress in the year T0 with a goodness-of-fit of 4.97% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.0497). 
The lack of statistical significance is consistent with Tables 7.4 and 7.5 above. 
Column 4 of Table 7.15 below shows the coefficient of the lagged three years 
(T–3) independent variable proxying the proportion of audit fee paid / total assets held 
by firm (L3.Prop_Aud_Feeit) is reported to be negative and statistically significant (β 
= -1.805, z-statistics (Wald) = -1.378, and p < 0.1). This result is as expected and 
implies that with the use of added control variables, an increase in the proportion of 
audit fee paid to the auditor over the total assets held by the auditee in the year T–3 
decreases the likelihood of financial distress in the year T0 with a goodness-of-fit of 
6.41% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.0641). 
Last column 5 of Table 7.15 shows that when all four lagged three years (T–
3) independent variables are simultaneously regressed (logistically) against the 
Altman Z2-Score, comparable results to as outlined above is obtained 
(L3.Aud_Spec_30it  - β = -0.087, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.017, and p < 0.1, 
L3.Cnon_Auditit - β = -3.501, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.579, and p < 0.01 and 
L3.Prop_Aud_Feeit - β = -1.709, z-statistics (Wald) = -1.857, and p < 0.1) and an 
overall goodness-of-fit of 7.76% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.0776) which implies that that 
unison effect of three of the four independent variables (namely L3.Aud_Spec_30it, 
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L3.Cnon_Auditit and L3.Prop_Aud_Feeit in the year T–3 affect the Altman Z2-Score in 
the year T0 by 7.76%. Column 5 of Table 7.15 however shows that when looking at 
the unison effect of all four key auditor attributes, variable auditor tenure loses its 
significance, though still with a negative correlation (L3.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit - β = -
0.0627, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.033 and p > 0.1). This is consistent with Tables 7.4 
and 7.5 when a lag of two-years and three-years respectively were used. 
7.2.15.2 Control variables 
As shown in column 1 of Table 7.15 below, where the independent variable 
L3.Aud_Spec_30it is regressed with the control variables against the Altman Z2-Score, 
control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the 
variables No_Geographic_Segmentsit (β = -2.827, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.203, and p < 
0.01) and Ln_Market_Capit (β = -4.510, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.230, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 1 of Table 7.15) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable 
L3.Aud_Spec_30it against the Altman Z2-Score. 
From column 2 of Table 7.15 below, where the independent variable 
L3.Cnon_Auditit is regressed with the control variables against the Altman Z2-Score, 
control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the 
variables No_Geographic_Segmentsit (β = -2.762, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.196, and p < 
0.01) and Ln_Market_Capit (β = -4.768, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.241, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 2 of Table 7.15) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable 
L3.Cnon_Auditit against the Altman Z2-Score. 
As shown in column 3 of Table 7.15 below, where the independent variable 
L3.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit is regressed with the control variables against the Altman Z2-
Score, control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the 
variables No_Geographic_Segmentsit (β = -2.762, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.196, and p < 
0.01) and Ln_Market_Capit (β = -4.596, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.234, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 3 of Table 7.15) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable 
L3.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit against the Altman Z2-Score. 
From column 4 of Table 7.15 below, where the independent variable 
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L3.Prop_Aud_Feeit is regressed with the control variables against the Altman Z2-
Score, control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the 
variables No_Geographic_Segmentsit (β = -2.997, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.244, and p < 
0.01) and Ln_Market_Capit (β = -3.523, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.202, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 4 of Table 7.15) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable 
L3.Prop_Aud_Feeit against the Altman Z2-Score. 
Last from column 5 of Table 7.15 below, where the four independent variables 
L3.Aud_Spec_30it, L3.Cnon_Auditit, L3.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit and L3.Prop_Aud_Feeit 
are regressed with the control variables against the Altman Z2-Score, control variables 
which are reported to have statistical significance include the variables 
No_Geographic_Segmentsit (β = -2.797, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.235, and p < 0.01) and 
Ln_Market_Capit (β = -3.789, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.218, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 5 of Table 7.15) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variables against 
the Altman Z2-Score. 
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Table 7.15: Logistic Regression Results – Lagged (three years) Alternative Measure of Key 
Auditor Attributes and Altman Z2 Score – Full Model 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
L3.Aud_Spec_30it -0.085*    -0.017* 
 (-0.461)    (-0.087) 
L3.Cnon_Auditit  -0.539***   -0.579*** 
  (-3.449)   (-3.501) 
L3.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit   -0.039  -0.033 
   (-0.771)  (-0.627) 
L3.Prop_Aud_Feeit    -1.378* -1.857* 
    (-1.805) (-1.709) 
BoD_Tenureit -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.012 0.011 
 (-0.012) (-0.023) (-0.019) (0.371) (0.335) 
CEO_Dualityit -0.129 -0.102 -0.151 -0.123 -0.094 
 (-0.685) (-0.534) (-0.797) (-0.613) (-0.459) 
Aud_Comit -0.154 -0.183 -0.150 -0.287 -0.307 
 (-0.828) (-0.973) (-0.807) (-1.445) (-1.520) 
Aud_Com_Meetit -0.104 -0.105 -0.100 -0.050 -0.051 
 (-1.425) (-1.429) (-1.390) (-0.680) (-0.670) 
No_Geographic_Segmentsit -0.203*** -0.195*** -0.196*** -0.244*** -0.235*** 
 (-2.827) (-2.678) (-2.762) (-2.997) (-2.797) 
Ln_Market_Capit -0.230*** -0.241*** -0.234*** -0.202*** -0.218*** 
 (-4.510) (-4.768) (-4.596) (-3.523) (-3.789) 
Ln_Salesit -0.054 -0.049 -0.057 -0.042 -0.035 
 (-1.408) (-1.256) (-1.459) (-1.021) (-0.818) 
Constant -4.968*** -5.272*** -5.146*** -4.181*** -4.663*** 
 (-5.678) (-6.061) (-5.795) (-4.311) (-4.730) 
Observations 948 948 948 948 948 
Year_Dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry_Dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Log_Pseudolikelihood -487.0 -481.2 -486.8 -434.5 -428.2 
Pseudo_R2 0.0493 0.0606 0.0497 0.0641 0.0776 
 Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Pease refer to Appendix-1 for variables definition. 
 
Column 1 based on Equation [75], Column 2 based on Equation [76], Column 3 based on 
Equation [77], Column 4 based on Equation [78] and Column 5 based on Equation [79]. 
 
Z2it = β0+β1L3.Aud_Spec_30it+β2Bod_Tenureit+β3CEO_Dualityit+β4Aud_C
omit+β5Aud_Com_Meetit+β6No_Geographic_Segmentsit+β7Ln_Market
_Capit+β8Ln_Salesit+β9Industryit+β10Yearit +εit 
 
[75] 
Z2it = β0+β1L3.CNon_Auditit+β2Bod_Tenureit+β3CEO_Dualityit+β4Aud_Co
mit+β5Aud_Com_Meetit+β6No_Geographic_Segmentsit+β7Ln_Market_
Capit+β8Ln_Salesit+β9Industryit+β10Yearit +εit 
 
[76] 
Z2it = β0+β1L3.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit+β2Bod_Tenureit+β3CEO_Dualityit+β4Au
d_Comit+β5Aud_Com_Meetit+β6No_Geographic_Segmentsit+β7Ln_Ma
rket_Capit+β8Ln_Salesit+β9Industryit+β10Yearit +εit 
 
[77] 
Z2it = β0+β1L3.Prop_Aud_Feeit+β2Bod_Tenureit+β3CEO_Dualityit+β4Aud
_Comit+β5Aud_Com_Meetit+β6No_Geographic_Segmentsit+β7Ln_Mar
ket_Capit+β8Ln_Salesit+β9Industryit+β10Yearit +εit 
 
[78] 
Z2it = β0+β1L3.Aud_Spec_30it+β2L3.CNon_Auditit+β3L3.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit
+β4L3.Prop_Aud_Feeit+β5Bod_Tenureit+β6CEO_Dualityit+β7Aud_C
omit+β8Aud_Com_Meetit+β9No_Geographic_Segmentsit+β10Ln_Marke
t_Capit+β11Ln_Salesit+β12Industryit+β13Yearit +εit 
 
[79] 
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7.2.15.3 Summary 
As shown in Table 7.15 above, the goodness-of-fit (or coefficient of 
determinant, Pseudo R2) for logistic regression shown in columns 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 as 
0.0493, 0.0606, 0.0497, 0.0641 and 0.0776 respectively. This implies that the lagged 
independent variables in the regression models explain 4.93%, 6.06%, 4.97%, 6.41% 
and 7.76% of the variation in the dependent variable (the Altman Z2-Score). These 
results may imply that all of the four key auditor attributes under consideration for this 
study using the lagged effect (T -3) may significantly assist the firm to lower the 
likelihood of financial distress. 
In summary, the results from Table 7.15 using the Altman Z2-Score model 
support the findings of Chapter Six in providing support for hypotheses H5c, H6c, H7c, 
and H8c showing that lagged (T – 3) specialist auditor (L3.Aud_Spec_30it), lagged (T 
– 3) the provision of non-audit services (L3.Cnon_Auditit), lagged (T – 3) auditor 
tenure (L3.Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit) and lagged (T – 3) audit fee (L3.Prop_Aud_Feeit) 
have a statistically significant association with financial distress with all coefficients 
being negative. 
7.2.16 Existence of a composite key auditor attribute and lagged (one, two and 
three years) composite key auditor attribute impact on financial distress 
in year zero: The Altman Full Model 
Table 7.16 below presents the results of binary logistic regressions where the 
composite score (AQit) and lagged (one, two, and three years) composite score (L.AQit, 
L2.AQit, and L3.AQit respectively) of the four key auditor attributes used in this study 
calculated as ∑ (Big4it, RNon-Auditit, Ln_Aud_Tenit and Ln_Aud_Feeit) is (logistically) 
regressed against financial distress, calculated using Altman Z2-Score model with 
added control variables.  
7.2.16.1 Independent variables 
As shown in column 1 of Table 7.16 below, the coefficient of the independent 
variable composite auditor attributes (AQit) is reported to be negative and statistically 
significant (β = -13.779, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.833, and p < 0.01). This result is as 
expected and implies that with the use of added control variables, the use of a 
composite auditor attributes decreases the likelihood of financial distress with a 
goodness-of-fit of 51.1% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.511). 
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Column 2 of Table 7.16 below shows the coefficient of the independent 
variable lagged one-year (T-1) composite auditor attributes (L.AQit) is reported to be 
negative and statistically significant (β = -9.214, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.694, and p < 
0.01). This result is as expected and implies that with the use of added control 
variables, an increase in the in the composite auditor attributes in the year T-1 decreases 
the likelihood of financial distress in the year T0 with a goodness-of-fit of 51% (that 
is, Pseudo R2 of 0.510). 
Column 3 of Table 7.16 below shows the coefficient of the independent 
variable lagged two-years (T-2) composite auditor attributes (L2.AQit) is reported to be 
negative and statistically significant (β = -6.668, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.776, and p < 
0.01). This result is as expected and implies that with the use of added control 
variables, an increase in the in the composite auditor attributes in the year T-2 decreases 
the likelihood of financial distress in the year T0 with a goodness-of-fit of 56.9% (that 
is, Pseudo R2 of 0.569). 
Last, column 4 of Table 7.16 below shows the coefficient of the independent 
variable lagged three-years (T-3) composite auditor attributes (L3.AQit) is reported to 
be negative and statistically significant (β = -5.882, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.701, and p 
< 0.01). This result is as expected and implies that with the use of added control 
variables, with added control variables, an increase in the in the composite auditor 
attributes in the year T-3 decreases the likelihood of financial distress in the year T0 
with a goodness-of-fit of 53.1% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.531). 
7.2.16.2 Control variables 
As shown in column 1 of Table 7.16 below, where the independent variable 
AQit is regressed with the control variables against the Altman Z2-Score, control 
variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the variables 
Prop_BoD_Indit (β = -5.677, z-statistics (Wald) = -1.435, and p < 0.01), 
Prop_Aud_Com_Indit (β = 4.601, z-statistics (Wald) = 1.109, and p < 0.01), 
Prop_Segment_Salesit (β = -2.970, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.480, and p < 0.01), 
Ln_Total_Assetsit (β = -8.708, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.335, and p < 0.01), Ln_Ageit (β 
= -2.765, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.214, and p < 0.01),  Earnings_Quality_EQit (β = -
2.245, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.138, and p < 0.05),  Leverageit (β = 2.708, z-statistics 
(Wald) = 0.043, and p < 0.01),  ROAit (β = -2.938, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.511, and p < 
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0.01),  and Aud_Opinionit (β = 25.921, z-statistics (Wald) = 4.419, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 1 of Table 7.16) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable AQit 
against the Altman Z2-Score. 
From column 2 of Table 7.16 below, where the independent variable L.AQit is 
regressed with the control variables against the Altman Z2-Score, control variables 
which are reported to have statistical significance include the variables 
Prop_BoD_Indit (β = -4.628, z-statistics (Wald) = -1.645, and p < 0.01), AC_Sizeit (β 
= -3.145, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.130, and p < 0.01),  Prop_Aud_Com_Indit (β = 5.018, 
z-statistics (Wald) = 1.619, and p < 0.01), Prop_Segment_Salesit (β = -2.286, z-
statistics (Wald) = -0.526, and p < 0.05), Ln_Total_Assetsit (β = -6.205, z-statistics 
(Wald) = -0.320, and p < 0.01), Ln_Ageit (β = -2.165, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.252, and 
p < 0.05),  Earnings_Quality_EQit (β = -1.939, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.185, and p < 
0.1),  Leverageit (β = 1.858, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.032, and p < 0.1),  ROAit (β = -
2.049, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.462, and p < 0.05),  and Aud_Opinionit (β = 19.331, z-
statistics (Wald) = 4.634, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 2 of Table 7.16) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable L.AQit 
against the Altman Z2-Score. 
As shown in column 3 of Table 7.16 below, where the independent variable 
L2.AQit is regressed with the control variables against the Altman Z2-Score, control 
variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the variables 
Prop_BoD_Indit (β = -2.054, z-statistics (Wald) = -1.132, and p < 0.05), AC_Sizeit (β 
= -1.973, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.117, and p < 0.05),  Prop_Aud_Com_Indit (β = 4.561, 
z-statistics (Wald) = 2.078, and p < 0.01), Ln_Total_Assetsit (β = -3.168, z-statistics 
(Wald) = -0.247, and p < 0.01), Sq-Empit (β = 1.868, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.016, and 
p < 0.1), Earnings_Quality_EQit (β = -1.902, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.288, and p < 0.1),  
ROAit (β = -2.184, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.698, and p < 0.05),  and Aud_Opinionit (β = 
14.207, z-statistics (Wald) = 5.251, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 3 of Table 7.16) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable L2.AQit 
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against the Altman Z2-Score. 
From column 4 of Table 7.16 below, where the independent variable L3.AQit 
is regressed with the control variables against the Altman Z2-Score, control variables 
which are reported to have statistical significance include the variables 
Prop_BoD_Indit (β = -2.027, z-statistics (Wald) = -1.228, and p < 0.05), AC_Sizeit (β 
= -2.324, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.149, and p < 0.05),  Prop_Aud_Com_Indit (β = 3.705, 
z-statistics (Wald) = 1.830, and p < 0.01), Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit (β = -1.681, 
z-statistics (Wald) = -0.452, and p < 0.1), Ln_Total_Assetsit (β = -3.804, z-statistics 
(Wald) = -0.298, and p < 0.01), Earnings_Quality_EQit (β = -1.700, z-statistics (Wald) 
= -0.230, and p < 0.1),  and Aud_Opinionit (β = 12.538, z-statistics (Wald) = 5.004, and 
p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 4 of Table 7.16) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable L3.AQit 
against the Altman Z2-Score. 
Since the inclusions of variables representing financial leverage Leverageit and 
return on assets ROAit can be argued given these variables are also used in the Altman 
Z2-Score model, the above regressions were re-run and the control variables 
Leverageit and ROAit were omitted. The results obtained did not significantly defer to 
those explained in Table 7.16. 
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Table 7.16: Logistic Regression Results – Composite Auditor Attributes (AQ) 
and lagged (one, two and three years) AQ with Altman Z2-Score – Full Model 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
AQit -0.833***    
 (-13.779)    
L. AQit  -0.694***   
  (-9.214)   
L2. AQit   -0.776***  
   (-6.668)  
L3. AQit    -0.701*** 
    (-5.882) 
Prop_BoD_Indit -1.435*** -1.645*** -1.132** -1.228** 
 (-5.677) (-4.628) (-2.054) (-2.027) 
BoD_Financial_Expertiseit 0.137 -0.012 -0.076 0.182 
 (1.100) (-0.076) (-0.334) (0.741) 
AC_Sizeit -0.049 -0.130*** -0.117** -0.149** 
 (-1.634) (-3.145) (-1.973) (-2.324) 
Prop_Aud_Com_Indit 1.109*** 1.619*** 2.078*** 1.830*** 
 (4.601) (5.018) (4.561) (3.705) 
Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit -0.042 0.046 -0.206 -0.452* 
 (-0.346) (0.287) (-0.845) (-1.681) 
Prop_Segment_Salesit -0.480*** -0.526** -0.362 -0.446 
 (-2.970) (-2.286) (-1.254) (-1.530) 
Ln_Total_Assetsit 0.335*** 0.320*** 0.247*** 0.298*** 
 (-8.708) (-6.205) (-3.168) (-3.804) 
Sq_Empit -0.004 -0.008 -0.016* -0.015 
 (1.122) (1.350) (1.868) (1.604) 
Ln_Ageit -0.214*** -0.252** -0.181 -0.064 
 (-2.765) (-2.165) (-1.026) (-0.334) 
Earnings_Quality_EQit -0.138** -0.185* -0.288* -0.230* 
 (-2.245) (-1.939) (-1.902) (-1.700) 
Lossit -0.135 -0.135 0.281 0.067 
 (1.115) (0.860) (1.172) (0.282) 
Leverageit 0.043*** 0.032* 0.024 0.004 
 (2.708) (1.858) (1.229) (0.152) 
ROAit 0.511*** 0.462** 0.698** 0.408 
 (-2.938) (-2.049) (-2.184) (-1.578) 
Aud_Opinionit 4.419*** 4.634*** 5.251*** 5.004*** 
 (25.921) (19.331) (14.207) (12.538) 
Constant -3.120*** -2.705*** -3.012** -3.826*** 
 (-4.549) (-2.880) (-2.139) (-2.720) 
Observations 4,876 2,082 1,172 948 
Year_Dummy Included Included Included Included 
Industry_Dummy Included Included Included Included 
Log_Pseudolikelihood -1195 -678.1 -322.5 -284.7 
Pseudo_R2 0.511 0.510 0.569 0.531 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Pease refer to Appendix-1 for variables definition. 
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Column 1 based on Equation [80], Column 2 based on Equation [81], Column 3 based on Equation 
[82] and Column 4 based on Equation [83]. 
Z2it = β0+β1AQit+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β4AC_Sizeit+β5Prop_
Aud_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7Prop_Segment_Salesit+β8Ln_
Total_Assetsit+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12Lossit+β13Le
verageit+β14ROAit+β15Aud_Opinionit+ β16Industryit+β17Yearit+εit, 
 
[80] 
Z2it = β0+β1L.AQit+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β4AC_Sizeit+β5Prop
_Aud_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7Prop_Segment_Salesit+β8Ln
_Total_Assetsit+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12Lossit+β13L
everageit+β14ROAit+β15Aud_Opinionit+β16Industryit+β17Yearit+ εit, 
 
[81] 
Z2it = β0+β1L2.AQit+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β4AC_Sizeit+β5Pro
p_Aud_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7Prop_Segment_Salesit+β8L
n_Total_Assetsit+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12Lossit+β13
Leverageit+β14ROAit+β15Aud_Opinionit+β16Industryit+β17Yearit+εit, 
 
[82] 
Z2it = β0+β1L2.AQit+β2Prop_BoD_Indit+β3BoD_Financial_Expertiseit+β4AC_Sizeit+β5Pro
p_Aud_Com_Indit+β6Aud_Com_Financial_Expertiseit+β7Prop_Segment_Salesit+β8L
n_Total_Assetsit+β9Sq_Empit+β10Ln_Ageit+β11Earnings_Quality_EQit+β12Lossit+β13
Leverageit+β14ROAit+β15Aud_Opinionit+β16Industryit+β17Yearit+ εit,  
 
[83] 
7.2.16.3 Summary 
As shown in Table 7.16 above, the goodness-of-fit (or coefficient of 
determinant, Pseudo R2) for logistic regression shown in columns 1, 2, 3, and 4 as 
0.511, 0.510, 0.569 and 0.531 respectively. This implies that the independent variables 
in the regression models explain 51.1%, 51%, 56.9% and 53.1% of the variation in the 
dependent variable (the Altman Z2-Score). These results may imply that the composite 
score of all of the four key auditor attributes along with the lagged composite auditor 
attributes under consideration for this study may significantly assist the firm to lower 
the likelihood of financial distress. 
In summary, the results from Table 7.16 (column 1) using the Altman Z2-Score 
model provide support for the hypothesis H9 showing that composite auditor attributes 
(AQit) has a statistically significant association with financial distress with all 
coefficients being negative. In addition, results from Table 7.16 (columns 2, 3, and 4) 
using the Altman Z2-Score model do not reject the hypotheses H10a, H10b, and H10c 
showing the lagged one, two, and three-years (T-1, T-2, and T-3) auditor attributes 
(L.AQit, L2.AQit, and L3.AQit respectively) have a statistically significant association 
with financial distress in the year T0 with all coefficients being negative.  
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7.2.17 Existence of a composite alternative measure of key auditor attribute and 
lagged (one, two, and three years) composite key alternative auditor 
attribute impact on financial distress in year zero: The Zmijewski Full 
Model 
Table 7.17 below presents the results of binary logistic regressions where the 
composite score (AQ2it) and lagged (one, two, and three years) composite score 
(L.AQ2it, L2.AQ2it, and L3.AQ2it respectively) of the four key auditor attributes used 
in this study calculated as ∑ (Aud_Spec_30it, Cnon-Auditit, Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit and 
Prop_Aud_Feeit) is (logistically) regressed against financial distress, calculated using 
Zmijewski ZFC-Score model with added control variables.  
7.2.17.1 Independent variables 
As shown in column 1 of Table 7.17 below, the coefficient of the independent 
variable composite auditor attributes (AQ2it) is reported to be negative and statistically 
significant (β = -2.879, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.138, and p < 0.01). This result is as 
expected and implies that with the use of added control variables, the use of a 
composite auditor attributes decreases the likelihood of financial distress with a 
goodness-of-fit of 5.46% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.0546). 
Column 2 of Table 7.17 below shows the coefficient of the independent 
variable lagged one-year (T-1) composite auditor attributes (L.AQ2it) is reported to be 
negative and statistically significant (β = -1.560, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.094, and p < 
0.05). This result is as expected and implies that with the use of added control 
variables, an increase in the in the composite auditor attributes in the year T-1 decreases 
the likelihood of financial distress in the year T0 with a goodness-of-fit of 6.52% (that 
is, Pseudo R2 of 0.0652). 
Column 3 of Table 7.17 below shows the coefficient of the independent 
variable lagged two-years (T-2) composite auditor attributes (L2.AQ2it) is reported to 
be negative and statistically significant (β = -0.248, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.018, and p 
< 0.05). This result is as expected and implies that with the use of added control 
variables, an increase in the in the composite auditor attributes in the year T-2 decreases 
the likelihood of financial distress in the year T0 with a goodness-of-fit of 4.42% (that 
is, Pseudo R2 of 0.0442). 
Last, column 4 of Table 7.17 below shows the coefficient of the independent 
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variable lagged three-years (T-3) composite auditor attributes (L3.AQ2it) is reported to 
be negative and statistically significant (β = -1.119, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.090, and p 
< 0.05). This result is as expected and implies that with the use of added control 
variables, with added control variables, an increase in the in the composite auditor 
attributes in the year T-3 decreases the likelihood of financial distress in the year T0 
with a goodness-of-fit of 3.71% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.0371). 
7.2.17.2 Control variables 
As shown in column 1 of Table 7.17 below, where the independent variable 
AQ2it is regressed with the control variables against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score, control 
variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the variables 
CEO_Dualityit (β = 2.551, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.246, and p < 0.05), Aud_Comit (β = -
2.098, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.197, and p < 0.05), Aud_Com_Meetit (β = -2.728, z-
statistics (Wald) = -0.091, and p < 0.01), No_Geographic_Segmentsit (β = -6.741, z-
statistics (Wald) = -0.244, and p < 0.01), Ln_Market_Capit (β = -9.120, z-statistics 
(Wald) = -0.235, and p < 0.01) and  Ln_Salesit (β = -2.984, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.059, 
and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 1 of Table 7.17) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable AQ2it 
against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
From column 2 of Table 7.17 below, where the independent variable L.AQ2it 
is regressed with the control variables against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score, control 
variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the variables 
No_Geographic_Segmentsit (β = -5.600, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.260, and p < 0.01), 
Ln_Market_Capit (β = -7.497, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.250, and p < 0.01) and  Ln_Salesit 
(β = -2.717, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.072, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 2 of Table 7.17) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable L.AQ2it 
against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
As shown in column 3 of Table 7.17 below, where the independent variable 
L2.AQ2it is regressed with the control variables against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score, 
control variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the 
variables Aud_Com_Meetit (β = -2.747, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.179, and p < 0.01), 
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No_Geographic_Segmentsit (β = -3.630, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.209, and p < 0.01), 
Ln_Market_Capit (β = -4.373, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.195, and p < 0.01) and  Ln_Salesit 
(β = -2.575, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.088, and p < 0.05). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 3 of Table 7.17) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable L2.AQ2it 
against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
From column 4 of Table 7.17 below, where the independent variable L3.AQ2it 
is regressed with the control variables against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score, control 
variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the variables 
Aud_Com_Meetit (β = -1.833, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.138, and p < 0.1), 
No_Geographic_Segmentsit (β = -2.258, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.138, and p < 0.05), 
Ln_Market_Capit (β = -3.399, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.167, and p < 0.01) and  Ln_Salesit 
(β = -2.350, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.083, and p < 0.05). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 4 of Table 7.17) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable L3.AQ2it 
against the Zmijewski ZFC-Score. 
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Table 7.17: Logistic Regression Results – Composite Alternative Auditor 
Attributes (AQ2) and lagged (one, two and three years) AQ2 with Zmijewski 
ZFC-Score – Full Model 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
AQ2it -0.138***    
 (-2.879)    
L. AQ2it  -0.094**   
  (-1.560)   
L2. AQ2it   -0.018**  
   (-0.248)  
L3. AQ2it    -0.090** 
    (-1.119) 
BoD_Tenureit 0.024 0.027 0.002 0.012 
 (1.491) (1.255) (0.085) (0.389) 
CEO_Dualityit 0.246** 0.011 0.070 -0.223 
 (2.551) (0.090) (0.450) (-1.289) 
Aud_Comit -0.197** -0.122 -0.124 -0.100 
 (-2.098) (-1.001) (-0.790) (-0.575) 
Aud_Com_Meetit -0.091*** -0.076 -0.179*** -0.138* 
 (-2.728) (-1.631) (-2.747) (-1.833) 
No_Geographic_Segmentsit -0.244*** -0.260*** -0.209*** -0.138** 
 (-6.741) (-5.600) (-3.630) (-2.258) 
Ln_Market_Capit -0.235*** -0.250*** -0.195*** -0.167*** 
 (-9.120) (-7.497) (-4.373) (-3.399) 
Ln_Salesit -0.059*** -0.072*** -0.088** -0.083** 
 (-2.984) (-2.717) (-2.575) (-2.350) 
Constant -3.941*** -4.550*** -4.118*** -3.494*** 
 (-8.824) (-7.610) (-4.904) (-3.875) 
Observations 4,876 2,082 1,172 948 
Year_Dummy Included Included Included Included 
Industry_Dummy Included Included Included Included 
Log_Pseudolikelihood -1916 -1124 -649.7 -527.6 
Pseudo_R2 0.0546 0.0652 0.0442 0.0371 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Pease refer to Appendix-1 for variables definition. 
Column 1 based on Equation [84], Column 2 based on Equation [85], Column 3 based on Equation 
[86] and Column 4 based on Equation [87]. 
 
ZFCit = β0+β1AQ2it+β2Bod_Tenureit+β3CEO_Dualityit+β4Aud_Comit+β5Aud_C
om_Meetit+β6No_Geographic_Segmentsit+β7Ln_Market_Capit+β8Ln_Sa
lesit+β9Industryit+β10Yearit +εit 
 
[84] 
ZFCit = β0+β1L.AQ2it+β2Bod_Tenureit+β3CEO_Dualityit+β4Aud_Comit+β5Au
d_Com_Meetit+β6No_Geographic_Segmentsit+β7Ln_Market_Capit+β8
Ln_Salesit+β9Industryit+β10Yearit +εit 
 
[85] 
ZFCit = β0+β1L2.AQ2it+β2Bod_Tenureit+β3CEO_Dualityit+β4Aud_Comit+β5A
ud_Com_Meetit+β6No_Geographic_Segmentsit+β7Ln_Market_Capit+β
8Ln_Salesit+β9Industryit+β10Yearit +εit 
 
[86] 
ZFCit = β0+β1L2.AQ2it+β2Bod_Tenureit+β3CEO_Dualityit+β4Aud_Comit+β5A
ud_Com_Meetit+β6No_Geographic_Segmentsit+β7Ln_Market_Capit+β
8Ln_Salesit+β9Industryit+β10Yearit +εit 
 
  [87] 
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7.2.17.3 Summary 
As shown in Table 7.17 above, the goodness-of-fit (or coefficient of 
determinant, Pseudo R2) for logistic regression shown in columns 1, 2, 3, and 4 as 
0.0546, 0.0652, 0.0442 and 0.0371 respectively. This implies that the independent 
variables in the regression models explain 5.46%, 6.52%, 4.42% and 3.71% of the 
variation in the dependent variable (the Zmijewski ZFC-Score). These results may 
imply that the composite score of all of the four key alternative auditor attributes along 
with the lagged composite alternative auditor attributes under consideration for this 
study may significantly assist the firm to lower the likelihood of financial distress. 
In summary, the results from Table 7.17 (column 1) using the Zmijewski ZFC-
Score model provide support for the hypothesis H9 showing that composite alternative 
auditor attributes (AQ2it) has a statistically significant association with financial 
distress with all coefficients being negative. In addition, results from Table 7.17 
(columns 2, 3, and 4) using the Zmijewski ZFC-Score model do not reject the 
hypotheses H10a, H10b, and H10c showing the lagged one, two, and three-years (T-1, T-
2, and T-3) auditor attributes (L.AQ2it, L2.AQ2it, and L3.AQ2it respectively) have a 
statistically significant association with financial distress in the year T0 with all 
coefficients being negative.  
7.2.18 Existence of a composite alternative measure of key auditor attribute and 
lagged (one, two, and three years) composite key alternative auditor 
attribute impact on financial distress in year zero: The Altman Full Model 
Table 7.18 below presents the results of binary logistic regressions where the 
composite score (AQ2it) and lagged (one, two, and three years) composite score 
(L.AQ2it, L2.AQ2it, and L3.AQ2it respectively) of the four key auditor attributes used 
in this study calculated as ∑ (Aud_Spec_30it, Cnon-Auditit, Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit and 
Prop_Aud_Feeit) is (logistically) regressed against financial distress, calculated using 
Altman Z2-Score model with added control variables.  
7.2.18.1 Independent variables 
As shown in column 1 of Table 7.18 below, the coefficient of the independent 
variable composite auditor attributes (AQ2it) is reported to be negative and statistically 
significant (β = -0.858, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.041, and p < 0.05). This result is as 
expected and implies that with the use of added control variables, the use of a 
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composite auditor attributes decreases the likelihood of financial distress with a 
goodness-of-fit of 3.73% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.0373). 
Column 2 of Table 7.18 below shows the coefficient of the independent 
variable lagged one-year (T-1) composite auditor attributes (L.AQ2it) is reported to be 
negative and statistically significant (β = -0.551, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.034, and p < 
0.1). This result is as expected and implies that with the use of added control variables, 
an increase in the in the composite auditor attributes in the year T-1 decreases the 
likelihood of financial distress in the year T0 with a goodness-of-fit of 4.56% (that is, 
Pseudo R2 of 0.0456). 
Column 3 of Table 7.18 below shows the coefficient of the independent 
variable lagged two-years (T-2) composite auditor attributes (L2.AQ2it) is reported to 
be negative and statistically significant (β = -1.064, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.085, and p 
< 0.1). This result is as expected and implies that with the use of added control 
variables, an increase in the in the composite auditor attributes in the year T-2 decreases 
the likelihood of financial distress in the year T0 with a goodness-of-fit of 4.11% (that 
is, Pseudo R2 of 0.0411). 
Last, column 4 of Table 7.18 below shows the coefficient of the independent 
variable lagged three-years (T-3) composite auditor attributes (L3.AQ2it) is reported to 
be negative and statistically significant (β = -0.911, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.079, and p 
< 0.1). This result is as expected and implies that with the use of added control 
variables, with added control variables, an increase in the in the composite auditor 
attributes in the year T-3 decreases the likelihood of financial distress in the year T0 
with a goodness-of-fit of 5% (that is, Pseudo R2 of 0.0500). 
7.2.18.2 Control variables 
As shown in column 1 of Table 7.18 below, where the independent variable 
AQ2it is regressed with the control variables against the Altman Z2-Score, control 
variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the variables 
CEO_Dualityit (β = 2.187, z-statistics (Wald) = 0.204, and p < 0.05), Aud_Com_Meetit 
(β = -2.655, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.083, and p < 0.01), No_Geographic_Segmentsit (β 
= -5.344, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.195, and p < 0.01) and Ln_Market_Capit (β = -9.037, 
z-statistics (Wald) = -0.214, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 1 of Table 7.18) return no 
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statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable AQ2it 
against the Altman Z2-Score. 
From column 2 of Table 7.18 below, where the independent variable L.AQ2it 
is regressed with the control variables against the Altman Z2-Score, control variables 
which are reported to have statistical significance include the variables 
Aud_Com_Meetit (β = -2.627, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.114, and p < 0.01), 
No_Geographic_Segmentsit (β = -3.849, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.182, and p < 0.01), 
Ln_Market_Capit (β = -7.144, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.225, and p < 0.01) and Ln_Salesit 
(β = -1.792, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.048, and p < 0.1). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 2 of Table 7.18) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable L.AQ2it 
against the Altman Z2-Score. 
As shown in column 3 of Table 7.18 below, where the independent variable 
L2.AQ2it is regressed with the control variables against the Altman Z2-Score, control 
variables which are reported to have statistical significance include the variables 
Aud_Com_Meetit (β = -1.839, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.118, and p < 0.1), 
No_Geographic_Segmentsit (β = -3.029, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.189, and p < 0.01), 
Ln_Market_Capit (β = -4.523, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.203, and p < 0.01) and  Ln_Salesit 
(β = -1.905, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.071, and p < 0.1). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 3 of Table 7.18) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable L2.AQ2it 
against the Altman Z2-Score. 
From column 4 of Table 7.18 below, where the independent variable L3.AQ2it 
is regressed with the control variables against the Altman Z2-Score, control variables 
which are reported to have statistical significance include the variables 
No_Geographic_Segmentsit (β = -2.791, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.198, and p < 0.01) and 
Ln_Market_Capit (β = -4.635, z-statistics (Wald) = -0.235, and p < 0.01). 
The remaining control variables (as per column 4 of Table 7.18) return no 
statistically significant results when regressed with the independent variable L3.AQ2it 
against the Altman Z2-Score.
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Table 7.18: Logistic Regression Results – Composite Alternative Auditor 
Attributes (AQ2) and lagged (one, two and three years) AQ2 with Altman 
Z2-Score – Full Model 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
AQ2it -0.041**    
 (-0.858)    
L. AQ2it  -0.034*   
  (-0.551)   
L2. AQ2it   -0.085*  
   (-1.064)  
L3. AQ2it    -0.079* 
    (-0.911) 
BoD_Tenureit 0.018 0.002 -0.020 -0.000 
 (1.213) (0.115) (-0.728) (-0.007) 
CEO_Dualityit 0.204** 0.084 0.115 -0.128 
 (2.187) (0.668) (0.699) (-0.681) 
Aud_Comit -0.062 0.012 -0.175 -0.153 
 (-0.675) (0.096) (-1.050) (-0.829) 
Aud_Com_Meetit -0.083*** -0.114*** -0.118* -0.106 
 (-2.655) (-2.627) (-1.839) (-1.456) 
No_Geographic_Segmentsit -0.195*** -0.182*** -0.189*** -0.198*** 
 (-5.344) (-3.849) (-3.029) (-2.791) 
Ln_Market_Capit -0.214*** -0.225*** -0.203*** -0.235*** 
 (-9.037) (-7.144) (-4.523) (-4.635) 
Ln_Salesit -0.023 -0.048* -0.071* -0.056 
 (-1.220) (-1.792) (-1.905) (-1.434) 
Constant -4.147*** -4.875*** -4.887*** -5.158*** 
 (-10.629) (-9.174) (-5.945) (-5.833) 
Observations 4,876 2,082 1,172 948 
Year_Dummy Included Included Included Included 
Industry_Dummy Included Included Included Included 
Log_Pseudolikelihood -2013 -1136 -599.2 -486.7 
Pseudo_R2 0.0373 0.0456 0.0411 0.0500 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Pease refer to Appendix-1 for variables definition. 
 
Column 1 based on Equation [88], Column 2 based on Equation [89], Column 3 based on Equation 
[90] and Column 4 based on Equation [91]. 
 
Z2it = β0+β1AQ2it+β2Bod_Tenureit+β3CEO_Dualityit+β4Aud_Comit+β5Aud_C
om_Meetit+β6No_Geographic_Segmentsit+β7Ln_Market_Capit+β8Ln_Sa
lesit+β9Industryit+β10Yearit +εit 
 
[88] 
Z2it = β0+β1L.AQ2it+β2Bod_Tenureit+β3CEO_Dualityit+β4Aud_Comit+β5Aud_
Com_Meetit+β6No_Geographic_Segmentsit+β7Ln_Market_Capit+β8Ln_
Salesit+β9Industryit+β10Yearit +εit 
 
[89] 
Z2it = β0+β1L2.AQ2it+β2Bod_Tenureit+β3CEO_Dualityit+β4Aud_Comit+β5Aud
_Com_Meetit+β6No_Geographic_Segmentsit+β7Ln_Market_Capit+β8Ln
_Salesit+β9Industryit+β10Yearit +εit 
 
[90] 
Z2it = β0+β1L2.AQ2it+β2Bod_Tenureit+β3CEO_Dualityit+β4Aud_Comit+β5Aud
_Com_Meetit+β6No_Geographic_Segmentsit+β7Ln_Market_Capit+β8Ln
_Salesit+β9Industryit+β10Yearit +εit 
 
  [91] 
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7.2.18.3 Summary 
As shown in Table 7.18 above, the goodness-of-fit (or coefficient of 
determinant, Pseudo R2) for logistic regression shown in columns 1, 2, 3, and 4 as 
0.0373, 0.0456, 0.0411 and 0.0500 respectively. This implies that the independent 
variables in the regression models explain 3.73%, 4.56%, 4.11% and 5.00% of the 
variation in the dependent variable (the Altman Z2-Score). These results may imply 
that the composite score of all of the four key alternative auditor attributes along with 
the lagged composite alternative auditor attributes under consideration for this study 
may significantly assist the firm to lower the likelihood of financial distress. 
In summary, the results from Table 7.18 (column 1) using the Altman Z2-Score 
model provide support for the hypothesis H9 showing that composite alternative 
auditor attributes (AQ2it) has a statistically significant association with financial 
distress with all coefficients being negative. In addition, results from Table 7.18 
(columns 2, 3, and 4) using the Altman Z2-Score model do not reject the hypotheses 
H10a, H10b, and H10c showing the lagged one, two, and three-years (T-1, T-2, and T-3) 
auditor attributes (L.AQ2it, L2.AQ2it, and L3.AQ2it respectively) have a statistically 
significant association with financial distress in the year T0 with all coefficients being 
negative. 
7.3 SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
Table 7.19 provides a summary of results from Chapter Six (Tables 6.2 to 6.6) 
and Chapter Seven (Tables 7.2 to 7.18). 
Overall, the sensitivity tests support the main findings of this study (from 
Chapter Six) by consistently showing the four key auditor attributes adopted by this 
study to have a statistically significant negative association with the likelihood of 
financial distress (using both the Altman Z2-Score and the Altman Z2-Score models). 
  
 Table 7.19: Summary of results 
Hypotheses 
Main Results Sensitivity Results 
Conclusion R2  
Z2 and Auditor 
Attributes 
ZFC and Alt. Auditor 
Attributes 
Z2 and Alt. Auditor 
Attributes 
Conclusion R2  Conclusion R2  Conclusion R2  
H1  
Negative association between Big4it (Aud_Spec_30it) and 
likelihood of financial distress Supported  0.349 Supported 0.553 Supported 0.1050 Supported 0.0584 
H2 
Negative association between RNon-Auditit 
(Cnon_Auditit) and likelihood of financial distress 
Supported 0.381 Supported 0.536 Supported 0.0989 Supported 0.0678 
H3 
Negative association between Ln_Aud_Tenit 
(Aud_Part_Tenit) and likelihood of financial distress 
Supported 0.317 Supported 0.530 Supported 0.1070 Supported 0.0941 
H4 
Negative association between Ln_Aud_Feeit 
(Prop_Aud_Feeit) and likelihood of financial distress 
Supported 0.294 Supported 0.531 Supported 0.1120 Supported 0.0997 
H5a 
Negative association between lagged one year L.Big4it 
(L.Aud_Spec_30it) and likelihood of financial distress 
Supported 0.361 Supported 0.507 Supported 0.0779 Supported 0.0461 
H5b 
Negative association between lagged two years L2.Big4it 
(L2.Aud_Spec_30it) and likelihood of financial distress 
Supported 0.409 Supported 0.563 Supported 0.0519 Supported 0.0411 
H5c 
Negative association between lagged three years 
L3.Big4it (L3.Aud_Spec_30it) and likelihood of financial 
distress 
Supported 0.353 Supported 0.523 Supported 0.0462 Supported 0.0493 
H6a 
Negative association between lagged one year L.RNon-
Auditit (L.Cnon_Auditit) and likelihood of financial 
distress 
Supported 0.376 Supported 0.503 Supported 0.0823 Supported 0.0581 
H6b 
Negative association between lagged two years L2.RNon-
Auditit (L2.Cnon_Auditit) and likelihood of financial 
distress 
Supported 0.423 Supported 0.557 Supported 0.0605 Supported 0.0473 
H6c 
Negative association between lagged three years 
L3.RNon-Auditit (L3.Cnon_Auditit) and likelihood of 
financial distress 
Supported 0.360 Supported 0.531 Supported 0.0455 Supported 0.0606 
 H7a 
Negative association between lagged one year 
L.Ln_Aud_Tenit (L.Aud_Part_Tenit) and likelihood of 
financial distress 
Supported 0.351 Supported 0.486 Supported 0.0644 Supported 0.0456 
H7b 
Negative association between lagged two years 
L2.Ln_Aud_Tenit (L2.Aud_Part_Tenit) and likelihood of 
financial distress 
Supported 0.397 Supported 0.537 Supported 0.0457 Supported 0.0448 
H7c 
Negative association between lagged three years 
L3.Ln_Aud_Tenit (L3.Aud_Part_Tenit) and likelihood of 
financial distress 
Supported 0.344 Supported 0.503 Supported 0.0365 Supported 0.0497 
H8a 
Negative association between lagged one year 
L.Ln_Aud_Feeit (L.Prop_Aud_Feeit) and likelihood of 
financial distress 
Supported 0.331 Supported 0.484 Supported 0.0927 Supported 0.0749 
H8b 
Negative association between lagged two years 
L2.Ln_Aud_Feeit (L2.Prop_Aud_Feeit) and likelihood of 
financial distress 
Supported 0.390 Supported 0.564 Supported 0.0658 Supported 0.0611 
H8c 
Negative association between lagged three years 
L3.Ln_Aud_Feeit (L3.Prop_Aud_Feeit) and likelihood of 
financial distress 
Supported 0.334 Supported 0.519 Supported 0.0490 Supported 0.0641 
H9 
Negative association between auditor attributes 
composite score AQit (AQ2it) and likelihood of financial 
distress 
Supported 0.497 Supported 0.511 Supported 0.0546 Supported 0.0373 
H10a 
Negative association between lagged one year auditor 
attributes composite score L.AQit (L.AQ2it) and likelihood 
of financial distress 
Supported 0.409 Supported 0.510 Supported 0.0652 Supported 0.0456 
H10b 
Negative association between lagged two years auditor 
attributes composite score L2.AQit (L2.AQ2it) and 
likelihood of financial distress 
Supported 0.443 Supported 0.569 Supported 0.0442 Supported 0.0411 
H10c 
Negative association between lagged three years auditor 
attributes composite score L3.AQit (L3.AQ2it) and 
likelihood of financial distress 
Supported 0.372 Supported 0.531 Supported 0.0371 Supported 0.0500 
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7.4 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER 
Chapter Seven presents the main findings of binary logistic regressions from a 
comprehensive set of robustness and sensitivity tests completed. Specifically, the 
results of logistic regressions using alternative measurements of the key auditor 
attributes and financial distress are examined. These alternative measures are 
regressed against the likelihood of financial distress (proxied by both the Zmijewski 
ZFC-Score and the Altman Z2-Score models).  Furthermore, lagged analysis (using 
lagged of T-1, T-2 and T-3 proxy of the key auditor attributes) are also presented. Last, 
a comparison of results between the main analysis results (Chapter Six) and sensitivity 
analysis results (Chapter Seven) is provided. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT:  
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
8.1 OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTER 
Chapter Eight reviews the major conclusions and implications of this study. 
Determination of acceptance or rejection of the hypotheses based on empirical results 
(from Chapter Six) is made, henceforth leading to the key findings of this study. This 
is then followed by a discussion on the implications and contributions with limitations 
and future research opportunities also emphasized. Last, an overarching summary of 
this study is provided. 
8.2 STUDY OVERVIEW 
This study focuses on providing a comprehensive examination on the 
association between four pivotal auditor attributes (namely, Big 4 auditor, the 
provision of non-audit services, auditor tenure (audit firm) and audit fee) and firm’s 
likelihood of facing financial distress (using the Zmijewski ZFC-Score for the main 
analyses).  
The theoretical perspective presented by agency theory best serves the 
analytical approach of this research and is most relevant given its close affinity with 
corporate governance and earnings quality issues. Based on the underlying perspective 
of agency theory and results from related prior studies, a number of directional 
hypotheses determining the association between the four key auditor attributes 
examined in this study and financial distress are hypothesized. 
A negative direction is postulated for the association of Big 4 auditor and 
financial distress, the provision for non-audit services and financial distress, audit firm 
tenure and financial distress and last, audit fee and financial distress. Similarly, when 
lagged regression for the four key auditor attributes (for T-1, T-2 and T-3)35 are used, a 
negative direction between each of the lagged key auditor attributes (that is, lagged 
Big 4, lagged provision for non-audit services, lagged audit firm tenure and lagged 
audit fee) is hypothesized.  
So as to empirically analyse to assess the evidence for the hypotheses, the 
selected auditor attributes (independent variables) were logistically regressed against 
                                                     
35 Whereby T-1 is a lag of one year, T-2 is a lag of two years and T-3 is a lag of three years. 
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financial distress (dependent variables) proxied by the Zmijewski ZFC-Score model. 
The data required for the dependent, independent and control variables are obtained 
from the Annual Reports Collection (Connect 4 Pty Ltd), Morningstar DatAnalysis 
Premium, Osiris and Sirca Corporate Governance Database. 
For the purpose of analysis, an initial pool of all listed firms (on the ASX) in 
accordance with the DatAnalysis database are obtained for each of the observation 
years (2008 to 2014). From the data obtained, a number of exclusions are applied in 
keeping with prior literature. Such exclusions include financial institutions and trusts 
and investments. For the firms remaining, data required to calculate the Zmijewski 
ZFC-Score is gathered (downloaded and/or hand calculated) and the ZFC-Score is 
calculated for each of these firms. From this initial sample, firms deemed to be healthy 
(per the ZFC-Score) are then matched to the closest comparable distressed firm, based 
on year, size (proxied by total assets) and industry. Logistic regressions between the 
dependent and independent (and control) variables are then performed using 4,876 
firm-year observations (992 observations for 2008, 874 for 2009, 652 for 2010, 612 
for 2011, 536 for 2012, 632 for 2013 and 578 for 2014). Conclusions provided by the 
statistical analyses on the hypotheses are provided in the next section. 
8.3 MAJOR CONCLUSIONS OF THE STUDY 
8.3.1 The acceptance or rejection of hypotheses 
Table 8.1 provides a summary of the overall acceptance or rejection of the 
testable hypotheses as formulated and examined (based on the empirical analyses of 
Chapter Six and Seven) in this study. Tables 6.1 to 6.6 present the main empirical 
results of this study respectively using the Zmijewski ZFC-score (without and with 
control variables). Specifically, Tables 6.1 and 6.2 present the main analyses of the 
full model, Tables 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 present the lagged (T-1, T-2, and T-3 respectively) 
main empirical results of the full model. Last, Table 6.6 presents the main results for 
a composite auditor attributes and lagged composite auditor attributes. Tables 7.1 to 
7.19 follows similar structure to Chapter Six (as detailed above) but with the use of 
alternative measures for the independent variables (that is, the selected four auditor 
attributes) and alternative proxy for financial distress (that is, the Altman Z2-Score). 
It is postulated in hypothesis H1 that client firms engaging a Big4 auditor may 
exhibit a lower level of financial distress. The results from Chapters Six and Seven 
provide evidence supporting hypothesis H1 by showing a statistically significant 
negative association between the engagement of a Big4 auditor and financial distress. 
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With regards to hypothesis H2, it is postulated that client firms paying higher 
non-audit fees to the incumbent auditor may exhibit a lower level of financial distress. 
The results from the analyses conducted support the acceptance of hypothesis H2 by 
showing a statistically significant negative association between paying higher non-
audit fees to the incumbent auditor and financial distress. 
It is suggested in hypothesis H3 that client firms with longer audit firm tenure 
incumbent auditor may exhibit a lower level of financial distress. The results from 
Chapters Six and Seven support the acceptance of hypothesis H3 by showing a 
statistically significant negative association between client firms with longer audit 
firm tenure incumbent and financial distress. 
With regards to hypothesis H4, it is suggested that client firms paying higher 
audit fees to the incumbent auditor may exhibit a lower level of financial distress. The 
results from the analyses conducted support the acceptance of hypothesis H4 by 
showing a statistically significant negative association between client firms paying 
higher audit fees to the incumbent auditor and financial distress. 
It is proposed in hypothesis H5a that client firms engaging a Big4 auditor in the 
year T=-1 (one year prior) may exhibit a lower level of financial distress in the year 
T=0. The results obtained support the acceptance of hypothesis H5a by showing a 
statistically significant negative association between the engagement of a Big4 auditor 
in the year T=-1 and financial distress in the year T=0. 
With regards to hypothesis H5b, it is postulated in that client firms engaging a 
Big4 auditor in the year T=-2 may exhibit a lower level of financial distress in the year 
T=0. The results from the regressions conducted support the acceptance of hypothesis 
H5b by showing a statistically significant negative association between the engagement 
of a Big4 auditor in the year T=-2 and financial distress in the year T=0. 
It is suggested in hypothesis H5c that client firms engaging a Big4 auditor in 
the year T=-3 may exhibit a lower level of financial distress in the year T=0. The 
results from Chapters Six and Seven support the acceptance of hypothesis H5c by 
showing a statistically significant negative association between the engagement of a 
Big4 auditor in the year T=-3 and financial distress in the year T=0. 
It is proposed in hypothesis H6a that client firms paying higher non-audit fees 
to the incumbent auditor in the year T=-1 may exhibit a lower level of financial distress 
in the year T=0. The results obtained support the acceptance of hypothesis H6a by 
215  
showing a statistically significant negative association between paying higher non-
audit fees in the year T=-1 to the incumbent auditor and financial distress in the year 
T=0. 
With regards to hypothesis H6b, it is suggested in that client firms paying higher 
non-audit fees to the incumbent auditor in the year T=-2 may exhibit a lower level of 
financial distress in the year T=0. The results from the analyses conducted support the 
acceptance of hypothesis H6b by showing a statistically significant negative 
association between paying higher non-audit fees in the year T=-2 to the incumbent 
auditor and financial distress in the year T=0. 
It is proposed in hypothesis H6c that client firms paying higher non-audit fees 
to the incumbent auditor in the year T=-3 may exhibit a lower level of financial distress 
in year T=0. The results from the main and sensitivity analyses support the acceptance 
of hypothesis H6c by showing a statistically significant negative association between 
paying higher non-audit fees in the year T=-3 to the incumbent auditor and financial 
distress in the year T=0. 
With regards to hypothesis H7a, it is claimed that client firms with longer audit 
firm tenure incumbent auditor in the year T=-1 may exhibit a lower level of financial 
distress in the year T=0. The results from regressions performed support the 
acceptance of hypothesis H7a by showing a statistically significant negative 
relationship between client firms with longer audit firm tenure incumbent in the year 
T=-1 and financial distress in the year T=0. 
It is postulated in hypothesis H7b that client firms with longer audit firm tenure 
incumbent auditor in the year T=-2 may exhibit a lower level of financial distress in 
the year T=0. The results obtained from Chapters Six and Seven support the 
acceptance of hypothesis H7b by showing a statistically significant negative 
association between client firms with longer audit firm tenure incumbent in the year 
T=-2 and financial distress in the year T=0. 
With regards to hypothesis H7c, it is suggested that client firms with longer audit 
firm tenure incumbent auditor in the year T=-3 may exhibit a lower level of financial 
distress in the year T=0. The results from the analyses conducted support the acceptance 
of hypothesis H7c by showing a statistically significant negative association between client 
firms with longer audit firm tenure incumbent in the year T=-3 and financial distress in 
the year T=0. 
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Table 8.1: Acceptance/Rejection of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis Description Accept/Reject 
H1  
Client firms engaging a Big4 auditor will be less likely to 
suffer financial distress than client firms engaging a non-
Big4 auditor. 
Accept √ 
H2  
Client firms paying higher non-audit service fees to the 
incumbent auditor will be less likely to suffer financial 
distress than client firms paying lower non-audit service 
fees to the incumbent auditor. 
Accept √ 
H3 
Client firms with longer audit firm tenure will less likely 
to suffer financial distress than client firms with shorter 
audit firm tenure. 
Accept √ 
H4 
Client firms paying higher audit fees to the incumbent 
auditor will less likely to suffer financial distress than 
client firms paying lower audit fees. 
Accept √ 
H5a 
Client firms engaging a Big4 auditor in the year t-1 will 
be less likely to suffer financial distress in the year t0 
than client firms engaging a non-Big4 auditor. 
Accept √ 
H5b 
Client firms engaging a Big4 auditor in the year t-2 will 
be less likely to suffer financial distress in the year t0 
than client firms engaging a non-Big4 auditor. 
Accept √ 
H5c 
Client firms engaging a Big4 auditor in the year t-3 will 
be less likely to suffer financial distress in the year t0 
than client firms engaging a non-Big4 auditor. 
Accept √ 
H6a 
Client firms paying higher non-audit service fees to the 
incumbent auditor in the year t-1 will be less likely to 
suffer financial distress in the year t0 than client firms 
paying lower non-audit service fees to the incumbent 
auditor. 
Accept √ 
H6b 
Client firms paying higher non-audit service fees to the 
incumbent auditor in the year t-2 will be less likely to 
suffer financial distress in the year t0 than client firms 
paying lower non-audit service fees to the incumbent 
auditor. 
Accept √ 
H6c 
Client firms paying higher non-audit service fees to the 
incumbent auditor in the year t-3 will be less likely to 
suffer financial distress in the year t0 than client firms 
paying lower non-audit service fees to the incumbent 
auditor. 
Accept √ 
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H7a 
Client firms with longer audit firm tenure in the year t-1 
will less likely to suffer financial distress in the year t0 
than client firms with shorter audit firm tenure. 
Accept √ 
H7b 
Client firms with longer audit firm tenure in the year t-2 
will less likely to suffer financial distress in the year t0 
than client firms with shorter audit firm tenure. 
Accept √ 
H7c 
Client firms with longer audit firm tenure in the year t-3 
will less likely to suffer financial distress in the year t0 
than client firms with shorter audit firm tenure. 
Accept √ 
H8a 
Client firms paying higher audit fees to the incumbent 
auditor in the year t-1 will less likely to suffer financial 
distress in the year t0 than client firms paying lower audit 
fees. 
Accept √ 
H8b 
Client firms paying higher audit fees to the incumbent 
auditor in the year t-2 will less likely to suffer financial 
distress in the year t0 than client firms paying lower audit 
fees. 
Accept √ 
H8c 
Client firms paying higher audit fees to the incumbent 
auditor in the year t-3 will less likely to suffer financial 
distress in the year t0 than client firms paying lower audit 
fees. 
Accept √ 
H9 
Client firms engaging an auditor composed of a higher 
set of quality attributes will be less likely to suffer 
financial distress than client firms engaging an auditor 
composed of a lower set of quality attributes. 
Accept √ 
H10a 
Client firms engaging an auditor composed of a higher 
set of quality attributes in the year t-1 will be less likely to 
suffer financial distress in the year t0 than client firms 
engaging an auditor composed of a lower set of quality 
attributes. 
Accept √ 
H10b 
Client firms engaging an auditor composed of a higher 
set of quality attributes in the year t-2 will be less likely to 
suffer financial distress in the year t0 than client firms 
engaging an auditor composed of a lower set of quality 
attributes. 
Accept √ 
H10c 
Client firms engaging an auditor composed of a higher 
set of quality attributes in the year t-3 will be less likely to 
suffer financial distress in the year t0 than client firms 
engaging an auditor composed of a lower set of quality 
attributes. 
Accept √ 
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It is proposed in hypothesis H8a that client firms paying higher audit fees to the 
incumbent auditor in the year T=-1 may exhibit a lower level of financial distress in 
the year T=0. The results obtained from the main and sensitivity analyses support the 
acceptance of hypothesis H8a by showing a statistically significant negative 
relationship between client firms paying higher audit fees to the incumbent auditor in 
the year T=-1 and financial distress in the year T=0. 
With regards to hypothesis H8b, it is postulated that client firms paying higher 
audit fees to the incumbent auditor in the year T=-2 may exhibit a lower level of 
financial distress in the year T=0. The results obtained support the acceptance of 
hypothesis H8b by showing a statistically significant negative association between 
client firms paying higher audit fees to the incumbent auditor in the year T=-2 and 
financial distress in the year T=0. 
Regarding hypothesis H8c, it is postulated that client firms paying higher audit 
fees to the incumbent auditor in the year T=-3 may exhibit a lower level of financial 
distress in the year T=0. The results obtained from Chapters Six and Seven support 
the acceptance of hypothesis H8c by showing a statistically significant negative 
association between client firms paying higher audit fees to the incumbent auditor in 
the year T=-3 and financial distress in the year T=0. 
It is claimed in hypothesis H9 that client firms engaging an auditor with a higher 
composite score may exhibit a lower level of financial distress than firms engaging an 
auditor with a lower composite score. The results of the analyses support the 
acceptance of hypothesis H9 by showing a statistically significant negative association 
between the engagement of an auditor with a higher composite score and financial 
distress. 
With regards to hypothesis H10a, it is postulated that client firms engaging an 
auditor with a higher composite score in the year T=-1 may exhibit a lower level of 
financial distress in the year T=0. The results of the analyses support the acceptance 
of hypothesis H10a by showing a statistically significant negative association between 
an auditor scoring a higher composite score in the year T=-1 and financial distress in 
the year T=0. 
It is suggested in hypothesis H10b that client firms engaging an auditor with a 
higher composite score in the year T=-2 may exhibit a lower level of financial distress 
in the year T=0. The results of the analyses backing the acceptance of hypothesis H10b 
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by showing a statistically significant negative association between an auditor scoring 
a higher composite score in the year T=-2 and financial distress in the year T=0. 
With regards to hypothesis H10c, it is claimed that client firms engaging an 
auditor with a higher composite score in the year T=-3 may exhibit a lower level of 
financial distress in the year T=0. The results of the analyses support the acceptance 
of hypothesis H10c by showing a statistically significant negative relationship between 
an auditor scoring a higher composite score in the year T=-3 and financial distress in 
the year T=0. 
8.3.2 The relevance of Agency Theory 
Results from Table 8.1 validates the use of agency theory due to the acceptance 
of hypotheses H1 to H10. Extant literature, especially agency theorists have long 
postulated that corporate governance structures (such as external audit, internal audit, 
board of directors and audit committees) assist in lessening agency conflicts (Hill and 
Jones 1992; Fama 1980). These mechanisms in place to mitigate agency conflicts are 
proposed to play a crucial role in the provision of monitoring controls on management 
decisions and actions in order to minimize agency costs. This effect subsequently 
results in the safeguard of shareholders’ wealth (Gay and Simnett 2012; Stiles and 
Taylor 2001). The safeguarding of company’s assets and shareholders’ wealth in turn 
assist in minimizing the likelihood of financial distress. 
8.4 IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY 
Results from this study offer a number of significant insights into 
understanding the association between pivotal auditor attributes and financial distress. 
In addition, finding from this research provide important implications to key 
stakeholders, namely, regulators, investors, scholars, and auditees. The implications 
for the respective key stakeholders are identified in the following subsections.  
8.4.1 Regulators 
Results obtained from this study suggest that the auditor attributes selected 
(that is, auditor brand name (Big 4), provision of non-audit services, auditor tenure 
and audit fees) all have a statistically significant relationship with firm’s likelihood of 
facing financial distress. This association provide major implications to regulators. 
First, regulatory initiatives such as SOX in the US and CLERP 9 in Australia have 
been introduced so as to regulate the auditor-auditee engagement as a result of 
accounting and audit failures over the past decades. Example of such regulations 
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include the length of audit partner tenure and the payment to the auditor for the 
provision of non-audit services.  
Though legislations contained in CLERP 9 does not ban auditors from 
providing non-audit services to auditees, it however imposes extensive disclosure 
requirements in regards to the provision of non-audit services by the incumbent 
auditor36. The effectiveness of the implementation of such regulations as part of 
CLERP 9, especially in key capital market determinants such as earnings management 
has been well researched in extant literature37. However, an examination of the impact 
of CLERP 9 (especially the disclosure requirements imposed on the provision of non-
audit services) on firms’ distressed risk is lacking. Results of this study suggest that 
the provision of non-audit services has a statistically negative relationship with 
financial distress (this result is also consistent in the sensitivity tests). This implies that 
if incumbent auditors are to provide non-audit services to auditees, auditees financial 
distress risk may decrease. This can be as a result of an increase in auditor knowledge 
about the auditee and consequently an improvement in the efficiency in detecting 
misstatements as suggested by Schneider et al. (2006). Findings of this study therefore 
supports the knowledge spilled-over hypothesis which is well-researched in extant 
literature (Stanley 2011; Griffin and Lont 2010; Callaghan et al. 2009; Gul et al. 2007; 
Schneider et al. 2006; Lennox 2005; Larcker and Richardson 2004; Menon and 
Williams 2004; Geiger and Rama 2003; Barkess et al. 2002; Franker et al. 2002; 
Beaver 1966). This finding will be valuable for officials in that it provides more 
understanding on the impact of CLERP 9. In this case, whilst the benefits of imposing 
disclosure requirements on the provision of non-audit services is proven, this study 
adds a different dimension (that is, the impact of providing non-audit services may 
assist reduce financial distress risk) therefore supporting regulators decision of not 
banning incumbent auditors from providing non-audit services to auditees. This study 
provides evidence on the effectiveness of regulatory changes, specifically CLERP 9, 
on the enhancement of the quality of financial reporting and by association, the capital 
market. 
                                                     
36For reporting periods commencing from the 1st July 2004, CLERP 9 requires the inclusion of details of fees paid to the 
incumbent auditor in the directors’ report. Such details need to include itemize amount paid to the auditor for each of the non-
audit services provided during the year. In addition, also required is a statement by the audit committee (or board in its absence) 
that the non-audit services provided during the year were aligned with the general standard of independence of auditors imposed 
by the Corporations Act 2001 and that the non-audit services provided have not compromised auditor independence (Behan 
Legal 2004). 
37Extant literature include studies finding a statistically significant positive association between the provision of non-audit services 
and earnings management in the pre-CLERP 9 period (Hussain 2013; Coulton, Ruddock, and Taylor 2007; Chai and Jubb 2000) 
however the same association is found to be statistically insignificant in the post-CLERP 9 era (Hussain 2013). 
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On a similar note, another requirement of CLERP 9 is the mandatory audit 
partner rotation, whereby audit partners of an Australian listed firm is obligated to 
rotate after five successive years and can only return after a two-year gap. Extant 
literature agree this strategy to be successful for Big 4 auditors to achieve a better-
quality audit, however, finds this detrimental to non-Big 4 auditors suggesting that the 
learning experience obtained through longer audit partner tenure to be crucial for 
smaller sized auditors. This has led to scholars questioning the ‘one size fits all’ 
requirements for audit partner rotation (Hamilton et al 2005). This study adopts audit 
(firm) tenure as a pivotal auditor attributes for the main analysis and audit (partner) 
tenure as a pivotal auditor attributes for the sensitivity analysis. Results obtained 
suggest both of these auditor attributes (audit firm tenure and audit partner tenure) to 
have a statistically significant negative relationship with financial distress. This 
implies that longer audit tenure (whether firm or partner tenure) assist firms mitigate 
any financially distressed position. Results from this study therefore supports existing 
studies questioning the audit partner rotation requirement, especially the “one fit all” 
approach which may encourage regulators to consider the adverse effect of mandatory 
audit partner rotation, especially for non-Big 4 auditors. 
8.4.2 Investors 
Extant literature commonly recognizes a significant asymmetrical information 
gap between corporate management and investors as a consequence of the agency gap 
which results in the separation between ownership and control (Campbell, Moroney 
and Hamilton 2014; Gay and Simnett 2012; Klein 1998; Vafeas and Theodorou 1998). 
This asymmetrical information gap leads investors to significant uncertainties in 
establishing a firm’s accurate value. As such, investors generally rely heavily on 
accounting information reported in financial reports to make investment decisions (to 
buy, sell or hold shares) (Moroney, Campbell, and Hamilton 2014; Klein 1998; Vafeas 
and Theodorou 1998). One of the key role of an external audit is the provision of 
assurance to outside investors (along with other stakeholders) on the credibility and 
reliability of reported financial information by providing independent verification of 
the information reported in the financial reports (Moroney, Campbell, and Hamilton 
2014; Gay and Simnett 2012; Jensen and Meckling 1976). Given the key role that the 
external audit function plays, the use of audit quality by investors as a tool to make 
investment decisions has been suggested in prior literature (Lee et al. 2003; Copley 
and Douthett 2002). However, given the multi-dimensional nature of audit quality, 
determining it (that is the quality of the audit) can be a daunting task (Blasam, 
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Krishnan, and Yang 2003). Investors may however be able to form an opinion on the 
quality of an audit by gathering details of identifiable auditor attributes (such as these 
adopted in this study namely, auditor name (Big4), the provision of non-audit services, 
audit tenure and audit fees). Prior studies have generally shown these attributes to be 
reliable proxies for audit quality. The four auditor attributes selected for the purposes 
of this study, therefore, may provide investors with an indication of the underlying 
quality of the audit and the firm’s value and, by association, the firm’s risks (such as 
financial distress risks).  
Furthermore, the results derived from this study suggest that an external 
auditor possessing the four pivotal auditor attributes used in this study will help its 
auditees to mitigate distressed risks on a timely manner. Should firms facing a higher 
likelihood of financial distress not manage these risks in an effective and efficient 
manner, the result can be the erosion of shareholder wealth and the loss of investors 
and creditors trusts. Distressed firms (if not dealt in a timely manner) may choose to 
divert corporate resources to debt restructuring at the expense of business 
opportunities. This could levy significant direct and indirect costs on key stakeholders 
(such as shareholders and creditors). Such costs may include the costs of restructuring 
the firm’s debt as well as the opportunity costs (loss of earnings due to the inability to 
invest the money in income producing avenues). In addition, financially distressed 
firms are more likely to engage in income increasing earnings manipulation (Rosner 
2003). 
If financially distressed firms are unable to resolve their distressed position 
effectively in a timely manner, these firms may then face insolvency risks. 
Subsequently this may lead to these distressed firms having to file for bankruptcy 
should they be unable to deal with the insolvency matters. However, if a financially 
distressed firm is able to effectively manage and overcome a distressed position, 
shareholder confidence may increase which may subsequently lean to an improvement 
in market capitalisation. It is therefore utmost importance to be able to assess a 
distressed position in a timely manner, so as to preserve shareholders’ (that is, 
investors) wealth. 
8.4.3 Scholars 
Given the prominent role played by financial reporting in ensuring the efficient 
operation of capital markets, scholars have thoroughly investigated both the quality of 
financial reporting by firms and the effectiveness of corporate governance instruments 
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(such as the external audit function) in improving the credibility of information in 
financial reports. The attainment of high quality financial reporting is underpinned by 
agency theory which can be moderated by, amongst other things, a quality audit. 
Scholars examining audit quality have in the past generally proxied for audit quality 
with a single auditor attributes in spite of acknowledging the multi-dimensional nature 
of audit quality which cannot be measured by a single auditor attribute (Balsam, 
Krishnan, and Yang 2003). In so doing, such investigation potentially ignores 
complementary or supplementary influences of omitted attributes which may potentially 
mask the findings. This study however undertakes a broader holistic approach by 
considering several auditor attributes. Similarly, to date, there is a lack of research 
looking into a number of auditor attributes and their association with firms facing 
financial distress. Results from this study indicate that all of the four pivotal auditor 
attributes investigated are significantly associated with financial distress. Further results 
from this study based on composite measure of audit quality also reveals significant 
association with financial distress (though as previously discussed, disadvantages to 
using a composite measure includes the need to dichotomise the variables). Given the 
exploratory nature of this study along with the promising results obtained, a large 
number of possible avenues can be taken by scholars for future research. 
First, scholars can choose to look into the effect of other auditor attributes and 
its linkage with financial distress. In addition, researchers should consider using other 
measures of audit quality, especially variables related to the audit process such as 
planning, evaluation of internal control and audit risks. The external audit function 
being one of many other mechanisms of corporate governance, scholars can elect to 
investigate the linkage of other corporate governance mechanisms (e.g., the internal 
audit function, the board of directors, the audit committee or the remuneration 
committee) with financial distress. 
Second, the findings of this study consistently display comparable results are 
obtained when proxying financial distress with two different models (namely, the 
Zmijewski ZFC-Score and the Altman Z2-Score). However, there exists a significant 
number of literature reporting models such as the Merton BSM (Black-Scholes-
Merton 2010) and the Shumway (2001) outperform accounting-based models in the 
prediction of bankruptcy (Wu, Graunt, and Gray 2010; Tanthanongsakkun, Pitt, and 
Treepongkaruna 2009; Vassalou and Xing 2004). Scholars undertaking future research 
can look at proxying financial distress with these other measures to see if the results 
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of this study can be replicated. Similarly, instead of looking at the linkage between 
these four pivotal auditor attributes and financial distress, researches can investigate 
the association of these four pivotal auditor attributes and other capital markets 
determinants (such as financial reporting quality and earnings quality). 
This study uses logistic regressions as the principal statistical tool to 
investigate the relationship between the four chosen auditor attributes and financial 
distress. Since this study is quantitative in nature, scholars have the possibility of 
including other qualitative techniques (such as interviews and / or questionnaires) in 
the determination of audit quality, especially given the fact that a number of different 
approaches may be required to fully capture audit quality (due to its multi-dimensional 
nature). Last, given that this study is based only on an Australian perspective (that is, 
a single nation focus), this has implications for researches in that only one dimension 
of institutional, economic, cultural and social settings was examined. Therefore, 
scholars undertaking future research should consider other settings (that is, different 
institutional, economic, cultural and social conditions, or even an international 
perspective). 
8.4.4 Auditees/firms/corporate management 
Results provided by this study also have significant implications for firms. The 
increasing number of corporate failures has resulted in an increased demand for 
responsible corporate governance, in an attempt to discharge extensive corporate 
accountability (Porter 2009). Effective corporate accountability necessitates 
independent and effective quality monitoring instruments. In addition, a key principle 
of agency theory is that the separation of ownership (shareholders) may lead to the 
agent (management) not acting in the best interests of the shareholders but rather their 
own personal interests (Moroney, Campbell, and Hamilton 2014; Gay and Simnett 
2012). In an attempt to reduce agency costs and to align the interests of the 
shareholders and the agents (management) and to prevent the latter from furthering 
their self-interests at the expense of the former, principals (owners) often depend on 
monitoring controls (Gay and Simnett 2012; Fama and Jensen 1983). The external 
audit function is one of such monitoring controls commonly debated in prior studies 
as an effective means of reducing the opportunistic behaviour of management 
(Knechel et al. 2013). Hence, an auditee can implement initiatives (such as those 
provided in this study namely, the hiring of a reputable auditor (big4 auditor), the 
provision of non-audit services to the incumbent auditor, longer audit tenure and 
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allowing the auditor to perform more detailed testing and investigations thereby higher 
audit fee) in an effort to mitigate both agency costs and the risk of financial distress. 
Other initiative an auditee could adopt to potentially assist in reducing the 
likelihood of financial distress involve improving their corporate governance 
mechanisms such as the introduction of an internal audit function so as to assist 
external auditors implement and monitor internal controls, which may lead to a 
deterrent in fraudulent activities (committed by corporate management or other 
employees) or misappropriation of assets. Another example of such initiative can be 
the implementation of an audit committee which is increasingly required to oversee 
the financial reporting process and actively liaise with and monitor the external 
auditors (Chen and Zhou 2007; Carcello and Neal 2000). By implementing or 
increasing the audit committee effectiveness (such as through appropriate resourcing 
and adequate authority) the audit committee may reduce the possibility of fraudulent 
activities, misappropriation of assets or errors in the financial statements which in turn 
can reduce the firm’s likelihood of facing a financially distressed position. 
8.4.5 The auditing profession 
The findings from this research also have significant implications for the 
auditing profession based on both the auditor attributes and the auditee features 
examined. 
Given that this study indicates certain auditee characteristics are significantly 
associated with the likelihood of financial distress, incumbent auditors can utilize this 
information to their advantage and increase audit effectiveness. Similarly, potential 
auditors (when deciding on whether to accept an engagement) can use this information 
for decision-making purposes. Specifically, the results from this study indicate that 
firm board of director characteristics (such as board of director independence) has a 
consistently significant negative association with financial distress. Similarly, audit 
committee characteristics (such as audit committee financial expertise) show 
consistently significant negative association with financial distress. The same 
significant negative association is noted for total assets, age, and return on assets. 
These outcomes indicate that auditors need to increase their focus when auditing 
younger, smaller firms without an independent board of directors and with an audit 
committee having a low financial expertise. Should the auditor accept the engagement 
with such firms, strategies such as increasing the level of professional scepticism, 
increasing the quantity of substantive testings, or assigning more experienced auditors 
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to the audit team should be implemented (Reichelt and Wang 2010; Chen, Kelly and 
Salterio 2009). 
Similarly, the audit profession can use the results of this study to assess the 
benefits or drawback on imposing restrictions on the provision of non-audit services. 
The provision of non-audit services by contracted auditors has long been deemed as 
one of the main factors leading to an impairment of the auditor’s independence. 
Franker et al. (2002) state that the provision of non-audit services may potentially 
impair auditor’s independence when the auditee receives preferential treatments like 
overseeing of “immaterial” discrepancies in the financial statement; less arduous audit 
procedures or the auditor not testing assertions thoroughly. Auditors may be tempted 
to act in such a way so as not to run the risk of losing a high-fee paying client if an 
unfavourable opinion is given (Geiger and Rama 2003; Barkess et al. 2002; Franker 
et al. 2002). However, Schneider et al. (2006) argue that the provision of non-audit 
services by contracted auditors may yield a higher audit quality due to the increase in 
the auditors’ knowledge about the auditee and therefore improve the efficiency of 
detecting misstatements. This view, commonly referred to the knowledge spilled-over, 
is supported by several considerable scholars (Stanley 2011; Griffin and Lont 2010; 
Callaghan et al. 2009; Gul et al. 2007; Schneider et al. 2006; Lennox 2005; Larcker 
and Richardson 2004; Menon and Williams 2004; Geiger and Rama 2003; Barkess et 
al. 2002; Franker et al. 2002; Beaver 1966). Findings of this study may assist the 
auditing profession by providing another argument in favour of the provision of non-
audit services for the fact that the results show a consistent statistically significant 
negative association with financial distress (that is, the provision of non-audit services 
by the incumbent auditor assist in the reduction of the likelihood of financial distress). 
8.5 MAJOR CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY 
This Australian study provides a thorough examination of the auditor attributes 
and financial distress linkage by using a comprehensive range of fundamental auditor 
attributes along with two different proxies for financial distress. Results obtained as 
part of this study provide various important contributions. First, this study is the first 
(to the best of the researcher’s knowledge) to examine such an association with the 
use of these pivotal auditor attributes. Consequently, the benefits derived is two-fold. 
In the first instance, this study helps to provide a deeper understanding of business and 
economic factors that are likely to exacerbate or mitigate financial distress, which 
costs and determinants are becoming increasingly important given the recent 
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economic turmoil and the increasing number of corporate collapses. On a similar note, 
this study further helps in the provision of a deeper comprehension of the external 
audit function as a monitoring mechanism (based on the Agency Theory concept) and 
the degree to which it benefits the auditee (by helping firms mitigate its financial 
distressed risks) as well as other stakeholders (by improving the credibility of financial 
reporting by listed firms). In so doing, this study assists in providing a critical analysis 
of an effective corporate governance contribution by the external audit function by 
investigating whether key external auditor attributes impact on the likelihood of 
financial distress, thereby aiming to contribute to the limited Australian empirical 
evidence on this association (that is, the association between pivotal auditor attributes 
and financial distress). These results, therefore, have important significance for the 
effective and efficient process of capital markets, scholars, auditors and firm’s actions. 
Second, the consistent results that this study provide (both from Chapter Six – 
Main Results and Chapter Seven – Sensitivity Results) strengthen the conclusions that 
are derived from this study’s statistical analysis. From the four pivotal auditor 
attributes adopted in this study (namely, Big4 auditor, provision for non-audit services, 
audit tenure and audit fee) all four auditor attributes are found to effectively reduce 
the likelihood of financial distress. Based on this information, regulators, auditors and 
scholars can utilize the results from this study to further investigate and possibly 
regulate key corporate governance instruments (especially the external audit function). 
This is done in an attempt to increase the quality and efficiency of the external audit 
process so as to improve the integrity of firms’ financial reporting processes and 
subsequently attempt to provide capital market players with a tool to mitigate firms’ 
risks of financial distress. Henceforth, results of this study will have real economic 
consequences for auditees, auditors, regulators and scholars alike. 
Third, given that the results from this study suggest the statistically significant 
negative association between the four pivotal auditor attributes (proxyies for the 
external audit function), scholars can extend similar studies to investigate other key 
corporate governance mechanisms that may also be effective in improving the 
integrity of the financial reporting process and subsequently mitigate the likelihood of 
financial distress. This further strengthen the contributions and benefits provided by 
the results of this study to auditees, auditors, regulators and scholars. 
Fourth, this study contributes to extant literature by suggesting that each 
dimension of audit quality (i.e. big four auditor, the provision of non-audit services, 
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auditor tenure and audit fee) have a significant role in improving firm performance. 
Hence, this study suggests that ignoring a single auditor attribute may tamper firms’ 
effort in improving performance. Furthermore, investors should also not ignore any 
one of the auditor attributes in their investment decision making process. 
Fifth, this study provides methodological contribution to extant literature by 
being the first to examine the impact of four key auditor attributes on financial distress 
in an Australian regulatory environment. This is because the Australian regulatory 
environment is different from the US environment in several contexts. For instance, 
the US follows a rule-based approach with more strict regulations whereas Australia 
follows a more principle-based approach with more flexibility in applying standards. 
Furthermore, litigation risks are higher in the US as compared to Australia where more 
opportunities exist for firms to manipulate accounting numbers.  
In summary, results of this study benefit a number of key capital market 
players. Policy makers and regulators are able to determine the effectiveness and true 
impact of legislation impacting on the auditor attributes (as well as on corporate 
governance) in an attempt to improve firms’ quality of financial reporting. This also 
benefits capital market partakers by having a flow on effect of minimizing poor 
corporate reporting practices and, possibly, subsequent financially distressed firms 
and in turn corporate failure. In addition, external auditors are able to use the findings 
of this study to assist them in determining which of the four attributes adopted in this 
study significantly influence auditees’ (or potential clients) performance and hence 
financial distress. The auditors can also apply information on which client features are 
most significantly associated with financial distress to their advantage so as to enhance 
audit effectiveness. Evidence from this study will also help scholars to identify which 
specific auditor attributes to investigate in future research. 
8.6 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
Whilst Although this study has several strengths, it is not absent with 
limitations. First, even though there are a significant number of studies in the extant 
literature using accounting-based models such as Zmijewski and Altman to determine 
financial distress (or to predict firms’ bankruptcy risks) (Wu, Graunt, and Gray 2010; 
Tanthanongsakkun, Pitt, and Treepongkaruna 2009) there also exist significant 
number of literature that report models such as the Merton BSM (Black-Scholes-
Merton 2010) and the Shumway (2001) outperform accounting-based models in the 
prediction of bankruptcy (Wu, Graunt, and Gray 2010; Tanthanongsakkun, Pitt, and 
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Treepongkaruna 2009; Vassalou and Xing 2004). Whilst acknowledging reports of 
these negative performance, there has been a significant number of studies dedicated 
to finding the best model to predict corporate failure but in vain (Balcaen and Ooghe 
2006). In fact, let alone the empirical identification of the best model to predict 
corporate failure, even the definition of corporate failure lacks undivided consensus. 
In addition, the use of accounting-based models in the prediction of financial distress 
(not bankruptcy) is still prominent in extant literature. 
Second, given the multi-dimensional nature of audit quality (Blasam, 
Krishnan, and Yang 2003), prior researches have used a number of auditor attributes to 
measure audit quality. This study specifically targets four auditor attributes. Even 
though these four selected attributes are the most commonly cited in prior studies as 
being key auditor attributes (Francis 2011; Carcello and Nagy 2004; Ashbaugh et al. 
2003; Blasam, Krishnan, and Yang 2003; Balsam, Krishnan, and Yang 2003; Kim et 
al. 2003; Carcello et al. 1992); there may be other auditor attributes that could be 
significantly associated with financial distress. 
Third, in order to test the hypotheses, data for all the variables (dependent, 
independent and control) adopted in this study were collected from the respective 
companies’ annual reports. This approach to data collection can potentially posit as a 
further limitation due to the amount and type of data that can be collected. Such an 
example can be the proxies used to measure for the auditor attributes adopted in this 
study. Whilst there can be other alternative proxies, these are excluded due to their 
firm-specific nature. 
Fourth, even though this study includes a large number of control variables (in 
addition to the independent variables) in the tests performed so as to control for 
additional possible influencers of the likelihood of financial distress, it is without 
doubt that there are additional factors that may impact financial distress. For example, 
corporate culture, economic, and management style and integrity may impact the risk 
of financial distress but were omitted from this study due to their lack of effective 
measurements. However, since this study does not focus on the causality but rather the 
association between key auditor attributes and financial distress, the consequence of 
this issue may not be significant in affecting the findings of this study. 
Fifth, for data collection purposes, sample firms selected was done by 
matching distressed firms (measured by the Zmijewski ZFC-Score) with the closest 
comparable healthy firms (based on year, size, and industry). Admittedly, the use of 
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matching based solely on the Zmijewski ZFC-Score rather than using both the 
Zmijewski ZFC-Score and the Altman Z2-Score has limitations. However, these two 
models show an agreeance (whereby both models agree on either a firm-year 
observation being healthy or distressed) of 79%. Furthermore, this study adopts the 
use of the Zmijewski ZFC-Score model as the main proxy for financial distress. The 
Altman Z2-Score is only used to provide robustness to the main findings. Therefore, 
the consequence of this issue may not be significant in affecting the findings of this 
study. 
Sixth, it is argued that non-audit services, such as consulting services by 
auditors may also have a more direct bearing on addressing financial and operational 
problems that cause financial distress. However, the data may not be available to 
disentangle this direct effect of auditors’ consulting activities on reducing financial 
distress. Hence, this is acknowledged as a limitation of this study which may be 
considered for further research to examine the impact of individual component of non-
audit services, such as consulting services, on financial distress. 
Last, this study focuses on publicly listed firms from only one country, namely 
Australia. This can potentially limit the ability to generalize the findings derived from 
empirical tests of this study to other institutional and domestic settings. However, 
Australia has a mature and well-developed capital market with active contribution 
from regulators, investors and the audit discipline (Goodwin and Kent 2006; Francis 
1984). Moreover, given the historical linkage to the UK, Australia will have 
comparable institutional structures established grounded on principles and values 
shared with many other countries with the same historical linkage. This consequently 
provide confidence that the findings of this study can be applied to research based on 
alternative institutional and domestic settings.  
While the limitations pertaining to this study are duly acknowledged, these do 
not offset this study’s findings, strengths or contributions highlighted. 
8.7 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Findings of this study (as well as its limitations, as noted above) raise a number 
of possible future research avenues. First future research may include other auditor 
quality attributes to test their association with financial distress. Second, whilst both 
proxies of financial distress used in this study yields comparable results, it will be 
interesting to see whether other proxies of financial distress provide a converging or 
diverging view to this study. Third, this study only focuses on the linkage between one 
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of the corporate governance instruments (namely external audit) and financial distress. 
Future studies may wish to look at the impact of other corporate governance 
instruments on financial distress. Such instruments may include internal audit 
function, board of director and audit committee. Fourth, with sufficient available data, 
future studies may wish to consider change in auditor attributes (that is change from a 
Big4 to a non-Big4, from high provision for non-audit services to low provision, from 
high audit tenure to low tenure, from high audit fee to low fee and vice versa) and the 
likelihood of financial distress. Last, to generalize the findings of this study (which is 
focussed on a single nation focus, Australia), future study on the audit quality (or 
auditor attributes) and financial distress association can be undertaken in another 
domestic, regional, or broader international setting. Subsequent related research can 
be performed by choosing nations with varying regulatory and institutional settings.  
8.8 SUMMARY OF THE STUDY 
The binary logistic analysis (including lagged analysis) of this study yielded 
significant insights into the association between four key auditor attributes (namely 
Big4 auditor, the provision for non-audit services, audit tenure and audit fees) and the 
likelihood of financial distress faced by publicly listed firms. An examination of the 
financial distress – auditor attributes linkage is of regulatory, professional and capital 
market investor interests. This thorough analysis of the auditor attributes and financial 
distress linkage involved extensive statistical tests based on a sample of 4,876 firm-
year observations spanning from the year 2008 to 2014. This study finds the 
engagement of Big4 auditors, provision of non-audit services, audit tenure and audit 
to negatively (and significantly) impact of firm’s likelihood of facing financial 
distress. Further analysis suggests that the lagged effect of these pivotal external 
auditor attributes to also negatively (and significantly) impact of firm’s likelihood of 
facing financial distress. Aside from the auditor traits adopted in this study, the results 
obtained also show certain client features such as firm’s performance, firm’s size, 
leverage, and other auditor attributes (such as the qualification of audited financial 
reports) to be significant determinants of financial distress. Overall, findings from this 
study provide valuable insights and understanding in respect to the auditor attributes 
and financial distress to key stakeholders. This study is however not without 
limitations but these limitations provide a fruitful avenue for future research. 
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APPENDIX - 1:  
VARIABLE DEFINITION 
Dependent Variables: 
ZFCit = For firm i for time period t, a value of “1” will be assigned if the calculated 
results using the Zmijewski model is equal to or greater than 0.5, otherwise 
a value “0” will be assigned;  
Z2it = For firm i for time period t, a value of one (1) will be assigned if the 
calculated results using the Altman’s model is less than 2.6, otherwise a 
value “0” will be assigned; 
Independent Variables: 
Big4it  = A dichotomous indicator variable representing Big N auditors; where a 
score of one (1) will be given to firm i if the auditor contracted during period 
t is from a big 4 accounting firm (i.e. KPMG, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 
Deloitte and Touche and Ernst and Young); otherwise a score of zero (0) 
will be awarded;  
L. / L2. / L3.Big4it  = A dichotomous indicator variable representing lagged Big N auditors; 
where a score of one (1) will be given to firm i if the auditor contracted 
during period t (where t = t-1, t-2, and t-3)38 is from a big 4 accounting firm 
(i.e. KPMG, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte and Touche and Ernst and 
Young); otherwise a score of zero (0) will be awarded;  
Aud_Spec_30it = A dichotomous indicator variable representing Auditor Specialization, 
following the industry market share approach suggested by Krishnan 
(2003b); where a score of one (1) will be given to firm i if the auditor 
contracted during period t is considered an industry specialist for auditing 
purpose in the industry sector to which form i is categorized by the GICS 
codes (30% market share within the specific industry); otherwise a score of 
zero (0) will be awarded; 
L. / L2. / L3.Aud_Spec_30it = A dichotomous indicator variable representing lagged Auditor 
Specialization, following the industry market share approach suggested by 
Krishnan (2003b); where a score of one (1) will be given to firm i if the 
auditor contracted during period t (where t = t-1, t-2, and t-3) is considered an 
industry specialist for auditing purpose in the industry sector to which form 
i is categorized by the GICS codes (30% market share within the specific 
industry); otherwise a score of zero (0) will be awarded; 
RNon-Auditit  = A continuous measure denoting the ratio of fee charged by the auditor for 
the provision of non-audit services to total fees paid to the auditor j by 
auditee i during time period t. Following Palmrose (1986) non-audit 
services is calculated as the fee charged for accounting related management 
                                                     
38 Whereby L. represents T-1 as a lag of one year, L2. Represents T-2 as a lag of two years, and L3. Represents 
T-3 as a lag of three years. 
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advisory services + the fee charged for non-accounting related management 
services + the fee charged for taxation services;  
L. / L2. / L3.RNon-Auditit  = A continuous measure denoting the lagged ratio of fee charged by the 
auditor for the provision of non-audit services to total fees paid to the 
auditor j by auditee i during time period t (where t = t-1, t-2, and t-3). 
Following Palmrose (1986) non-audit services is calculated as the fee 
charged for accounting related management advisory services + the fee 
charged for non-accounting related management services + the fee charged 
for taxation services;  
Cnon_Auditit  = A dichotomous indicator variable representing the provision of non-audit 
services; where a score of one (1) will be given to firm i if the auditor 
contracted during period t earns proportion of non-audit fees to total fees < 
or = to 25%; 
L. / L2. / L3.Cnon_Auditit  = A dichotomous indicator variable representing the lagged provision of 
non-audit services; where a score of one (1) will be given to firm i if the 
auditor contracted during period t ( where t = t-1, t-2, and t-3) earns proportion 
of non-audit fees to total fees < or = to 25%; 
Aud_Tenit = Natural log of continuous measure denoting the actual number of years 
the auditor (audit firm) held office will be used;  
L. / L2. / L3.Aud_Tenit = Natural log of continuous measure denoting lagged the actual number of 
years the auditor (audit firm) held office will be used during time period t 
(where t = t-1, t-2, and t-3); 
Ln_Aud_Part_Tenit = Natural log of continuous measure denoting the actual number of years 
the audit partner office will be used; 
L. / L2. / L3.LnAud_Part_Tenit = Lagged Natural log of continuous measure denoting the actual number of 
years the audit partner office will be used for firm i during period t ( where 
t = t-1, t-2, and t-3); 
Aud_Feeit    = Natural log of audit fee paid by firm i at the end of time period t; 
L. / L2. / L3.Aud_Feeit  = Natural log of audit fee paid by firm i at the end of time period t (where t 
= t-1, t-2, and t-3); 
Prop_Aud_Feeit  = Proportion of audit fee paid / total assets held by firm i at the end of time 
period t; 
L. / L2. / L3.Prop_Aud_Feeit  = Proportion of audit fee paid / total assets held by firm i at the end of time 
period t; 
AQit   = Sum of the individual component scores underpinning auditor quality (i.e. 
Big4 (Big4it); Non-audit services (RNon-Auditit); audit tenure (Aud_Tenit); 
and audit fee (Aud_Feeit) for firm i at the end of time period t; 
L. / L2. / L3.AQit  = Sum of the lagged individual component scores underpinning auditor 
quality (i.e. Big4 (Big4it); Non-audit services (RNon-Auditit); audit tenure 
(Aud_Tenit); and audit fee (Aud_Feeit) for firm i at the end of time period t 
(where t = t-1, t-2, and t-3). 
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Control Variables: 
Prop_BoD_Indit  = The proportion of independent directors to total number of directors 
on the board of the firm i at the end of time period t;  
BoD_Financial_ 
Expertiseit  
= A dichotomous indicator variable representing Board of Directors 
Financial Expertise. Following Agrawal and Knoeber (1996); and 
Klein (1998), a value of 1 is awarded if 50% of more of the members 
of the board have financial expertise; otherwise 0 is awarded. 
Financial Expertise is measured as (1) Financial Related 
Qualification (CA, or CPA); and (2) Over 5 years’ experience as a 
member of a board;  
BoD_Tenureit = The average number of years for which the members on the board of 
a firm i have served on the board at the end of time period t; 
CEO_Dualityit = A dichotomous indicator variable representing CEO Duality whereby 
a value of one (1) is awarded if the CEO and Chair of the Board are 
the same person; otherwise a value of zero (0) is awarded; 
Aud_Comit = A dichotomous indicator variable representing the existence of an 
audit committee for firm i at the end of time period t whereby a value 
of one (1) is awarded if an audit committee exists; otherwise a value 
of zero (0) is awarded; 
Aud_Com_Meetit = The number of audit committee meetings per year of firm i at the end 
of time period t; 
AC_Sizeit  = The number of members on the Audit Committee board for firm i in 
period t;  
Prop_Aud_Com_Indit  = The proportion of independent directors to total number of directors 
on the audit committee of the firm i at the end of time period t; 
Aud_Com_Financial_
Expertiseit  
= A dichotomous indicator variable representing Audit Committee 
Financial Expertise. Following Klein (1998) and Krishnan and 
Visvanathan (2007), a value of 1 is awarded if over 50% of the 
members of the board have financial expertise; otherwise 0 is 
awarded. Financial Expertise is measured as (1) Financial Related 
Qualification; and (2) Over 5 years’ experience as in a finance related 
role;  
Prop_Segment_Salesit  = Proportion of offshore sales for firm i at the end of time period t;  
No_Geographic_Segm
entsit 
= Number of segments outside Australia for firm i at the end of time 
period t; 
Ln_Total_Assetsit  = Natural log of total assets for firm i at the end of time period t;  
Ln_Market_Capit = Natural Log of Market capitalisation for firm i at the end of time 
period t; 
Ln_Salesit = Natural log of sales during the year for firm i at the end of time 
period t. 
Sq_Empit  = Square root of the number of employees for firm i at the end of time 
period t;  
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Ln_Ageit  = Natural Log of age of firm i in the period t;  
Earnings_Quality_ 
EQit  
= The modified traditional discretionary accrual measures Jones (1995) 
model. TAit = β0(1/ASSETSit-1) + β1(ΔSALESit - ΔReceivableit) + 
β3PPEit + εit (Kothari, Leone and Wasley 2005); 
Lossit = A dichotomous indicator variable where firm i is given a score of one 
(1) if the firm reported a loss in year t; otherwise, firm i is scored zero 
(0);  
Leverageit  = Total debt to total assets of firm i at the end of time period t;  
ROAit  = The return on assets of firm i at the end of time period t;  
Aud_Opinionit  = A dichotomous indicator variable whereby firm i is given a score of 
one (1) if during time period t the firm received a qualified audit 
opinion; otherwise, firm i is scored zero (0); 
∑Industryit = 
Energyit + Materialsit + Industrialsit + Consumer_Discretionaryit + 
Consumer_Staplesit + Health_Careit + Information_Technologyit + 
Telecommunication_Servicesit + Utilitiesit 
Energyit = 
A dichotomous variable given the score one (1) if the firm i is in the 
energy industry and zero (0) if otherwise in 2008. 
Materialsit = 
A dichotomous variable given the score one (1) if the firm i is in the 
materials industry and zero (0) if otherwise in 2008. 
Industrialsit = 
A dichotomous variable given the score one (1) if the firm i is in the 
industrials industry and zero (0) if otherwise in 2008. 
Consumer_ 
Discretionaryit 
= 
A dichotomous variable given the score one (1) if the firm i is in the 
consumer discretionary industry and zero (0) if otherwise in 2008. 
Consumer_Staplesit = 
A dichotomous variable given the score one (1) if the firm i is in the 
consumer staples industry and zero (0) if otherwise in 2008. 
Health_Careit = 
A dichotomous variable given the score one (1) if the firm i is in the 
health care industry and zero (0) if otherwise in 2008. 
Information_ 
Technologyit 
= 
A dichotomous variable given the score one (1) if the firm i is in the 
information technology industry and zero (0) if otherwise in 2008. 
Telecommunication_ 
Servicesit 
= 
A dichotomous variable given the score one (1) if the firm i is in the 
telecommunication services industry and zero (0) if otherwise in 
2008. 
Utilitiesit = 
A dichotomous variable given the score one (1) if the firm i is in the 
utilities industry and zero (0) if otherwise in 2008. 
Yearit = 
Series indicator variables controlling time temporal differences of 
reporting periods for firm-year observations with firm i scored one 
(1) if financial data corresponds to time period t; otherwise scored 
zero (0). 
εit = The error term. 
 
 
 
